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Abstract 
This is a study of the usefulness of the concept of 'discursive positioning' in the 
practice of mediation and in the analysis of what happens in mediation. Mediation, as 
typically practised, has developed within the general philosophical framework of 
modernist thought, exemplified in mediation by the problem-solving method. Several 
foundational assumptions of the problem-solving method are identified: a) the idea of 
the mediator as a neutral facilitator; b) the idea of negotiating on the basis of 
underlying interests or needs rather than polarised positions; c) the idea of a win-win 
resolution in the form of an agreement. In this study, these foundational concepts are 
examined first in terms of the critiques that have been raised against them. They are 
further examined through the lens of postmodern and social constructionist thought 
and found inadequate in their accounting for the cultural conditions that give rise to 
people's interests. A theory of discourse and discursive positioning is outlined which 
explains how people take up positions in relation to discourse in the process of 
making an utterance in conversation. Such utterances also implicitly or explicitly call 
others into position in relations within discourse. The concept of discursive 
positioning is used in this study as a theoretical tool, a practical tool and a research 
tool. For the research purpose, Critical Discourse Analysis is adapted to include 
attention to the negotiation of discursive positions in conversation. This study uses 
this method of discourse analysis to demonstrate therapeutic change by tracking shifts 
in discursive positioning. Two transcripts of role-played mediation conversations are 
examined. One of these is used to demonstrate how a narrative mediator can make 
use of discursive positioning as a conceptual tool for practice. The second role-play is 
analysed to show the shifts in discursive positioning negotiated in the course of the 
conversation. The analysis of conversation through using the concept of discursive 
positioning as a research tool makes cultural influences visible in discourse in the 
very moment of their utterance. An approach to mediation that takes discursive 
power relations into account is then articulated. While a single conversation cannot 
change a pervasive social discourse, people can, in conversation, re-position 
themselves within discourse. This kind of analysis avoids constructing people as 
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determined within discourse and supports a conceptualisation of personal agency 
achieved through discursive positioning. This study demonstrates the effect of using 
discursive positioning as a conceptual tool in practice through tracking the discursive 
shifts that take place in mediation. In the process, it establishes claims for narrative 
mediation as an ethical and effective practice that addresses power relations and 
cultural influences on relationships. The analysis of discursive positioning makes the 
effects of this practice visible and enables a theoretically robust account to be given 
of this practice. 
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The intention of this study is to address the practice of mediation through the 
particular Jens of postmodern and social constructionist thought. The best review of 
social constructionist thinking that I know is elaborated by Vivien Burr (1995) and 
her book can serve as an articulation of the lens that I am referring to. Kenneth 
Gergen' s work ( 1994; 1999) contributes substantially to the ideas that Burr reviews 
and deserves mention as theoretically foundational to this study as well. 
In contrast with this orientation, the theory and practice of mediation, as 
typically practised, has developed within the general philosophical framework of 
modernist thought. By this, I mean that the dominant ideas of Western culture that 
gave birth to the Enlightenment in the seventeenth century and established the 
scientific method as the primary mode by which truth claims could be established 
(Seidman, 1994) have found their way into the theories and practices that have 
formed the basis of mediation as a social practice. Just as it has in business, politics, 
education, law and engineering, the modernist scientific agenda has proved powerful 
and persuasive. As I shall show, the dominance of problem-solving thought in the 
mediation literature (after Fisher & Ury, 1981) attests to this. Conflicts are 
constructed within this framework as problems to be solved and the mediator 
becomes a problem-solver, that is, a professional trained in the skills of the scientific 
method - a scientist-practitioner. As has happened in other areas of social science, 
the modernist approach of establishing foundational concepts and then building upon 
those has been followed. In mediation, examples of foundational concepts have been 
mediator neutrality, disputing parties'underlying interests and agreements as 
resolutions of conflict. 
However, the modernist framework for making sense of the world has not 
remained uncontested. In recent decades, there has been a groundswell of academic 
writing that investigates the limits of this way of thinking and proposes some new 
departures in what has been loosely called a "postmodern" direction (Lyotard, 1984). 
This is the starting point of this dissertation. My aim is not so much to discredit the 
work done within a modernist, problem-solving tradition but to seek to explore the 
possibilities that lie in thinking otherwise, particularly in the articulation and 
elaboration of a narrative practice of mediation. This introductory chapter outlines 
the course that I shall travel across the terrain of mediation practice and describes 
how I came to set out across it. 
Defining Mediation 
In the field of conflict resolution, 'mediation' has come to refer to a particular 
set of practices that are used to help disputants resolve differences and move forward. 
Kruk (1997) defines it most simply as 'negotiation assistance' (p. 5); Haynes (1994) 
as 'the management of other people's negotiations' (p. l); and Moore (1996) as 'an 
extension or elaboration of the negotiation process that involves the intervention of an 
acceptable third party who has limited or no authoritative decision-making power' 
(p.8). It always involves a non-partisan third party who facilitates the process of 
negotiation between disputing parties (Haynes, 1994; Kruk, 1997; Picard, 1998; 
Tillett, 1999; Ury, 1999). It is also common for mediation to be described as a 
conversation aimed at producing a 'resolution' (for example, Haynes, 1994). These 
practices have a long informal history in many cultural traditions (see Moore, 1996 
for an account of these) but a relatively brief professional one. Parents and teachers 
often mediate quarrels between children, supervisors and managers mediate 
arguments among their employees, and friends among friends. More recently, it has 
become more common for disputants to employ mediators in a professional capacity 
in many countries and in many different contexts - for example, in conflict within 
families, businesses, schools, and organisations; in landlord-tenant relations; around 
environmental resource consent issues; in trade union negotiations with employers; in 
restorative justice; in the negotiation of international agreements; in intercultural 
disputes; and in community arguments (Kruk, 1997; Moore, 1996; Picard, 1998; Ury, 
1999). 
Mediation differs from other methods of third-party conflict resolution such as 
arbitration or adjudication in that mediators do not try to determine who is right, or 
which side's story is more factual. Rather, they seek to assist both parties to focus on 
the most important issues and to resolve their differences. Resolution is achieved by 
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facilitating communication between disputing parties and helping them to formulate 
and commit to agreements for the future that address the issues that the conflict is 
about (Ury, 1999). Advantages typically claimed for mediation are that it is less 
adversarial and protracted than litigation, more private than courtroom hearings, 
cheaper than legal negotiation and faster than processes that require waiting for a 
court date (Haynes, 1994). 
It has been common in the mediation literature to talk of mediation as a 
process in which mediators control the process while disputants shape the outcome 
(Fisher & Ury, 1981; Kruk, 1997; Picard, 1998; Tillett, 1999). The authority for 
mediators to do this rests on the consent of the parties for mediators to facilitate the 
conversation, rather than to exercise any decision-making power (Picard, 1998). 
While, in some contexts, participation in mediation is mandated, the decisions that 
emerge from a mediation are usually voluntarily assented to by the parties (Kruk,. 
1997; Menkel-Meadow, 2001; Moore, 1996; Picard, 1998). The goal of mediation is 
more limited than, say, counselling, to the resolution of a particular conflict and the 
process is accordingly time-limited as well (Kruk, 1997). 
The Purpose Of This Study 
The broad purpose of this study is to elaborate the discursive analysis of 
positioning (in the sense advanced by Davies & Harre, 1990) both in the practice of 
mediation and in the analysis of what happens in mediation. I intend to show how a 
particular concept of positioning, in and through discourse, has explanatory power, 
and therefore value, for the practice of mediation. I want to utilise the idea of 
discursive positioning to make new forms of practice possible, especially when 
associated with other practices drawn from narrative therapy (White & Epston, 1990) 
and narrative mediation (Winslade & Monk, 2000). 
I also intend to research some examples of this practice using discourse 
analytic methods (Burman & Parker 1993; Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; 
Fairclough, 1992; Gee, 1999; Parker, 1992). In the process of the analysis of 
discourse, I want to utilise the same idea of discursive positioning for a research 
purpose. I believe it has explanatory potential for the analysis of the politics of 
conversation, and hence for understanding better what happens in mediation. I 
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therefore want to add it into the mix of what is becoming referred to as critical 
discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1992). The discursive analysis of positioning thus has 
a contribution to make to the development of discourse analysis as a research method. 
In order to achieve the research purpose outlined above, the dissertation will 
involve theoretical exploration, the elaboration of a distinctive mediation practice and 
a developmental research orientation. All three components will be woven into its 
fabric. In part. it will involve the laying down of a theoretical framework that can be 
the basis for both questioning the dominant models of mediation and suggesting some 
elements of a narrative approach. In part, it will articulate and demonstrate how this 
narrative method builds upon this theoretical framework. Then, it will use the 
research methods that have been worked up in the field of discourse analysis to ask 
some questions about the effects of this practice. There is thus a trilateral purpose to 
this study: to theorise a practice, to demonstrate the practice and to begin to research 
the practice. 
A narrative perspective has already been advanced previously as a way of 
making sense of what happens in mediation (Cobb, 1993; 1994). But the 
implications for practice of this perspective have remained relatively unclear. Along 
with Gerald Monk and Alison Cotter, I have in recent years published some attempts 
to clarify this practice and to articulate it in a systematic way that is consistent with a 
postmodern philosophical framework (Winslade & Cohen 1995; Winslade & Cotter, 
1997; Winslade, Monk & Cotter, 1999; Winslade & Monk, 2000). But these efforts 
have been beginnings only and have not, as yet, been joined by others. Part of the 
rationale for this study is that the practice of mediation from a narrative perspective is 
still in the process of being articulated. There is a background literature in the family 
therapy domain that can be drawn upon but the specifics of translating this work into 
the context of mediation are still being worked out. This thesis should be seen as a 
contribution to that work. 
Rationale 
The rationale for pursuing the purpose outlined above involves describing a 
problem in mediation and articulating a line of reasoning that seeks to address this 
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problem. The rest of the dissertation will then hang flesh on the bones of the 
argument that I shall present now. 
The professional practice of mediation has been dominated for the last twenty 
years by a problem-solving mode of practice that was outlined first by Fisher and Ury 
(1981 ). This practice has rested crucially on several key ideas: a) the idea of the 
mediator as a neutral facilitator interested only in process and not in the substance of 
disputes; b) the idea that the polarised positions that people take up in disputes are 
driven by underlying interests or needs; c) the idea that conflict resolution works best 
by addressing people's personal interests; d) the idea that the goal of mediation 
should be the negotiation of a win-win solution in the form of an agreement. 
Twenty years has been time enough for problems to arise with this 
conception of the practice of mediation. In chapter two, I shall outline some of these 
problems more fully. My concentration here will not be on the empirical question of 
whether the practice of mediation from a problem-solving perspective can be shown 
to work, so much as on the conceptual question of the value of the work that it does. 
Therefore, I shall outline the problems that have arisen with regard to the assumptions 
on which this model of practice has been built. 
Critiques of the problem-solving model have been made on the basis of the 
culturally-located assumptions built into it (for example Gergen, 1999). Feminist 
critiques have challenged the adequacy of this model of mediation for addressing 
gender privilege (Astor & Chinkin, 1992; Bower, 1992; Leitch, 1986-87; Neumann, 
1992). Critics from indigenous cultural viewpoints have taken issue with the focus 
on a Western humanistic notion of the individual that does not fit with indigenous 
approaches to conflict resolution (Duryea & Grundison, 1993; Kruk, 1997; Nunnerly, 
2002; Tomas & Quince, 1999). The possibility of mediator neutrality, especially 
with regard to the values and opinions of the mediator on the substantive issues in the 
conflict, has come under uncomfortable scrutiny (Beck & Sales, 2000; Cobb & 
Rifkin, 1991; Rifkin, Millen & Cobb 1991). It has even been argued that the very 
focus of problem-solving mediation on reaching agreement creates an instrumental 
focus that selects certain issues for greater attention than others (Folger & Bush, 
1994; Putnam, 1994). These critiques have illuminated the assumptions built into the 
problem-solving model of mediation. Rather than a scientific process that is built on 
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culturally neutral knowledge, the problem-solving model of mediation now appears, 
in the light of these critiques, to embody a particular cultural viewpoint. 
If mediation is not to be built upon a singular cultural viewpoint, these 
critiques need to be taken seriously. They raise a problem for the practice and the 
theory of mediation. It is a problem of the cultural colonising that ensues if we 
uncritically continue to practise in ways that impose these cultural assumptions on 
people in conflict. In short, it is a problem of what to do about the professional 
power that is involved in the uncritical embodiment of cultural assumptions in 
practice. How exactly can mediators address the issues of power that are raised by 
these critiques? 
The search for answers to these questions can take us in different directions. 
It can invite us to a theoretical search for different assumptions on which to build a 
practice: for example, the transformative model of mediation (Bush & Folger, 1994) 
which will be discussed in chapter two. It can encourage the search for models of 
practice that are built on diverse cultural assumptions, including the promotion of 
more indigenous approaches: for example, the development of circle meetings in 
Native Canadian contexts (Stuart, 1997); family group conferences in New Zealand 
(Maxwell & Morris, 1993); and the ho' oponopono process in Hawaii (Hurdle, 2002). 
Or it can lead to more pragmatic new departures in practice that seek to avoid the 
pitfalls associated with the problem-solving model: for example, examination of the 
details of mediator communications with parties (Moore, 1994). All of these avenues 
have been, or are being, explored in the mediation literature. 
The approach I shall elaborate here begins with the philosophical base of 
mediation practice. It is my contention that there is further foundational work to be 
done in re-examining the underlying assumptions of mediation, in order to open up 
further possibilities for practice development. I shall, therefore, examine the 
assumptions of the problem-solving approach in relation to the traditions of 
modernist thought as a response to the postmodern critiques of recent years. In the 
social sciences, and in psychology in particular, postmodern thinking has been 
articulated in a variety of ways. 
The social constructionist perspective (summarized by Burr, 1995) is one of 
the most thoroughgoing articulations of postmodern ideas in psychology. A key 
principle of social constructionist thinking is that language does not simply neutrally 
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represent pure reality but that it is always imbued with culturally located meanings. 
Hence, every utterance to some degree constructs the world in accordance with the 
cultural world being referenced in the linguistic constructions used. Speaking is thus 
considered a social action with material consequences, and meaning is necessarily 
referenced back to social contexts rather than assumed to refer unproblematically to 
the true meaning of things. The politics of control of meanings in social contexts 
assumes greater explanatory value in social science as a result. Hence, social 
constructionists are interested in power relations as they are constructed in discourse. 
It follows too that understanding how narratives and discourses work to construct 
people's decisions, practices, and relationships has potential value for research and 
for professional practice. This is a brief summary of ideas that will be elaborated 
more fully in Chapter Three. I shall adopt constructionist ideas and use them to 
examine the assumptions built into problem-solving mediation. For this purpose, a 
particular understanding of the concept of discourse is crucial to an understanding of 
social phenomena, including the conflicts in which people become embroiled. 
The concept of discourse I shall use requires a little explanation at this point, 
although it will also be examined in more detail in Chapter Three. In its general 
usage, discourse refers to the process of conversation, written and spoken, by which 
human beings trade in meanings. I am using discourse here in the tradition of 
Foucault (1969; 1972; 1978; 1980) who referred to discourse as a "social practice" 
dispersed through a cultural world in linguistic forms and exerting a dominating 
effect on what can be thought or spoken. It is a fluid concept that bears upon the 
structuring of social and institutional forms, ofrelations between individuals and 
groups and of individual subjective experience (see also Burman & Parker, 1993; 
Parker, 1992). Discourse is implicated in the construction of power relations through 
its authorisation and legitimation of social positions, thereby constituting positions of 
relative privilege and relative disadvantage. Foucault also drew links between the 
development of particular regimes of knowledge in discourse and the legitimation of 
social positions in relation to that knowledge. In this way, he pointed to the 
connections between knowledge and power. 
A constructionist perspective requires attention to the constitutive effects of 
discourse on what can be said, who can say it and on the very formation of the 
subjective positions that disputing parties argue from. It disrupts the individual 
7 
psychological assumptions on which a problem-solving approach relies and re-
imagines personhood as constituted in constant dialogue with discursive influences. 
If we think about the interests and needs that people express in the conflicts they 
bring along to mediators in terms of discourse theory, they do not appear so simply to 
belong to the individuals who are expressing them. Hence, I shall argue that 
discourse theory disrupts theoretically the reliance on interest-based negotiation in 
mediation. 
It also disrupts the idea of a single knowledge base for mediation practice. It 
explains how the cultural assumptions that permeate discourse get built into problem-
solving theory. In the process, it clears the way for thinking otherwise. And this is 
one of the primary goals of this dissertation: to explore the possibilities of an 
alternative approach to the practice of mediation that includes the concept of 
discourse as part of the philosophical foundation for practice. From this perspective, 
mediation would be focused much more explicitly on the politics of meaning-making. 
It would conceive of the stories people tell of a conflict, and of their underlying 
interests and needs as well, as formed within discourse rather than as based on a 
concept of needs (with its overtones of biological imperative). It would also need to 
theorise the political significance of the professional authority of the mediator and 
take account of the implications of the power of mediation knowledge in practice. 
Discourse theory has been elaborated since Foucault in one particular way that 
I believe holds much promise for professional practice. Building on Foucault's 
concept of subjective positioning, Bronwyn Davies and Rom Harre (1990) suggested 
the value for psychology of thinking in terms of "discursive positioning". It is a 
concept that points to the ways in which people take up positions in relation to 
discourse in the very moment of making an utterance in a conversation. At the same 
time they offer the other person(s) they are addressing a position (or a choice of 
positions) from which to respond. As a theoretical tool, the concept of positioning 
strengthens the link between pervasive discourses that permeate the social world and 
the particulars of localised exchanges of meaning in ongoing relations between 
people. The advantage for psychology in general, and for mediation in particular, is 
that positioning theory (as it has been called, Harre & van Langenh!Z)ve, 1999) enables 
a study of the detail of how discourse operates in the production of relationships and 
of personal subjective responses. Positioning theory makes cultural influences 
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visible in discourse in the very moment of the establishment of their influence. It also 
makes visible the ways in which people resist and refuse dominant discourse in the 
detail of conversational exchange. 
Since mediation is clearly about the negotiation of meaning in conversation, 
and therefore in discourse, I shall argue that positioning theory makes the concept of 
discourse available to the practice and the theory· of mediation in ways that have 
much potential for the development of new forms of practice. This potential lies in 
the ways in which meanings that disputing parties build into their stories of a conflict 
can be opened up to make visible the discursive influences at work within them. 
When discursive influences become more visible, they cannot continue to do their 
work in secret and people can make more informed choices about the positions they 
will choose to take up in relation to discourse. In this dissertation, I shall argue for a 
version of mediation practice that places discourse and positioning in the forefront of 
the mediator's practice. 
This practice, however, has not developed in a vacuum. A Foucauldian, 
discourse-informed practice has already been developed in the neighbouring 
professional field of family therapy. It has become known as "narrative therapy" and 
has established a substantial literature (for example, Epston & White, 1992; 
Freedman & Combs, 1996; Monk, Winslade, Crocket & Epston, 1997; White & 
Epston, 1990; White, 1995; Zimmerman & Dickerson, 1996). The version of 
mediation practice that I shall illustrate in this study draws considerably on the work 
done in narrative therapy. However, the concept of positioning has not been taken up 
extensively in this field either. Arguing for the usefulness of this concept is one of 
my prime goals in this study. 
But I also want to go further than the theoretical articulation of this approach 
to practice. I want to demonstrate with some examples what this practice looks like in 
action. And I want to subject one of these examples to a research enquiry. This 
enquiry makes use of discourse analytic methods to illuminate how an approach to 
mediation based on a narrative perspective and on the discursive analysis of 
positioning works and has an effect. The choice of what kind of research enquiry was 
informed by several considerations: theoretical consistency, the nature of the subject 
matter being investigated and the stage of development of the ideas I was 
investigating. I shall take each of these points in tum and explain them further. 
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Discourse analysis methods take various forms, as I shall outline in chapter 
four. The approach which has become known as critical discourse analysis (CDA) 
(Fairclough, 1992) appealed most to my purposes because it emphasised and was 
built on the same philosophical assumptions as the practices I was interested in. 
Hence, there would be an advantage for research through the absence of a discord 
between paradigms (Kuhn, 1962), that is, between the worldviews assumed in the 
practice and in the research methods. As a result, fewer problems of the meaning of 
concepts might arise and the practices I was researching could be examined fairly in 
their own terms. 
Furthermore, I judged that what was required for the establishment of the 
discursive analysis of positioning as relevant to mediation practice was detailed 
exploration of examples of positioning in practice. In order to sensitise mediators to 
the momentary detail of positioning in conversation, the close study of language-in-
use is needed. Hence a detailed close analysis of case examples would be more 
useful than a broad sweep across the landscape of many mediations. Critical 
discourse analysis methods are eminently suitable to this purpose. 
Then, I needed to consider the developmental stage of the work that I was 
researching. Narrative mediation is in its infancy. Two implications follow for this 
study. One is that the work I am doing here remains a part of the articulation of a 
narrative practice in mediation. There is no established practice that can be referred to 
and evaluated. My purpose here, therefore, is to advance the possibilities of such a 
narrative practice in ways that build on previous writings but which also add value to 
them. My aim in this study is to develop both the theory of narrative mediation and 
more detailed descriptions of the practice of narrative mediation. The second 
implication is that a practice in the early stages of its evolution does not warrant being 
researched in ways that might hinder its development. To subject it to summative or 
evaluative research would be premature. Any research conducted into this practice at 
this time should be exploratory in nature rather than confirmatory. This point has a 
bearing on research design. A full-scale outcome study would be imprudent. If it 
reached negative conclusions about a promising practice before the practice had been 
given enough opportunity to develop, questions could justifiably be asked about the 
ethics of the research design. Michael Quinn Paton ( 1990) makes this point about the 
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choice of research design. So this study is not an summative evaluation of the 
effectiveness of narrative mediation. Its emphasis is formative and developmental. 
Nevertheless, the development of an embryonic practice may be assisted by 
the right kind of research. What was needed was a research approach that would be 
exploratory rather than summative in its focus. It would need to assist me primarily 
to describe possibilities rather than to confirm specific hypotheses. Research methods 
that examine process data in qualitative ways can be used to demonstrate what is 
happening in practice. They can also potentially show the detailed effects of such 
practice on a moment-by-moment basis. In other words, they can serve as the basis 
for claiming effectiveness, at least on a modest scale. It is in this domain that this 
study aims to do research. Again the descriptive and interpretive methods of critical 
discourse analysis are apt for this purpose. This is intended, therefore, to be an 
exploratory study that seeks to impact on the development of a practice. I want this 
impact to ensue from the asking of some research questions about the ethics and the 
utility of this practice at the level of detailed process. 
But there was also a research methods problem that I needed to address. 
Discourse analysis methods to date have hardly been used for the purposes to which I 
wanted to put them. They have been used to develop accounts of how dominant 
discourses can be shown to be present in conversations (for examples, see Willig, 
1999). They have been used to study conversation strategies, even in mediation (for 
example, Garcia, 1997; 2000; Greatbatch & Dingwall, 1998). They have been used 
to describe how people work up identities for themselves in conversation (for 
example, Edwards, 1998). But what I was looking for was a model of discourse 
analysis that could be used to demonstrate therapeutic change. I am using the term 
'therapeutic change' to mean shifts in personal and relational positions, which 
includes the shifts that people make so that conflict resolution is possible. For a 
model of discourse analysis to illuminate such shifts, it would need to be possible to 
theorise therapeutic shifts in terms of discourse theory. Analysing the background 
discourses at work in the construction of identity would not be enough. There was a 
need to foreground the nuances of discursive exchange in conversation in a way that 
made the moments of transition (or transformation) in a mediation visible in relation 
to discourse theory. The major attempts to do this to date have been in the work of 
Jerry Gale and Steven Kogan (Gale, 1991; Gale & Newfield 1992; Kogan & Gale, 
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1997). They used a combination of conversation analysis methods (see ten Have, 
1999 for a summary of these) and, in later work, Foucauldian analysis, in a way that 
comes close to what I was seeking to achieve. In the process, they showed through 
discourse analysis the effectiveness of work by two family therapists, Bill O'Hanlon 
and Michael White. 
I want to add two foci to this work. One is an appreciation of the 
heteroglossic nature of all utterances drawn from a reading of Mikhail Bakhtin's 
( 1981; 1984; 1986) theorising of the dialogical nature of communication. Bakhtin 
has some important things to say about how utterances are multiply voiced and have 
multiple addressees who exert an influence on what can be said. Bakhtin's theorising 
breaks up the singularity of the speaking voice of the individual in a way that does 
not compromise the ability of individuals to speak in meaningful ways. 
I was also interested in the value of positioning theory for research methods. It 
seemed to me logical for the study of significant conversations (such as what happens 
in mediation) that pervasive social discourses could not in themselves change in one 
conversation but that discursive positions could be subject to shifts as people traded 
utterances. Therefore, I was interested in exploring the leverage to be gained from 
positioning theory in the analysis of what happens in conversational exchange. 
Through an analysis of the positions people take up, call each other into, refuse to 
take up or renegotiate on a moment-by-moment basis in an exchange of utterances, it 
is possible to study the construction of relations and subjectivities in a way that is 
attentive to the social structuring influences of discourse. At the same time, the 
analysis of positioning avoids constructing people as determined within discourse. 
They are constantly making decisions about how to position themselves in relation to 
discourse. Positioning theory brings into focus the relationship between personal 
agency and the structuring effects of discourse. 
The Analysis of Discursive Positioning 
What do I mean by 'the analysis of discursive positioning'? I have already 
introduced the concept above and will flesh it out more fully in Chapter Three, but 
the idea is so central to this dissertation that further explanation is required before 
proceeding. I am referring to the ways in which any utterance in a social interaction 
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(including those in mediation conversations) calls upon a discursive background in 
order to make sense. As it does so, often outside of the conscious intention of the 
person making the utterance, it is inserted into a social context made up of patterns of 
meaning, often in contest with other meanings. Whatever meanings come to 
dominate, to be authorised with institutional legitimacy, or to be accepted as just how 
things are, begin to serve a hegemonic function (Laclau & Mouffe, 2000) in relation 
to other possible meanings. They can even obscure the possibility that other meanings 
exist. 
As people in conversation use words and deploy meanings against this 
discursive background, they inevitably take up positions in relation to the background 
politics of meaning-making. They craft subject positions that form the basis for acting 
in relation to others. This idea of positioning builds on Foucault's ( 1978; 1980) 
descriptions of how power becomes constituted in the everyday exchanges of life. 
Whatever discourse is dominant ensures that certain meanings will be privileged over 
others. It also establishes unequal conditions of possibility in social relations through 
the recognition and legitimation of some people's actions and not others. Some 
actions make sense within a particular discourse and some do not. 
As people speak, they position themselves not just in immediate relation to 
the other person(s) in the conversation, but also in relation to utterances in other 
conversations (Bakhtin, I 984; 1986). What is more, any utterance offers other 
persons, directly or by implication, positions from which to respond. They are called 
into particular positions, not just in obvious terms like agreement or disagreement, 
but also in much more subtle ways as giving support to whole frameworks of 
meaning, perhaps through the choice of a single word rather than another word to 
describe something that the conversation is about. For example, "We are here to 
settle a custody dispute," calls up quite different discursive meanings than, "We are 
here to discuss the care of your children." 
The analysis of such discursive positioning involves opening to view the 
discursive work being done by the words in positioning people in social relations. 
Such analysis is "deconstructive". The term deconstruction originates with Derrida 
(1976) but I am using it in the way that Michael White (1991) does in the sense of 
making evident the connections between words and the forms of life that they 
support. Deconstruction in mediation enables the taking up of other options and the 
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finding of new ways forward in conversations. My contention is that mediators (as 
Michael White, 1992, has argued for therapists) can do this kind of deconstructive 
work in the process of conversation and that it enhances the mediation process. 
Similarly, researchers can use positioning theory to achieve fine-grained analysis of 
mediation conversations by showing how discursive positioning shifts and changes in 
the course of moment-by-moment interactions. 
Within the broad purpose of this study, I shall elaborate the benefits of the 
discursive analysis of positioning for the practice of narrative mediation. In support 
of this case, I have some specific contentions that I wish to argue. The discursive 
analysis of positioning does not just make new modes of practice possible. It makes 
possible practices that are valuable on the grounds of utility, ethics, theoretical 
robustness and political sophistication. What I am referring to as a 'narrative' 
approach to mediation here will include a specific focus on discursive positioning. 
This focus has utility value because it promotes more effective practice through 
deconstructing the discursive influences that underlie the 'interests' of disputants. It 
has ethical value, because it promotes a more respectful practice, particularly when 
mediators develop a reflexive consciousness about the effects of their professional 
positioning. It has theoretical robustness because it has stronger explanatory power 
for making sense of conflict stories. And it has political value because it directs 
attention to the politics of meaning-making in mediation conversations. Each of 
these contentions will be elaborated further in the chapters that follow. They will also 
be revisited in the final discussion in Chapter Nine. 
The research question 
From the above rationale for this study, I can sum up the purpose of this 
dissertation in terms of a central research question. The central question I am 
addressing is: how might the analysis of discursive positioning add value to both the 
practice of mediation and to the study of effects of mediation? Subsidiary questions 
that need to be addressed in order to answer this central question are: 
• How does the discursive analysis of positioning assist the theorizing of 
conflict? 
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• How can mediators utilize positioning reflexively in the politics of mediation 
conversations? 
• What sort of understandings of the exchanges that happen in mediation does 
the discursive analysis of positioning make possible? 
• How does the discursive analysis of positioning make noticeable the shifts 
and changes that can lead to resolution of conflict? 
• How can mediators make use of positioning in order to invite disputing parties 
into meanings that make conflict resolution possible? 
The Personal Story Of This Study 
I have been outlining the rationale for this dissertation in the form of a logical 
argument. It also has a personal rationale that better takes on the form of a narrative. 
In this section, I shall give an account of how I came to be engaged in this project. 
If the narratives and discourses of people's lives are to be placed in a position of 
prominence in understanding how they make decisions and form practices then the 
practice of developing a thesis and the practice of research is no exception. In the 
interests of consistency, this study deserves to be placed in a narrative context (as 
Harre and van Langenh!Zlve, 1991, have argued). 
Researching The Practice Of Counselling 
At the outset, this study was intended to focus on the practice of narrative 
therapy rather than mediation. The first idea was to study the detail of counselling 
conversations in order to demonstrate counselling effectiveness through discourse 
analytic methods. As a counsellor educator, I regularly set my students the task of 
transcribing pieces of their work in columns and analysing the conversational 
processes they were engaging in. My work required me to help students refine their 
conversational styles and focus them in ways that would be constructive for people 
who sought their help. The question that interested me was to do with how to use 
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research in order to do this work better. I was interested in the learning value that 
could accrue from studying the moment-by-moment effects of utterances in therapy. 
The idea of studying the detail of counselling conversations is not new in 
counselling research. It has been around since Carl Rogers first began making tape 
recordings of counselling interviews (Rogers 1942). Rogers' concentration was upon 
a search for the relational conditions that could be distilled from a helping 
conversation to explain the core achievement of a successful conversation between a 
counsellor and a client. The communication of empathy, in particular, became 
enshrined in counselling literature as crucial to the opening of possibilities for change 
for the client as a result of Rogers' work ( 1951, 1957, 1961, 1980). For this reason, 
much attention has been directed in the counselling literature to the study of the 
relational conditions which produce empathy and to its effects. There have been a 
series of studies which have sought, in a modernist spirit, to establish empathy as a 
foundational concept in counselling that explains success in otherwise markedly 
different approaches to counselling (Anthony & Carkhuff, 1971; Auerbach & 
Johnson, 1977; Bergin & Garfield, 1986; Fiedler, 1950a, 1950b, 1951; Goldfried, 
Greenberg & Marmar, 1990; Sloane & Staples, 1984 ). 
This foundationalist emphasis has been a feature of modernist social science 
as described by Gergen (1994). The search has been for a psychology of stable, 
predictable universal truths about the functioning of the human psyche that can be 
objectively studied. Rational, problem-solving approaches to personal and social 
problems were emphasised and the "correct" methods of application of these were 
sought in the counselling literature (for example, Egan 1994). As I was thinking 
about studying the detail of counselling practice I was also engaging with the 
literature of social constructionism (for example, Burr 1995; Gergen, 1985; 1991; 
1994; Harre 1986; Shotter & Gergen, 1989), narrative theory (for example, Bruner, 
1986) and poststructuralism (for example, Foucault, 1969; 1978; 1980). This 
literature was taking my thinking into quite different places, from which even the 
very concepts of things like empathy began to look very different. 
The counsellor education team with which I was working had made a decision 
in the early 1990s to develop a concentration in our teaching and research on 
constructionist psychology and narrative methods in counselling. This work was still 
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emergent, however, and lacked substantial research support. I wanted to mount a 
piece of research for this dissertation that would contribute to this gap. 
From a poststructuralist perspective, the production of subjective shifts in 
counselling needed to be articulated on quite different bases. It resulted more from 
the counsellor asking questions that were deconstructive of the client's problematic 
experience than from essentialist foundational concepts like empathy. The original 
aim of this study was to revise understandings of the detailed practice of counselling 
in the light of constructionist and narrative thinking. 
To do justice to constructionist and narrative practices, a method of studying 
the effects of such practices was needed that was theoretically consistent with these 
practices. To study the effects of deconstructive questioning on discursive 
positioning, for example, requires research tools that are constructed with such tasks 
in mind. Therefore, I began reading discourse analysis literature with a view to 
finding tools that would be compatible. It was in the field of critical discourse 
analysis that I found researchers developing such research tools. However, critical 
discourse analysis is in the early stages of its own development and has not to date 
been used for exactly the kind of purpose I envisaged. It has most commonly been 
used for the study of social phenomena, rather than the study of change processes. 
Most discourse analyses aim to uncover the hidden work being done by discourse, 
rather than exploring the therapeutic potential for discursive repositioning that 
follows from thinking about subjective experience with a discursive perspective in 
mind. Hence, it became clear that this study would have to engage with the literature 
on discourse analysis and adapt it to my purposes rather than borrow a readymade 
'method'. 
What was promising about discourse analysis as a research method was its 
declared emphasis on the study of social practices (Fairclough, 1992). Making such 
practices the object of study could perhaps bridge the divide between the study of 
'pure' psychological phenomena and the 'applied' fields of study (for example 
Willig, 1999) which might speak more to practitioners in fields such as counselling or 
mediation. Gee ( 1999, p. 8) goes as far as arguing that discourse analysis should 
always have a 'point to it' such as an evident focus of application. 
There was nothing for it but to dive in and to begin to practice analysing some 
narrative therapy texts and to see what needed to be adapted along the way. I began 
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with some videos of Michael White and a transcript lent to me from David Epston's 
work and wrote some brief practice analyses of some of these conversations. From 
these exercises, which are not included here and are not for publication for ethical and 
copyright reasons, I began to see ways to describe the practice of narrative therapy in 
ways that these practitioners had not used in their own theorising of their practice. 
This experience encouraged further work in this domain. At this time I was planning 
to seek out some narrative therapists and ask them to find some clients who would 
agree to have some counselling sessions recorded for analytical purposes. 
Several problems arose with this plan. First, some therapists who I hoped 
would agree to participate in this project refused when I broached the subject with 
them. Like them, I was also concerned about the ethical dangers of this kind of 
research. It was possible to design a process by which clients would find their lives 
and concerns rendered objects of research enquiry with little benefit to themselves. I 
was not keen to participate in that kind of objectifying practice. One way to avoid 
this would be to engage in a larger ethnographic study in which I would ensure that 
my engagement with clients would be to their benefit. But this would take my focus 
away from the close study of textual detail and the micro-analysis of therapeutic 
responses. I considered using only publicly available teaching videotapes as sources 
of conversations to turn into text for analysis, but there were copyright problems 
involved. These could no doubt be resolved with goodwill and permission but there 
was another concern that worked against this possibility. There is alive in the 
community of narrative therapists a suspicion of those in universities who might 
exploit for the benefit of their own careers the practitioners who have worked to 
develop and promote the narrative approach. This suspicion is built on the 
poststructuralist analysis of academic complicity in the construction of the 
knowledge/power alliance and on the analysis of power relations in professional life. 
It is exemplified in these words by Johnella Bird: 
Those who write determine ownership of ideas and practices ... Outside of 
academic circles (which provide structure.funding and an explanation for 
self-preoccupation) a limited number of clinicians find the emotional, 
physical and financial space needed to write. Ethnic, gender and class 
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perspectives on clinical work remain unavailable as academics (both men 
and women) retain positions of authority as teachers and writers. 
(Bird, 2000, p. xv) 
The tone is a little bitter and the logic leaves little room for 'navigating life's 
contradictions' as the subtitle of her book suggests. This kind of perspective was 
conveyed to me (by others, not by Bird) in several personal communications as well. 
Since I had no desire to be implicated in such a construction of my own work, 
this study remained halted for some time as I worried about how to do it. Should I 
persist in trying to identify some narrative therapists with whom it might be possible 
to forge a collaborative arrangement that would not be perceived as exploitative? Or 
should I seek some other approach altogether? One option would be to write only 
about my own clinical practice, but that would bring some other ethical issues, such 
as conflict of interest, into play and potentially put more pressure on clients to please 
the researcher as well as the therapist. The quandary was of such significant concern 
that I considered abandoning the whole project. 
Developing Interest In Mediation 
The resolution of these concerns in a way that allowed this project to go ahead 
was made possible by a shift in attention away from the area of practice that I had 
begun with, that of counsellor education. I had developed a growing interest in the 
work of mediation in the years leading up to and during the work on this dissertation. 
In my professional life, I had worked as a teacher and then a counsellor in 
secondary schools before I began teaching counselling. As a counsellor, I was drawn 
to conflict resolution work out of an impatience with hearing people complain about 
other people (students about teachers or parents, teachers about students or 
administrators, administrators about teachers or board members). It became a 
common practice of mine, when people told me of such complaints, to offer to 
facilitate a meeting with the person they were complaining about, in effect, a 
mediation. So I ended up mediating between families and school boards over 
suspensions, between principals and teachers over professional issues, between 
teachers and students about behaviour problems, and between students and other 
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students over playground brawls, teasing or spats between friends. As the schools 
that I was working with took on board the requirements of the reforms of the 
education system that became known in New Zealand as the "Tomorrow's Schools" 
reforms (Ministry of Education, 1988), one of the provisions required them to put in 
place a policy and a set of procedures for dealing with sexual harassment in schools. 
This led me to become involved as a mediator in a series of situations in which some 
form of sexual harassment had taken place. A growing interest in peer mediation 
programmes in Auckland schools caught me up in a series of training programmes in 
mediation skills and I launched a peer mediation service in the school where I was a 
school counsellor. 
At the same time, I was developing a small private practice in counselling 
with the family court. This gave me experience in conciliation counselling with 
couples who were in the process of separating. Although called counselling in the 
New Zealand family court system, this was largely mediation work. 
I was an enthusiastic participant in the formation of Waikato Mediation 
Services in Hamilton in the mid 1990s. A group of a dozen people began meeting to 
form a community mediation service and training group. In the process, we engaged 
with the mediation literature and began to articulate a distinctive approach to 
mediation that moved away from the dominant problem-solving model. The interests 
that Gerald Monk and I had in narrative therapy became significant influences among 
this group on the development of a model of practice that was largely based on 
narrative ideas. Alison Cotter and Tim Clarke played significant roles also in the 
development of our thinking about the role of narrative ideas in mediation and on the 
securing of work opportunities in which to try these ideas out. We did mediation 
work in organizational and community disputes, in restorative justice contexts and in 
schools. We also planned and organized some community discussions of 
controversial issues along the lines of the Public Conversations Project (Becker, 
Chasin, Chasin, Herzig & Roth, 1995; Chasin, Herzig, Roth, Chasin, Becker, & 
Stains, 1996). The practice of narrative mediation began to flourish in this context 
and led to attempts to articulate this practice in writing. Alison Cotter and I wrote a 
chapter on mediation for the book that was edited by Gerald Monk, Kathie Crocket, 
David Epston and myself ( 1997). An article in the Negotiation Journal (Winslade, 
Monk & Cotter, 1999) and the publication of a book (Winslade & Monk, 2000) 
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followed. I was also involved with a group from the University of Waikato who 
undertook a pilot project for the New Zealand Ministry of Education to use a 
restorative conferencing process as an alternative to suspension in secondary schools 
(Winslade, Drewery & Hooper, 2000). As convenor of the New Zealand Association 
of Counsellors Ethics Committee, I was also involved in the development of 
mediation processes in response to complaints against counsellors (Winslade, 1996b). 
By this time, it was clear that my professional energies were becoming more 
heavily committed to developing the practice of mediation than the practice of 
therapy. It made sense for this dissertation to follow that interest and become more 
aligned with the work that I was pursuing in other domains. Micro-analysis of the 
interactions in a mediation conversation was still close enough to the original purpose 
of studying interactions in counselling. The focus of the change process was simply 
more focused on relationship problems than on personal identity projects. Therefore, 
I made the decision to change tack in the direction of analysing mediation 
conversations rather than counselling ones. Given the difficulties I was facing in 
finding a way to generate text for the purposes of discourse analysis, this move could 
have made things even more difficult, since mediation involves people who 
frequently mistrust each other in situations of conflict. It is not easy to secure consent 
from such participants for their conversation to be taped and transcribed. 
However, there exists within the mediation literature a tacit acknowledgement 
of this problem. Mediation training and research is frequently done with the aid of 
roleplayed conversations (for example, Association of Family Mediators, 1989; Gale, 
Mowery, Herrman, & Hollett, 2002; Menkel-Meadow, 1994; Pope & Bush, 2000). 
Waikato Mediation Services had produced such a tape of its own (Winslade, 1996a). 
I made the decision, therefore, that, for the purposes of this research, I would 
make two tapes of roleplayed mediations. One would feature myself as mediator. I 
would use this tape as a source of text to illustrate my articulation of a narrative 
practice in mediation. The need for such an articulation was greater in the field of 
mediation than it was in therapy where a narrative practice has been established over 
a period of time. In mediation, the book published by Gerald Monk and myself 
(2000) and the articles with Alison Cotter, really break new ground. The other tape 
would feature my co-author on mediation, Gerald Monk, as the mediator. The 
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transcription of this conversation would furnish a piece of text that could be used for 
discourse analysis purposes. 
These two tapes were made with the assistance of San Diego State University, 
where Gerald Monk is now employed. They have been shown a few times in 
teaching contexts since then and the responses and questions by mediators who have 
watched them have contributed to the development of my own analysis of the 
conversations. The details of the process of analysis that I have pursued will be 
outlined in chapter five. 
This study has changed focus a little along the way but the main emphasis has 
remained intact, that is, the emphasis on the analysis of the detail of positioning 
effects in a conversation between a professional and clients. The development of a 
study of mediation, rather than therapy, now accords with a shift in my own areas of 
practice and writing during the course of setting up this research enterprise. At times, 
the work I have done in the mediation area has appeared to delay the task of getting 
this research exercise done. The delays have not been without benefit, however. As 
a result of them, the emphasis that has emerged has been tested in practice and 
articulated in several pieces of writing as well as in a variety of teaching contexts and 
conference presentations. As a result, what is reported in this exercise is much more 
mature than it would have been had I written it two or three years earlier. 
Organisation Of The Study 
After this introductory chapter, the three strands of this tri-lateral study each 
need to be given space to be developed before they are woven together. Here is an 
outline of the course that the rest of the dissertation will run in order to achieve this 
task. 
In Chapter Two, problems with the assumptions that inform the current 
practice of mediation will be reviewed. The dominant approaches to mediation will 
be explained and some critiques of these approaches will be made. The need for 
some rethinking of mediation theory will be argued. 
Chapter Three will address the theoretical issues raised in Chapter Two. In 
this chapter, I shall explain why I believe mediation theory needs to take account of 
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developing postmodern ideas in order to equip mediators better to respond to the 
everyday politics of conversation. The conceptual tools, drawn from discourse 
theory, that can serve this purpose will be distinguished and articulated. In particular, 
a theory of the utterance and a theory of discursive positioning will be detailed. 
The discourse analysis method on which this research will rely will be 
outlined in Chapter Four. This outline will distinguish the critical discourse analysis 
(CDA) approach from other approaches to discourse analysis. Then, the addition of 
some further elements to this approach, suggested by some of the literature cited in 
Chapter Three, will be introduced. I shall be especially interested in how discourse 
analysis can be used to show shifts in discursive positioning taking place in the 
course of a mediation conversation. A list of questions to be asked of a text in order 
to make such shifts evident will be outlined. 
Chapter Five will review the discourse analytic literature to date that has 
focused on mediation conversations and will position this study in relation to this 
literature. The main difference in this study from many other discourse analyses of 
mediation conversations is a focus on the effects of professional practice. I am not 
just interested in demonstrating the work that discourse is doing to shape 
conversations and identities. I want to use discourse analysis to show that changes in 
positioning are possible and to evaluate how a mediator working from a narrative 
perspective can facilitate such shifts. 
However, before examining the effects of a narrative mediation approach, it is 
necessary to establish just what this is. Chapter Six will outline a narrative approach 
to mediation that addresses the problems raised in the review of the mediation 
literature in chapter two. The general principles of narrative mediation will be 
articulated and linked back to the theoretical positions outlined in Chapter Three. 
This approach will be illustrated through the inclusion of extracts from a transcribed 
mediation, accompanied by explanatory commentary. 
In Chapter Seven, the text of a narrative mediation session will be presented 
and interwoven with a detailed discourse analysis, focusing especially on the analysis 
of discursive positioning. I shall introduce this text transcribed from an interview and 
include almost the whole conversation, together with accompanying commentary. 
In Chapter Eight, the discourse analysis will continue by drawing together 
some of the threads picked out of the fabric of the conversation in Chapter Seven. 
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The background orders of discourse at work in the shaping of the participants' 
relational positioning in the mediation will be explored and the discursive themes 
drawn forth. I shall also here examine the uses made by the mediator of discursive 
positioning to open up new relational possibilities in the dispute. 
Chapter Nine will conclude the study with a review on what it has covered 
and some comments on the implications for ongoing work. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Problems With Mediation: 
A Literature Review 
The professional practice of mediation has been articulated only in the last 
twenty-five years. It has been described as focused on pragmatism and as lacking a 
body of theory (Irving & Benjamin, 2002). Carrie Menkel-Meadow (2001) says that 
it lacks a 'meta-theory' because it draws from a variety of disciplinary traditions. The 
problem-solving model proposed through the Harvard Negotiation Project by Roger 
Fisher and William Ury ( 1981) was at first considered definitive of the professional 
practice of negotiating the resolution of conflict and has been widely taken up by 
mediators. However, the dominance of this formulation of mediation practice has 
been challenged in the 1990s and beyond. The challenges have come from several 
avenues of social critique and from the articulation of some alternative approaches to 
mediation. This chapter will review the basic ideas behind the problem-solving model 
and also examine the various bases from which it has been critiqued. My argument is 
that these critiques make problematic a straightforward acceptance of the problem-
solving model. The transformative model offers an alternative perspective with 
certain advantages, but it also has many of the same problems as the problem-solving 
perspective built into it. I shall attempt to show that mediators need to look beyond 
these approaches for the development of models of mediation that are able to take 
account of power relations and developing social theory. 
Models of Mediation Practice 
Problem- Solving Mediation 
The current mediation literature is dominated by a problem-solving or 
interest-based approach to resolving disputes. The term 'interest-based' refers to 
a major feature of the problem-solving approach in which mediators seek to 
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identify the underlying interests that are hidden behind the polarized stances that 
people take up in conflict situations. 
There have been various attempts to dislodge the dominance of a 
problem-solving orientation and other models have been proposed, such as 
transformative mediation (Bush & Folger, 1994) therapeutic family mediation 
(Irving & Benjamin, 1987) and a therapeutic-interventionist model (Kruk, 1997). 
The promoters of a 'transformative' perspective have mounted the most 
successful alternative model of practice so far. Nevertheless, the problem-
solving orientation has continued to be the approach to practice that has been 
learned first and utilized most by those entering conflict resolution work 
(according to Rifkin, 1994). It has also been referred to as a 'transactional' 
orientation to mediation (Bush, 2001, p. 368), a description that emphasizes the 
goal of arriving at a settlement that resembles a business contract. 
The foundations for this approach were laid by Fisher and Ury (1981) in 
their groundbreaking book, Getting To Yes, and have been built upon since by 
other authors who have elaborated a detailed practice based on these ideas (e.g. 
Haynes, 1994; Menkel-Meadow, 1994; Moore, 1996; Beer, 1997; Picard, 1998; 
etc). Before examining some of the critiques of this model, I shall outline its 
central ideas. 
Basic Elements Of Problem-Solving, Interest-Based Mediation 
The goal of a problem-solving mediation is defined as searching for a 
win-win solution that addresses the interests, or meets the needs, of each party 
(Fisher & Ury, 1981 ). To achieve this solution, a mediator should listen to each 
party's stories and then help them to uncover the underlying interests that are 
being expressed in the conflict. When the problem is defined in terms of 
interests rather than polarized positions, a negotiation can take place that aims to 
satisfy everyone's interests and resolve the conflict. To this end, the mediator 
engages the parties in a brainstorming process to generate a range of options. 
These are then evaluated for their usefulness to a negotiated agreement. The 
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mediator invites the parties to negotiate with each other to have both persons' 
sets of interests met so that no one loses and the conflict is resolved. 
Fisher and Ury illustrate interest-based mediation by telling their now 
famous story of two individuals who are disputing over the heating in a library 
(Fisher & Ury, 1981, p. 40). One person is too hot and wants to open a window 
so as to have air circulating in the room. The other person is concerned that if the 
window is opened the draft will be unpleasant and possibly chill them. Fisher 
and Ury suggest an alternative to the traditional problem-solving method of 
compromising and giving up part of what they would like (perhaps leaving the 
window partially open). In their alternative, the emphasis is on identifying the 
underlying shared need of wanting a more favorable temperature in the room. 
The problem gets resolved with the help of a librarian who facilitates the 
identification of underlying interests and suggests opening a window in an 
adjacent room to allow cooler air to circulate without creating a draft. Thus the 
needs for fresh air and even temperature are met. 
The problem-solving model is proposed as a process containing several 
cumulative steps. The first step in a problem-solving mediation is to 'define the 
problem'. This model offers some suggestions for how to do this that imply a 
theory about the nature of conflict. The problem should be defined in the context 
of a distinction between substance and relationship. 'Separate the relationship 
from the substance' urge Fisher and Ury (1981, p.21). The idea is that there are 
psychological realities and substantive issues and mediators are enjoined to 
maintain neutrality with regard to substantive outcomes. Instead, mediators 
should address mainly the psychological issues ('perception, emotion and 
communication') with 'psychological techniques'. For example, when there are 
strong emotions, 'find ways for each person involved to let off steam' or, where 
misunderstanding exists, 'work to improve communication', or where 
perceptions are inaccurate, 'look for ways to educate' (p. 21). 
In relation to the substantive issues, mediators should distinguish further 
between 'stated positions' usually about desired outcomes, and 'underlying 
interests' which are described as 'needs, desires, concerns and fears' (Fisher & 
Ury, 1981, p.40). Although Fisher and Ury do not explicitly describe them as 
such, these would seem also to be psychological issues. They are founded on a 
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conception of what constitutes universal basic human needs like security, 
economic well-being, belonging, recognition, control over one's life (p. 48). 
Frustration of these underlying interests or needs is theorised as causative of 
conflict. 
Interests motivate people; they are the silent movers behind the hubbub of 
positions. Your position is something you have decided upon. Your 
interests are what caused you to so decide. 
(Fisher & Ury, 1981, p. 41) 
Christopher Moore (1996) distinguishes these psychological interests from what 
he calls 'substantive interests' (for money or time) and 'procedural interests' 
(which are about how the process works). Conscious decision-making is involved 
in establishing a position and interests are constructed as originating in natural 
drives. The interest-based focus within the psychology of problem-solving is 
implicitly founded upon something like Maslow's (1956) hierarchy of needs as 
the basis on which a notion of interests is founded. 
Fisher and Ury's use of the term 'position' needs to be distinguished from 
the constructionist usage I shall be developing in this dissertation. Fisher and 
Ury use 'position' to refer to a rationally chosen attitudinal stance on a polarizing 
issue. Moore (1996) describes these positions as preferences for 'particular 
settlement options' (p. 70). Positioning theory, as I shall draw from it later, uses 
the word 'position' with reference to discourse theory. I shall explain this usage 
more in the next chapter. 
The separation of interests from positions is also advocated by Fisher and 
Ury from the pragmatic perspective that 'reconciling interests rather than 
compromising between positions' works better (Fisher & Ury, 1981, p. 42). As 
John Haynes (1994) says, people usually bargain about positions rather than 
interests, and 'bargaining about positions often results in a stalemate' (p. 5). Each 
side to a dispute is likely to have 'multiple interests' (p47) and can appreciate 
overlapping or shared interests more easily than compromise options: ' ... shared 
interests help produce agreements' (Fisher & Ury, 1981, p. 71). A clear 
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implication is that it is easier to work from the basis of the legitimacy of interests 
(Fisher & Ury, 1981, p. 51) than of positions. 
After defining the problem in terms of interests, the problem-solving 
mediator seeks to establish a conversation aimed at negotiating the satisfaction of 
these interests rather than focussing on positions. This is achieved by first 
generating 'options for mutual gain' through brainstorming before undertaking 
any evaluation of these options or negotiating a resolution. Deciding about best 
options is suspended during the process of 'invention of options,' as is the 
'search for the single answer' (Fisher & Ury, 1981, p. 58). Sometimes, when 
interests conflict, it is necessary to call on 'objective criteria' against which to 
assess the invented options before meaningful negotiation can begin. These are 
independent standards against which, say, the fairness of a price might be 
compared. For example, if the disagreement is about the value of a vehicle, then 
an 'objective criterion' might be a book that lists recent car sale prices. 
The problem-solving approach has achieved a great deal in the mediation 
field. It has contributed much to the development of practice. However, it has 
also been subject to a variety of queries, especially about the assumptions that are 
built into its practice. 
Questions About The Assumptions In Interest-Based Problem-
Solving Mediation 
Problem-solving approaches to mediation are predicated upon a series of 
assumptions about conflict and about human intentions and relations. These 
assumptions are open to challenge if we look at them from different vantage 
points. Indeed, they have in recent years been subjected to a series of challenges. 
I shall question these assumptions and review the challenges that have been 
raised in recent years. 
Implicit in the heart of the problem-solving approach is the idea that 
conflict results from a competition between people to meet their goals in life 
(Moore, 1996). Conflict occurs when the attainment of the interests, or the 
satisfaction of the needs, of one party is found, or perceived, to be incompatible 
with the interests or needs of another. Conflict intensifies as the human interests 
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of needs are frustrated by the conflict itself. This position has been stated clearly 
in statements like this one. 
Problem-solving is an orientation to negotiation which focuses on finding 
solutions to the parties' sets of underlying needs and objectives. 
(Menkel-Meadow, 1994, p.794) 
The opposition created by competing interests is theorized to harden into 
positions around which polarization occurs. These positions are opinions or 
viewpoints that consolidate around the rational interpretation and justification of 
self-interest. The parties then concentrate upon defending these positions while 
seeking to attack or undermine the positions of the other party. It follows that 
conflict resolution needs to be about facilitating the satisfaction of needs and the 
attainment of interests. Folger and Bush (1994) refer to this as the 'satisfaction 
story' of mediation. 
This account of the resolution of conflict is founded upon the 
psychological assumption that individuals are driven primarily by internally 
generated needs. That these needs are assumed to be foundational is expressed in 
in their description sometimes as 'real needs' (for example, Menkel-Meadow, 
2001, p. xxi). In mediation these needs become expressed as their interests. Such 
needs are posited to have their origin in human nature rather than in, say, cultural 
or discursive patterns of thinking. Each party in the conflict is assumed to be 
pursuing a path of natural self-interest and to require their self-interested needs to 
be met in order to succeed in any negotiation. The 'needs' of the individual in 
this framework rely in tum upon a set of psychological assumptions that have 
been commonly accepted in many psychological theories. Both Freud's (1969) 
account of the individual's psychodynamic struggles and Maslow's (1956) 
hierarchy of needs assumed an inherent self-interested pleasure-seeking principle 
at a basic level of individual human motivation. Individual needs-based 
assumptions direct our focus away from cultural, collective or relational aspects 
of personhood. As a result, we are more likely to view people's claims of 
entitlement in mediation as natural, or biologically essential, once we have sorted 
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out what those 'basic' interests are and distinguished them from polarized 
posturing. 
There is no suggestion in problem-solving theory that anything 
underlying interests needs to be considered. For example, the possibility that a 
person's interests might be culturally informed is not given prominent emphasis. 
Nor is the possibility that power relations might grant legitimacy to certain 
interests over others. Rather, the liberal democratic assumption of hypothetically 
equal opportunity for each party is incorporated into the model of mediation. 
The problem-solving mediation literature does, however, give some credence to 
the existence of power relations, chiefly by suggesting that mediation should 
involve a recognition of power disparities and a balancing of power where these 
exist (Haynes, 1988; 1994; Mnookin, 1984). The concept of power referenced in 
this literature is based on an equation of the accumulated individual power and 
potentially measurable amounts of information, legal rights, expertise, charisma 
or strength of personality, and financial resources. There is also a literature in 
mediation that stresses that mediation should not be attempted in situations where 
power differentials are at work. However, the proscribing of the interest-based 
method in such circumstances leaves intact the neglect of power relations and of 
socio-cultural influence in the construction of people's interests in situations 
where the method is used. 
In a mediated dispute, the parties' positions, and especially their 
underlying interests, are also assumed to wholly belong to them as individuals. 
For example, there is little suggestion in the problem-solving model that 
individuals might be conscious at times of representing the interests of a social 
group. However, it is not uncommon for women in family mediations to make a 
stand consciously on behalf of women against a patriarchal assumption about 
marriage or about the family. I have also personally worked as a mediator in 
conflicts where Maori disputants are conscious of arguing for the interests of 
Maori in general rather than principally in their own interests. In the problem-
solving formula, such political consciousness would have to be considered a 
'position' and the mediator would be directed by the model to search for the 
underlying individual interests. 
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Gergen ( 1999, p. 150-2) has pointed out that the problem-solving model 
reflects a modernist worldview and presumes the primary importance of 
rationality and realism. Haynes (1994) indeed asserts that the problem-solving 
method is primarily a 'rational process' (p. 6). It assumes, says Gergen, that 'the 
problem', 'my interests', the 'optimal solution' are essential categories rather 
than 'moves in discourse'. It constitutes the parties to a dispute in the mould of 
'autonomous individuals, each with private interests, perceptions and reasons', 
independent actors in the world who can be found 'ideally reasoning their way 
toward identifiable goals' in the midst of a singular existing reality. The problem 
Gergen is pointing out is that these terms are considered the stable baseline, 
constituted within a single reality, from which the mediation conversation is 
constructed. However, the definition of these terms and their connection to the 
stories of the parties is not unproblematic. People do not always act rationally. 
They do not always even act in their own interests. In the next chapter, I shall 
review in more detail how postmodern questions render the modernist 
assumptions problematic. Here, it is worth noting that the whole idea of defining 
a conflict as a distinct 'problem' of competing underlying 'interests', which can 
be isolated from the complexities of life around the parties, is itself a culturally 
informed act. It could not develop without the background assumptions of a 
market economy and the idea that rational scientific method can be applied to 
problems of Ii ving. 
Fisher and Ury use these words to describe the ideal stance towards 
relationship in the context of a negotiation. 
Base the relationship (between a mediator and the parties) on accurate 
perceptions, clear communication, appropriate emotions and aforward-
looking purposive outlook. 
(Fisher & Ury, 1981, p.21.) 
Reason and be open to reason. 
(Fisher & Ury, 1981, p.89) 
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The person called into position as the subject in such discourse is a recognisable 
expression of the enlightenment ideal. It is the model citizen of the modem 
democratic state, stabilised and normalised by modern psychology and education, 
believing in and relying on the progress of truth authorised by the technologies 
and procedures of the scientific method. 
Even when the parties are collective entities like organizations or nations, 
the model plumps for an approach based on individual psychology. Fisher and 
Ury advise: 
What is true for individuals remains equally true for groups and nations. 
(Fisher & Ury, 1981, p. 49) 
From this perspective, individuals are conceived of as the prime movers in the 
world, and communities are portrayed as made up of distinct, separate human 
beings who act independently and who are accountable for their choices. The 
identification of an individual's needs and the accommodation of her or his 
interests are viewed as the essential ingredients of a successful mediation. What 
is left out of this picture are cultural patterns of behaviour, institutional demands, 
structural inequalities, and the influence of discourse on what people can think. 
Presumably these formulations of social life remain epiphenomena of the actions 
of social actors in the world, rather than constitutive influences in the production 
of people as actors. It is not that the mediation literature is not cognizant of these 
dimensions of social analysis. My point here is simply that these social, cultural 
and political dimensions are not present in the problem-solving theory itself. 
Therefore the problem-solving approach does not place mediators in an easy 
position from which to handle power relations in the mediation process. 
Sara Cobb ( 1997) makes this point by contrasting the discourse of needs 
in mediation theory with a discourse of rights, such as might be more dominant 
in legal contexts. In a discussion of the 'domestication of violence in mediation', 
she argues that the discourse of needs serves the purpose in mediation of hiding 
the operation of power through violence. For example, if a mediator was to 
attempt to enquire about the underlying interests of the perpetrator and the victim 
of domestic violence the possibility of expressing a community's moral objection 
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to the abuse of power involved is blunted. Her distinction does not attempt to 
problematise the rights discourse itself. Trina Grillo (1991), while making 
similar arguments about dangers for women in the mediation process also argues 
against the 'reification' of rights, that is the 'conceptualizing of rights as real, or 
thing-like' (p. 1566). She suggests that this conceptualization results in the 
'acceptance of the existing social order as an inevitable fact of life' (p.1566). In 
this way, she argues that rights claims characterised in a formal way are 
'hierarchical and therefore patriarchal' (p.1566). Nevertheless, Sara Cobb makes 
some useful comments by using the rights discourse as a standpoint from which 
to explicate the discursive work that is done in the needs discourse. She says: 
... while rights construct the relation between the self and community, their 
reformulation into needs disintegrates that community, as actions that 
were obligated within a normative frame are reframed as actions that 
please or appease an individual. In needs discourse, the locus for the 
obligation of action moves from the community to the individual. A need 
connects a person's internal state to the actions of self or others ... That 
which obligates the action, rather than remaining external to the speaker, 
moves back into the person, dissolving any external standard for 
evaluating or guiding action. The final standard becomes the pragmatic 
service to the psychological/physiological processes internal to 
individuals. 
(Cobb, 1997,p.412) 
The point is that the idea of needs serves to construct a basis for entitlement that 
refers inwards to basically physiological sources. It sidelines the moral 
dimension in the particular construction of meanings as 'interests'. The assertion 
of rights, by contrast, links entitlement claims to the world of social interaction. 
Trillo ( 1991) also acknowledges this point and suggests that the assertion of 
rights can have positive psychological effects for women. 
What about the possibility that a person's stance in a conflict might be 
informed by racism for example? It might be easy to identify underlying self-
interest at the base of a racist position. However, a mediation process that sought 
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to satisfy the drive behind a self-interested racist idea would clearly be abhorrent. 
No doubt, most problem-solving mediators would agree and would find ways to 
avoid such a situation developing. My concern is that the problem-solving model 
of interest-based mediation does not in itself offer them enough assistance at 
such moments. 
Freud's ( 1969) use of the pressure chamber metaphor to account for the 
'decathexis' of human emotions is also to be found in the problem-solving 
discourse. The idea that emotions, if not expressed, will build up internal 
pressure inside the person and need release in the form of letting off steam was a 
mechanistic metaphor built on an observation of the steam engine. Arising from 
the discourse of Freud's day, it has found its way into many corners of 
psychological discourse. In Fisher and Ury it takes the following form. 
Often one effective way to deal with people's anger, frustration, and other 
negative emotions is to help them release those feelings. People obtain 
psychological release through the simple process of recounting their 
grievances. 
(Fisher & Ury, 1981, p. 31) 
What is not taken into account in this formulation is the moral dimension in the 
emotional experience. If, for example, the anger or frustration has been produced 
as a result of the experience of injustice then having one's emotions siphoned off 
through psychological release does not address the source of the anger. If a 
person is angry at being shut out of the chance to make a decision about 
something that affects their wellbeing, then being channeled into becoming more 
rational can be experienced as patronising. Another perspective on emotions like 
anger has been proposed by Brian Parkinson (1995). He suggests that the heart 
of the experience of anger is the desire to change something. Feeling angry is 
more than just a physiological experience. It is a protest about some state of 
affairs in the world. It therefore entails a moral judgment that something is not 
right and needs to change (Parkinson, 1995). The 'psychological release' 
approach to dealing with anger seems to grant precedence to the physiological 
dimension ahead of the social and moral dimension. What can ensue is that 
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protest about injustice and the use of power can be quieted and contextualised as 
the expression of emotional self-interest. 
It will not be just mediators either who approach things with needs-based 
assumptions in mind. Disputants too are likely to carry such assumptions into 
mediation. Needs-based assumptions are part of common discourse in the 
modem world. These widely held taken-for-granted assumptions provide a lens 
through which people construct their needs and desires. They influence people's 
expectations and behaviour, affect the way they respond to other people, and 
inform what they find acceptable about their social arrangements. These 
expectations in turn construct people's understandings of what moves or 
responses are possible, what outcomes are desirable, and what role a mediator 
should play in this process. In other words, these expectations become the 
dominant norms to which people subscribe and around which they perform 
meaning in their day to day dealings in a variety of contexts. 
A further major assumption in the problem-solving model is about 
conflict. It follows from the assumption of the drive to fulfil individual needs. 
Conflict is assumed to happen because individual needs are not being met. 
Disputes transpire when individuals, in the attempt to fulfil their needs, encounter 
others who believe that their own need-fulfilment goals are threatened. The 
frustration of unfulfilled needs leads to a deficit condition, which fuels the 
motivation for need-satisfaction. Thus the underlying motivational drive for 
conflict is considered to be a personal deficit (an unmet need). The deficit can be 
removed and the need satisfied when a solution is found to the conflict. 
A biological metaphor of homeostasis lies in the background behind this 
idea. Unmet need equals disequilibrium. The biological organism is driven to 
return to a steady state (homeostasis). The solution is found. Homeostasis, or 
equilibrium, is restored. The background narrative is the medical one of disease 
interfering with a state of normal health, followed by the administration of the 
requisite treatment to cure it and restore health again. In other words, conflict is 
akin to a disease that needs treatment. What then is the task of mediation from 
this perspective? It is to find solutions that will meet the needs of each of the 
(individual) parties and restore homeostasis. Peace is conceived of as stable, 
orderly trading in the marketplace of individual interests. 
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The problem with this kind of model is again that it ignores power 
relations. The steady state of homeostasis when everyone's needs are met 
assumes a world of equality of opportunity for the 'meeting of needs'. There are, 
however, differences in the kinds of needs that people believe themselves entitled 
to have met. And there are social and cultural influences on the definition of a 
person's needs. Therefore the meeting of both parties' needs in a dispute may 
contain within it a built-in privileging of one party over another simply because 
that party's needs were constructed in terms of greater entitlement. 
Another assumption built into the problem-solving model is that the 
mediator can be an objective, neutral third party. If the parties to a dispute have 
needs, then the mediator should remain neutral with regard to these needs. If the 
parties have interests, then the mediator is assumed to be disinterested. If the 
parties have substantive goals they want addressed, then the mediator should care 
only about the process and about creating the opportunity for both parties to 
reach their goals in a 'win-win' resolution. The ultimate model for the mediator 
is that of the scientist practitioner, the detached neutral observer applying the 
knowledge generated within Modernist scientific traditions, in which the concept 
of problem-solving is well entrenched. The emphasis in this tradition is on the 
generation of universal acultural truths and their application. Differences of 
culture, social class and gender contribute to the kind of bias and distortion that 
good models of practice seek to eliminate. When a stalemate is reached in the 
discussion of optimal solutions the mediator appeals to some objective scale that 
has been produced in the wider cultural world as a point of comparison for the 
parties. There is no questioning of the possible cultural bias of the scale that is 
used as the external reference point. 
Disquiet about the concept of neutrality in the problem-solving approach 
has been expressed from a variety of quarters. The concept of neutrality as 
'absence of bias on the part of the mediator', or 'impartiality' (Cobb and Rifkin, 
1991; Beck & Sales, 2000), has been distinguished as one meaning of neutrality 
that has been subject to criticism. To achieve this, mediators are supposed to 
guard 'against psychological processes that may favor either disputant' (Cobb 
and Rifkin, 1991, p. 44) and to act as if they were 'observers without a 
perspective' (Grillo, 1991, p. 1587). However, the assumption of a neutral, 
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disinterested stance in relation to the needs that disputing parties present to a 
mediator has been strongly questioned in the mediation literature (Kruk, 1997, 
Grillo, 1991 ). Beck and Sales (2000) review the social psychological literature on 
impartiality and point out that the production of an impartial stance involves 
processing of disputants' stories through an interpretive filter which is made up 
of the attitudes and values of the mediator. These attitudes and values are in turn 
formed out of 'affective, behavioural and cognitive' information. Pre-existing 
attitudes and values are also, they suggest, the very bases from which mediators 
must respond in order to form quick perceptions, categorise information and 
make rapid decisions. Hence, they can hardly be left out of the process of 
mediation without rendering the mediator ineffective. At the very least, for 
example, divorce mediators are not likely to be neutral about the 'appropriate 
terms for divorce agreements' (Beck & Sales, 2000, p. 1001). If mediators hold 
values about such things as an individual's right to self-determination, or social 
justice, or what constitutes 'good' parenting, then these values are likely to be 
expressed in their responses to disputants' utterances that are not impartial. In the 
questioning of the neutrality assumption in mediation, the cultural values implicit 
within parties' interests and needs has been highlighted. 
Moreover, Rifkin, Millen and Cobb (1991, p.151) commented that there 
has been less 'theorizing' about the neutrality of the mediator than there has been 
a developing 'folklore of neutrality'. The idea of the mediator as neutral 
facilitator of the process, who 'makes no assessments, judgments or value 
interventions ... ' but is ' ... wholly supportive of all actors, and adopts a no-fault 
and neutral position' (Burton, 1990, p. 204) is now hard to hold. It makes more 
sense to see that mediators are unlikely to be able to stand outside of time and 
space and their own culturally and historically located values. Just in the way 
they respond to people's stories, they are likely to select for emphasis some 
perspectives over others, or attune themselves to some people more than to 
others. 
The idea that content and process can be separated and that the mediator 
is best thought of as a process facilitator who is impartial with regard to content 
has also been questioned. Linda Putnam (1994) has pointed out how particular 
conceptions of process (for example, thinking in terms of instrumental goals) 
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influence the selection of which subject matter will be discussed or emphasized. 
She suggests that instrumental goal-directed thinking leads to a privileging of 
'substantive issues over relational and identity management aims.' Haynes 
(1994), articulating a problem-solving approach to mediation, argues that 
mediators should 'ideally' focus discussion on 'practical issues' (p.28). Thus 
problem-solving mediation might focus more on business transactions than on 
emotional or relational shifts such as the expression of mutual understanding, the 
reconstruction of trust or the offering of an apology. 
Likewise, Folger and Bush (1994; also Bush & Folger, 1994) have shown 
a 'settlement orientation' to narrow the range of subject matter that a mediation 
conversation can address. They argue that a problem-solving orientation, even in 
the early stages of problem definition, leads to the selecting out of issues that will 
admit some kind of substantive agreement from the many possible problematic 
considerations. Their concern is that the mediation conversation can be 
unnecessarily and unproductively limited as a result. The 'satisfaction story', 
they argue (Bush & Folger, 1994 ), comes to dominate over other possible paths 
forward in the resolution of conflict. Kresse!, Frontera, Florenza, Butler and Fish 
(1994) support this argument with research showing that the more mediators 
were settlement-oriented the less they actually were successful in facilitating 
settlement agreements and the less durable were the agreements that were 
reached. Bush and Folger are particularly concerned about making room for the 
'transformation story', in which people do not so much 'resolve' a conflict as 
reach a place of mutual understanding in which the conflict dissipates. 
A critique was also made with regard to the construct of neutrality on a 
narrative basis (Rifkin, Millen & Cobb, 1991 ). Following an interest in the 
narrative construction of conflict stories in the mediation process, these writers 
suggested that the order of parties telling their stories sets a frame for how the 
conflict will be defined and how mediation will proceed. If the first speaker 
selects out some features of the conflict for mention, the second speaker must 
work hard to avoid having the conflict defined for them on the same discursive 
ground. The issue pointed up here is that of the power that inheres in being the 
first speaker. However, as Folger points out, the issue is also bigger than that. 
He argues that Rifkin et al.' s research questions 'the entire premise that the 
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mediator's control of the process is independent of the 'content' of the conflict' 
(Folger, 2001, p. 392). It is an example, he says, of how control over process can 
effectively shape the substance of the conflict itself. 
Feminist critics (Leitch, 1986-87; Neumann, 1992) have also taken 
mediators to task on the issue of neutrality. They have focused their analysis on 
the construction of power in gender relations and the 'failure' of mediation to 
influence gender power relations. Their accusation has been that frequently 
'win-win' solutions simply reflect the pre-existing power relations between the 
parties and that these are often constructed in patterns of privilege based on 
patriarchal assumptions of how things should be. For example, mediators are just 
as likely as anyone else, suggests Trina Grillo (1991 ), to make assumptions that 
privilege men's work commitments and careers over women's. Thus patriarchal 
power relations, unless specifically addressed in the mediation itself, get 
reproduced in the outcomes that flow from a 'neutral' mediator's stance (Astor & 
Chinkin, 1992). A key argument along these lines rests on the comparison of the 
relative incomes and economic positions of men and women after divorce. 
Mediation, say the critics, does nothing to address economic inequality (Bower, 
1992). 
Another feminist argument that has been raised, particularly against 
mandated mediation in divorce cases, pertains to differences in men's and 
women's communication styles. If women are socialised to be more emotional 
and to emphasise the maintenance of relational connection over the expression of 
anger and the assertion of individual rights, then an approach to mediation that 
regards emotional expression as antithetical to rational problem-solving may 
legitimise values in mediation that do not serve women's purposes. Trina Grillo 
(1991) speaks of mediation conducted in this way as treating women who 
become emotional as 'unfeminine' and 'pathological'. Similarly women who 
express their interests strongly in mediation may be more likely than men to be 
characterised as 'greedy', 'selfish', or 'controlling' (Grillo, 1991, p. 1599). Thus, 
mediators can 'delegitimate women's anger' and the expression of women's 
interests (p, 1578) in ways that harm their interests in divorce settlements. 
Women's relational orientation has also been suggested as a handicap in conflict 
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situations if it leads them to be more willing to cooperate and compromise than 
their ex-spouse (Grillo, 1991). 
Some of the feminist arguments along these lines have been based on a 
comparison of mediation with litigation in the context of divorce settlements. 
Critics of mediation have proposed that women do better when they focus on 
winning their legal rights in courts of law than when they settle amicably in 
mediation (Rifkin, 1984; Grillo, 1991 ). However this argument has been 
contested (for example by Benjamin & Irving, 1992; Edwards, 1997) on the 
grounds that it is too global and fails to take into account, firstly, some of the 
possibilities for women in mediation, and, secondly, some of the failings of 
adversarial legal systems to obviate patriarchal inequality. As Trina Grillo says, 
Of course, subordinated people can go to court and lose. In fact they 
usually do. 
(Trillo, 1991, p. 1610.) 
Stronger feminist critiques have raised questions about mediators' 
failures to be sensitive to the effects of violence on what transpires in mediation 
itself (Lerman, 1984; Rifkin, 1989; Robertson, Lapsley & Busch, 1992). If a 
husband has been abusive, then mediator neutrality can give legitimacy to the 
abuser's perspective and fail to take adequate account of the effects of the abuse 
on the victim's ability to speak freely. Moreover, victims of abuse have 
sometimes been placed at risk of further abuse even by attending a mediation 
meeting. 
However, it also needs to be noted that research evidence to support the 
claim that mediation is not necessarily supportive of women's interests has been 
at best equivocal. Beck and Sales (2000) review the literature about gender and 
mediation and note that, in one study of divorce mediation by Kelly and Duryee 
( 1992), women tended to be more satisfied than men with both the experience 
and outcomes of mediation. They also reported greater confidence in their ability 
to stand up for themselves. Against this, another study reported that women who 
litigated were more satisfied with the outcome than were women who went 
through mediation, while men were more likely to be satisfied with mediation 
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(Emery, Matthews & Kitzmann, 1994). And a third study found similar 
satisfaction rates for men and women (Pearson & Thoennes, 1988). These data 
appear inconclusive, and Beck and Sales examine the detail of these studies to 
show that the results are influenced by various factors in the study design or the 
sampling process to the extent that nothing conclusive can be established about 
gender-based satisfaction with mediation processes. Satisfaction rates also focus 
only on outcomes and do not get at the process issues in the relations between 
people in the mediation itself. In this way they are a blunt instrument for 
assessing the neutrality issue in particular. Perhaps more telling is a study 
reported by Grillo (1991) in which men and women cited differing reasons for 
refusing mediation. The differences reflect gendered power relations. Women's 
reasons for not wanting to participate were more likely to relate to their mistrust 
of, or fear of, their ex-spouse, whereas men were more likely to refuse mediation 
because they were sceptical of mediation processes or convinced they could win 
in court. 
Mediation practice in the problem-solving model has also been found 
wanting by various non-European ethnic communities. For example, the 
emphasis on individual psychological concepts such as needs and interests does 
not sit easily with cultural traditions that emphasize collective responsibility 
ahead of individual autonomy (Duryea & Grundison, 1993; Kruk, 1997; 
Nunnerly, 2002; Tomas & Quince, 1999). Nor does the field of mediation pay 
enough attention to the culture-bound values and assumptions that are built into 
dominant formulations of mediation practice. For example, the valuing of direct 
over indirect communication (Durie, 2000; Kruk, 1997; Menkel-Meadow, 2001; 
Nunnerly, 2002), the emphasis on rational and analytical thinking (MacDuff, 
1999; Nunnerly, 2002), the formality of mediation process (Nunnerly, 2002) 
have all been argued to reflect a cultural bias. It might also be worth questioning 
the ethics of the neutral facilitation of win-win solutions to address situations 
where the interests of one of the parties are strongly informed by racism. 
Furthermore, culturally specific patterns of addressing conflict are not 
necessarily included in an approach that does not advertise its cultural origins 
(MacDuff, 1999; Nunnerly, 2002). Menkel-Meadow (2001) suggests that there 
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is in practice 'no cultural uniformity' (p. xvii) to the forms that mediation takes 
anyway. 
The point here is that the idea of neutrality is highly problematic when 
cultural dimensions are taken into account simply because no aspect of mediation 
is free from cultural influence. Therefore, it is always likely that cross-cultural 
mediation will produce inequalities in the way in which understandings are 
produced. 
As a result of these critiques, a more cautious approach to the subject of 
neutrality can be detected in recent writings (for example, Beck & Sales, 2000). 
Empirical data suggest that such caution is evident in mediators' consciousness. 
It has been suggested that mediators experience the 'ideal' of neutrality as an 
'institutional constraint' (Garcia, 2000, p. 323) holding them back from imposing 
more of their own viewpoints. I would prefer to speak about discursive restraint, 
but Garcia describes mediators as producing in their talk a 'display' of neutrality 
(Garcia, 1997, p. 229; 2000, p. 337) which is different from being neutral. This 
discursive display is then necessarily compromised by other elements of 
mediator practice, such as the issuing of 'general or specific solicits' (Garcia, 
2000, p. 331) designed to 'empower' disputants to reach resolution of dispute. 
These 'solicits' are questions asking disputants to respond in the general 
direction of a settlement. In order to even ask such questions, mediators step 
away from the neutral position that they espouse. 
Transf ormative Mediation 
A further critique of the problem-solving model leads us directly into the 
consideration of the major alternative orientation that has developed during the 
1990s, known as transformative mediation (Folger & Bush, 1994; Bush & Folger; 
1994). These writers critique the problem-solving orientation on the grounds that it 
places a 'heavy reliance on mediator initiative and direction, because both are useful 
in generating settlement' (Bush, 2001, p. 369). Following from their critique of the 
way in which an instrumental settlement-orientation in problem-solving leads to the 
selection out of certain kinds of issues ahead of others (see above), they focus on the 
facilitative practices of the mediator that work towards this end. The problem-solving 
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orientation, they claim, leads to a much too directive style (Bush & Folger, 1994, p. 
64). This description refers to mediators' use of 'techniques and strategies in order to 
control the relationship ... to produce outcomes' (Nabatchi & Bingham, 2001, p. 
401). 
Proponents of transformative mediation advocate giving people control over 
resolving their own conflicts. Their political analysis of the mediator-party 
relationship leads them to urge a more hands-off style of mediation in which the 
parties to a conflict are given more opportunity to communicate directly with each 
other, rather than through the mediator. They place faith in people's 'capacity to 
regain their footing' after feeling the effects of the 'conflict's natural destabilizing 
impacts on interaction' (Bush, 2001, p. 369). The footing to be regained is argued to 
have two main components: a 'restored sense of strength/confidence in the self (the 
empowerment shift) and openness/responsiveness to the other (the recognition shift)' 
(Bush, 2001, p. 369). 
Empowerment is taken to mean giving parties a 'greater sense of self-respect, 
self-reliance, and self-confidence' (Bush & Folger, 1994, p. 20). Such empowerment 
is achieved by helping people: a) realize more clearly what their goals and interests 
are; b) realize that choices and options exist; c) learn better skills for conflict 
resolution; d) become more aware of resources already in their possession; e) make 
conscious decisions on their own behalf (Bush & Folger, 1994, pp. 84-87). 
Promoting recognition is taken to mean helping people: a) reach a genuine 
appreciation of the other's human predicament; b) focus attention on what the other is 
experiencing and acknowledge it; c) reinterpret past events more sympathetically in 
the light of the other's views; d) see the other party in a more favourable light; e) 
stop thinking the worst about the other's motives and behaviours; f) communicate 
new understanding and offer apologies for 'having thought the worst'; g) make some 
concrete accommodation of the other in terms of the dispute (Bush & Folger, 1994, 
pp. 89-91). 
As the individual parties regain their sense of empowerment and recognition, 
'the interaction can therefore regenerate and assume a constructive, connecting, and 
humanizing character' (Bush & Folger, 1994, p. 369). This is the transformative 
effect referred to in the name of this orientation. The argument is that when people 
are in conflict they are more interested in transformation of the relationship and the 
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interaction than in settlement per se. A transformative mediator's goal is not 
therefore to pursue settlement itself but to 'help the participants reach clarity about 
their concerns and to recognize each other's position and interests' (Hallberlin, 2001, 
p. 375). Reaching agreement or settlement takes a back seat and becomes a secondary 
aim of the mediation process. Carrie Menkel-Meadow goes as far as describing the 
transformative approach as 'indifferent to whether or not agreement is reached' 
(Menkel-Meadow, 1995, p. 231). 
In a major nationwide application of this approach in the United States, Postal 
Service settlement rates were specifically rejected as measures of the success of 
mediation in favour of what were called 'participation rates' and 'closure rates' 
(Hallberlin, 2001, p. 379). 'Closure rates' is a phrase designed to include settlements 
of complaints but also their withdrawal or dropping in the wake of a mediation. 
The transformative model is illustrated by a story of a particular case 
drawn from this same project. Let me include this story as it is told by Joseph 
Folger. 
A Hispanic employee and other members of their unit were at a 
meeting with their manager about upcoming changes in their unit. At one 
point in the meeting the frustrated manager slammed a stack of papers on 
to the table. The employee immediately got up and left the room. He was 
then disciplined by the manager for leaving the meeting. The employee 
went to the doctor complaining that the actions of the manager had hurt 
his ears and he filed an EEP complaint against the manager. This is how 
the case came to mediation. 
The beginning of the mediation was intense. The manager was 
especially angry and could not understand how slamming papers on the 
table could cause injury or why the employee would leave the building. 
Fallowing a caucus the employee explained a concept which his culture 
called a 'bad wind. ' He said it is like a curse on you and your family and 
when you experience it, you need to get away from it as soon as possible. 
When the manager slammed papers on the desk he said all of this 'bad 
wind' hit me. After he left the meeting, he did not feel comfortable 
explaining his beliefs to the manager or his coworkers; so to save face, he 
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claimed that the manager's actions hurt his ears. This revelation in the 
mediation led to a tremendous discussion that went on for hours. The 
manager and the employee apologized and the complaint was withdrawn. 
(Folger, 2001, pp. 395-6) 
In his analysis of this story, Folger emphasises the absence of a settlement. 
Rather, the difference achieved in mediation is described with reference to 
notions such as increased understanding and greater mutual recognition. 
Some comments on this story as an example of transformative mediation 
in action are in order before passing on. As a report on a mediation, the 
construction of this narrative is interesting. It appears to hinge on the fact that 
some information was hidden from the manager in the early stages of the conflict 
and when it is revealed, improved communication can take place and the conflict 
is resolved. What happens in the several hours of 'tremendous discussion' 
leading to the exchange of apologies and the withdrawal of the complaint is left 
out of the story. One can only speculate that this selection of certain narrative 
elements for emphasis and the omission of others is shaped by the transformative 
model so that the spotlight falls on the communication that leads to increased 
personal understanding and mutual recognition. There is no discussion of the 
work done in cultural discourse to produce relations around these issues. For 
example, there is no question about why the worker, rather than the manager, has 
to 'save face', or about what might have been at work in the context of ethnic 
relations to convey to the worker that his concerns would not be recognised as 
legitimate if he spoke about 'bad wind' from the start (unless such things were 
part of the 'tremendous discussion'). 
Transformative mediation also embraces a wider social vision than a 
simple transformation of the immediate relationship between the disputing 
parties. It is a vision of personal 'moral growth' (Bush & Folger, 1994, p. 24) 
expressed in transformed social environments through the 'bridging of human 
differences' (Nabatchi & Bingham, 2001, p. 401). In Bernstein's (1996) terms, 
Bush and Folger' s vision is that mediation embrace explicitly a 'pedagogical' 
function (I shall refer more to Bernstein's version of pedagogy in Chapter Three). 
The transformative vision is expressed by Bush and Folger in this way: 
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It involves changing not just situations but people themselves, and thus the 
society as a whole ... The goal is a world in which people are not just 
better off but better: more human and more humane. Achieving this goal 
means transforming people from dependent beings concerned only with 
themselves (weak and selfish people) into secure and self-reliant beings 
willing to be concerned with and responsive to others ( strong and caring 
people). 111e occurrence of this transformation brings out the intrinsic 
good, the highest level, within human beings. And with changed, better 
human beings, society as a whole becomes a changed, better place. 
(Bush & Folger, 1994, p. 29) 
In the United States Postal Service Project, a clear objective was to enhance the 
working conditions of the entire organisation, not just to clear some particular 
complaints (Hallberlin, 2001). However, it is clear that the vision of social 
change being articulated is not about structural or institutional conditions, except 
incidentally. Bush and Folger specify: 
... transformation does not mean institutional restructuring but rather a 
change or refinement in the consciousness and character of individual 
human beings. Transformation in the sense used here necessarily 
connotes individual moral development, although this kind of change will 
very likely lead to changes in social institutions as well. (emphasis in 
original) 
(Bush & Folger, 1994, p. 24) 
Assumptions In Transformative Mediation 
It is interesting to note that transformative mediation begins its critique of 
problem-solving from something of a deconstructive perspective. It pays close 
attention to the ways in which the mediator's articulation of practice constitutes 
the parties in several ways, especially in how it pushes ('directs') them towards a 
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settlement. In a recent conference presentation, four advocates of transformative 
mediation used a detailed deconstruction of the language of mediator evaluation 
and accreditation policy documents to demonstrate how a focus on settlement 
rates meant that transformative mediators were being systematically excluded 
from a fair hearing on their own terms (Bush, Della Noce, Press & Sharp, 2001). 
In other words, the transformative perspective shows an inclination to take 
seriously the work that is done by particular ways of speaking to shape the 
mediation process. 
There is also a greater analysis of the power relations between the 
mediator and the parties than can be found in the problem-solving orientation. 
Transformative mediators' desire to give the parties as much control as possible 
over the process. They demonstrate reflexive awareness of mediators' potential 
to influence parties' participation in and understanding of both procedural and 
substantive issues. 
However, the transformative notion of empowerment that aims to give 
parties a 'greater sense of self-respect, self-reliance, and self-confidence' (Bush 
& Folger, 1994, p. 20) fits within the parameters of the 
'rehabilitative/developmental' model of empowerment critiqued by Sara Cobb 
( 1993). Cobb shows how the power referred to in such ideas about 
empowerment 'lurks unseen in the hearts and minds of disputants, as an attribute 
of individuals' (Cobb, 1993, p. 248). It reduces to a cognitive mental state, rather 
than to an understanding rooted in communicative practices or social relations. It 
refers to an individual state of being empowered rather than to a shift in the 
structure of a relation. 
Transformative mediation claims an allegiance to a social constructionist 
perspective. However, it is interesting to note the ways in which this claim is 
constructed. Bush and Folger put it this way: 
In the language of contemporary thought, this is a social constructionist 
view of human nature and society. 
(Bush & Folger, 1994, p. 236) 
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The language of this sentence indicates a certain distance from any kind of easy 
identification with social constructionism. Seven years later, Folger is similarly 
cagey: 
A 'social constructionist view' is one term that is often used to capture the 
way people construct meanings. 
(Folger, 2001, p. 389) 
He specifically does not claim to use this term himself. He makes this comment 
in the context of arguing a relationship of kinship between transformative 
mediation and the ideological shifts evident in the development of qualitative 
research methodologies, in conversation analysis, in the rhetorical tum in social 
science, and in the possibility of multiple meanings (rather than of singular 
underlying true meaning) in any piece of communication. But he does not refer 
to any social constructionist assumptions being built into the transformative 
mediation model itself. 
The apparent reluctance to embrace social constructionism is telling with 
regard to identifying the dominant discourses at work in transformative 
mediation. It may contain a number of constructivist elements. Constructivism 
(Mahoney, 2000; Kelly, 1955) is a philosophical movement that shares with 
constructionism an interest in meaning making but places less emphasis on the 
structuring effects of discourse and power relations. Instead, it emphasises the 
construction of knowledge and meaning 'in the interpersonal context' (Raskin & 
Lewandowski, 2000, p. 16). While advocates of transformative mediation 
espouse an openness to constructionist ideas, it does not read as a social 
constructionist approach. Kruk (1997) refers to transformative mediation as 
humanistic in orientation and this description seems more apt. The conflict 
theory implicit in transformative mediation seems to be based on modernist 
communication theory. The underlying argument runs thus: absence of clear, 
direct communication can be expected to lead to communication problems which 
can be resolved when people are able to speak directly to each other with full 
emotional expressiveness. 
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The image of the self that engages in this communication is clearly also 
modernist psychology's construction of self as a rational, goal-oriented, moral 
agent, possessing resources, exercising conscious choices, and bolstered by 
processes of empowerment that promote self-respect, self-reliance and self-
confidence. It is modified a little by the elaboration of an incipient relational 
dimension, but it is still the individual self of modernist psychology that is at 
work in these conceptualisations. As Carrie Menkel-Meadow comments: 
... Bush and Folger proudly take on ... the individualization and 
internalization of problems and disputes. They have' psychologized' or 
'moralized' exactly what ... should remain political. 
(Menkel-Meadow, 1995, p. 235.) 
Their vision of social change is an inside-out approach. Change the 
person on the inside (make them more moral, concerned about others) and the 
social world outside them will be transformed. This sounds more idealist than 
constructionist. A social constructionist or discursive approach would start in a 
different place, perhaps an outside-in approach. The constructionist vision is that 
the self (or selves) is created through the positions taken up in discourse through 
the articulation of social practices and therefore personal moral development and 
concern for others might develop as a product of discourse in which such values 
were featured. It might conceive of social change primarily as achieved in 
discursive shifts, which are gradually internalised by people, or by institutions, 
leading to shifts in social practice. A social constructionist approach would also 
be interested in a more thorough-going deconstruction of how power relations in 
mediation are constructed in discourse. It would particularly be interested in how 
people's interests, positions, sense of empowerment and recognition of others are 
legitimated (or excluded) in knowledge systems and in dominant discourse. 
Such an interest is not developed in the literature of transformative mediation. 
There are critiques that have been advanced about transformative 
mediation. Carrie Menkel-Meadow (1995) sympathises with the ethics of 
building the competence of disputing parties and promoting mutual 
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understanding but roundly criticises the transfonnative writers for the following 
reasons: 
a) Transfonnative mediation's individual focus makes it insensitive to social 
conditions and even ethnocentric. 
b) It does not specify clearly from what to what it is seeking to transform 
people. 
c) Despite its claims to being less directive and more process neutral, it is no 
less neutral with regard to content than is a problem-solving model. 
d) The emphasis on individual growth does not attend well to relationship 
development, let alone to the group or the community. 
e) The emphasis on personal transformation rather than settlement is too 
grandiose and ignores disputing parties' frequent wishes to reach 
settlements. 
Novella Keith (1996), while appreciating the shift to a more relational 
perspective, also raises questions about whether transformative mediation 
processes adequately address social inequity and power differences. 
So where does this sketch of the problem-solving and transformati ve 
approaches to mediation leave us? Clearly, neither of these approaches are the 
last word in mediation practice. Both leave intact the individual subject of 
modernist psychology and make assumptions about power relations that focus on 
personal power rather than on a socio-cultural analysis of power. They are both 
therefore open to criticism from feminist and indigenous cultural perspectives 
and share a somewhat leaky notion of neutrality. While both open some 
possibilities for bringing about shifts towards more inclusive social interactions 
in contexts where people negotiate differences between them, both are also 
limited by their own assumptive baggage. I believe that the field of mediation is 
ready for new approaches. In the search for new models and new practices of 
mediation, I propose that we begin with some recent developments in 
constructionist psychology and ask whether the elaboration of these ideas into the 
field of mediation can produce new approaches to conflict resolution. In the next 
chapter a selection of the most relevant of these ideas will be explained and 




Before I return to the practice of mediation, I want to introduce some ideas 
that will be relevant to the kind of practice I want to articulate. These ideas will 
serve as the philosophical basis for the argument of this study and they also offer 
some specific advantages for the practice of mediation. They enable some useful 
conceptualizations of the nature of conflict itself and promise greater purchase in 
the negotiation of ways forward in conflict resolution. These advantages, 
moreover, have the potential to address some of the problems that have been 
thrown up by the problem-solving approach, as I have articulated them in the 
previous chapter. In addition, the same ideas will serve as the basis for the 
discourse analytic research method that I want to employ. 
In this chapter, I shall outline the conceptual tools, drawn principally from 
social constructionist or discourse psychology, that will be used for the purpose 
outlined in chapter one, the elaboration of the discursive analysis of positioning in 
mediation. I shall locate these conceptual tools in the academic conversations 
where they have developed and select from among the available versions of these 
concepts those that are most relevant to this project. In order to make this 
selection, I shall review the problems that I see arising in relation to these 
concepts and argue that the choices I am making are likely to bear most fruit for 
the practice of mediation and for the kind of research that can illuminate this 
practice. 
The concentration in this chapter will be on laying the foundation for my 
use of what I am calling the discursive analysis of positioning. In the following 
chapters, I shall build on this foundation both an articulation of a practice of 
mediation that deploys the idea of positioning as a conceptual tool and a research 
method that uses the same concepts to investigate the effectiveness of this practice 
in moment-by-moment detail. 
So what are the building blocks that need to be laid as foundations for this 
work? The central concept that will be the focus of this study is 'discursive 
positioning'. Clearly, then, the idea of discourse needs to be further explained, as 
does the theory of positioning. But first, I briefly need to locate these concepts in 
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the general literature of postmodern social theory out of which they arise. Social 
constructionism is one name for the development of postmodern ideas in 
psychology and this study will draw on the literature that uses this description. A 
cornerstone of some versions of social constructionist psychology has been 
Michel Foucault's (1978; 1980) analysis of the articulation of power relations 
through discourse. Foucault's ideas help understand the structuring of utterances 
in mediation contexts and therefore this work needs to be reviewed. However, the 
analysis of the structuring effects of discourse can appear to erase the possibility 
of agency in conventional terms. If mediation is to be a relevant site for the 
expression of resistance to dominant discourses, then a theory of agency needs to 
be invoked. Therefore, it is necessary to articulate a description of 'personal 
agency' in terms that can be sustained with regard to discourse theory. I shall 
show how the theory of positioning is especially useful in this regard because it 
enables a focus on the individual without losing sight of pervasive social issues in 
the process. Mikhail Bakhtin's (1981; 1984; 1986) theory of the utterance and his 
notions of dialogue and heteroglossia are relevant supports for the theory of 
positioning at this point. The flexibility of this concept of positioning will serve 
as the basis for the claims I shall make in relation to the practice of mediation. I 
shall show how positioning helps facilitate the negotiation of ways forward in 
dispute situations, always in relation to the background discourses at work in the 
production of a conflict. To introduce each of these building blocks and to 
specify how I shall be using them is the task of the rest of this chapter. 
Postmodernism 
This study is located within the broad tradition of postmodern social 
theory. Postmodernism is a term applied to a loose collection of intellectual 
movements in a variety of social fields stretching well beyond the social sciences. 
Some suggest that its centre of gravity lies more in the arts and architecture than 
in social science (for example, Burr, 1995, p. 12) but it needs to be considered as 
part of the background against which we can understand the general principles of 
social constructionist psychology and the specific concept of positioning. 
As the term suggests, postmodernism as an intellectual movement is a 
reaction to the dominance of modernism: a term referring to the approach to 
knowledge and truth that grew out of the Enlightenment in Europe in the mid-
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eighteenth century (Seidman, 1994 ). Postmodernism casts doubt on the idea that 
the world can best be understood in terms of the grand narratives or meta-
narratives (Lyotard, 1984) of modernist science (based on rationality and 
objective observation) with their promise of ongoing social progress. Seidman 
( 1994) has summarised modernist culture as built on the following set of 
organizing assumptions or grand narratives: 
Assumptions regarding the unity of humanity, the individual as the 
creative force of society and history, the superiority of the west, the 
idea of science as Truth, and the belief in social progress ... 
(Seidman, 1994, p. 1) 
Built on the basis of these assumptions, Seidman details a series of institutional 
edifices that have entrenched the modernist cultural perspective: 
An industrial-based economy; a politics organized around unions, 
political parties and interest groups; ... the market and state regulation 
... role specialization and professionalism ... ; knowledges divided into 
disciplines and organized around an ideology of scientific 
enlightenment and progress; the public celebration of a culture of self-
redemption and emancipatory hope. 
(Seidman, 1994, p. 1) 
From a postmodern perspective, modernism is characterized as 'in crisis' 
but far from 'abruptly coming to an end' (Seidman, 1994, p. 1). Postmodernism 
asks uncomfortable questions of the adequacy of modernist assumptions about 
truth, knowledge, the relations between the individual and the social, and the 
possibility of progress, and argues that many historically and culturally specific 
assumptions have been masquerading as timeless universal truths. 
The field of mediation is underpinned by its own grand narratives. The 
problem-solving orientation assumes the value of applying the scientific method 
to problems of living. It instructs us first to identify a problem, isolate it from its 
social context, gather facts about it through objective study, determine the 
underlying causes (that is, discover the interests or basic human needs), and 
negotiate a democratic solution to solve the problem. These are the process grand 
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narratives. There will also be grand narratives that underpin the nature of specific 
conflicts that mediators work with. For example, in family mediation, narratives 
about the 'normal' family will be at work. The analysis of positioning in 
mediation focuses on the relations between these grand narratives and the specific 
positions in which people find themselves. In other words, the deconstruction of 
discursive positioning foregrounds the work being done by these narratives rather 
than leaves them to do their work in the background. It also foregrounds the ways 
in which people construct themselves in relation to these narratives. The analysis 
of positioning will also pay attention to the ways in which standard mediation 
knowledge works to construct the mediator in the 'scientist-practitioner' mould 
and to construct consequent relations between the mediator and the parties. 
Poststructuralism 
The concepts of discourse and of positioning also draw from the academic 
tradition known as poststructuralism. The term poststructuralism derives from a 
set of academic debates that Lemert (1994) locates as taking place initially in 
France in the aftermath of the intellectual ferment in Paris in 1968 (see also 
Peters, 1996). Key figures in these debates were Derrida, Lyotard, Lacan, 
Foucault, Kristeva and Baudrillard (Peters, 1996). As the name suggests, 
poststructuralism was an outgrowth of the academic movement known as 
'structuralism' in which social phenomena were studied by a process of 
identifying and analysing their structural elements rather than their surface 
features, for example, Levi-Strauss' s (1967) analysis of myth. 
Structuralism represented a radical questioning of the humanist subject 
(Peters, 1996). It was built on a linguistic foundation in which meanings were 
detached from the intentions of the author and explained in terms of underlying 
patterns, or structures. Levi-Strauss (1967) argued that these structures were 
ahistorical and universal. Therefore, the specifics of history and culture mattered 
less to the development of meaning. Realities were to be explained with reference 
to the underlying structure of language. Whereas humanism might place the 
individual at the centre of the creation of meaning, structuralism pushed the 
human subject aside and placed the universal form or structure at the centre. 
Structuralist analysis in linguistics was paralleled in Marxist analyses of 
social structure that privileged the economic determination of ideological 
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formations. In Marx's analysis (Tucker, 1978), within a given social system of 
organisation, the structural economic base of the means of production (including 
the social relations of production) determined the social class relations and the 
superstructural world of ideology, rhetoric, art, religion, fashion and politics. In 
order to understand the ideological and political world it was necessary to refer 
back to the economic or material base for the major organising forces (Tucker, 
1978). Political, religious and philosophical ideas were thus relegated to the 
position of social effects and stripped of the possibility of originary force. As 
Vivien Burr (1995) points out, ideology per se was always to be suspected, in 
Marxist analysis, as 'false consciousness' and human beings were considered 
almost as irrational and unwitting puppets of social and material forces beyond 
their control. 
However, if all ideas and ideologies are simply epiphenomena of the 
underlying structural economic base, it becomes problematic to trust any analysis 
of the social world because it must be assumed that the analysis itself is a product 
of the underlying structure. This is a problem for economic determinism when it 
comes to agreeing on a strategy for action to bring about social change, since any 
political strategy could be criticised on the same basis. 
Another problem with such a deterministic view (Chouliaraki & 
Fairclough, 1999, p. 2, refer to an 'emphasis on structural constraint' in social 
theory) is that it leaves little room for the exercise of moral agency. Political 
analysis is possible but it is difficult to say how it can lead to effective action. 
Political struggle might be pursued but, in the end, will not be decisive. Only 
structural shifts in the relations of production, such as through revolution, can 
achieve real social change. Mediation, or therapy, for example, can scarcely be 
conceived of as sites of worthwhile activity for social change. At best, they might 
help people bear their suffering. At worst, they might actively alienate people 
from their essential class or gender interests and adjust them to tolerate rather than 
challenge oppression. 
Marxist theory developed a less deterministic emphasis when Gramsci 
(1971) proposed a theory of hegemony that included a cultural perspective as well 
as a purely economic one in his analysis of social change. In his view, ideology 
was not simply identified with a systematic 'false consciousness' produced only 
as an effect in the social superstructure. Rather he saw ideology as present in a 
more organic way as part of the struggle between bourgeois and working class 
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collective wills made materially evident in social institutions and apparatuses. If a 
hegemonic formation was understood as produced out of such a struggle, then it 
was less determinate in advance of the historical specifics of that struggle (Laclau 
& Mouffe, 2001). He had at least argued that agentic struggle against structuring 
social forces was worth the effort and that it could make a difference to the course 
of history and the materiality of people's lives. However, as Laclau and Mouffe 
(2001) point out, the essential interests of social classes still constituted an 
underlying structural driving force in the formulation of the struggle for 
hegemony in Gramsci's analysis. 
The poststructuralist critique goes further in challenging the reliance on 
essential structures, although it also retains some continuity with structuralist 
thought (Peters, 1996) through its further challenges to the humanist subject. 
Poststructuralists like Foucault (1969; 1972) suggested that it was not possible to 
adequately account for social phenomena with reference to their essential 
structures because those structures were themselves constructed out of the social 
world that was mapped onto them through discourse. Lemert (1994, p. 265) 
describes the poststructuralist project as focussed on the practice of 'decentering' 
the idea of an essential structure, whether we are referring to linguistic structures, 
psychological structures or social structures. 
Poststructuralist social theorising has sought to disestablish what used to 
pass for essential certainties in social science. For example, in Marxist social 
theory, the essential interests of the working class and the inevitable progress 
from a capitalist economic system to a more socialist one are argued against as 
either contestable or no longer able to be sustained (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001 ). 
Radical feminist critiques of the essential opposition of men and women were 
transformed by a new emphasis on the discursive production of gender that was 
not essential at all (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). 
Michel Foucault (1969; 1978) challenged the foundations of knowledge in 
social science by arguing that knowledge was not only inseparable from the flow 
of discourse but that it was also deeply implicated in the production of power in 
social relations. Particular historical and cultural contexts, argued Foucault, are 
productive of, and at the same time products of, the knowledges and assumptions 
about the world out of which we operate and our assumptions about the world are 
cultural artefacts more than they are positive facts. To notice this does not make 
these assumptions wrong, but it may limit the functionality of these assumptions 
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to the cultural world to which they belong. We might also do better to think of 
them as inevitably tied to a particular social context, rather than as universal 
truths. 
Hence, there was no position from which it might be possible to formulate 
knowledge of the social world that was objective and free from a culturally-
imbued perspective. Foucault's argument asks us to enquire into the knowledge 
that has been generated in the field of mediation and ask questions about the 
power relations that might be fostered by the application of this knowledge. 
These questions might include, 'Who is advantaged by this knowledge?' or 'What 
relational positions are made legitimate within this knowledge?' or 'Whose 
interests are excluded by the dominant discourses at work in the production of this 
knowledge?' 
Poststructuralist thinking then makes the process of knowledge 
construction a subject of study. Knowledge and discourse are understood as 
integral to the social construction of relations between people. Personal identity, 
social categories, relationships and families need to be understood with reference 
to the work done by discourse more than with reference to underlying essential 
structures. 
Since discourse is produced in the exchanges that take place between 
people in various sites of interaction or conversation, it follows that specific sites 
of interaction can be studied in order to understand how discursive meanings are 
negotiated within them. Thus Fairclough (1992) is able to speak of counselling 
(and the same might be said of mediation) as an 'ambiguous practice', not 
essentially either oppressive or emancipatory, but potentially either, according to 
how and in which contexts it is practised. 
Poststructuralist writers further challenge the subjectivist account of the 
human subject that has been a feature of liberal humanist thought since the 
Enlightenment. Foucault, in particular, sought to decentre the position of 'man', 
and especially the individual, as the 'creative force of society and history' 
(Seidman, 1994 ). Foucault ( 1969) argued that the concept of the human being of 
the social sciences was not so much discovered by scientific method as it was 
created by and within such a method. Derrida (1976) contributed to the 
decentering project with his efforts to 'deconstruct' text in ways that diffused the 
position of the author. Instead of meaning being inherent in either the text or in 
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the intentions of the author, Derrida proposed an idea of meaning as produced in 
the shifting field of interpretation between the reader and the text. 
Applied to the practice of mediation, these ideas suggest a revision of the 
simple assumption that conflicts can be understood with reference to the 
underlying 'interests' of the disputing parties. These interests, or needs, are 
assumed to proceed either from what is essential in the individual or from an 
essential position within a social structure. If we decentre the subject of the 
problem-solving discourse and imagine how discourse might offer people subject 
positions, then the notion that a conflict might originate in parties' underlying 
(structural) interests slips a little. It becomes of more interest to think about the 
discursive influences on what someone is saying than to assume that what they are 
saying corresponds to an internally driven need. If the meaning of a person's 
utterance is shaped to at least some extent by social forces constituted in 
discourse, then the search for the underlying interests in the problem-solving 
method may not be enough. Instead, from a poststructuralist perspective, the 
interests that may be driving a dispute may be sought in the interplay of discourse 
that takes place between the individual and the social world around them. Such 
interplay of discourse would have to include the conversation that takes place in 
the mediation itself. Hence, an implication of poststructralism is that we take 
more seriously what actually happens in the mediation conversation and consider 
the possibility that the conflict, and the respective parties' interests, may actually 
still be in production through the process of dialogue in mediation, rather than 
already structured by underlying essences. If this is so, then it also follows that it 
may be transformed in that moment in some way as well. 
The Concept Of Discourse 
The poststructuralist concept of discourse is the basis for the approach to 
the discursive analysis of positioning that I want to make use of in this study. 
However, this usage is far from consensual and it is necessary to lay out carefully 
the basis for my own use of it in this context in more detail than I did in Chapter 
One. 'Discourse' is not a hard and fast category in itself. Many different usages 
of the term overlap. Therefore MacLeod (2002) suggests that it is preferable to 
speak about 'conceptualisations' of discourse rather than 'definitions'. I am using 
it in the Foucauldian sense to signify a description of a social practice. In order to 
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distinguish this usage let me briefly review some different ways in which the term 
discourse has been used. 
Fairclough (1992) notes that in some contexts 'discourse' is taken to refer 
to extended samples of spoken dialogue rather than written texts, while, in other 
instances, it is used to refer to different types of language used in different social 
contexts (for example, the discourse of classrooms, courtrooms or medical 
consultation rooms). There are also conceptualisations of discourse that make 
distinctions between the use of the term discourse and the use of other linguistic 
elements of analysis, for example distinctions between 'discourse' and 'text' or 
'genre'. One such simple conceptualisation describes discourse as: 
A stretch of language consisting of several sentences, which are 
perceived as being related in some way. 
(Nunan, 1993, p. 5) 
This conceptualisation does not go far enough into the analysis of social practice 
for my purposes but it does capture the aspect of coherence across units of 
linguistic analysis and directs attention to the relatedness of words in their 
meaning content. It at least points to the possibility of appreciating the 
constructedness of meaning systems. The idea of meaning systems leads us to an 
understanding of discourse (and a focus in its analysis) that includes more than the 
immediate linguistic context. For it is in discourse that people take perspectives 
on a number of potentially contestable aspects of life. Hence discourse can be 
understood as the domain in which what is 'normal', what is 'acceptable', what is 
'right', what is 'real' and what is 'possible' are constructed (Gee, 1999, p. 2). Gee 
offers another conceptualisation of discourse: 
In the end a Discourse is a 'dance' that exists in the abstract as a 
coordinated pattern of words, deeds, values, symbols, tools, objects, 
times, and places, and in the here and now as a performance that is 
recognized as just such a coordination. 
(Gee, 1999, p. 19) 
This conceptualisation emphasizes the performance aspect of discourse. It points 
to the moment of interaction and to the way the social exchange that takes place in 
60 
this moment embodies more than what is immediate, or more than what is present 
in the intentions and consciousness of the performers. The inclusion of these 
dimensions of discourse is useful in the analysis of actual conversations and 
connects with conceptualisations that emphasize the use of discourse as a social 
practice. As we perform acts of social significance around particular 
understandings of what is right or normal or real and so on, we embody these 
understandings in practice. This is why conceptualisations of the concept of 
discourse take us into the domain of the social and particularly into descriptions of 
widespread social practices. 
Foucault was a leading contributor to the development of an analysis of 
the social world with reference to the concept of discourse. His definition of 
discourse picks up on the notion of social practice and has been widely quoted. 
He calls discourses: 
. .. practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. 
(Foucault, 1969,p.49) 
This conceptualisation brings together several features of discourse. One is the 
use of the word 'practices' which suggests what Burr (1995) refers to as the 
performative function of language through which people act upon the world. 
Discourses are not simply representations of such acts. Words make a difference 
to reality, they do not just report it. MacLeod (2002) argues in this regard that 
Foucault wished to restore to discourse its character as an 'event'. The word 
'practices' also suggests a wide enough view of language to include more than a 
narrow lexical focus. Discourses as practices include, for example, nonverbal 
communications, visual symbols, clothing or architectural constructions, as well 
as words in their written or spoken form. 
The word 'systematically' in Foucault's conceptualisation suggests 
something wider than the individual as the social context in which discourse lives. 
It makes no sense to say that a person has her own personal discourse. 
'Systematically' also suggests a structuring and organising principle. Discourses 
are repetitive and patterned. The objects Foucault refers to are the nominal 
categories of our world. They include physical objects, activities, identities, 
forms of embodiment, relationships and social groupings (Gee, 1999; Willig, 
1999). Ian Parker (1992, p. 5) has suggested that a discourse is a 'system of 
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statements which constructs an object', in part echoing Foucault's definition. 
Knowledge is theorised in this way as a system of statements that are produced 
out of discourse. The final words of Foucault's definition are 'the objects of 
which they speak.' Here the speaking folds back into the practices mentioned at 
the start of the definition. The effect is to suggest the reflexive logic of the 
workings of discourse. Gee (1999) describes this as the 'reciprocity' of language 
and 'reality'. Through discourse we simultaneously reflect the way the world is 
and we construe it or construct it that way. Practices produce objects, which we 
speak about, which speaking then becomes a practice. But if we allow for the 
possibility that each speaking is unique in its context, even though patterned and 
apparently repetitive, and can make subtle shifts in response to its unique context, 
then the notion of discourse does not have to be deterministic in character. 
What is also implied here is that there is nothing that can be said to exist 
outside the world of discourse. This view, of Foucault and others (for example 
Derrida, 1976), is a strong stand on the centrality of discourse. Not everyone 
would go along with it. Chouliaraki and Fairclough ( 1999), for example, argue 
the more palatable view that discourse mediates other 'moments' of reality. 
However, Foucault also pointed out that his own uses of the term 
discourse were varied. He comments: 
Instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the 
word 'discourse', I believe I have in fact added to its meanings; 
treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, 
sometimes as an individualizeable group of statements, and sometimes 
as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements. 
(Foucault, 1969, p. 80) 
We can read here an effort to avoid reducing a concept to any stabilized essential 
meaning. Discourse itself is being treated as if its meaning retains a degree of 
indeterminacy. We can also hear an emphasis on discourse as a systematic 
concept. It accounts for the socially consistent nonrandom aspects of the relations 
between utterances. In this sense, it works to help us make sense of our experience 
of the world and to reduce a sense of everything being free-floating and 
indeterminate. 
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However, there are other ways of approaching the concept of discourse. 
Laclau and Mouffe begin from the concept of articulation and refer to a discourse 
as the product of the articulation of social interests . 
. . . we will call articulation any practice establishing a relation among 
elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the 
articulatory practice. The structured totality resulting from the 
articulatory practice, we will call discourse. 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p.105) 
In a process of the articulation of a social practice, a system of differences, and 
therefore relations, are fixed, or are dislocated and refixed in some new 
arrangement. This arrangement can be called discourse. Laclau and Mouffe 
stress that discourse is not of a purely linguistic character. It also must 'pierce the 
entire material density of the multifarious institutions, rituals and practices 
through which a discursive formation is structured' (p109). 
This conceptualisation is similar to one that, elaborating from Foucault, 
describes discourse simply as ' ... any regulated system of statements' (Henriques, 
Hollway, Urwin, Venn & Walkerdine, 1984, p. 105). The emphasis here is on 
widespread social formations and the means by which they are reproduced. 
Attention is drawn away from the smaller scale, more local and immediate, 
sometimes ephemeral aspects of discourse. 
The choice of definitional emphasis needs to relate to the research purpose 
of a particular discourse analysis exercise. I want to use the concept of discourse 
in order to elaborate the detail of a conversational practice and the local effects of 
discourse in the process of sometimes subtle change. The lens chosen therefore 
needs to focus more locally and be sensitive to the subtler aspects of discourse 
than if I was focussed on the analysis of larger systematic social phenomena. The 
latter still have to be considered in their local manifestations but my operational 
definition of discourse needs to gesture more to what Laclau and Mouffe call 
'points of rupture' than to 'systematic regulation' against the emergence of such 
ruptures. 
Fairclough's (1992) conceptualisation therefore has appeal because it 
focuses our attention on the articulation of social practices rather than on 
systematic regulation. 
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... discourse is a mode of action, one fonn in which people may act 
upon the world and especially upon each other, as well as a mode of 
representation. 
(Fairclough, 1992, p. 63) 
From this perspective, different discourse contexts and different constructions of 
knowledge produce different ways of acting on the world. Burr ( 1995, p. 5) cites 
the example of the difference between constructing drunkenness as morally 
blameworthy or as an illness, leading to different social responses: imprisonment 
or treatment. Thus how we talk to each other matters, because when we talk we 
construct the world, constitute our social life and fashion our future (Gergen, 
1999). 
It follows that we should think of mediation conversations as sites for 
social action, where social relations are in the process of construction. We should 
also be alert to the relations between established knowledge in the mediation field 
and the social processes that have produced them. The approach to the discursive 
analysis of positioning that follows should therefore adopt a critical stance 
towards taken-for-granted knowledge in the field of mediation. 
Fairclough's emphasis is also on how discourse can be made open to 
detailed textual analysis. He has expressed a reservation about Foucault's 
understanding of the operation of discourse. Fairclough ( 1992) argues for a more 
limited view of the role of discourse among other social forces which contribute 
to the constitution of reality and develops this further with Chouliaraki (1999) 
when they refer to discourse as the 'semiotic elements of social practices' in 
distinction from other 'moments' of social practice (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 
2001, p. 38). These other 'moments' might include material practices, institutions 
or sovereign power. They are all internalised in social relations through the 
mediating aspect of discourse. 
This distinction opens up a knotty problem in discourse theory: is it 
necessary, or indeed possible, to make a distinction between discursive and 
nondiscursive practices? Chouliaraki and Fairclough want to be careful not to 
reduce the whole of social life to discourse. They argue that people can interact 
nondiscursively and cite the example that people can interact for instance by 
tidying a house together (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 2001, p. 38). Parker would 
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agree with the Chouliaraki and Fairclough position, prefening to emphasise the 
independent reality of objects outside of discourse, which are nevertheless 'given 
another reality by discourse' (Parker, 1992, p. 9). For Laclau and Mouffe (2000) 
however, this position is not good enough. They take the view that, ' ... every 
object is constituted as an object of discourse' (p. 107) and would see the practice 
of tidying the house as articulated within discourse and inseparable from it. 
The resolution of this theoretical debate is not the focus of this study. Nor 
is this ontological argument crucial to the epistemological basis for my study. 
There does at least seem to be agreement that in practice we cannot study social 
phenomena except through discourse. This idea in itself makes the analysis of 
how discourse constitutes social relations a legitimate object of study. Mediation 
must by its very conversational nature entail the articulation of conflict through 
discourse and the question of whether there is anything else that lies outside of 
discourse is not crucial to the pursuit of a discursive perspective on mediation. 
Fairclough (1992) takes Foucault to task for making the concept of social 
practice central to his definition of discourse (see above) but then being more 
confusing in his specification of what a social practice is. Foucault's definition, 
according to Fairclough, references it back to the effects of social structures. 
Fairclough's purpose is to emphasise the idea of a social practice as quite simply 
'real instances of people doing or saying or writing things' (p. 57). This criticism 
may not be fair to Foucault's rather different project but Fairclough's emphasis 
nevertheless directs attention to the importance of the close analysis of particular 
instances of social practice in context. 
Fairclough, in combination with Chouliaraki, has later developed the 
conceptualisation of social practice in a fuller way. They argue that social 
practices are: 
... habitualised ways, tied to particular times and places, in which 
people apply resources (material or symbolic) to act together in the 
world. 
(Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p. 21) 
Discourses are instantiated in practices and realised in texts (Macleod, 2002). 
The advantage of focussing on practices is that they are a point of connection 
between abstract structures and the mechanisms by which they are maintained and 
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reproduced, between society and people, between the general rule and the specific 
application. 
The word practice also refers to more than just the semiotic aspects of 
discourse as well. There is a sense of activity in this usage as well as a sense of 
this activity being rehearsed frequently and repeated often. Thus practices may be 
actions or they may be words conceived of as acts upon the world (rather than just 
reports or representations of acts). 
Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999, p. 22) suggest three characteristics of 
social practices. First, they are forms of production of social life. This 
'constitutive' claim contrasts with the structuralist determinism of classical 
Marxism in which the production of social life is always referenced back to the 
underlying economic base, not to the stuff of conversation. Secondly, social 
practices are always located in a network of relationships to other practices. In 
this way, a sense of social coherence is possible. Thirdly, social practices have a 
reflexive dimension. They generate representations of what they do as part of 
what they do. Social practices vary greatly in their degree of complexity and 
nature. Simple practices are often tied in with more complex practices. 
An advantage of the concept of discourse that emphasises social practices 
is that it allows for the conceptualising of local interactions (such as the 
exchanges in a mediation conversation) as sites of struggle where competing and 
contradictory representations come into contact. The working out of these 
competing representations always has the potential to change dominant discursive 
formations (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p.105). Therefore we can theorise 
mediation practice as potentially contradicting and challenging (even changing) 
the dominant hegemonic influences in a given social context, rather than just 
being shaped and determined by them. 
At a more comprehensive level of social abstraction, the range of 
discursive practices within a given society or institution have been described by 
various writers as 'orders of discourse' (Foucault, 1971; Fairclough, 1992; 
Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). Orders of discourse 
represent the more enduring (for example across centuries of a particular 
civilisation) and more pervasive (assumptions so widely taken-for-granted as to be 
scarcely noticed as products of discourse) aspects of social practice. An order of 
discourse consists of a large number of discourse elements configured in a way 
that informs the ongoing production of many social practices. It serves a 
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stabilizing, social 'ordering' function. Particular instances of social practice then 
must take place within the context of background orders of discourse and in some 
way respond to them. The concept of 'orders of discourse' is useful to the 
analysis of conversation because it enables the analysis to make links between 
discourse as the actual words being said and discourse as the background systems 
of meaning against which what is said becomes meaningful. 
Discourse Psychology 
The concept of discourse has been applied across a range of academic 
disciplines. For my purpose here, however, it is necessary to concentrate 
primarily on the discipline of psychology as the discipline upon which the 
practices of mediation draw most strongly. We can use the concept of discourse 
to illuminate social practices at the level of institutions and political movements. 
But here I am most interested in its value for making sense of the production of 
subjective experience and personal relationships. This focus has been primary for 
the field of discourse psychology that has developed in the last fifteen years. 
Discourse psychology has a particular role to play in the development of discourse 
theory through the study of the power of discourse to shape how people think, 
behave, talk, respond to each other and experience life (Burman & Parker, 1993). 
There is by no means complete consensus about the assumptions that form 
the basis of discourse psychology, but for working purposes, I shall outline the 
assumptions on which I shall build. The first assumption of discourse psychology 
is that we cannot study the mind outside language, or outside of discourse 
(Burman & Parker, 1993). What happens in our minds is composed of language 
elements which embody 'shared patterns of meaning'. Since these categories of 
meaning often exist long before any individual's use of them in language, we can 
think of ourselves more often as 'carriers' of discursive meanings than as 
'originators' of such meanings (Gee, 1999, p. 18). Hence, if we use the concept 
of mind in discourse psychology, we are using it in a sense that emphasises its 
social or discursive dimensions rather than thinking of it solely as an individual 
private domain (Gee, 1999, p. 52; Gergen, 1999, p. 133). 
In a social constructionist approach to mediation then, we should look 
primarily to the role of discourse in the production of conflict rather than looking 
primarily to the internal dynamics of 'mind' to explain the source of a conflict. 
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Rather than uncritically seeking out underlying psychological interests, it might 
be important for mediators to ask how these interests are fonned out of discourse 
rather than assuming some pure internal driving force that is free from discursive 
influence. 
Psychology, from this perspective, becomes a study of how social and 
cultural conditions give rise to discursive meanings, which in tum come to 
constitute subjective experience. As Miller Mair (2000) suggests, a psychology 
that is conceived as a discipline of discourse is 'almost a mirror image of the kind 
of psychology that holds centre stage at present' because it 'takes as crucial what 
most empiricist, fact-finding, experiment-reporting psychology suppresses almost 
entirely' (p. 341). A discourse psychology entails studying how the description of 
social and personal realities actually can have the power to bring them into 
material being (Willig, 1999, p. 2). In this sense, it can be said that we 'speak 
ourselves into existence' (Davies, 1991, p. 42). Or, 'In the act of speaking I 
become a different being' (Mair, 2000, p. 340). Or, discourse does not just 
describe the world, it acts in the world (Pujol, 1999). When psychology is 
approached in this way, the conventional categories on which it has been based 
(for example, personality, behaviour, cognitions, attitudes, emotions) may need to 
be reconceived from a discursive perspective. One reason for this is that these 
categories themselves are seen to be products of discourse rather than essential 
categories of the universal human psyche (Burr, 1995; Willig, 1999, p. 2; 
Banister, Bunnan, Parker, Taylor & Tindall, 1994, p. 92). Therefore they can be 
read as texts and made available to a deconstructive scrutiny. 
We can therefore study the 'texts' (spoken and written) of discourse, 
including transcripts of conversation, and claim (with Burman & Parker, 1993) 
that we are studying the stuff of psychological experience. On this basis, this 
dissertation makes its claim to be a study of the psychology of mediation. It will 
build this case on the basis that the texts of a mediation conversation are 
manifestations of the discourses at work in the production of a conflict and can 
stand for these discourses for research purposes. 
Because meanings are produced and reproduced in social discourse and in 
particular contexts, they are always to some extent unstable, are constantly 
shifting and changing, and multiple meanings are always possible. This point is 
made by a series of writers about a constructionist perspective in psychology 
(Banister et al., 1994, p. 93; Burman & Parker, 1993, p. 3; Gee, 1999, p. 40). 
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Therefore, an individual's psychological make-up does not appear as stable from a 
discursive perspective as it might from a more essentialist perspective. Personal 
identity or subjectivity or 'situated identity' (Gee, 1999, p. 39) does not emerge 
from within but is negotiated through discourse in conversation and interaction 
(Burman & Parker, 1993, p, 7; Burr 1995, p. 50; Widdicombe, 1993). From a 
constructionist perspective, then, the 'self' is not understood as a unitary, stable 
location that is theoretically prior to discursive interaction. Thus it has been 
suggested that one's 'self' may be different in different interactions (Gergen, 
1994; 1999) and that human beings may be described as having multiple selves 
rather than a singular self. If this is the case, or even if identity is able to be 
storied in multiple ways while still retaining some continuity from one 
conversation to the next, then a constructionist perspective destabilises any claim 
for a permanent psychological structure. It is also obvious enough in elaboration 
of this idea that 'identity' as a stable psychological category begins to break up. It 
looks less like a constant essential core located in the mind of the individual and 
carried around from one context to another. Instead, it moves into a shifting field 
of production, permeated by discourse. This 'identity' is not only responsive to 
the encompassing storms of pervasive orders of discourse, but is also sensitive to 
the subtle zephyrs of particular conversations. Small wonder that we sometimes 
experience ourselves and each other as inconsistent! 
There have been a series of attempts to reconfigure the concept of identity 
in a postmodern way. Foucault sought to clear the ground by undermining the 
humanistic concept of identity that has formed the basis of modern psychology. 
Bruner ( 1986) argues for a provisional identity on the basis of narrative coherence 
rather than on naturalistic grounds. McNamee and Gergen (1999) have attempted 
to construct a relational description of identity. Social constructionist theorists 
(Gergen 1994; 1999; Shotter and Gergen 1989) have put forward the idea of 
multiple identities. Gergen (1991) argues that 'multiphrenia' is a normal feature 
of modem existence. Others have argued for subjectivity as originating in 
multiple points of origin (Henriques et al., 1984) leading to a developmental 
psychology based on cultural influences rather than on unfolding inner essences 
(Bird & Drewery, 2000; Olssen, 1991). 
All these attempts to decentre the stable subject of psychology and the 
straightforward notion of personal identity render even more problematic the 
effort to discover the underlying interests of parties in mediation. If a person's 
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centre shifts according to the discursive context they are in, then underlying 
interests might be more ephemeral than at first appears and might be produced in 
their particular form by the mediation context itself. 
Distinguishing Discourse From Related Concepts 
In order to use the concept of discourse in the rest of this dissertation, I 
shall pause for a moment to distinguish it from some other concepts. One of these 
is the concept of genre. The concept of genre was emphasised by Bakhtin (1981; 
1986) sometimes in ways that are now better reserved for the concept of 
discourse. But genre is still a useful notion. It refers to a conventional pattern of 
interaction that takes place within the territory governed by particular orders of 
discourse. As Fairclough (1992) says, a genre is a particular type of language 
used in the performance of a particular practice. It has a quality of stability to it, it 
is socially sanctioned within orders of discourse, it implies a particular text type 
(for example, a job interview, a television documentary, a poem) and it is often 
associated with a particular style. Genres shape interactions to fit within time 
frames and institutional demands. They are ordering devices that constitute 
'particular degrees of insulation between subjects' (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 
1999, p. 118). 
Traditionally, the term genre has been reserved for literary discourse but 
Bakhtin (1986; also Fairclough, 1992; Shetter, 1993) has argued specifically for 
the importance of the concept in speech as well. The counselling or mediation 
interview, for example, is established now as a conversational genre which 
constitutes lay and professional practices in certain patterned ways and positions 
client and professional in patterned relations. One will ask the questions and the 
other will answer them. One person's life will be the subject of conversation and 
the other's will not. Sh otter relates genres to sets of related and patterned (albeit 
continually changing), 'speech positions' that 'permit us as speakers certain forms 
of addressivity, that is, to aim our speech at the positions of others' (Shetter, 
1993b, p. 383). This idea is better pursued below under the heading of 
'positioning' but the point here is that genres set up ritualised patterns for 
discursive interaction. The notion of genres therefore accounts for some of the 
determinacy and predictability of dominant discourse but does not account for the 
variability that Shotter alludes to. 
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The term 'conjuncture,' advanced by Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999), 
is also useful for making distinctions between certain types of discursive contexts. 
It lies between the idea of social structure and a particular event. It describes a 
particular repeated type of social practice and is distinguishable from a genre. A 
conjuncture is a type of social practice that is repeated across a range of events or 
instances at different times and places at which similar discourses come together. 
For example an election or a court hearing might constitute a specific type of 
project that has many variations in relation to a range of institutional contexts but 
we can look for and expect to find some common discourses at work in each 
instance. At such a conjuncture, a particular range of practices are assembled that 
bear a stronger relation to other elections or court hearings than they do to the 
nature of the institutional context in which they are being deployed. An election 
of a board chairperson for a public company may therefore have discursive 
similarities with the election of a trade union shop steward because they have 
connections as conjunctures rather than because the social contexts are similar. 
Gee (1999, p. 82) uses the word 'situation' to describe roughly the same concept. 
Conjuncture refers to the particular type of social practice, whereas genre refers to 
the style and context of language used in such a context. A conversation with a 
mediator has conjunctural elements about it that are likely to call forth particular 
forms of social practice that will resemble other instances of such conversations 
within quite different contexts. For example, a divorce mediation will contain 
practices that resemble a commercial dispute resolution process or an international 
treaty negotiation, even though the contexts for these conversations vary 
considerably. 
Power Relations 
The concept of discourse offers the opportunity for reformulations of the 
workings of power in social relations. Rather than a simple equation of power 
with economic structural position, the concept of discourse enables us to 
appreciate some greater complexities in relations of privilege or domination. The 
work of Foucault (1978; 1980) has been most influential in spelling out the 
discursive construction of power relations in the modem world. He noted that 
social control and social privilege are frequently predicated on different 
technologies than they used to be in medieval times. Rather than relying solely 
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on the 'sovereign' power produced by inducing fear of top-down physical force, 
in the modern world we have created a series of technologies for the construction 
of power relations more from the bottom up, without the use of force (Foucault, 
1978). Such technologies produce relational positions of greater or lesser 
privilege through regulating the flow of discourse in particular ways. 
In particular, Foucault noted how our knowledge systems - that is, 
constructions of phenomena produced in discourse that have 'received the stamp 
of truth' (Burr, 1995, p. 64 ) - operate to create descriptions of normality in 
personal and social life and then seek to measure and categorise deviations from 
the norm. Because there are recognisable consequences for being positioned on 
the margins of what is normal within a given discursive context, such as exclusion 
from opportunities that are available to others, it is necessary for people to work 
to produce themselves within the range of the norm. In order to be 'normal', it is 
continually necessary to be conscious of how one appears from the outside to the 
'gaze' of those who have the authority to interpret social norms. We are 
encouraged in the modem world to constantly scrutinise our own behaviour, to 
ask ourselves questions about our own normality, to measure ourselves against 
officially sanctioned yardsticks, to consult 'experts' to help us scrutinise 
ourselves, and to confess our deviations from the norm (Burr, 1995; Foucault, 
1980). Foucault termed this form of power 'disciplinary power' because it 
involved the twin operations of external surveillance and internal compliance with 
norms to create conformist or docile behaviour. 
Modern technologies of power have spawned multiple systems of 
surveillance to the extent that we are required to be constantly vigilant in the 
policing of ourselves with regard to social norms. Surveillance and evaluation are 
backed up with technologies of note-taking and recordkeeping. We fill in forms 
and constitute files about ourselves which are kept and used to stabilise our 
relational positions vis-a-vis the world. In this way, disciplinary power shapes the 
production of subjectivity. 
Examples of surveillance abound. The census is an example of the kind of 
form-filling exercise in which people are required to produce themselves to fit a 
particular range of identity categories. In the process the categories themselves 
are reproduced and a range of identity possibilities is defined and a normal range 
of distribution within categories is published. Another simple example exists in 
the use of speed cameras to produce driving behaviour within an acceptable range 
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of normality. They operate by inducing among drivers the awareness that they 
may be being watched and evaluated at any moment in relation to a defined norm 
(a speed limit). This awareness leads to drivers monitoring their own speed and 
controlling themselves most of the time, without the necessity for promoting a 
fear of being tortured, or of being put to death, as an example to others who might 
be found speeding. 
The key feature of such modern technologies of power is that the 
mechanism of social control is placed inside people's subjectivity rather than 
outside. Docility, or conforming behaviour, is produced willingly and voluntarily, 
rather than reluctantly and forcibly. In this sense, these technologies produce 
hegemonic relations of privilege, if we understand hegemony to be the process by 
which power relations are based on consent rather than on coercion (Chouliaraki 
& Fairclough, 1999). Such hegemony is achieved according to Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough (p. 24) by the 'naturalisation of practices and their social relations' in 
discourse. They become treated as 'common sense relations' (Burr, 1995, p.63) 
apparently with little political import. In this way they are stabilised and obscured 
from view, and their articulation is made to seem relatively permanent. 
Some other features of this modern form of 'disciplinary power' deserve 
noting too. First, power is not imposed from above in a hierarchical way. Power 
is distributed in everyday social practices and in every domain of life (Fairclough , 
1992). We are all participants in its ongoing production and reproduction. 
Neither is there a conspiratorial central cadre who 'hold' power of this kind but 
rather a 'great anonymous murmur of discourses' (Foucault, 1989, p. 27). Indeed, 
Foucault argued against the use of a metaphor of power as a material commodity 
that can in any way be 'held'. 
Power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something 
that one holds onto or allows to slip away; power is exercised from 
innumerable points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile 
relations ... Power comes from below; that is there is no binary and all 
encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power 
relations and serving as a general matrix. 
(Foucault, 1978, p. 94) 
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His suggestion is that power is constructed as a property of a relation rather than 
held by individuals, or for that matter, by institutions. It developed from below in 
the procedures and microtechniques (such as the examination, the interview, the 
file) of modem social institutions such as the prison, the hospital or clinic, the 
school, the army, the factory (Fairclough, 1992). 
The next point is that such power is often best thought of as productive or 
constitutive rather than as repressive (Burr, 1995; Fairclough, 1992; Foucault, 
1979). Foucault suggested that if we focus only on repression we direct our 
attention only to the peripheral aspects of power relations and miss the larger 
picture. 
In general tenns, I would say that the interdiction, the refusal, the 
prohibition, far from being essential forms of power, are only its limits: 
the frustrated or extreme forms of power. The relations of power are, 
above all, productive. 
(Foucault, 1989, p. 147) 
Dominant discourses function productively to make us up in relational contexts 
that are always imbued with power, that is, with privilege and with differential 
opportunity to act. In discourse we produce knowledge, produce patterns of social 
relation, and produce identities, attitudes, intentions, bodily manifestations, 
sexualities, concepts, thoughts, or emotions. We form identifications and 
identities out of the dominant discourses of our world. We construct our sense of 
entitlement in life (and thereby positions of greater or lesser privilege) in such a 
way that we scarcely need to be coerced into compliance with social norms. Out 
of the positions constructed in such power relations, we are granted access to 
social and economic resources such that we can have an effect in the world. 
In mediation, therefore, we can expect to find the operation of discourse in 
the production of power relations between the participants. Disputants will draw 
upon dominant discourse to legitimate their claims of entitlement. For example, 
in family mediation contexts parents will debate the 'needs of the child' in terms 
that are built on the basis of knowledge that is produced in discourse. We can 
also expect that this knowledge will legitimate privileged positions to some 
mediation participants and de-legitimate others according to what is dominant in 
discourses of gender, social class and sexual orientation. In the background of the 
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family disputes that are brought to mediation will also lie the systems of 
surveillance set up by statutory authorities and implemented by the courts, by 
social worker interventions and by psychologists who evaluate family 
relationships. The norms of family life, established in psychological knowledge 
and social work practice, will be kept in place by such surveillance and parents 
will be required to produce themselves to fit the norms in response. 
Therefore we can scarcely expect that when disputing parties in mediation 
speak of their interests they are speaking only out of internal individual needs. 
Rather they will be participating in the negotiation of relationship in terms that 
can only be drawn from the world of discourse in which power is always already 
implicit. What is needed then is an approach to mediation that takes account of 
power relations and the work done in discourse to produce them. 
Narrative Theory 
Another vessel of thought that has anchored in the same bay as discourse 
theory but has sailed through slightly different waters to get there can be called 
narrative theory. The narrative idea is that life can be understood better through 
the study of stories than through the unearthing of factors and causes along 
traditional scientific lines. It is necessary to explore the narrative perspective a 
little because it has given rise to the approach to family therapy that I want to 
draw from in considerable measure to articulate a practice of mediation. It is 
therefore another building block on which the argument of this dissertation is 
based. 
It is a commonplace to observe that human beings live in and through 
stories (Neimeyer, 2002; Randall, 1995; White & Epston, 1990). We tell each 
other accounts of our day, our childhood or our plans for the future. We convey 
cultural and moral messages to our children about how to do life through stories. 
We read stories in newspapers and novels and watch stories unfold in plays, 
movies and television shows and make sense of our own lives in relation to these. 
We construct mythologies to explain the universe in narrative forms. We describe 
our dreams as stories. We tell stories in our courtrooms, therapy rooms and 
barrooms and trust the narrative form implicitly as an adequate account of events. 
In mediation contexts, people place great store on the opportunity to tell their 
story and most approaches to mediation (including Bush & Folger, 1994; Fisher & 
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Ury, 1981) acknowledge the importance of parties being given the chance to tell 
their story. 
Narrative theory grants greater importance to this aspect of human life 
than has usually been credited in modernist scientific understandings of social 
science. If we consider the possibility that stories are not just told about things 
and serve to represent them somewhat neutrally, but that they work to construct 
our understandings and representations of life, then we need to pay much more 
attention to them. If stories shape and organise our experience, then they are 
taking over some of the work otherwise assumed by underlying essences and 
structures. In conflict situations, it follows that we might expect the ongoing 
viability of a conflict to be grounded in a clash of stories as much as in causal 
factors such as unmet needs. 
Writers about a narrative perspective in psychology have proposed that 
stories have a structuring effect in people's lives (Bruner,1986; Gergen and Kaye, 
1992; Sarbin, 1986; White, 1989; White and Epston, 1990). In this view, 
narratives serve a constructive function in social life, not just a representational 
function. As we make decisions and take actions on the basis of a narrative plot 
trajectory and our place within it, the story takes on a creative function. It makes 
a difference to reality. It does not just reflect it. In mediation then, as disputing 
parties tell their stories, they are not simply reporting on a pre-existent truth. 
Even in the telling of a story they can be said to be constructing various truths, 
such as their own sense of entitlement, illegitimacy of the other party's story, or 
positions from which to relate to the other party and to the mediator. 
A narrative perspective in psychology also proposes that stories assist 
people in establishing coherence in life (Bruner, 1986; Neimeyer, 2000; Randall, 
1995). Through stories, we organise our sense of ourselves and of others to 
reduce the complexity and confusion of existence. We give meaning to things 
that change through story because stories move through time. Thus narrative 
theory suggests that stories serve a meaning-making function (Neimeyer, 1995). 
For an understanding of the psychology of personhood, narrative theory 
provides an explanation of the experience of personal continuity through time 
(Neimeyer, 1995; Randall, 1995). The self is a particular site for the building of 
narrative coherence. As noted above, postmodern theories of the self have 
concentrated on fracturing the image of the singular, stable, essential, 
individualistic self in favour of a more pluralistic, permeable self (Burr, 1995; 
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Cushman, 1990; Gergen, 1991; Neimeyer, 2000). However, we still seek a sense 
of continuity and coherence and describe our selves as developing more or less 
consistently through time. Narratives provide us with such a sense of continuous 
development. Therefore, people become attached to particular narratives, because 
they have constructed a sense of identity around them. Hence, conflict stories in 
mediation contexts can often be closely tied to people's cherished identity 
projects. Despite the fact that mediators sometimes seek to carefully distinguish 
mediation from therapy, the interweaving of conflict stories and personal identity 
projects ensures that mediation often has a therapeutic edge to it. 
Narratives are also, however, cultural products and serve cultural purposes 
(Cushman, 1995; Rosaldo, 1993). It is in the nature of stories that they are told by 
someone(s) to some other(s). Thus they have their life in the relations of social 
exchange. They are shared experiences. In the process, they help groups of people 
define themselves as groups, as a people who share allegiance to a set of stories. 
Jerome Bruner (1986, p. 15) suggests that,' ... human mental activity depends for 
its full expression upon being linked to a cultural toolkit,' and that cultural 
narratives operate as such a toolkit. 
Coherence, however, whether we think of it in a personal sense or in terms 
of cultural belonging, is a constraining aspect of narrative. This aspect concerns 
how possibilities are constrained to fit within an organising storyline. The 
narrative perspective also allows for the possibility of breaking from such 
constraints through the disruption of storylines. Bruner describes the narrative 
mode of thinking as providing a 'loose-fitting' constraint which is therefore 
serviceable for dealing with the 'vicissitudes of human intention' (Bruner, 1986, 
p.17). Human beings work out their intentions in the face of actual or threatened 
breaches or crises and the outcome is always to some degree indeterminate. 
Narrative theory also offers explanatory power for psychologists that 
Bruner (1986) suggests can rival what he calls 'paradigmatic' scientific method. 
He argues for narrative thinking as a 'mode of thought' that is distinct from the 
logico-scientific mode of thought. The narrative mode invites us to build 
psychological understandings more on the foundations of literary theory than on 
scientific reductionism. In this vein, we can study narrative forms as 'prosthetic 
devices' (Bruner, 1986, p. 15) with which we construct our consciousness. 
Moreover, he argues for the concept of intention in the narrative mode of thinking 
as rivalling the scientific concept of causation in the paradigmatic mode. The 
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point will be important when I start to describe an approach to mediation that calls 
upon a narrative perspective. It can mean that mediators need not be as concerned 
with establishing the underlying causes of a conflict as much as establishing the 
intentions of the parties and working towards a way forward that is inclusive of 
those intentions. 
The narrative metaphor further offers the possibility of noticing how 
particular characterisations can construct relations in particular directions within a 
story. In the conflict stories that come to mediation, parties often have allegiance 
to competing stories and characterise themselves and each other within familiar 
storylines as heroes and villains, supporters or combatants, truth-tellers or liars. 
Within these storylines, people articulate their intentions with regard to plot 
development. The analysis of narrative trajectories and characterizations provides 
substantial material for the analysis of what happens in a conversation aimed at 
conflict resolution. While not exactly the same, it is close enough to the concept 
of discursive positioning for the terms 'discourse' and 'story' to be used almost 
interchangeably in some circumstances. 
The narrative metaphor has been deployed in the therapeutic field to 
describe an approach to family therapy that has grown originally out of family 
systems theory but which has in the last ten years incorporated many postmodern 
and poststructuralist notions. Narrative therapy owes much to the original work 
of Michael White and David Epston (Epston & White, 1992; White, 1989; 1995; 
White & Epston, 1990). It has developed a following and a literature that has 
explained White's and Epston's original work in a variety of ways (Freedman & 
Combs, 1996; Monk, Winslade, Crocket & Epston, 1997, Morgan, 2000; 
Zimmerman & Dickerson, 1996). 
Conversations in narrative therapy aim to 'deconstruct' (White, 1991) the 
constitutive effects of dominant stories, dominant discourses, or 'dominant 
cultural practices' (White, 1989) and to 'open space' (Freedman & Combs, 1996) 
in the narrative construction of people's lives for a 're-authoring' (White, 1995) to 
take place. The aim is to develop an 'alternative story' (White & Epston, 1990) 
that can compete with the 'problem-saturated' story (White, 1989). Narrative 
therapists ask questions aimed at encouraging the 'performance of meaning' 
(White, 1989) around 'unique outcomes' (White & Epston, 1990) or unstoried 
elements of experience in order to develop this alternative story. These 
therapeutic practices have much relevance to the work of facilitating conflict 
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resolution through mediation. I shall elaborate these ideas further in Chapter Six 
when I show an example of narrative mediation in action. 
The Utterance 
Having outlined a general theory of discourse I now want to direct my focus 
more specifically onto the concepts that will support the analysis of positioning 
within discourse. The discursive analysis of positioning requires some 
elaboration of what is meant by positioning. This concept is built upon discourse 
theory in general but takes it up for particular purposes that are especially useful 
to the analysis of conversation. 
I want to begin discussing the analysis of positioning by referring to the idea 
of the utterance and to claim with Mikhail Bakhtin (1986) that the utterance is the 
most useful analysable element of discourse through which we can notice the 
work of discursive positioning taking place. Some of the definitions of discourse 
cited above refer to the 'statement' as a primary element of discourse and 
characterise discourses as collections of 'statements'. Bakhtin has argued the 
alternative view of the 'utterance' as a basic unit of discourse. Interestingly, 
Foucault (1972) used the term 'enonce' in French, which is closer to the concept 
of utterance in English than it is to 'statement'. 
'Statement' in English carries connotations of a type of sentence that is 
distinct from a question or an instruction, whereas 'enonce', as does 
'announcement' in English, suggests words spoken for a social purpose. The 
content is important as well as the grammatical form. Bakhtin argues that the 
concept of the utterance works across spoken and written genres of language use 
and functions as the 'real unit of speech communication' in preference to the word 
or the sentence (statement). Fairclough (1992) makes no distinction between the 
'utterance' and the 'statement' but Bakhtin's definition works better across both 
written and spoken conversations because it directs attention to the social process 
of communication rather than to the grammatical analysis of sentences. The 
sentence as a unit is defined in terms of written language and does not map easily 
onto the analysis of spoken conversation. Utterances, on the other hand, have 
'clearcut boundaries' says Bakhtin, marked by the 'change of speaking subjects' 
that takes place when one speaker 'ends his (sic) utterance in order to yield the 
floor to the other' (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 71 ). This distinction makes possible the 
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application of the idea of the utterance to the practice of mediation as I want to 
elaborate it. It focuses our attention on the positioning work done within a 
speaking tum. 
Bakhtin extends this notion from spoken conversation to include written and 
even literary utterances. In writing, a letter might be a single utterance and, in 
literature, a poem or a novel might constitute a single utterance. This idea enables 
Bakhtin to elaborate a theory of literary criticism that begins with the analysis of a 
particular literary work as a response in a 'conversation' taking place within 
single or multiple cultural contexts as well as within literary traditions. Thus, no 
novel exists in isolation, as a work to be appreciated for its own essence. Novels 
are also responses to other utterances in a wider cultural conversation. This idea 
constitutes the reader as a respondent and therefore as a participant in the 
communication event that an utterance signals. Academic articles or books are 
also understood first as utterances in particular genres of conversation, always 
within some dialogue, always as an aspect of the production of discourse. Each 
utterance is therefore not free-floating, but to some extent reliant on the particular 
cultural, literary or academic dialogues out of which it has been produced. There 
might be a single author but this author is speaking within the possibilities of 
response to what has been said before in a dialogue and in relation to the listener 
or reader. Bakhtin put it this way: 
. .. the single utterance, with all its individuality and creativity, can in 
no way be regarded as a completely free combination of forms of 
language ... 
(Bakhtin, 1986, p. 81) 
Any utterance is a link in the chain of speech communion. 
(Bakhtin, 1986, p. 84) 
Bakhtin's theory of utterances within speech genres incorporates aspects 
of his theory of utterances within literary genres. In relation to a focus on 
mediation conversations, it is the domain of spoken genres that deserves most 
attention. Bakhtin stresses the ways in which utterances cannot be free from the 
cultural worlds of dialogue in which they take place. 
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Utterances are not indifferent to one another, and are not self-
sufficient; they are aware of and mutually reflect one another ... Every 
utterance must be regarded primarily as a response to preceding 
utterances of the given sphere ... Each utterance refutes, affirms, 
supplements, and relies on the others, presupposes them to be known, 
and somehow takes them into account. 
(Bakhtin 1986, p. 91) 
Bakhtin's use of the concept of 'utterance' has been taken up by John Shotter, 
who acknowledges Bakhtin's influence (along with Vygotsky's and 
Wittgenstein's) on his own efforts to articulate a 'rhetorical-responsive' (Shotter, 
1993) version of social constructionism. Specifically, he takes up the idea of the 
utterance as at the centre of the communication processes by which we construct 
our worlds and our selves. We are never the first speaker on any particular 
subject. Every utterance is first a 'rejoinder' (Shotter, 1993b, p. 383) to some 
previous utterance(s). Thus an utterance must be understood as situated in 
discourse and to some extent constituted by its discursive context. It uses words 
borrowed from other utterances and any use of words carries with it an echo of 
other voices, down a 'corridor of voices' (Bakhtin 1986, p. 121 ). The term 
Bakhtin used most commonly to define this phenomenon was 'heteroglossia'. It 
refers to the sense that any utterance contains many other usages from other 
conversations within it. There are always many other voices speaking. The 
heteroglossic nature of a text is also sometimes referred to as its 'double-voiced' 
quality (Bakhtin, 1986; Gee, 1999). While not analysing power relations in the 
same way as Foucault, Bakhtin acknowledges the existence of 'authoritative 
utterances' that 'set the tone' for conversation within a genre (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 
88). Bakhtin argues: 
The utterance is filled with dialogic overtones, and they must be taken 
into account in order to understand fully the style of the utterance. 
After all our thought itself- philosophical, scientific, and artistic - is 
bom and shaped in the process of interaction and struggle with others' 
thought, and this cannot but be reflected in the forms that verbally 
express our thought as well. 
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(Bakhtin, 1986, p. 92) 
Even the words that we use, he suggests, carry with them traces of many 
other utterances (also Shotter, 1993b). They are not of our own invention but have 
at some time belonged to others and have been used in other contexts. There must 
always be a degree to which our words are not our own. In this sense, our mental 
life is not 'wholly under our own control, nor filled with our own materials' 
(Shotter, 1993b, p. 382). But this degree will vary too. Our use of discourse can 
vary in the degree of distance from, or closeness to, our own 'expressive 
intentions' in a particular dialogue. Meanings are therefore inherently dialogical 
and nuanced with constantly shifting boundaries, because they are suspended in 
the discursive soup of conversation across multiple contexts. 
Each word contains voices that are sometimes in.finitely distant, 
unnamed, almost impersonal (voices of lexical shadings, of styles, and 
so forth), almost undetectable, and voices resounding nearby and 
simultaneously. 
(Bakhtin, 1986, p. 124). 
Foucault was also interested in the historical traces that words carried with 
them in discourse. His studies were often dedicated to the task of locating the 
historical conjunctures that gave birth to these traces. 
Personally I am rather haunted by the existence of discourse, by the 
fact that particular words have been spoken; these events have 
functioned in relation to their original situation, they have left traces 
behind them; they subsist and exercise, in this subsistence even within 
history, a certain number of manifest or secret fanctions. 
(Foucault, 1989, p. 25) 
The discursive analysis of positioning will therefore need to take account of the 
traces of other conversations that are carried forward within an utterance. This 
point is important with regard to the debates about what should be the empirical 
focus of discourse analysis that will be addressed in the next chapter. It supports 
interpretations that go beyond the immediate text in order to understand the 
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meanings present. In mediation conversations, as disputants tell their story to a 
mediator, they can be expected to use language that carries traces of many 
previous conversations, some of them with other parties to the dispute and some 
with their other friends and allies. 
But Bakhtin was not only concerned with the historical traces of other 
conversations. He also understood the utterance as determined within a 
relationship with future utterances as well. Each utterance is made with an eye to 
possible responses and the listener (or the listener's expected response) exerts a 
powerful influence on what can be said. He put it like this: 
Every word is directed towards an answer and cannot escape the 
profound influence of the answering word that it anticipates. 
(Bakhtin, 1981, p. 280) 
To some extent primacy belongs to the response, as the activating 
principle: it creates the ground for understanding, it prepares the 
ground for an active and engaged understanding. Understanding 
comes to fruition only in the response. 
(Bakhtin, 1981, p. 282) 
This idea amounts to a challenge to the singularity of the author's voice (also 
challenged by Foucault, 1977). It privileges a more dialogical or relational view 
of communication processes and focuses attention on the reflexive aspects of 
speaking. The term Bakhtin coined for this aspect of any utterance was 
'addressivity'. It refers to the aspect of any utterance that anticipates a response 
from the 'addressee' and seeks to shape that response in some way. The 
addressee's influence might be felt in the words chosen, in the style of 
communication, in the rhetorical strategies employed, and in the very content of 
the message. The speaker makes judgments in the moment of speaking about the 
addressee's 'apperceptive background' and 'degree of responsiveness' (Bakhtin, 
1981, p. 346; also Sh otter, 1993c ). This addressee can be: 
.. . an immediate participant-interlocutor in an everyday dialogue, a 
differentiated collective of specialists in some particular area of 
cultural communication, a more or less differentiated public, ethnic 
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group, contemporaries, like-minded people, opponents and enemies, a 
subordinate, a superior, someone who is lower, higher, familiar, 
foreign, and so forth. And it can be an indefinite, unconcretized other. 
(Bakhtin, 1986, p. 95) 
This quality of addressivity in a word or a statement cannot be studied in isolation 
or in abstract. It can only be found in the context of conversation. Hence, 
Bakhtin reiterates his theory of the primacy of the utterance as a unit of language. 
This point suggests the importance of studying discourse in context. It is also 
important for the practice of mediation because it alerts us to the possibility that 
any utterance by a participant is already being shaped both by the other party (or 
parties) to a conflict and by the mediator, even before it is spoken. In this sense, 
the relational dimension is never absent from a conversation. The listener is 
already influencing the speaker before the speaker has made an utterance. And 
the speaker, while speaking, is both taking up a position in anticipatory response 
to the listener and calling forth responses from the listener. 
In his concern with the social influence of the listener, Bakhtin is 
suggesting an embryonic notion of power in discourse. It is not as developed as 
Foucault's later ideas but it is present in such statements as this: 
The addressee's social position, rank, and importance are reflected in 
a special way in utterances of everyday and business speech 
communication. 
(Bakhtin, 1986, p. 96). 
Moreover, the social position of the speaker is implicated in the very meaning of 
words, in Bakhtin's view. He argued that it is impossible to separate the 
meanings of words used from the speaker's social position (profession, social 
class, gender, etc) within a concrete situation. Thus: 
Who speaks and under what conditions he (sic) speaks: this is what 
detennines the word's actual meaning. 
(Bakhtin, 1981, p. 401). 
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The meanings of words and of utterances are determined by the contextual 
features of discourse use. Meanings are linked to social relations and each usage 
plays into such relations. Thus, Bakhtin arrives at a view of communication that 
emphasises discourse rather than essence. 
Everything that is said is located outside the 'soul' of the speaker and 
does not belong only to him. 
(Bakhtin, 1986, p. 121) 
However, while Bakhtin stresses the extent to which any utterance is not 
free-floating but is located within and to some extent determinate within 
discourse, he also is careful to allow for the discursive agency of the speaker in 
discourse. He does not constitute the speaker as completely originary (as a 
biblical Adam naming virgin objects for the first time) but as a respondent in 
dialogue who has the responsibility (or response-ability) to speak. He puts it this 
way: 
As a living, socio-ideological concrete thing, as heteroglot opinion, 
language, for the individual consciousness, lies on the borderline 
between oneself and the other. The word in language is half someone 
else's. It becomes 'one's own' only when the speaker populates it with 
his own intention, his own accent, when he appropriates the word, 
adapting it to his own semantic and expressive intention. 
(Bakhtin, 1981, p. 293) 
This expressive aspect of the speaker's relationship with an utterance is crucial to 
Bakhtin's understanding of the possibility for acting in the world. For him, 
agency is entailed in the 'speaker's subjective emotional evaluation of the 
referentially semantic content of his (sic) utterance' (1986, p. 84). Because we are 
located in the middle of a context of dialogue when we speak, we are positioned 
in a place that is never neutral. We are always speaking in relation to other 
speaking subjects and taking up positions of agreement or disagreement, building 
on their utterances or undoing them, evaluating or elucidating their words, 
referring to their previous utterances, making assertions in relation to their 
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assertions, approaching or moving away from them (see below for the relevance 
of this idea to positioning theory). In the process of doing this, says Bakhtin: 
Every utterance makes a claim to justice, sincerity, beauty and 
truthfulness. 
(Bakhtin, 1986, p.123) 
This claim is its expressive, discursive aspect. In this sense, the speaker is an 
active agent in the production of discourse and his or her responsiveness is not 
completely determined by the discourses into which he or she is speaking. 
Bakhtin was adamant on this point: 
An utterance is never just a reflection or an expression of something 
already existing outside it that is given and final. It always creates 
something that never existed before, something absolutely new and 
unrepeatable ... 
(Bakhtin, 1986, pp. 119-120). 
In this stand, Bakhtin ensures that voice can be expressed and personal agency (to 
be explained further below) can be realised. It is never simply a reproduction of 
existing discourse but is always, to some degree, a response to other utterances 
within a discourse. Therefore, it is possible to consider people as agentic in their 
exercise of moral responsiveness. 
However, Bakhtin also argues that this expressive intention can only 
develop in a dialogical context, that is, in dialogue with others. Commenting on 
Dostoevsky's novelistic art, he says: 
The idea lives not in one person's isolated individual consciousness - if 
it remains there only, it degenerates and dies. The idea begins to live, 
that is, to take shape, to develop, to find and renew its verbal 
expression, to give birth to new ideas, only when it enters into genuine 
dialogic relationship with other ideas, with the ideas of others. 
(Bakhtin, 1984, pp. 87-88.) 
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Truth is not born, nor is it to be found, inside the head of an individual 
person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth. 
(Bakhtin, 1984, p. 110.) 
This dialogic perspective contrasts with what Bakhtin refers to as a 
'monologic' one. Monologic thinking tends towards 'singleness of 
meaning', the 'finalising' of ideas and to 'dogmatism'. Bakhtin clearly 
prefers the ongoing generative possibilities of 'the joyful relativity of 
evolving existence' (Bakhtin, 1984, p.164). 
Bakhtin' s dialogical principle is valuable for theorising the practice 
of mediation. It suggests a process whereby two or more parties are invited 
into a genuine dialogue in which neither loses sight of their 'expressive 
intention' and both contribute to the development of ideas about how to 
move forward in a dispute situation. From Bakhtin's perspective, the 
outcome of dialogue is likely to be better than either party could think of 
alone. A mediator's role can be described as Socrates described his own 
function at the birth of an idea through Socratic dialogue - as a 'midwife' 
who 'assists at the birth' (quoted by Bakhtin 1984, p. 110). The challenge, 
however, lies in the fact that, in the midst of conflict, disputants are often 
very keen to impose a monological account of the conflict that does not 
admit the other party's version. They are often keen to finalize the 
conversation around their own claims and to dismiss the legitimacy of the 
other person's. Here the mediator needs to keep a dialogical vision in mind 
and facilitate the birth of a dialogical outcome. 
Positioning 
I shall now take the idea of the utterance, with its dialogical overtones, and 
add to it some ideas advanced within what has been called in the 1990s 
'positioning theory.' I am using the term 'positioning theory' and thus crediting 
these ideas with the status of a fully-fledged theory on the basis of Davies, Harre 
and van Langenhl2)ve's (1999) use of this title. 
The word 'position' has been used in a number of ways in social theory 
(Harre & van Langenhl2)ve, 1999, p.1). In the conflict resolution literature, there 
has developed a specific usage of the term that describes a beginning stance in the 
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process of negotiation as discussed in chapter two. However, it is the usage that 
has developed in relation to discourse theory in psychology that I want to 
distinguish here. I believe that it has more potential than has yet been explored to 
help us make sense of the process of mediation at the level of micro-analysis. 
Particularly, it helps us to get a take on the way in which power is constituted in 
relational exchanges, including the ways in which power relations can be very 
fluid and unstable and in constant process of renegotiation through the course of a 
conversation. 
As Drewery (2002) argues, positioning theory is focussed on 'the 
constitutive functions of talk.' It derives from Foucault's notion of a subject 
position (1978, 1980) and was developed by Davies and Harre (1990) into a 
concept that is useful for studying the production of selves in discursive contexts. 
Davies and Harre describe a subject position as involving 'both a conceptual 
repertoire and a location for persons within the structure of rights for those who 
use that repertoire' (1990, p. 43). When a person makes an utterance, the speaker 
both establishes a moral claim within a discourse and also calls the addressee into 
some kind of subject position within the structure that is invoked by the offer. In 
this way a relation is established, even if only momentarily, and a perspective on 
the world is invoked. Two different positions in this relation may offer the 
respective conversation partners differential entitlements to speak. For example, a 
speaker may take up a position of deference and call the other person into a 
position of superior knowledge and expertise such that his or her utterances will 
have greater material effect. Positioning is a spatial metaphor that emphasises the 
relationship between words and the forms of life that they physically point to and 
propel us into. The concept of positioning makes visible the idea that we are 
never speaking in a vacuum but always from some place, some time, some social 
context and in response to other utterances that have gone before. 
Drewery (2002) offers an example of positioning that is relevant to 
conversations in family mediation. A mediator might say to a separating couple: 
Have you thought about who will look after the children after the 
separation? 
This utterance calls the couple into position in a competing or oppositional 
relation, one in which claims of entitlement will be placed in contest with each 
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other such that the eventual outcome is likely to be some form of exclusion. By 
contrast, the question could be asked in a way that calls the couple into a quite 
different position in this way: 
Have you thought about how you will care for the children after the 
separation ? 
The positions called into being in this question are more inclusive and 
invite a shared interest and cooperative involvement in the care of the children. 
What these examples demonstrate is that the discursive constructions chosen 
make a difference. The choices that are involved in deciding on the phrasing, and 
the choices that follow for the couple who are called into position in response, are 
given within dominant discourse. However, they are not fixed by this discourse to 
the extent that other choices cannot be made, particularly when people are given 
opportunities to be reflexive and to decide on which positions to take up or refuse. 
The concept of positioning also can help describe processes of resistance 
to the operation of power. Davies and Harre ( 1999) refer to second order 
positioning, as distinguished from first order positioning, to refer to the ways in 
which people choose to refuse a position offered by someone else's utterance and 
instead respond from a different position. An example lies in the following 
exchange in a television interview between a white woman reporter and the 
African American boxer, Mike Tyson, who carries a reputation of uncontrolled 
violence both in and out of the boxing ring. 
Interviewer: Can you tell me where all the rage within you comes from? 
Tyson: (smiles) You know, you're so white asking me a question like that. 
The interviewer's question positions Tyson within a particular psychological 
discourse that accounts for acts of violence with reference to the postulate of an 
individualised psychic container of rage that will spill over when it reaches 
overflow level. It is a psychological discourse drawn from mainstream, 
psychodynamic, Western knowledge. Tyson refuses this position, however, and 
instead positions himself and the interviewer in a conversation about race, perhaps 
a discursive context in which his violence might be contextualised more 
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favourably against a background of racism. Tyson's response would amount to 
second-order positioning. 
However, I am choosing not to use the distinction between first and 
second order positioning in this dissertation for the following reasons. First, 
Bakhtin's notions of addressivity and heteroglossia suggest the typicality of 
multiple positionings within an utterance such that it becomes hard to distinguish 
which one is first or second. Secondly, as Bakhtin again points out, there are a 
variety of responses that are possible in response to being positioned (including 
deliberate acceptance, outright refusal, partial refusal, ironicisation, subtle 
renegotiation of meaning, etc) and this ranking system seems to narrow them 
down too much. Thirdly, any utterance in response to another one also constitutes 
the first utterance for the next response in a chain of utterances. Thus any 
utterance may be at the same time both an example of second order positioning in 
relation to a previous utterance and of first order positioning in relation to the 
subsequent one. It becomes too confusing to track which is which. I therefore 
prefer to simply describe the kind of response to an instance of positioning in 
terms of the possible choices of stance that can be taken up. 
The notion of positioning connects with Ken Gergen's notion of 
'supplementation'. Gergen argues that it is not possible to 'mean' something, or 
to make meaning, on one's own. Meaning only accrues in a relational exchange, 
in a conversation, in the process by which a listener 'supplements' (Gergen 1994, 
p. 264) my utterance. Gergen's notion of supplementation is reaching for the 
same idea that Davies and Harre describe as 'positioning.' I prefer the word 
positioning on two grounds. 'Supplement' carries with it a suggestion of 
completion or finalisation (Bakhtin's word, 1986) that positioning does not. 
While it suggests the participation of interlocutors in each other's utterances, it 
also implies that one person's utterance completes another's. I prefer the 
emphasis on an ongoing dialogue as Bakhtin (1981; 1984; 1986) describes it in 
which each utterance offers the other a position in an ongoing chain of utterances. 
Generativity, in Bakhtin's view, arises from the neverending exchange of 
positions as people respond to each other in dialogue, despite efforts to finalise 
conversation through various monological speaking practices. 'Positioning' also 
suggests more of the use of words as socio-political actions, in which someone is 
doing something to another. It therefore accords a clearer view of the politics of 
meaning-making. 
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Each utterance also acts in some small, or not so small, way to produce the 
social world into which we are acting. Our utterances serve to position us in 
relation to others and also to call others into position in relation to us. Thus 
Shotter (1993a, p. 70) articulates a view of communication (building on Vygotsky 
and Wittgenstein) in which human beings use language as tools or prosthetic 
devices. Speaking gets to be thought of as not just reporting on what is being 
thought but as an action in the social world. As we speak, we act upon ourselves 
and others and upon our social context. Through our utterances, we make (as in 
'produce') sense (Shotter, 1993a, p. 72). In this sense: 
Indeed we can go so far here as to say that this prosthetic-(tool) 
function of speech works on one's surroundings formatively, to specify 
themfurther. Retrospectively, however, what we (and others) have 
already said remains 'on hand,' so to speak, as like a 'text', constituting 
a given aspect of the situation between oneself and one's interlocutors, 
into which they ( as well as oneself) must direct their speech. Indeed, it 
is in the tensions between the retrospective and the prospective, the 
given and the created, between 'finding' and the 'making', in the 
expression of an utterance, that the 'movement of mind' is at work. 
(Shotter, 1993a, p. 72). 
This usage recalls Althusser's (1971) notion of 'interpellation' by which a 
person's subjectivity was 'hailed' by the dominant ways of speaking in a given 
social context and then incorporated into a set of institutional relations defined by 
social class interests. The constructionist version of positioning has, however, 
fewer deterministic overtones. 
The concept of positioning can be explained further by constrasting it with 
the 'more static' concept of role (Davies & Harre, 1990, p. 43; 1999, p. 32; Harre 
& van Langenh~ve, 1991, p. 393; 1999, p.14). Making use of discourse theory, 
the positioning theorists describe a more fluid, dynamic, sometimes shifting, sense 
of how people move themselves and each other around in conversation. The 
metaphor of 'role' by contrast offers a blunter instrument for describing processes 
of movement or change. For example, a 'doctor' can be considered a social role. 
Foucault (1972), however, sought to describe the social role of doctor as a series 
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of dispersed fragments of a variety of relational positions (such as questioner, 
observing eye, laboratory technician, interpreter of signs and so on). 
Davies and Harre recognise the poststructuralist idea of 'discursive 
practices' constituting social positioning through the 'inscription of subjectivity' 
(1990, p. 43; 1999, p. 32). Positioning theory seeks to articulate, through the 
analysis of very particular discourse usages, just how the social world becomes 
mapped onto the subjective experience of individuals in the context of 
conversation. It is, therefore, about the development of a sense of self. It also 
accounts for practices of exclusion from speaking rights in which a person may be 
offered a position that does not entail full participation as a legitimate social 
agent. Positioning is about social constraint as well as about social legitimation. 
The analysis of sexist language has provided many examples of exclusionary 
positioning. Thus, any utterance becomes understood in terms of its contextually 
specific social, or illocutionary, force. 
The notion of discursive positioning accomplishing the 'inscription of 
subjectivity', the production of a subject position in text, also includes the 
establishment of a foundation from which to act as a subject, not just to be 
subjected. It implies the possibility of agency from a place in history and culture, 
that is a place that is already structured within limits, but also a place that is a 
beginning point for acting into the cultural world (Laws & Davies, 2001). 
In this context, a discourse is referred to as an 'institutionalised use of 
language and language-like sign systems' (Davies & Harre, 1990, p. 45; 1999, p. 
34). Such institutionalisation can occur at various levels, such as the political, the 
disciplinary, the cultural and the small group levels. Hence, discursive 
positioning can be traced in relation to membership of local discourse 
communities (such as families) or in relation to widespread pervasive social 
categories, like gender or class. This fluidity distinguishes positions from roles, 
which are more closely tied to social structures. 
Moreover, any single saying can accomplish the task of an utterance in 
multiple conversations (Davies & Harre, 1990, p. 45; 1999, p. 34). Take for 
example a newspaper article, which in itself constitutes a response to a reporter's 
interviews with perhaps several sources. As an utterance, it gets read in many 
contexts by multiple readers, who respond to it with utterances of their own in 
many more conversations (even those conversations that are held in private in a 
reader's head). In the context of mediation, one party may be having an ongoing 
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conversation with her or his lawyer about the subject matter of the dispute. Then, 
in the mediation conversation itself, this person may make an utterance that is 
both a response to the mediator's question and at the same time a response to his 
or her lawyer's advice. 
Nor do we need to entertain any expectation of discursive consistency. 
Discourses often compete with each other to offer people subject positions which 
incorporate 'conceptual repertoires' (Davies & Harre, 1990, p. 46; 1999, p. 35) 
and structure or legitimise the right to act, or not to be able to act, in a local moral 
order. Positions also grant a vantage point from which to view the world. This 
vantage point is built out of metaphors, storylines and concepts which achieve 
relevance through their connection to a particular discursive context. We become 
the positions that we take up and we speak from these positions. 
Discourses are never of our own individual making, and, therefore, it 
makes sense to speak of our subjectivity as constituted largely from the outside in. 
Nevertheless, positioning theory allows for personal choice as well. Choice arises 
on the basis that there are always multiple discourses at work in our positioning 
(Davies & Harre, 1990, p. 46; 1999, p. 35.) As we move from conversation to 
conversation, we are offered a 'panorama' (Davies & Harre, 1990, p. 47) of 
different positions that in effect create multiple subjective experiences from which 
we can draw in understanding our potential choices in life. The ability we have to 
make such choices accords with Bakhtin's expressive intention in our utterances. 
The concept helps us analyse how it is that people 'do being a certain kind of 
person' (Davies & Harre, 1990, p. 62; 1999, p. 52). 
In the analysis of interactions in a mediation, the roles of 'disputant' and 
'mediator' are not sharp enough instruments on their own to enable meaning-
making with regard to the conversational moves in a conflict resolution process. 
There is more variability in utterances than can be accounted for by these roles. 
Nor, in a divorce mediation, is it enough to speak in a simple way about the roles 
of husband and wife if we want to appreciate exactly how gendered subjectivity is 
being constructed or contradicted, taken-for-granted or challenged, accepted or 
reconfigured, in the moment of interaction. The same can be said for other roles 
that might become embroiled in conflict, such as landlord and tenant, parent and 
child, brother and sister, customer and small business owner, teacher and 
principal, manager and employee, or even colleague and friend. Positioning 
theory offers us a more finely honed tool for analysing the moves in conversation 
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out of which, in a discursive understanding, we make ourselves up as persons, 
always in relation to others. 
Positioning theory also allows us to understand the more subtle nuances of 
contradiction and discontinuity (Davies & Harre, 1990; 1999). The possibility of 
contradiction of discursive positioning is necessary for any kind of critical social 
analysis or for the possibility of change. If we could not at times refuse the 
positions we are offered, then we would be determined by the discursive worlds in 
which we live. We would have no room to make choices, to take stands, or to 
protest injustice. In other words, we need the possibility of contradiction in order 
to exercise agency. 
Moreover, positioning theory opens the way to make sense of our 
inconsistencies, and even hypocrisies. We are positioned within many 
conversations, even at the same moment of time, and may not always find it easy 
to perceive how we are positioned. On some occasions, we may be able to 
formulate a contradictory response to the way that we are being positioned by. 
another, while on others we may not be able to do this. This advantage of 
positioning theory is important for an analysis of mediation processes, because 
mediation, by its very nature, is about weaving a path through contests and 
contradictions. Frequently, conflict might arise from the ways in which people 
are at least uneasy, and often downright unhappy, with the effects of how they are 
being positioned by the other party (or parties). Mediation conversations hold out 
the promise of opportunity to reposition oneself in a relation or to make more 
room for another's position-taking. 
Positioning theory allows us to theorise how people move each other 
around in conversation. As a concept then, it is useful in the analysis of exactly 
how power operates at the local and particular level. It accounts for how people 
take up, say, gendered subjectivities, even to their own cost. It allows for 
distinctions between 'forced' and 'deliberate' positioning of either ourselves or of 
others (Harre & van Langenh0ve, 1991, p. 399; 1999, p. 24), and between 'tacit 
and intentional' positioning (Harre & van Langenh0ve, 1991, p. 398; 1999, p. 23). 
This view entails an understanding of power in Foucault's terms as a 'constitutive 
force' (Davies & Harre, 1990, p. 46 ; 1999, p. 35) that is realised primarily in the 
exchange of utterances called conversation. 
Again, there are advantages for an appreciation of what can happen in 
mediation. Positioning theory provides a bridge between the local moral order of 
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a relation and the wider social discourse in which it is but one example among 
many. It does this through taking account of how an utterance can be responsive 
not just to the immediately preceding utterance but also to utterances in many 
other conversations in the discourse on a certain theme. These utterances may be 
responsive to other conversations from the same genre, from other conjunctures in 
the speaker's experience, or from background defining utterances in a particular 
order of discourse. When there are dominating discourses at work that provide 
insistent positions from which to make sense of the immediate utterance of the 
other, then they can exert a strong pull on what is said in the direction of the 
dominating discourse, and can discourage options for refusal or contradiction. 
Thus, we might make sense of how dominant discourses about gendered family 
arrangements might operate in divorce mediation. 
Linehan and McCarthy (2000) analyse an instance of discursive 
positioning that illuminates the possibilities for contradiction in the face of the 
normative power of discourse. The particular conversational exchange that they 
use as example takes place in an interaction between a teacher and student in a 
primary school. The class is given five exercises to do and the student, Lorraine, 
completes only one. The following exchange takes place beside the teacher's 
desk. 
T: That's a disgrace Lorraine Smith 
( Lorraine makes a face.) 
T: be very careful 
(Lorraine moves back to her seat and the class moves on to geography.) 
T: the girls who have their plans and scales book take it out please 
(Later on ... Tis passing out photocopies to students who do not have their book, 
without any comment, then .. ) 




T: ( says something in an undertone to Lorraine which includes 'your mother') 
The student refuses to cooperate with a teacher's positioning of her as behaving 
inappropriately within a classroom. She resists being positioned within a 
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discourse of school that legitimates the authority of the teacher simply through 
answering, 'No,' when asked if she has her book. The moment is characterised by 
the researchers as one where the outcome is not predictably structured within the 
dominant moral order of schooling, but is being negotiated through this exchange 
and the others that follow. Positioning theory illustrates how this happens on a 
moment by moment basis. 
Linehan and McCarthy show that there are multiple identity possibilities 
within this interaction, even within a constraining moral order. Moreover, the 
particular positions that are taken up by the individuals in the interaction remain 
indeterminate for each as long as it not clear which positions (out of the many 
available) the other will take up (Linehan & McCarthy, 2000, p. 449). They also 
draw from Hodges ( 1998) in saying that the participant's own meaning of the 
momentary gaps between normative practice and difference counts for something. 
Background discourses do not fix people in positions ahead of any moment of 
interaction. 
On the one hand, this analysis emphasises the normative power of 
discourse to constitute a 'moment by moment oughtness' (Linehan & McCarthy, 
2000, p. 442) in the relations between participants in a conversation. On the other 
hand, this analysis emphasises 'the idea of persons having the possibility of 
distinctness' (Linehan & McCarthy, 2000, p. 449) through the choices they make 
to take up or refuse discursive positions. An over-emphasis on discourse 
'stability' is thereby avoided and more possibilities for points of conflict and 
change can emerge. Analysis of a particular interaction therefore takes on greater 
vividness and the picture painted is one in which positioning theory: 
... offers a dynamic, agentive model of identity construction where a 
person creates a possible identity for themselves in a particular context 
through their active positioning in relation to, or perhaps in opposition 
to, elements in their discursive cultural context. 
(Linehan & McCarthy, 2000, p. 449) 
Of particular interest to Linehan and McCarthy are the 'momentary gaps that 
emerge between normative practice and difference' (Linehan & McCarthy, 2000, 
p. 443). Laclau and Mouffe (2001) might call these gaps 'points of rupture' in the 
dominance of discourse. Bakhtin might refer more generally to the 
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unfinalizability of dialogue and Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999, p. 127) speak 
of the 'openness of discourse'. 
These ideas are particularly important for the approach to mediation that I 
want to articulate below because they point to the possibility of shifts and 
changes. The discourse analysis of mediation also needs to pay attention to the 
momentary gaps in a conflict that arise as people jostle for discursive positions in 
conversation. Studying what happens in these moments offers the possibility of 
evaluating the effectiveness of work done in mediation. 
Agency 
Linehan and McCarthy's account of momentary gaps in the midst of the 
discursive constitution of relationships raises the general question of the need to 
theorise agency. A theory of agency has already been referred to implicitly in 
Bakhtin's 'expressive aspect' of an utterance, in Bruner's narrative 'intentions' 
and in the positioning theorists' description of the possibilities for refusing subject 
positions in discourse. I want now to make this theorising more explicit. 
Any explanation of the workings of power relations in discourse raises the 
question of the extent to which power can be resisted or refused. Such a question 
is significant in relation to the possibility that relations between people might 
remain to some degree indeterminate in the face of the constraining and 
structuring effects of discourse in our lives. If we mount a description of the 
operation of power within discourse do we become simply puppets of the function 
of discourse? Have we arrived at a new Calvinism which has our thoughts and 
actions predestined by the new god of discourse? 
To answer the question requires a theory of agency. It is necessary to 
balance an understanding of the constitutive effects of discourse with an 
appreciation of what remains indeterminate and within our agentic grasp. The 
term 'agency', as I am using it, refers to the possibility for persons of making 
decisions about their own lives. It involves the ability to be a moral actor in the 
construction of the material conditions of one's own life, rather than to be 
produced wholely by social structuring forces, whether these are described as 
discourse or social structure or institutional demands. It is about a person's 
productive capacity to negotiate a position within a social context from which to 
act. 
97 
Positioning theory invites a consideration of the subject positions offered 
to people within a given discursive relation. Noticing and considering the 
assumptions built into such 'position calls' (Drewery, 2002; Drewery & Winslade, 
1997; Winslade & Monk, 2000) opens up the possibility of deliberately re-
positioning oneself within a discourse. For example, conventional discursive 
positioning may offer an individual a position of diminished opportunity to speak 
in relation to another's more privileged position. Refusing the position of 
diminished opportunity may involve asserting one's speaking voice anyway and 
upsetting the relational balance laid down in a discursive formation. 
Agency, however, cannot be taken for granted. From a constructionist 
perspective, it is always an achievement in a particular social context. The ability 
to speak on one's own behalf will always be partial since we can only speak in the 
discourses available to us and this must mean that some of the meaning we can 
make always lies beyond our individual control. Sampson (1993) describes 
situations in which a person's voice is constructed, authorised or legitimised only 
within terms given by another and hence there is little meaningful possibility for 
agency. Foucault ( 1978) also argued that discourse works to set up constraints on 
what can be said, by whom and on what occasions. In the context of power 
relations, the coercive control of language may be exercised so that individuals 
find themselves called into non-agentive positions, or at least into positions in 
which their agency is severely limited. 
Taking account of these discursive constraints distinguishes this account 
of agency from a humanistic perspective that is built around the central 
significance of the self. Foucault destabilized the dominant humanistic 
assumption of agency in which individuals are assumed to be free and equal 
citizens of democratic states, able to express their subjective will in the 
marketplace of social relations. His erasure of this kind of subject cleared the 
ground for the development of revised notions of subjectivity that are responsive 
to discourse theory. It is important in building on this work to construct notions 
of subjectivity carefully in order to avoid re-inscribing a humanistic agentic 
subject. However, without a notion of agency it is hard to account for social 
change, as Bernstein points out. In fact, Bernstein criticises existing theories of 
cultural reproduction for not specifying the criteria by which agentic acts can be 
shown to produce change (Bernstein, 1996, p. 30). He implies that such theories 
lack plausibility without a theory of agency. 
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Bronwyn Davies (1991) distinguishes her theory of agency from a 
humanistic version that locates agency in a unified, rational identity possessed by 
individuals as a product of normative socialization. From her perspective, agency 
is inscribed as the experience of subjectivity that can be taken up in contradiction 
to being positioned within dominant discourse. It is not unified or continuous but 
fragmentary and 'spoken into existence at any one moment.' It is linked to the 
constitution of a person as having desires and meanings and a voice that is made 
legitimate and is heard, even as it goes beyond the given meanings. Agency is not 
to be confused with autonomy and does not spring from the essence of the person. 
Agency is never freedom from discursive constitution of the self but the 
capacity to recognise that constitution and to resist, subvert and 
change the discourses themselves. 
(Davies, 1991, p. 51) 
From this perspective, the individual social agent is necessarily decentred 
from the central position it occupies in liberal humanist thought. It does not issue 
forth in response to a self-actualizing tendency (Rogers, 1961) but finds itself in 
conversation or dialogue, always in response to another. It is both passive and 
active, as the source of the energy for meaning-making and articulation and as the 
site onto which discourse is mapped. Chantale Mouffe stresses the plurality of the 
contingent position of social agents in this way: 
We can ... conceive of the social agent as constituted by an ensemble of 
'subject positions' that can never be totally fixed in a closed system of 
differences, constructed by a diversity of discourses, among which 
there is no necessary relation, but a constant movement of over-
detennination and displacement. The 'identity' of such a multiple and 
contradictory subject is therefore always contingent and precarious, 
temporarily fixed at the intersection of those subject positions and 
dependent on specific fonns of identification. It is therefore impossible 
to speak of the social agent as if we were dealing with a unified, 
homogeneous entity. We have rather to approach it as a plurality, 
dependent on the various subject positions through which it is 
constituted within various discursive formations. 
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(Mouffe, 1992, p. 372). 
Mouffe is stressing a sense of personal identity that accrues through 
participation in multiple discursive contexts. It remains fragmentary, 
contradictory and plural and resists what Bakhtin would call finalization. It is 
only ever temporarily fixed. Like Bronwyn Davies, Mouffe theorises the person 
in an ongoing relation with discourse, always reaching for a sense of identity 
which Davies has suggested is achieved through recognising the effects of 
discursive positioning and deliberately contradicting it. 
The very complexity of life also produces innumerable moments that are 
not rehearsed within discourse. While there are many recognisable patterns 
within social interaction, there are always unique instances constantly arising in 
which we are required to 'make it up as we go along' (Speedy, 2001). Dominant 
discourse can be extended to exert control over such instances, but this control can 
never be completely successful, because, as fast as the influence of dominant 
discourse is spread, so do fresh gaps in its influence arise. Agency can, in some 
circumstances, involve noticing what is unique about a particular conjuncture, 
rather than what is patterned and generalisable, and responding to the uniqueness. 
Agency can also involve borrowing from other discourses. The 
possibilities of borrowing from other discourses are enhanced by the very 
intertextual nature of discourse (Bakhtin, 1984; Kristeva, 1986). Intertextuality 
refers to the property of texts to contain borrowed traces of other texts. These 
borrowings may sometimes be overtly marked as originating elsewhere or they 
may simply be incorporated unwittingly as part of the text. Thus relations are 
established between texts, which may be relations of agreement, elaboration, 
contradiction, etc. They are always, in a sense, historical relations since any new 
text builds on other texts that are prior to it. In the process of the intertextual 
influencing of one text by others, styles of language 'intermingle to create and 
transform meaning' (Gee, 1999, p. 41). 
The concept of intertextuality has been enjoined to account for processes 
of overdetermination (Althusser, 1971) whereby large-scale orders of discourse 
are woven together in almost inescapable, systematic webs of power. But 
intertextuality also opens new possibilities for contradiction, if ideas for resistance 
can be borrowed from some other known discursive context. An example exists 
in the way the disability movement borrowed from the feminist critique of sexist 
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language and developed a parallel analysis of disability discourse (Corker & 
French, 1999.) Viewing something from within constructions borrowed from 
another discourse, has the ability to 'render something strange' (White, 1991, p. 
121) and to break up the comfortable dominance of what was otherwise taken-for-
granted. 
Foucault made the point that the articulation of power through discourse 
produces its own resistance. He argued that the very processes of domination and 
the need for their constant reproduction admit their weakness and instability. 
Power relations in their productive function produce categories of personhood that 
can be expressed in the form of resistance. 
As soon as there is a power relation, there is the possibility of 
resistance. We are never trapped by power: we can always modify its 
grip in determinate conditions and according to a precise strategy. 
(Foucault, 1989, p. 153) 
No discursive formation achieves total authority. Dominance is 'always being 
threatened, always needing to be restored' (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 106). And 
the existence of resistance creates options for the refusal of dominant discourse. 
Agency is possible in the choices that must be made in this regard. 
Bernstein (1996, p. 44) sees 'potential discursive gaps' as arising between 
the context-bound material base of practice and the more indirect world of 
meaning in which it may be described. In this gap lies the potential for the 
generation of alternative meanings, for the realisation of alternative relations 
'between the material and the immaterial'. It is, says Bernstein, the 'site for the 
unthinkable, the site of the impossible' which is the meeting point of 'order and 
disorder, of coherence and incoherence', of the 'yet to be thought' (Bernstein, 
1996, p. 44 ). This site is a point of origin for the agentic act. It will be necessary 
here to demonstrate that mediation can be such a site, if mediation is not to be 
considered merely for its role in the reproduction of discursive power relations. 
The concept of voice is often used in relation to agency. To have a voice, 
to speak on one's own behalf, can be equated with notions of active participation 
in the creation of discourse. However, having an agentic voice is not as simple as 
just opening one's mouth to speak. Bakhtin (1981) shows how utterances can be 
101 
double-voiced (see also Fairclough, 1992; Gee 1999) and so contain voicings that 
the speaker did not authorise. He also stresses how the uses of words in any 
utterance will contain echoes of many other contexts of usage, such that the voice 
of the subject in any context is muted. For these reasons, it is not enough to 
distinguish having a voice from silence or even from being silenced. It is 
necessary for the articulation of a theory of agency to develop a concept of 
speaking in 'one's own language' (Fairclough, 1992). 
Bernstein suggests a starting point. He speaks of the processes of control 
over the legitimacy of speaking and suggests the need to understand something of 
such processes as part of the development of a voice. He puts it like this: 
To know whose voice is speaking is the beginning of having one's own 
voice. 
(Bernstein, 1996, p. 12) 
Articulating a voice thus means beginning with recognition of what is going on in 
a discursive field and being able to 'make distinctions between contextual events 
so as to manage a response' (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p. 117). This idea 
of voice is does not automatically correspond with speaking. Rather it is 
achieved, and achieved in a relational or discursive context. It is not so much a 
constant state of being, but a repeated production in a variety of contexts. 
Sometimes we achieve the possibility of agency in the face of dominating 
discourse but we do not necessarily always do so. Nor do we necessarily carry a 
sense of voice forward from one context to another. 
Finally, there is a role for reflexivity in the constitution of agency. Human 
beings have the ability to reflect on and to notice the process of production of 
their own practices. We can produce representations of what we do as a part of 
what we do (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). Such reflexivity is an important 
foundation for the exercise of agency. Without the ability to reflect, we would be 
more easily subjected by the constraining effects of social forces. Reflexive 
awareness, or the ' ... ability to stand out of the flow of lived experience, 
sometimes only momentarily, and to review the events of our lives from other 
vantage points,' (White, 2001, p. 23) gives us the opportunity to act in 
unpredictable ways. It enables us to alter, even subtly, the course of life that 
colonizing discourses would determine for us. Even if we do not use these words 
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to describe what we are doing, we can analyse just how we are being positioned in 
our own or in others' utterances and shift the basis of our responses. 
For mediation, the concept of agency is important with regard to the 
politics of meaning-making. If mediators can support both parties in a dispute to 
be agents in the design of their ongoing relationship, then the chances of one 
person dominating are minimised and the chances of real dialogue are enhanced. 
As I have theorised the concept of agency, mediators should be alert to the 
opportunities disputing parties take up in resistance to readymade positions in 
dominant discourse. They should capitalise on such opportunities by inviting 
people to give voice to their positions in the story of a conflict and also to be 
reflexive about their own positioning. In the process, they should seek to 
deliberately create a dialogical space in which multiple voices can be heard 
without any of them coming to dominate. I shall go on to outline some 
conversational methods that have these goals in mind. But first, there is one more 
concept that is relevant to the creation of a context for mediation. 
Recontextualising 
'Recontextualising' is the final concept that I want to include in this 
chapter. Its importance to this study lies in its relevance to the context of 
professional conversations such as mediation. The concept of re-contextualising a 
discursive formation in ways that bring about changes to social practices and even 
to power relations is developed in the work of Bernstein (1996). He defines 
recontextualisation as a 'principle for appropriating other discourses and bringing 
them into a special relation with each other for the purposes of their selective 
transmission and acquisition' (Bernstein, 1996, p. 183). His interest lies mainly in 
ways that educational pedagogy can develop into a special kind of discourse that 
has the potential to transform relations constructed within other discursive fields 
(for example, discourse of social class). Pedagogic discourse moves other 
discourses about. As they are relocated, social practices can be dislocated from 
their social basis and reimagined. Hence recontextualising can be useful in the 
production of social change. 
For Bernstein's purposes, the definition of pedagogy is a wide one that is 
not confined to schooling. He takes 'pedagogic practices' to include 
'relationships between doctor and patient, relationships between psychiatrists and 
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the so-called mentally ill, the relationships between architects and planners' and 
so on. In other words, 'pedagogic practice' describes lay-professional relations as 
a 'fundamental social context' through which 'cultural-reproduction-production 
takes place.' It is clear then that, in these terms, mediation would be a 
pedagogical practice. 
The concept of recontextualisation has potential in mediation for 
explaining the structuring aspects of discourse in a way that leaves them more 
fluid than rigid. It also accounts for another way that agency can be exercised in 
the face of the constitutive power of discourse. Bernstein specifies the 
recontextualising principle as one which 'selectively appropriates, relocates, 
refocuses and relates other discourses to constitute its own order' (Bernstein, 
1996, p. 47). He insists that in the process of recontextualising dominant social 
discourses (for example of social class, gender or race) through the discourse of 
pedagogy, the discourses existing outside the school (for example) are not simply 
reproduced intact but are always transformed in some way. 
Bernstein's proposal enhances the significance of what happens in 
mediation. It suggests that dominant discourses at work in the production of a 
relationship between disputing parties need not be simply reproduced in the 
mediation conversation but may be recontextualised by it. For example, when 
disputing parties tell a story in mediation of an angry and even abusive exchange 
that has taken place between them, they often do not do so in a way that resembles 
the original exchange. In the presence of the mediator they are far more polite 
and respectful towards each other. They therefore position themselves differently 
in relation to each other and in relation to the events of the previous angry 
exchange. Meanings begin to shift in the process. A relationship is 
recontextualised by being folded back on itself and events are revisited in a 
different context. Discursive positioning shifts a little in the process. If mediators 
take this possibility seriously, they can conceptualise their work as pedagogical 
without having to be didactic. Their task is to create the kind of relational context 
in which parties can feel comfortable enough to re-position themselves in the 
mediation conversation so that a different story of relationship can go forward. 
* * * 
Let me review the ground covered in this chapter. What I have sought to 
achieve is a representation of the major conceptual and interpretive tools that will 
inform this study. I intend to use these concepts as prosthetic devices (in 
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Shotter's terms, see above) in the elaboration of the practice of narrative 
mediation and also in the analysis of some pieces of conversation drawn from this 
field of practice. The concepts used here have been selected out of those available 
as those that seem to give the most promise for describing the articulation of a 
practice. 
I have sought also to locate my argument in a conversational tradition, in a 
particular discourse about discourse. This discourse provides both foundation 
stones and scaffolding for the edifice that I want to build. 
Amongst the ideas I have explored, there is some sense of tension between 
the structuring, shaping, constituting or determining effects of discourse on the 
one hand and the possibilities for resistance or agency that grow out of the 
indeterminacy, complexity and variability within discourse. I am not suggesting 
that this tension is a dialectic that can be, even in theory, reduced to a synthesis. 
Rather, it is a way of accounting for both the sense of coherence and stability in 
the production of our personal-cultural-social world and for the sense of 
instability that makes it possible to imagine social change. 
Michael White's formulation of this idea appeals for its simplicity. He 
describes the tension between the constitutive power of discourse and the 
unruliness of life as the possibility of 'indeterminacy within determinacy' (White, 
2001, p. 28). Under this heading, he asserts his belief that there is never a 'one-to-
one correspondence' between 'cultural knowledges and practices on the one hand 
and life as it is lived on the other'. Such an idea would render people as too 
passive and be disrespectful of their creative efforts. Discourse would then be 
thought of in mechanistic ways as 'inputs' which produce predictable 'outputs'. 
White prefers an account of people's relationship with culture and discourse that 
casts them in the active, agentive roles of 'performing acts of meaning', 'pulling 
the materials of culture together', 'engaging with cultural modes of life and 
thought' and 'expressing their knowleges of life' (p. 28). The verbs here are 
active. 
These descriptions render possible the kind of professional practice that 
can enhance possibilities for seeking out the 'chaotic zone of indeterminacy or 
uncertainty' (Shotter, 1997, p. 345), for dwelling in it temporarily, and utilizing 
indeterminacy to advantage. It is the place where dialogue happens, where things 
remain unfinalized and where social change originates. Here, culture is 
something being produced rather than a constraining straight jacket of 
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conventions (Rosaldo, 1993). Here too, history is often discontinuous (Mills, 
1997, p. 26) rather than driven along a fixed trajectory in which discourses appear 
arbitrary rather than overwhelmingly powerful. It will be necessary to turn to the 
world of practice to do justice to the conceptual tools outlined in this chapter and 
to show how we can wrest the prize of social change from the grasp of discourse. 
These then are the bases from which I shall argue for a practice of 
mediation that takes full account of the structuring effects of discourse but which 
also makes use of the possibilities for promoting agency among the participants in 
a mediation. It will be a practice that recontextualizes relations between 
disputants in a mediation conversation, deconstructs the workings of discourse 
behind people's backs, invites them to reposition themselves in relation to 
dominant discourse, and calls them into position as agents who are able to speak 
on their own behalf. Before describing and illustrating this practice in more 




In this study I have so far·developed an account of discourse and positioning 
theory that can serve as the basis for both a mediation practice and a research 
approach to analyse conversation data. I now need to tum to the task of articulating a 
mediation method informed by these ideas and then asking some questions of this 
practice through researching it. This chapter will contain an account of the methods 
used in the remainder of this study to pursue this objective. 
Research Design 
As outlined above in the introductory chapter, the emphasis in the design of 
this research task was to study narrative mediation in a way that could be justified in 
terms of its current stage of development. To subject it a full-scale outcome study is 
premature given that it is still a fledgling approach to conflict resolution. Therefore 
the method of study needed to match the developmental process and if possible 
enhance the development of the approach, including its theoretical elaboration, rather 
than subject it to evaluative scrutiny. 
The emphasis in terms of research design is therefore on the close study of 
some examples of the approach in action. The aim is to use the tools of research to 
develop a richer account of this approach than has existed so far and to elucidate this 
account through the use of positioning theory. As claimed in the introduction, I shall 
be attempting to show how the analysis of discursive positioning contributes to the 
development of a practice and to the research of that practice. 
A broad scale study across hundreds of examples of such practice is not 
possible since there do not exist a cadre of practitioners committed to embodying this 
approach in their practice. For this reason alone, a broad survey approach would not 
be possible. Nor would it benefit the process development of a newly articulated 
practice as much as the close study of this process. The generation of data that can 
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benefit the development of practice was the clear goal of this research exercise. It is 
not 'pure' research aimed at developing psychological concepts per se. Nor, on the 
other hand, is it principally an ecological study of the relation between a practice and 
the community it is designed to benefit. Nor is it an evaluation study aimed at 
demonstrating, for the benefit of funders and providers, the efficacy of a practice. 
Given this avowedly developmental research purpose, I would contend that 
there is no conflict of interest between my position as an advocate for narrative 
mediation and my position as a researcher asking questions about its effects. I have 
written elsewhere about narrative mediation (Winslade & Cotter, 1997; Winslade & 
Monk, 2000; Winslade, Monk & Cotter, 1999) and cannot be considered an 
independent observer of it. Even when I am commenting on a piece of conversation 
drawn from an example of narrative mediation performed by someone else, it is 
impossible for me to establish a position of impartiality. But if the research exercise 
is itself avowedly partial to the development of a practice, if it is indeed openly 
seeking to maximise the advantages of this practice and is using some research 
methods to this end, then my position as researcher is not so questionable. 
There are two role-played mediations that form the corpus around which the 
rest of this study is organised. In the first of these, I shall include selected segments 
of text from the course of a single interview to illustrate principles of narrative 
mediation in action. This example of mediation is one in which I was the mediator. I 
shall then use positioning theory to explain this example of practice and show how an 
understanding of discursive positioning can enable a practitioner to work narratively 
with people in dispute. The aim will be to show how discursive positioning is 
implicated in the production of the ethics and the politics of practice with a particular 
emphasis on how the mediator can make use of positioning theory. In the second 
interview, Gerald Monk was the mediator. With this example, I shall take up the 
position of researcher, analysing the discursive positioning in more detail. I shall 
mount a discourse analysis of the text of this conversation. The aim here is to 
demonstrate the explanatory power of positioning theory with regard to the shifts and 
changes that people can make in conversation. 
The methodology for these two exercises varies slightly. For the first 
exercise, I am using text to describe and make sense of a practice. For the second 
exercise, from the position of researcher, I want to ask many more questions of this 
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practice. In order to ask these questions, I need to invoke a research tradition and 
articulate the specific rigours of study that I shall deploy in order to claim the status 
of research for this exercise. The rest of this chapter will outline the methods used for 
these two different exercises. I shall begin with the methodology for the explication 
of practice and then in much greater detail describe the discourse analytic method that 
will be used for researching this practice. 
In the book I wrote with Gerald Monk (Winslade & Monk, 2000) on a 
narrative perspective in mediation, we did introduce the concept of discursive 
positioning but in this exercise I intend to take it further and expand the utility of this 
idea. The method for doing so involved making recordings of two mediation 
conversations in a narrative mode and turning them into text by transcribing the 
conversation. In Chapters Six and Seven, I shall present selected segments of these 
conversations along with commentary that seeks to make explicit the discursive 
positioning that takes place. 
Single Case Study Analysis 
The research aspect to this study is based on the detailed analysis of a single 
case study. There exists a tradition of such research in the therapy field dating back 
to Freud's analysis of Breuer's treatment of Anna O (Russell, 1987). It is justified as 
a basis for discourse analytic work by ten Have ( 1999) on the basis of the 'emic' 
perspective in social research and as a 'specimen perspective'. 
In the 19 50s, Carl Rogers pioneered the use of the tape recorder as a research 
tool in his early studies of therapists' use of language. Since the 1980s, a research 
tradition has grown up in the counselling field of 'psychotherapy process research' 
which uses various tools to study intensively the significant events in a counselling 
session (Toukmanian & Rennie, 1992). Gale ( 1991) introduced the study of discourse 
into this field when he used a conversation analysis method to analyse a single family 
therapy session for a doctoral dissertation. This is the research tradition in which I 
am seeking to stand. The data for a mediation session are comparable to those for a 
therapy session. And Critical Discourse Analysis is a closely related variant of the 
approach to conversation analysis that Gale employed. 
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Balance Of Process And Outcomes 
Another question that needs to be addressed with regard to research design 
concerns the balance of research focus on process or outcomes. While this is a study 
concerned with examining a practice in terms of its moment-by-moment effects and 
is therefore in this sense an effectiveness study, it is also an attempt to stand clearly 
outside the tradition of what has been called 'black box' outcome research (Patton, 
1994). By this, I mean the kind of research that asks a question about the 
effectiveness of a complex practice through a study of the endpoints reached at the 
termination of the process. Such research approaches lead to the establishment of 
summative judgments of the practice but shed little light on the elements of the 
process that have produced these outcomes. Such approaches to the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of mediations have been criticised in the mediation literature (Garcia, 
2000; Dingwall 1986) for their failure to capture what actually happens in mediation. 
Once again, the developmental focus of this study makes a process focus 
more relevant at this stage of the evolution of narrative mediation. I wanted 
formative judgments to take precedence over summative ones. The approach I am 
using aims to both demonstrate and make sense of the detailed elements of practice 
and to illuminate the micro-level effects of specific conversational moves, rather than 
to be concerned with the overall outcome picture. In all likelihood, there will be a 
relationship between the accumulation of micro-level effects and the massing of 
overall effect, but this may not be a simple relationship. Certain practice elements 
may be seen to have greater effect than others and the differential effects that the 
research illuminates may not always equate with what the practitioner expected or 
intended. Therefore, what I needed to do was to produce data for analysis that could 
represent the practice of narrative mediation. 
Producing Text For Analysis 
Since I am talking about a complex conversational practice it is clear that such 
a process can best be represented by pieces of text. The major methodological 
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questions concerned how to produce such text. Mediation conversations are more 
difficult from which to get recordings for transcription than are counselling 
conversations, because of the need to secure informed consent from people who are 
in conflict and therefore not in positions where they are easily trusting of each other. 
As a result, there is a tradition within mediation research of using role-played 
scenarios for the recording of mediation conversations for teaching and analytical 
purposes (for example, Association of Family Mediators, 1989; Gale, Mowery, 
Herrman, & Hollett, 2002; Menkel-Meadow, 1994; Pope & Bush, 2000). I chose to 
work within this mode of data collection and to set up two role-played mediation 
scenarios that were recorded and transcribed. 
There are limitations to the value of a role-play in representing what happens 
in a 'live' mediation. Participants role-playing disputing parties do not have a history 
of living with a conflict and can therefore find themselves either overplaying or 
underplaying the difficulty of the conflict. Role-players can introduce details that 
contradict what other participants have said as a result of the need to invent things 
along the way rather than drawing on actual memory. Role-players who do not have 
personal experience of, say, a divorce may not represent accurately the legal steps 
(for example) that people need to go through in such a context. And the method 
always leaves the process open to criticism that it would not be like this in 'real life'. 
However, Don Mixon ( 1974) defends the use of role-plays as a legitimate and 
flexible research tool which is 'particularly well-adapted to the systematic exploration 
of social episodes' (p. 84). He argues that there are many occasions where more 
information can be generated by the use of role-plays than is possible from 'real' life. 
A defence of the use of role-played mediation can also be made on the basis of 
discourse theory. When people find themselves in particular conjunctures, such as 
custody battles, they can be expected to construct their personal positions and their 
position calls of each other from the available discourses that are extant in their 
cultural worlds. Such discourses are known to us, both as participants in the language 
games that constitute custody disputes and as role-players who are temporarily 
entering into such language games without having to live them out in an ongoing 
way. I believe this accounts for the phenomenon that has been noticeable on several 
occasions where I have shown in teaching contexts the videotapes of the role-played 
mediations used in this dissertation. People regularly comment that the rolepaying 
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was so 'real' that it was hard to believe that it was a role-play. I would argue that it 
appears this way because the discourse that the role-players call on is 'real'. It has a 
real life in the cultural and linguistic worlds that the role-players are familiar with and 
therefore they can draw on this knowledge as they play the role. They do not even 
have to have shared in the exact experience of the people they are role-playing to 
know how to speak themselves into the discursive positions of the role-play. Perhaps 
it can be said that in 'real' life we are always role-playing anyway, in the sense that 
we are constructing our responses out of discourse rather than inventing them for the 
first time. 
On these grounds then, I argue that the role-playing of a mediation offers a 
reasonable representation of what might be expected to happen in a 'real life' 
mediation conversation. There are some things, though, that analysing a role-played 
conversation does not make available for study. One of these is the relationship 
between what happens in the mediation conversation and the performance of meaning 
in ongoing life after the conversation around the words exchanged in the role-play. 
Study of this contextual influence is not possible and therefore it is necessary to 
acknowledge this as a limit to this study. However, given that my main purpose in 
this exercise was the elaboration of a practice and a micro-study of the moment-by-
moment positionings and re-positionings that take place in response to this practice, I 
decided that the wider contextual perspective was not crucial to my current purpose. 
The other side of the coin is that role-play does offer some unique possibilities 
for research purposes that are not so easily available in 'real' conversations. After the 
completion of the role-play, as the participants are debriefing, and later on further 
reflection, the role-players can be asked to comment on their experience of the 
process. Since they are no longer committed to the content of the conversation they 
are perhaps freer to comment on the process issues, particularly on how the 
mediator's responses positioned them. This unique perspective for comment 
provides an added source of data and can be seen as an advantage of the use of role-
play over the recording of 'real' mediations. 
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Rigour In Qualitative Data Analysis 
Since this study employs a modified version of a qualitative research 
methodology, namely critical discourse analysis (I shall outline this approach below), 
it is useful to articulate an account of the methodological rigour of the procedures 
used. These procedures will be discussed in relation to the established criteria for 
rigour that exist in literature about such methods. 
One such attempt to establish some criteria for rigour in a qualitative study 
was laid down by Banister, Burman, Parker, Taylor and Tindall (1994 ). Their 
concern was to suggest how researchers can work 'interpretatively within the 
methodological horrors' of a reflexive science like psychology and 'transform them 
into methodological virtues' (p.10). They suggest three broad areas in relation to 
which a research exercise of merit should give account of itself: a) indexicality, b) 
inconcludability and c) reflexivity. I propose to use these three terms as a starting 
point for, on the one hand, explaining and justifying my research methods, and on the 
other hand being transparent about things that may be the basis of methodological 
criticism of this piece of research. 
Indexicality 
Indexicality refers to the 'problem' (as it is conceived in conventional positivist 
accounts of research methodology) of ecological validity. The meaning of all actions 
and all discourse needs to be indexed to, or held accountable to, the particular 
contextual features of its occurrence. Since no two contexts can be considered 
identical, the question arises as to the validity of using any research findings to 
explain occurrences of the phenomenon studied in other contexts. In qualitative 
research, this 'problem' is addressed by removing the separation of the activities of 
theorizing and of empirical testing (Banister et al., 1994, p. 10). Each piece of 
qualitative research work needs to be theorized and each piece of theorizing must in 
turn be related to the empirical context out of which it arises. 
What this means in practice is that for a particular piece of qualitative 
research, the extent to which the research can be said to relate to 'real life' refers to 
113 
the extent to which the meanings that the researcher imposes are made explicit and 
are made subject to interpretation from others involved in the study. Rigour here is 
based on ecological specificity rather than on generalisable replicability. Questions 
that might be asked include: 
- Has the study been done with the informants rather than against them? 
- Have the interests and influence of the researcher been made explicit and 
accountable to the participants? 
- Have the participants been accorded the right to speak in the research approach? 
Let me address these questions in relation to this research exercise. For the 
piece of transcript to be analysed in this study, the 'problem' being studied could be 
expressed as, 'What does narrative mediation look like in practice and what effects 
does it have at the micro-level of the ongoing production of discursive positions?' 
The contexts to which it might be indexed are therefore the contexts in which the 
role-players took part in the role-play, including the mediator. Let me outline the 
process by which such issues were attended to. 
I met with the role-play participants for twenty minutes before the videotape 
recording began when Gerald Monk was the mediator. For the exercise in which I 
was the mediator, Gerald met with the role-play participants in the same way. In 
these meetings, we asked the participants a series of questions to help them take on 
the roles they were playing (see Chapter Seven for these questions). After the 
recording of the role-played mediation was complete, I spoke with the role-players 
again and recorded their comments on the experience of the conversation. In this 
conversation, I was interested in their comments on the work done by Gerald as 
mediator. I was endeavouring to avoid using them as research subjects in an 
objectifying way and giving them an opportunity to participate in some first-level 
theorizing about the exercise. Their comments are included alongside the transcript 
in Chapter Seven. 
Once I had transcribed the role-play, I asked Gerald as the mediator to read 
through the transcript and give me any comments he would like to make about his 
intentions in the interview. In other words, he was asked to participate in the process 
of theorizing on his own work before I undertook the task of making sense of the 
conversation. After I had written a draft of my analysis of the role-played 
conversation, I again sent this to all the participants for them to comment on. My 
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interest was again to treat them as participants in the exercise with a valuable 
perspective to offer, rather than to separate them off as research subjects who were 
not needed for comment. I was also seeking to make my own conclusions 
accountable to those of the participants. 
These are the bases on which the study lays claim to relevance as an example of 
mediation work. It is not on the basis of a representative sample of mediation 
participants but on the basis that the participants who took part had ample opportunity 
to comment on how the experience was relevant to them. Gerald Monk, for example, 
commented that he was happy with the transcript as a representation of his work. 
Inconcludability 
Positivist research methods seek to build generalised conclusions on the 
validity of the data gathered, based on the success of the efforts to control outside 
factors from influencing the research results. Qualitative researchers claim, however, 
that there is always a gap between the meanings that appear in the data and the 
meanings that get concluded in research reports and that claims to have 'discovered' 
psychological facts are at heart rhetorical claims (Banister et al., 1994, p. 12). It is in 
this gap that qualitative research methods seek to operate, trading back and forth in 
meanings between researchers and participants, rather than keeping the two separate. 
Qualitative research data is thought to be more fluid and unstable as a foundation for 
reaching conclusions that can be carried into other contexts than are the generalised 
conclusions made from the quantitative analysis of data from a large sample of 
participants. But there is a trade-off here between the more meaningful commentary 
possible through qualitative research and more generalisable conclusions made 
possible through quantitative methods (Patton, 1994). Quantitative research methods 
also have limitations with regard to generalisability because, in order to develop 
universal enough concepts for generalisable purposes, context sensitivity is often 
sacrificed. Qualitative researchers (including discourse analysts) can lay claim to 
some advantages for their approaches with regard to explanatory power from small 
samples or from single case studies (Banister et al., 1994, p.12). But they are also 
advised to clearly state the reasons for making a particular selection of research 
informants (Banister et al., 1994, p.13). And they should accept the provisional 
nature of research findings, even within a context, let alone across multiple contexts. 
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Again, let me use the concept of inconcludability as a basis for describing my 
own choice of research method. Since my aim was to produce a detailed account of, 
and a demonstration of, mediation practice, rather than, say, an account of 
participants' experience of the ongoing effects of such practice, generalisable 
conclusions on the experience of the parties to the dispute was not at issue. If 
anything might be hoped to be generalisable, it would be the mediator's practice. 
However, a range of mediators using comparable practices does not exist. Nor has 
the kind of practice being demonstrated here stabilised into a sufficiently consistent 
practice that it could be reproduced in range of contexts. Hence, the emphasis clearly 
needed to be on the detailed analysis of a narrow range of practice with a view to 
articulating and interpreting it more fully than has been achieved so far. Therefore, in 
the choice between close and detailed analysis that is less generalisable, and less 
detailed analysis of data that is more generalisable because it originates from a wide 
cross-section of contexts, I chose the former. My hope would be that this account of 
the practice of narrative mediation would achieve a stronger position from which to 
claim generalisability through the eventual accumulation of a series of such practice 
examples. In the meantime, no strong claims can be made even that the principles of 
this practice demonstrated here in relation to an issue of child custody can be 
generalised to contexts such as mediation in, say, employment disputes, or restorative 
justice contexts, or business settlements, or international conflicts. 
Reflexivity 
Reflexivity is a concept used in research to address the issue of objectivity. 
The desire to be objective can be thought of as the desire for the research results to 
reflect more than just the preconceptions of the researcher. It is traditionally thought 
of in positivist research as opposite to subjectivity. Researchers have sought to 
remove subjectivity from their results through a variety of procedures designed to 
separate the subject of the researcher from the object of the study. These procedures 
are variously criticised by qualitative researchers as failing or as dishonest (Banister 
et al., 1994, p.13). Qualitative research, on the other hand, frequently does not make 
the same claim to objectivity. Its credibility stands on a different formulation of the 
relationship between the subjective and the objective. Subjectivity is seen as a 
resource and a research exercise must examine and make explicit the position of the 
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researcher in relation to the research. Such positions can then be examined by other 
research participants, whose opinions can be treated as valued resources rather than 
screened out. Credibility is established through the transparency of the researcher's 
position and through the inclusion of multiple perspectives rather than through the 
construction of a singular objective position. From this perspective, a research 
exercise need never be regarded as neutral in its effects. Studying something will 
al ways change it and qualitative researchers seek to celebrate this fact rather than 
conceive of it as a methodological limitation. 
Once again, Jet me apply this principle to the research exercise that I have 
undertaken. Some degree of objectivity was aimed at in this study in the following 
ways. I did seek to make a conversation into an object of study through the use of 
recording and transcription techniques. The conversation was recorded on videotape 
and was also audiotaped at the same time. The recordings were then used to make a 
written transcription that became the object of study. Thus, while subjective 
judgments necessarily came into play in the process of transcription, the data to be 
analysed was not simply a subjective account constructed from memory of what 
happened in the conversation. It could be referred to by all participants in the process 
and by subsequent readers of my analysis. The analysis was undertaken by asking 
some questions of the text and generating some interpretations based on the 
theoretical concepts already outlined. Where multiple interpretations seem possible 
these are included. Meanings made by the participants in response to the transcripts 
and to my commentary are included where these are available. 
However, a transcription does not illuminate a practice without interpretation 
and meaning-making. Interpretative analysis was necessary before the data could be 
of value. As indicated above, I sought to be reflexive about the analysis by including 
the participants in the process of generating interpretations. Since discourse is a 
shared commodity generated in social contexts, its interpretation is also best shared in 
such contexts. My own discursive emphasis would not always be the same as others. 
Therefore, I also gave the analysis I had written to a series of other selected 
commentators and asked for their subjective comments in relation to my 
interpretations. Their comments are included in Chapter Seven as other possible 
interpretations of the work being done by discourse in this conversation. 
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Data Collection And Text Generation Procedures 
In this section I shall move from the general research design issues to a 
description of the procedures used for collecting data and generating text for analysis. 
Scenario One 
The scenario used in the first role-play was selected from some scenarios 
suggested by students in a mediation class as representative of the kinds of disputes 
that were typical in their work or in their experience. An instance of family 
mediation around the care of a child was chosen because this is a major domain in 
which mediation is practised in New Zealand and elsewhere. The particular case 
chosen also had an extra dimension to it. It involved a gay man who had made an 
arrangement for a woman to carry a child for him. After carrying the child, the 
woman had decided that she did not want to give the child up to the man and his 
partner. This scenario seemed to offer the opportunity to make explicit some of the 
discursive effects in people's lives of normalised notions of family. How people 
position themselves and each other in relation to such discursive influences would, I 
hoped, show the work being done by such influences in many other contexts as well. 
The scenario that was given to the role-players is reproduced in Chapter Five. 
Scenario Two 
The scenario to be used in the second role-play was also generated by 
adapting a scenario that was suggested by students in a mediation class as 
representative of the kinds of issues they had come across in practice. The scenario 
used was chosen because it represented the kind of child custody issue that features 
commonly in divorce mediation, still one of the most frequent areas of practice for 
professional mediators. The scenario also had some added dimensions. It was about a 
conflict between a grandmother and a father after the death of a mother. The role-
play participants had a say in choosing this scenario over an alternative possibility 
and they mentioned in doing so that it was one in which they felt they could call on 
enough personal experience to be able to play the role. For example, Jackie, who 
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played the grandmother, referred to her own experience of being a grandmother as a 
resource for playing this role. 
Participants 
I was the mediator in the first role-play. The disputing parties were role-played 
by two students in the school counseling programme at San Diego State University 
named Andrew and Melissa. They volunteered to participate in this exercise in 
response to a request in their class from Gerald Monk. Both identify culturally as 
Latino/Latina and are in the late twenties. They did know each other before the role-
play. 
Gerald Monk was recruited to be the mediator in the second role-play. As my co-
author in a book about narrative mediation he could be expected to provide an 
example of the practice of this work that was recognisable as a narrative mediation 
approach. 
Gerald recruited two colleagues from San Diego State University who 
volunteered to be the role-players in the mediation scenario. Neither is involved in 
teaching mediation, but one does teach family therapy and the other teaches 
multicultural issues for students in the school counselling programme. They were 
given the role-play scenario the day before the recording of the mediation. Both 
participants are university teachers and therefore well educated and articulate. Jackie 
is African-American and Craig is Anglo-American, and this racial difference emerged 
as a factor in their adaptation of the scenario. Gerald did have a collegial relationship 
with each of the role-players prior to the role-play although they each did not know 
each other beforehand, except by sight. 
The Recording 
The role-played mediations were recorded on videotape by two cameras 
provided by the audio-visual department of San Diego State University and later 
edited onto one tape by them. It was also audiotaped at the same time. The recording 
was made on the 191h of July, 2001, at San Diego State University in California. The 
entire session lasted fifty-five minutes. I was present in the room during the 
recording of the role-play, as were two production crew members who were working 
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the cameras. The presence of three other people in the room no doubt affected the 
conversation and rendered it less similar to what might happen in a 'real' mediation. 
The role-played nature of the interaction and the recording process itself also made 
the conversation differ in some ways from a more naturally occurring interaction as 
'would take place without research observation' (ten Have, 1999, p. 49). For the sake 
of video quality, the participants were required to sit in closer proximity than they 
would in other contexts so that the camera operators could get them all in shot at the 
same time. They were also required to sit facing out towards an imaginary audience 
rather than facing each other more naturally. No doubt these factors had a shaping 
influence on the conversation, although it is hard to measure exactly how. At one 
point in the course of the recording the production crew called a brief halt to the 
conversation for one minute while a videotape change was made. 
Nevertheless, the conversation recorded largely resembled the kind of 
conversation that might conceivably occur in a naturally occurring mediation. It was 
representative of a genre of conversation between a professional mediator and two lay 
persons. It differs from an interview made for research purposes. 
The Transcription 
The transcription was made by me as the researcher rather than treated as a 
mechanical activity that could be completed with secretarial help. This decision was 
made on the basis of advice from various writers on discourse analysis who stress the 
value of close listening to the dialogue by researchers in order to hear and understand 
what was said (Gale, 1991; ten Have, 1999; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). The process 
of listening to a tape and rendering a version of that in writing is a process that 
involves discursive construction and interpretation (Fairclough, 1992; Gee, 1999) and 
is the first step in the process of discourse analysis. 
Repeated listenings to the audiotape were necessary in order to develop the 
written construction of the conversation and on each hearing extra dimensions to the 
conversation were added. The first hearing was done with the videotape and the 
entire conversation was listened to without pausing. The next three listenings 
concentrated mainly on the transcription of words. Small segments of tape were 
played several times and the words used were written down. The next run-through 
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concentrated on picking up words that were missed at first. Then the following two 
listenings focused on the pauses (voiced and unvoiced) between the words, the 
stresses and tone shifts, the laughs, the sighs and the intakes of breath. 
After a series of listenings to the audiotape, the videotape was also studied. 
The extra visual cues produced a number of different interpretations of expressions 
used and allowed for the inclusion of more paralinguistic communication features that 
were useful for micro-analysis. These features could not be exhaustively represented 
without interfering with the readability of the transcript but I sought to include what I 
interpreted as major head nods, body gestures, shifts of gaze and shifts in body 
position. Of particular importance was at whom each participant was looking while 
speaking. In all, over forty hours of time were spent listening to and transcribing the 
tapes. An ordinary cassette tape recorder and video recorder were used for these 
purposes. 
Transcription Conventions 
Since transcription from an oral recording to a written text always involves 
some degree of translation and the 'idealization of speech in terms of the standard 
language' (ten Have, 1999, p. 81), it is necessary to explain the conventions adopted 
in this translation. My concerns were, on the one hand, to preserve the spoken qua1ity 
of the language, and, on the other hand, to render it easily readable. Ten Have 
advises that, 'one should adapt one's transcription style to one's purpose and 
audience' (ten Have, 1999, p. 82). A key decision I made was to keep in mind. 
professional mediators as the primary audience who might want to read the transcript, 
rather than to focus on the production of a transcript that would provide the richest 
value to linguists interested in the study of conversational phenomena. Working from 
this premise, I decided to develop my own adaptation of the transcription conventions 
advocated in the literature on discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1992, Sacks, Schegloff 
& Jefferson, 1974). I made the following decisions: 
1. On the basis ofBakhtin's theory of the utterance (see Chapter Three) I decided to 
use the beginning and the end of an utterance rather than the sentence as it occurs 
in written modes as the organizing units of language. Capital letters and full stops 
are therefore used to denote the beginnings and ends of utterances (some would 
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call these tum construction units, ten Have, 1999, p. 90). Within an utterance, 
pauses such as might be represented by the end of a sentence are designated with 
two dots ( .. ). 
2. Words spoken by the participants were represented largely in standard spellings 
rather than making an attempt to represent them phonetically. Accents and 
dialects were not considered crucial features of what needed to be studied in this 
exercise. The reasoning here was that making a greater attempt to show how 
something was said rather than simply what was said would impede too much the 
flow of reading for the target audience. Neither did I want to risk portraying 
participants in the role-play as stupid or sloppy (ten Have, 1999). 
3. Pauses were represented with dots( ... ) and the length of such pauses was 
estimated rather than measured. Precise measurement of pause length (e.g. 
[0.Ssecs]) was not considered crucial enough to the meanings over a lengthy 
conversation to warrant the effort of measurement. It would also provide a 
further unnecessary impediment to the reading flow. Instead, length of pauses 
was indicated roughly by the number of dots, with more dots for longer pauses 
( ..... )and fewer dots for shorter ones( .. ). 
4. Voiced pauses (um, ah, er) were treated as pauses and rendered with dots( ... ) 
rather than transcribed as words. This was also a decision made with an eye to 
privileging readability over linguistic accuracy. 
5. Paralinguistic features were written in brackets in italics (laughs, Alan nods, looks 
at Theresa). Relevant visual phenomena from the videotape were treated in the 
same way. 
6. Inaudible sounds or words were represented by brackets and the word inaudible 
written in italics in the brackets. 
7. The common convention of marking overlapping by using square brackets was 
not employed. I decided that this convention was not commonly enough in use to 
be easily picked up by mediators reading this transcript and did not want to 
require mediators to learn the convention as a pre-requisite for easy readability. 
As it happened, the conversation had a measured reflective pace to it and 
overlapping did not feature highly. Where it does happen and seemed important I 
have used the more cumbersome, but easier to read, method of referring to it in 
full in brackets and italics. 
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8. Where the meaning of a word or expression depended in its spoken rendition on 
emphasis conveyed through increased volume, capital letters are used to indicate 
this. Simple stresses on particular words were rendered by underlining. 
9. Intonation was a linguistic feature that I decided to leave aside for the purposes of 
my analysis. 
10. The transciption was formatted according to the vertical rather than partiture 
system (ten Have, 1999, p. 89), again for reasons of easy readability. 
Discourse Analysis 
After the production of a piece of text for study, an approach to its analysis 
and interpretation needs to be articulated. First, I shall discuss the general nature and 
purposes of critical discourse analysis before outlining the specific methods of 
analysis to be used in this study. I shall also locate the approach that I am using here 
in relation to the existing literature on discourse analysis. 
The first general point that can be made is that discourse analysis has 
developed not just as a way of thinking about the social world but as a specific 
research approach. It has been developed into a tool of inquiry which takes 
advantage of the concept of discourse and uses it as a 'thinking device' (Gee, 1999, p. 
53). It can be used to study systematically different ways of talking or writing 'so 
that we can understand them better' (Parker, 1992, p. 5). In order to do so, it is 
necessary to take pieces of discourse and tum them into objects of study. Discourse 
analysis, according to discourse theory, is not a neutral process. Rather, it constructs 
objects (discourses) in the process of representing them. In Bernstein's terms (see 
Chapter Three) discourse analysis recontextualizes pieces of discourse. 
Discourse analysis has been the subject of discussion by various writers. It is 
first of all a process of studying language-in-use rather than language itself (Gee, 
1997). This means that the emphasis in discourse analysis needs to be on the 
relationship between social contexts and linguistic elements in their communicative 
functions rather than on either the abstracted structure of language or the abstracted 
structure of the social. Thus the very use of discourse analysis amounts to the taking 
of a position on the nature of this relationship between discourse and the social. This 
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position rejects the possibility of constructing either the social or discourse as discrete 
objects of study in themselves. 
On this basis, a range of emphases can be found within the field of discourse 
analysis. There is little consensus to be drawn from. Rather, there is a literature of 
exploration and development and sometimes of debate and disagreement. Some of 
these differences relate to the diverse disciplinary backgrounds in which discourse 
analysts are located (sociology, linguistics, cultural studies, social psychology, 
literary criticism). More linguistically-oriented discourse analysts are inclined to 
emphasise regularities and patterns in language use in relation to linguistic context, 
genre, topic, and participant relationships (for example, Nunan, 1993), often 
following the principles of Garfinkel' s ( 1967) ethnomethodology as developed into 
'Conversation Analysis' (CA) (by Sacks, 1995; Schegloff and Sacks, 1973). 
Discourse analysts with more of a bent towards social theory and the facilitation of 
social change have clustered under the banner of 'Critical Discourse Analysis' (CDA) 
especially as championed by Burman and Parker (1993), Billig (1998), Chouliaraki 
and Fairclough (1999), Fairclough (1992) and Parker ( 1992). These approaches start 
from the assumptions represented by Bernstein in this way: 
The text is the form of the social relationship made visible, palpable, material. 
(Bernstein, 1990, p. 17) 
It is the text that becomes the object of study for discourse analysis. However, the 
interest for critical discourse analysts is not in the linguistic elements of the text in 
themselves, so much as in the social relations being constituted and the agents 
endowed and authorised in and through the text. Fairclough bases his argument for 
textually-oriented discourse analysis on Foucault's approach to discourse but he also 
expresses disappointment in Foucault for largely ignoring the detailed 'discursive and 
linguistic analysis of real texts' (Fairclough, 1992, p. 56) resulting in a neglect of the 
specificities of practice, particularly practices of resistance to the operations of power. 
The merits and problems of Critical Discourse Analysis have been debated in 
recent literature (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; Billig & Schegloff, 1999; 
Schegloff, 1997; 1998; Wetherell, 1998) and some points of issue have been thrown 
up that deserve attention in the articulation of method. 
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Schegloff ( 1997), arguing for the ethnomethodological tradition of 
conversation analysis, has made a series of critiques of work done by critical 
discourse analysts. In the process he sparked off an energetic debate about approaches 
to discourse analysis. I take seriously his desire to privilege the straightforward 
intentions of participants in a conversation. As discourse users, they are attempting to 
achieve something and they know best what they are trying to achieve. I have 
already mentioned how a similar point is made by Linehan and McCarthy (2000). It 
is possible for critical discourse analysts to treat people as chaff blown about in the 
winds of discourse with little emphasis on their intentions or agency. Heeding 
Schegloff's concern is necessary if we are not to slip back into classical Marxist 
assumptions of 'false consciousness' when describing participants' intentions, while 
we as discourse analysts claim the high ground of being able to see the underlying 
truth. So the approach to discourse analysis I want to use here needs to include a 
focus on the intentions of participants with regard to the discourse they are immersed 
in. 
However, it is a different thing to suggest, as Schegloff seems to, that 
discourse analysis should adopt the rigorous disciplinary position of only analysing 
the social elements of discourse that are actually made relevant by the participants in 
the text being analysed. For example, he might argue that the construction of gender 
identity in discourse should not be analysed unless the conversation participants in 
some way make reference to their own consciousness of gender discourse at work. 
Schegloff is concerned with what he sees as the tendency of critical discourse 
analysts to approach texts with a set of ideological predilections in mind which then 
get mapped onto the conversation without making them available to influence from 
the data. 
This limitation does not take adequate account of the complexity of discursive 
influences, some of which participants in a conversation will be consciously 
responding to and some of which will fall outside of their consciousness as taken-for-
granted understandings of how the world is. I see no reason why careful analysis 
might not render understandable to participants aspects of what they have to say that 
were not present in their consciousness at the time. If we take seriously Bakhtin's 
notion that every word used contains traces of other uses and Foucault's accounts of 
the dominance of certain discourses in the background systems of meaning, without 
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which participants' utterances would not make sense, then an analysis of conversation 
that leaves out the relationship between a discursive usage and the wider social 
context will be severely limited. 
These arguments have also been made in various responses to Schegloff's 
comments. Wetherell (1998) insists on the importance of the 'imbrication of 
discourse, power and subjectification' (p. 388). She cites Lac1au and Mouffe's 
descriptions of 'nodal points', 'discursive c1umps'and 'ensembles'which achieve 
relative stability for long periods of time and which provide the 'argumentative 
fabric' (p. 393) from which conversational participants fashion signification and 
construct social realities. These discourse features are often so implicit that they 
scarcely feature in the immediate intentions of participants in a conversation. 
Discourse analysis does need to take account of how conversational participants' 
utterances make sense and this means that it needs to explore the complexities of the 
relationship between specific utterances and background orders of discourse. 
Billig ( 1999) points out that this task is not only necessary but also 
unavoidable. He goes further than Wetherell in taking Schegloff to task and points to 
some of the common concepts used in conversational analysis (tum-taking, repair, 
etc) that he claims can also be seen as preconceptions imposed on participants' 
intentions. Reflexive attention to the researcher's preconceptions is always necessary. 
Billig goes too far though and in the end appears to justify some of Schegloff's 
concerns. His choice of one example to attack Schegloff with is worth noting in 
passing. He suggests that even the selection of names to use in a transcript is a 
political choice. By way of illustration, he describes a hypothetical analysis of a 
conversation about rape or abuse and suggests that it would be preferable to identify 
the participants in the transcript as 'rapist' and 'victim' in preference to using their 
names. However, such a move would make Schegloff's criticisms appear justified. 
To be sure it conveys an enthusiasm for a political analysis. But it also totalises and 
objectifies people's identities and appears to use them as pawns in the analyst's 
agenda. The example is objected to strongly by Schegloff and the whole debate is 
somewhat sidetracked by a spurious (not to say nonexistent) example. 
Chouliaraki and Fairc1ough ( 1999) help us get the debate back on track in 
their response to these issues. They argue that it is inevitable that discourse analysts 
will be 'operating in theoretical practices whose concerns are different from the 
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practical concerns of people as participants' (p. 7). Therefore, of course it will happen 
that the analyst's preoccupations will be brought to bear upon the discursive text. 
That is to be expected and is no fault. Chouliaraki and Fairclough therefore argue that 
a technical or formal analysis that excludes the theoretical preoccupations of the 
researcher is not possible anyway (Wetherell, 1998, makes a similar point). But 
Chouliaraki and Fairclough still emphasise Schegloff's prime concern, which is that a 
discourse analysis needs to remain answerable to the text. 
Another argument against Schegloff's stance is advanced by Wendy Drewery 
(2002). She points out that the conversation analysis approach Schegloff is 
recommending leads to a focus on the detail of the text to the extent that it is cut off 
from the overall context of the conversation, let alone from the context of the 
relationship outside the recorded text. She advocates studying the relationship 
between texts and the contexts of the lives of persons who participate in them rather 
than focussing solely on what is in the text. As Vivien Burr argues, this approach 
makes it easier to 'harness such analytic work for the purposes of personal and social 
change' (Burr, 1998, p. 21). 
My own preference in all this is for the wider, more interpretive focus of the 
Critical Discourse Analysis perspective over the more formal and technical linguistic 
analysis of Conversation Analysis. This preference relates to two concerns. The first 
is that the influence of discursive relations, and more specifically power relations, in 
the content of conversation appears more salient to me than the Conversation 
Analysts make evident. Like Wetherell ( 1998), I am also not convinced that it is 
possible to do a technical linguistic analysis first and a social analysis later. 
My second concern relates to the intended audience of this study. This study 
aims to use discourse analysis to speak first to those interested in the practice of 
mediation rather than to those interested in the practice of either linguistic analysis or 
social psychology. To the extent that such readers might be served by an introduction 
to the technical aspects of discourse analysis I am prepared to use these, but not to the 
extent of having them wade through material of little applied relevance to practice. 
On the other hand, professional mediators can be assumed to have an interest in the 
deconstruction of background discourses at work in conversation for its potential 
practical value rather than for an academic interest in the study of discourse. This 
concern about practice leads me to be interested in more than how people work up 
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identity claims in texts. Narrative mediators are concerned with how people can 
make identity shifts in their lives in the context of conflict situations. 
Moreover, the approach to mediation that I am about to outline, itself 
consciously and directly draws on the same poststructuralist social analysis that 
Critical Discourse Analysis draws from. The congruence of epistemological 
perspectives between the research methods and the mediation approach can only be 
advantageous for the purposes of this study. 
This is not to say that there is not still much to be gained from Conversation 
Analysis. Critical Discourse Analysts have included in their work many of the 
practices developed by Conversation Analysts (see Fairclough, 1992; Parker, 1992). 
Schegloff's call for attention to the detail of the text is important, as is his concern for 
the intentions of the participants in a conversation. The kind of analysis I am aiming 
at should provide insights into the text that go beyond mere description, but this 
should not be the kind of insight that sets out to prove the naivete or shallowness of 
participants. It should be the kind of insight that participants can, potentially at least, 
find helpful in understanding their own discursive positions. It should promote their 
chances of taking up agentic positions in future conversations. 
Such a study requires a combination of both micro-analysis and macro-
analysis, a concentration on the detail of textual emphasis and on the broad scale 
orders of discourse (Fairclough, 1992). I now shall address the specifics of doing 
discourse analysis from a Critical Discourse Analysis perspective. 
Since there are a range of approaches to discourse analysis, it is not surprising 
that there have been a series of calls to resist the development of a formulaic method 
that could be established as a convention for repeated use (Billig, Condor, Edwards, 
Gane, Middleton & Ridley, 1988; Parker 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Such a 
formula would tie discourse analysis down but it would also make it contextually less 
responsive. Discourse analysis, particularly critical discourse analysis, stands upon 
the principle of analysing text in relation to the context of its creation and in reflexive 
relation to the contextual purposes of the research. There is a desire to keep the 
method fluid enough to be moulded by contextual demands, and a resistance to 
hardening it into a singular approach. That would lead to a greater degree of 
abstraction and objectification. 
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At the same time, there have been calls for development of greater consensus 
over what can be understood as discourse analysis (van Dijk, 1997a; 1997b). Van 
Dijk argues that the consensus should establish how discourse analysis amounts to 
more than 'simply citing or paraphrasing selected fragments of text' and also more 
than 'mere commentary on text and talk' (van Dijk, 1997a, p. 6). As editor of the 
journal Discourse and Society, which is dedicated to publishing discourse analysis 
examples and leading the way in the development of the research approach, he called 
for: 
... details of structures and strategies in terms of conceptual devices that 
produce novel and interesting insights in talk, in its interactional 
accomplishments, or in its contextual or societal conditions and functions. 
(van Dijk, 1997, p. 6) 
He implies that such methods are not as yet available and will only become available 
through the 'doing of more discourse analysis and in the process developing new 
ideas, concepts and theories about our own practices.' Van Dijk (1997b) also 
laments the state of discourse analytic research for its lack of applied value, despite 
its disavowal of schism between 'pure' and 'applied' scholarship as 'bad for both' (p. 
451). He remarks on the articles he receives for publication as editor of Discourse 
and Society that they mostly 'remain severed from practical applications' (p. 452). 
The last point leads into the relevance of discourse analysis as a research 
method to this particular study. My focus here is on the study of an 'applied' 
practice. It is also a study about the facilitation of change. Hence my interest lies 
less in the linguistic study of conversation than in the social usefulness of particular 
forms of conversation. Or to put it another way, I am not so interested in studying 
how identity accounts work within the text, so much as in the relevance of these 
accounts to possible changes in people's lives. Moreover, I deem the critical 
discourse analysis interest in power relations to be an important focus of discourse 
analysis and hence I choose to locate this study in this tradition more than in that of 
conversation analysis. 
Fairclough ( 1992) has laid out an agenda for discourse analysis that can serve 
as a guide for the practice of discourse analysis as I am using it. He specifies four 
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conditions for distinguishing a critical discourse analysis approach. The first is that it 
would need to maintain a multidimensional focus and relate detailed properties of 
texts to social practices and to social change. Secondly, it would need to be a multi-
functional analysis that attends to the functions of discourse in the production of 
knowledge, social relations and social identities. Thirdly, it would need a historical 
focus, relating particulars of texts to longer-term constitution through time of orders 
of discourse. Fourthly, it would need to be a critical method that made more 
transparent the hidden processes of social structuring. Such an analysis makes 
possible some material benefits for those who are disadvantaged through such 
processes remaining hidden. 
These are valuable principles that I accept as the basis for discourse analysis 
but they also fall short of one crucial dimension that is important in relation to the 
purpose of this study. The social change processes that Fairclough is envisaging here 
always lie outside the process of discourse analysis. Change is assumed to follow 
(potentially at least) from a good piece of discourse analysis that sheds such light on a 
particular context that stakeholders in it might rise up in protest and bring about 
change. The emphasis is not on mapping processes of discursive change themselves. 
An extra dimension is needed in the analytic process for this purpose. It is the 
analysis of discursive positioning that I believe advances the kind of analysis that 
Fairclough proposes in a direction that is more sensitive to the subtle shifts and 
changes of conversation. In conversations that are explicitly aimed at the production 
of changes in people's relationship with the discursive conditions of living (such as in 
counselling or mediation), we can profit from the analysis of the subtleties of 
positioning and re-positioning that take place. In such positional moves, we can see 
people producing and reproducing their worlds. This emphasis makes people less the 
puppets of Fairclough's hidden processes of social structuring while preserving the 
sense in which people are making and remaking their worlds in relation to the 
discourses that are at work in these worlds. 
Chouliaraki and Fairclough ( 1999) have elaborated Fairclough' s earlier ideas 
further by directing the focus of critical discourse analysis principally at a series of 
suggested target problems. They highlight a concern about power and struggle over 
power as a major theme through all discourse analysis and suggest that this needs to 
be studied in the following domains: a) processes of colonisation and appropriation 
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of social practices; b) current social trends towards globalisation of social practices 
and their disembedding from local cultural worlds; c) the relationship between 
ideological constructions of the world (for example through racist or sexist discourse) 
and the effects of reflexive awareness of the working of such ideologies; and d) the 
production of identity in relation to categories of social grouping and in relation to 
both universalizing and fragmenting tendencies. A study of mediation practice 
might potentially be relevant to all of these domains of research but it is the fourth 
area of identity construction in relation to categories of social grouping that is most 
pertinent to the discursive analysis of positioning in mediation. 
The research task then for the discursive analysis of positioning is to 
illuminate just how people in conversation are building their worlds (Gee, 1992, p. 
93) by deploying the meanings available to them. Such research asks of a piece of 
text what kinds of person are being called into position in a particular discourse 
(Parker, 1992, p. 10). Gee would have us ask about what kinds of 'situated identity 
and relationship building' (Gee, 1992, p. 93) are taking place. But if we are to focus 
on the possibilities for social change, we also need to ask how these identities are 
being 'stabilized or transformed' (Gee, 1992, p. 94) in the course of conversation. Or 
how the right to speak is being constituted or restrained (Parker, 1992, p. 10) and 
therefore what can be said? Following Linehan and McCarthy (2000), I believe it is 
also important to ask what remains indeterminate within the shaping effects of 
discourse. Such a focus has potential for the study of social change processes. Now it 
is time to articulate an analytical method that will meet these demands. 
Handling The Corpus 
Having examined some general parameters, we now need to get down to the 
detail of how to go about this kind of analysis. There are some models to draw from. 
Fairclough' s (1992) model has been widely cited as a point of reference and is more 
recently developed in conjunction with Chouliaraki ( 1999). Parker ( 1992) offers a 
systematic procedure and Gee ( 1999) has listed a series of angles from which to 
address textual material. 
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One issue is to do with how to handle the corpus of a lengthy transcript of 
conversation. A common approach is to code and select sample sections of the 
conversation according to topic or other features (Fairclough, 1992). Another is to 
focus on 'moments of crisis' (Fairclough, 1992). Such selection processes can 
identify textual elements that represent the overall whole or can pinpoint change 
points but this may be at the cost of a sense of the whole. In order to demonstrate an 
approach to mediation practice, I was concerned to convey a sense of the overall 
development of a conversation, as well as to show shifts and changes in discursive 
positioning as they occurred. I therefore decided to follow the model used by Gale 
(1991) in his analysis of a family therapy session of including nearly the whole of the 
corpus in a series of chunks. For the sake of brevity I omitted only a few blind alley 
sections of conversation that did not contribute to the overall development of the 
conversation. Detailed textual analysis was inserted in between the chunks of 
conversation and was then followed by an analysis of the whole that drew themes 
together and cited examples from different places in the text. 
The Process Of Discourse Analysis 
Fairclough ( 1992) advocates starting with the macro-level analysis of social 
practices, moving to a micro-level textual analysis and then back to the macro-level 
analysis of the context in which the discourse takes part. His approach starts with an 
interest in the social practices within which the text has been produced. In his 1999 
version with Chouliaraki, he adds the identification of a problem as the first stage of 
the analysis of the social context in which the text has been produced. His method 
continues with a search for intertextual features of the discourse production, includes 
a Conversation Analysis emphasis on interactional control, scrutinises a series of 
semiotic textual elements (ethos, grammar, transitivity, theme, modality, word 
meaning and metaphor) and then pulls back to the larger world of discourse, orders of 
discourse and the ideological production of social relations. Fairclough notes that 
this model involves moving from interpretation to description and back to 
interpretation again. I would prefer to talk about repeated cycles of such movements, 
not just one. The analytical reasoning is neither purely inductive (moving from text 
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to interpretation) nor deductive (moving from interpretation to examples in the text) 
but rather a continual back and forth interplay between interpretation and text as ideas 
are examined in the light of textual data and data are questioned for the concepts that 
they might support. Neither interpretation nor description can take precedence as the 
chicken or the egg. 
Parker (in Banister et al., 1994) emphasises a more inductive approach in his 
version of discourse analysis. He starts with locating nouns; free associating around 
these (a piece of psychoanalytical discourse that has to be queried from a discourse 
theory perspective since no associating can be free of discursive influences); 
identifying the objects formed within the text and the subjectivities being constituted; 
reconstructing the differential rights to speak of these subjects and mapping the social 
worlds which exist within the text. 
This method describes a worthwhile discipline to follow when working in a 
detailed way with a small amount of text but it is hard to imagine identifying all the 
nouns in forty pages of conversation transcript and free associating around these 
before forming a sense of the subject relations involved. 
Gee (1999) outlines a series of 'building tasks' to be done in the process of 
constructing a discourse analysis. These include using the cues in the text to 
construct versions of the work being done in discourse to: assemble semiotic 
meanings; build worlds; perform activities; formulate identities; distribute 'social 
goods'; and make coherent connections between past and present. He suggests that 
these building tasks are always all being done at once and that they are not 
sequentially ordered. Like Fairclough, for each he lists some questions that can be 
asked of a text. 
None of these approaches includes an emphasis on some of the features of 
discourse theory that I would like to see included, particularly those that derive from 
Bakhtin' s theory of the utterance, from Bernstein's notion of recontextualizing, from 
Cobb's attention to narrative coherence, and from positioning theory. The idea of 
constructing a series of questions to pose in relation to a text does however appeal. 
Therefore I set out to construct such a set of questions, drawing in part from each of 
these approaches and adding some that were drawn from positioning theory and from 
Bakhtin 's theory of the utterance. Before outlining this list of questions let me 
address the additional issues that guided this list. 
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Discourse analysis that focuses attention on the creation of differential 
speaking rights (for example Parker, 1992) and the corollary exclusions that result in 
the silencing or bypassing of such rights seem to me in the light of Bakhtin's ideas to 
emphasise only one aspect of the production of subjectivity in discursive 
communication. Bakhtin points much more vigorously to the role of the addressee in 
any utterance. He suggests that we should pay much more attention not just to who is 
speaking but to who is exerting claims to be addressed. The shaping influence of the 
addressee is often neglected in discourse analysis. This influence may be much wider 
than the immediate listeners too. A speaker may have one eye on other more 
persuasive audiences than the one immediately present and an utterance may take its 
place in more than one conversation. Similarly, the speaker is always offering the 
addressee a position from which to respond, which brings me to the second point. 
Bernstein's theory of pedagogy as a context in which discourses get 
recontextualised (see Chapter Three) is also important to my analysis of what 
happens in mediation. It helps take account of the ways in which simply talking to a 
mediator and hearing a mediator carefully listen to what one has to say makes a 
difference to the discursive resonance of what is said. When the mediator uses some 
deconstructive tools, for example the method of developing externalising 
conversations (explained in Chapter Six), meanings even more rapidly become 
recontextualised. One of the important uses of this idea is that it helps us account for 
shifts and changes that happen in mediation. What I am looking for are the analytical 
tools that help develop just such an account. 
Positioning theory and the concept of position calls deserve attention in the 
analysis of discourse. Describing the subjectivities produced within a text and even 
the power relations between different subject positions, often appears largely static in 
many discourse analyses. The analysis often gives the appearance of locking 
participants into such positions. For the analysis of conversations that are intended to 
create opportunities for shifts in subjectivity and shifts in relational positioning (for 
example counselling or mediation conversations), such analytical emphases will not 
do. A more relational emphasis, rather than one that focuses on individual subjective 
achievements is needed for this purpose. We need an approach to discourse analysis 
that is more sensitive to the subtle shifts in discursive relations that can happen in 
significant conversations. 
134 
Analysing the position calls being offered in any utterance, and either taken 
up or not, is one way that discourse analysis can be made more sensitive to social 
change, even on a micro-level. A good example of the kind of analysis that makes 
use of positioning theory has been recently provided by Linehan and McCarthy 
(2000). In this account of interactions between a teacher and a student they use the 
concept of positioning to illuminate not only the 'sense of oughtness' (p. 442) 
constituted through discourse but also the 'momentary gaps in determinacy' (p. 445) 
in which 'normative practice meets difference' (p. 440). They argue that: 
' ... we need an analytical tool that can be used flexibly to describe the 
shifting multiple relations in a community of practice, something that 
captures the sense of momentary gaps in interactions. We argue that 
'positioning' is a useful way to characterise the shifting responsibilities 
and interactive involvements of members in a community.' 
(Linehan & McCarthy, 2000, p. 441) 
This suggestion that positioning can be used as an analytical tool 'to describe the 
movement of participants through interactions' (p. 443) amounts to a refinement of 
Davies and Harre's (1990) use of positioning in a much more static way. It is useful 
to my purpose here because it is sensitive to the shifts in positioning that people make 
in the midst of a mediation conversation. It is respectful of the agentic choices that 
mediation participants make in relation to the positions being offered to them on a 
moment-by-moment basis and it helps us account for change as the outcome of such 
choices. Moreover, facilitating shifts in positioning rather than facilitating wholesale 
discursive change makes for a realistic goal for a therapist or mediator in the context 
of even a single conversation. 
Analytical Questions To Pose In Relation To A Text 
What I have arrived at therefore is the not uncommon approach of formulating 
a list of questions that can be asked of a text. Such questions should guide the 
analysis through directing attention to what deserves to be noticed. The list that I 
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developed and used in this research exercise is based on the Critical Discourse 
Analysis sources that I cited above (Fairclough, 1992; Fairclough and Chouliaraki, 
1999; Banister et al, 1992, Parker and Burman, 1993; Gee, 1999). However it is also 
influenced by the four further conceptual sources that I have referenced above: 
Bakhtin 's theory of the utterance; Cobb's theory of narrative coherence, Bernstein's 
theory of recontextualisation and positoning theory, particularly as elaborated by 
Linehan and McCarthy. Here are the questions that I devised. 
General Contextual Features 
1. In what genre is this conversation conducted? Does it draw upon other genres? 
2. What kinds of social practice are being performed in this conversation? 
3. What conjunctures serve as the context for this conversation? 
4. What other conversations/background discursive influences/institutional 
normative expectations are being referenced in this text? 
5. What storylines are presupposed in this exchange? In what other narratives are 
the stories being told here nested? 
6. What traces of other usages in other contexts are present in this exchange of 
utterances? 
Positioning 
7. What position calls are being offered by the mediator and by the disputing parties 
in this exchange of utterances? How are they taken up or refused? 
8. What positions do participants seek to establish for themselves in this exchange? 
9. What options are made available/excluded from availability in the position calls 
issued? 
10. What other position calls (including contradictory ones) might participants be 
responding to in addition to the apparent ones? What other addressees might the 
participants have in mind as they position themselves and each other? 
11. What sense of 'oughtness' might be operating on participants in this 
conversation? 
12. To what extent does the taking up of positions involve the assumption of or the 
compromise of possibilities for agency? 
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13. What storylines (for personal identity/relationship/community/or institutional life) 
are being created or restrained by the positions claimed, taken up or refused? 
What other possible storylines are not taken up? 
14. How is narrative coherence being organised around the discursive positions that 
are established? 
15. What alternative narratives·, and the positions possible within these, are being 
closed off by the positions established within the storylines that are privileged in 
each person's account? 
16. What kind of power relations are being promoted within the position calls being 
offered and taken up? 
17. What dilemmas of agency arise in relation to the possibility of multiple 
positionings? 
18. What 'momentary gaps in determinacy' are evident in this exchange of 
utterances? 
19. What shifts in position are enabled in the course of this conversation? 
Recontextualising 
18 How are utterances being recontextualised in the course of this conversation? 
19 Is irony or humour being used to recontextualise discursive meanings? 
20 If shifts in position can be detected, how are they contextualised so as to be 
sustained or are they reincorporated back into a dominant storyline or discourse? 
Orders Of Discourse 
21. What systems of meaning, interpretive communities, discursive assumptions are 
necessary as presuppositions in order for these utterances to have meaning? 
22. What hegemonic relations might be reproduced or challenged in this 
conversation? 
23. How do the practices engaged in or referenced in this conversation stand in 
relation to conventional or normative practices? 
24. What systems of knowledge are drawn upon, have their authority upheld or are 
undermined in this conversation? 
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Finally, it would be misleading to suggest that this list of questions was first 
constructed and then applied. In fact, this list is the product of a process of 
generation that has included: practice attempts at analysing the discourse of narrative 
therapy sessions; theoretical work on the conceptual tools outlined in Chapter Three; 
and the process of diving into the discourse analysis of a mediation, working out what 
seemed important and noticing what seemed to be happening in the conversation. 
Theoretical readings several times led to a need to revisit the terms of the analysis to 
pay attention to new elements in it. A version of this list was developed before 
writing the analysis in Chapters Seven and Eight and then revised again as this 
chapter was written. This revision led to a need to revisit the discourse analysis once 
again. All this I would argue is as it should be. The constant working back and forth 
between concepts and practices is what distinguishes robust discourse analytic work 
from mere description (as van Dijk called it, see above). My hope is that these 
questions represent an approach to discourse analysis that can assist in the 
illumination of what happens in the complex conversations that are intended to 
facilitate a way forward in conflict situations. I want them particularly to be 
sensitive, not just to the workings of dominant discourses, but also to the subtle re-
positionings that take place within discourse in the course of a mediation, particularly 




A Review Of Analyses Of Discourse In Mediation 
Any piece of research can be understood in Bakhtin' s (1981; 1984; 1986) 
terms (see Chapter Three) as an utterance in a conversation. In order to be intelligible 
it must respond to other utterances in that conversation and contribute to the ongoing 
conversation. Previous chapters in this study have located this study in academic 
conversations about mediation theory and practice (Chapter Two), about discourse 
theory (Chapter Three) and about research methods (Chapter Four). There is, 
however, another domain of conversation in which this study seeks to be an utterance. 
In Chapter Four, the methods of discourse analysis that will be employed in the 
following chapters were outlined. But this is not the first occasion for the use of 
discourse analytic methods in the understanding of what happens in mediation or 
family therapy. It is therefore important to draw some points of connection with 
other academic utterances in this domain in order for my work to be appreciated in 
this academic context. That is the purpose of this chapter. 
There are several domains of discourse analytic study in which I want to 
examine recent contributions. In the process, I shall clarify how this study will either 
build on, or differ from, other work done in these domains. The focus of this review 
will be restricted to analyses of the genres of conversation that are similar to the 
mediation conversations of main concern here. I have ruled out from this review 
discourse analyses that have focused on conversations that were primarily research 
interviews. However, it is necessary to review a little more widely than just the 
discourse analyses that have been done on mediation conversations because there 
have been so few of these. Beck and Sales (2000) point out that they could find only 
seven studies in total on the process of mediation. And not all of these used discourse 
analysis methods. 
One relevant larger domain is the analysis of conversations between 
professionals and their clients. Such studies have been steadily growing in number in 
recent years (MacLeod, 2002). There have been a number of such discourse analysis 
studies that have focused on conversations between doctors and patients, nurses and 
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patients, teachers and students, social workers and clients, as well as the 
conversations that involve therapists and mediators. I shall briefly represent this 
literature. Then, there is a literature in which the work of family therapists with 
families or couples have been analysed using discourse analytic methods. In 
introducing this literature, I shall distinguish between work that has been done in the 
Conversation Analysis tradition and that that has been more aligned with Critical 
Discourse Analysis. Some of these studies will include the discourse analyses that 
have been attempted in relation to examples of narrative therapy. Of more direct 
relevance to this study is the literature in which mediation conversations themselves 
have been studied as a separate genre. In each of these domains, I shall describe the 
existing academic utterances in this field, the purposes to which discourse analytic 
methods have been put, and the achievements that have accumulated in this work 
with a view to distinguishing my own work from these. 
Discourse Analyses Of Conversations Between Professionals And Their Clients 
In a variety of domains, there exists a research interest in how professional 
knowledge can be conveyed in ways that can be of use to the general public. This 
interest is a recognition that discourse in spoken conversation always mediates 
between the academic knowledge that serves as the basis for professional service and 
the practices that are the embodiment of such service. Such knowledge is itself 
constructed in discourse too, but here I am interested in the negotiation of the 
influence of such knowledge in conversations between professionals and their clients 
rather than in conversations between professionals and academics. For example, in 
the field of medicine, doctors need to converse with patients in order for medical 
knowledge to be useful. In education, learning processes can be studied in the 
context of conversations between teachers and students. 
Discourse analysis has been used recently in relation to various aspects of 
professional practice in disciplines such as nursing (Adams, 2001; Powers, 2002) and 
teaching (Obilade, 2002; Tuffin, Tuffin & Watson, 2001; Tunstall, 2001). However 
the focus has often not been upon the negotiation of meaning in the conversations 
between professionals and their clients. The usual focus is on the analysis of 
discourses at work in the structuring of power in professional relations. 
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There have been instances of discourse analysis of particular conjunctures 
such as job interviews. Gee ( 1996) provides a brief example of such an analysis, in 
which he focuses on the requirement to produce a performance of identity to fit an 
appropriate social class narrative for the job. This kind of analysis can help explain 
to both interviewers and interviewees what happens in a particular interview to 
produce an outcome. 
Another domain of practice where discourse analyses have begun to appear is 
in the realm of doctor-patient conversations. Norman Fairclough used an example of 
a comparison of two doctors conversing with their patients to illustrate his approach 
to Critical Discourse Analysis in his ( 1992) description of the practice of discourse 
analysis. The focus of this analysis was on the exercise of professional power in 
conversation with patients and the ways in which this may be moderated in different 
styles of medical interviewing. Such power is mainly indexed to interaction control 
and topic control. It does have a focus on social change as well however, since the 
second conversation in the comparison is advanced as a representation of a shift, 'on 
the ground, in the way doctors and patients really interact' (Fairclough, 1992, p. 144 ). 
He describes a trend in contemporary medicine: 
' ... in the construction of the medical self away from overt authority and 
expertise, shifts in power away from the producers of goods and services 
towards the consumers or clients. ' 
(Fairclough, 1992, p. 148.) 
While it is not a study of discursive positioning, it is in broad terms a shift in 
discursive positioning that Fairclough is analyzing and calling a trend. This trend of 
power shifting towards consumers and clients is of interest in relation to this study 
since the pursuit of this shift appears as an ethical goal in many of the writings about 
narrative therapy. Fairclough's purpose differs from mine, however, in that his is not 
primarily a study of the effects for the patient of the deliberate use of positioning in 
professional medical practice. Moreover, the social change being indexed happens 
elsewhere than in the conversation (somewhere in the background orders of 
discourse) and is merely made noticeable in the comparison between the two 
conversations. The conversation is analysed mainly in terms of the evidence it 
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provides of such a shift having taken place. I am seeking to use discourse analysis 
here to demonstrate the negotiation of positioning happening in the moment of 
conversation and to call that social change. 
John Nessa and Kirsti Malterud ( 1998) use discourse analysis to examine the 
concept of patient autonomy in a doctor-patient interaction. Their concern is about 
the negotiation of power in a medical interview in the light of various philosophical 
assumptions about autonomy and authenticity. They suggest a dialogical 
understanding of 'authentic interaction', although the nature of this concept is not 
developed extensively. 
Glyn Elwyn and Richard Gwyn (1999) provide a more refined example of 
discourse analysis of a conversation between a doctor and a patient that is directly 
designed to persuade doctors to listen carefully to the ways in which patients are 
constructing themselves in the context of a clinical interview. The value of such 
listening, they suggest, can be that doctors might be able to 'allow a more democratic 
arrangement of voices' in the interview. In other words, discourse analysis might 
lead to differences in the moment of discursive production. To this end, they offer 
some examples of ways in which a patient and a doctor position each other (although 
they do not use the language of positioning theory) around a request for a further 
prescription of anti-depressants. The patient presents elements of a story in which 
the request fits as part of an ongoing story of her life. She positions herself in relation 
to a particular 'sustaining fiction' (p.187) and, at the same time, negotiates some 
legitimacy for this position, so that she is not viewed as 'malingering' (p.188). Part 
of this position of legitimacy for her request is analysed by Elwyn and Gwyn in 
conversational elements that demonstrate 'maintaining her contractual commitment to 
recovery' (p.188). This study is an example of the use of discourse analysis to 
investigate the detailed construction of relations in a professional genre. It 
demonstrates sensitivity to the negotiation of power in professional relations, and 
does so in a way that leaves the outcome of that negotiation open. In other words, the 
relations of power are not presented as monolithic and conclusive and there is room 
for the exercise of agency in the conversation. 
In relation to the practice of teaching, there have also been some discourse 
analyses of teacher-student interactions. For example, Fairclough (1992) gives a 
brief account of topic control in teacher-student conversations that shows how teacher 
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evaluation of student talk constructs and polices the subjection of students. The 
account developed does not also examine the ways in which students position 
themselves in relation to such operations of power and hence the power relations 
appear somewhat monolithic. I have already referred in Chapter Three to Linehan 
and McCarthy's (2000) analysis of a teacher-student interaction around a disciplinary 
incident in a classroom that illustrates more fully the complexity of relations in the 
classroom. This analysis has the potential to be more informative of professional 
practice because it indicates the openness of the choices that can be made in relation 
to discursive positioning. 
In a similar account of conversations between a principal and students in a 
special educational setting for 'behaviourally disturbed' students, Cath Laws and 
Bronwyn Davies (2000) assemble a useful account of the construction of the 'good 
student' in educational discourse. Their account makes use of the notion of 
positioning in the course of the construction of 'subjection' to a dominant rational 
humanist discourse. But they also notice the possibilities for subjective positioning 
that are opened up in the very moment of being subjected. 
In the process of this kind of analysis, Laws and Davies provide examples of 
professional practice that make possible shifts in positioning. In one such example, a 
young man who is out of control on the school roof, screaming and threatening to 
bum the school down, is spoken to by Cath Laws in a way that recognises him as 
someone making a protest about an injustice against a friend, rather than as a 'bad 
subject'. He is then able to reposition himself as an agent in this storyline (it fits with 
the storyline in which he is operating himself) and to come down from the roof and 
change the behaviour that could have been read as behaviourally disturbed. Cath 
Laws is able to speak to the young man in a way that recognises his narrative 
intentions (Cobb, 1994) and treats him as an agentic and purposeful rather than just as 
a problem. Analysis of positioning thereby illuminates the stands that young people 
make in relation to dominant discourse. 
Laws and Davies make some comments that are relevant to the practice of 
mediation as well. They advocate the usefulness of a professional practice that does 
not assume that 'bad' behaviour emerges from an essential fault in the individual, but 
which assumes that people take up positions of subjection in particular conversational 
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exchanges in relation to dominant discourses. They argue that a poststructuralist 
reading differs from a structuralist one in its attention to agency. 
A poststructuralist reading must take account of the psychic energy of the 
subjected being and what it is they are doing with the imposed structures 
or discourses. 
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(Laws & Davies, 2000, p. 219.) 
This is advice that may well benefit mediators as they form readings of the stories 
told by participants in mediation. It has potential for making sense of the actions of 
people in conflict situations that is an advance on listening for the underlying 
individual rational interests because it takes account of the socially structuring effects 
of discourse but also takes seriously the agency of the person. It is a model for the 
discourse analysis of professional practice that puts positioning theory to work in 
effective ways. 
Discourse Analyses Of Family Therapy 
The field of family therapy is perhaps the closest to the field of mediation, 
especially given that divorce mediation is a substantial domain for professional 
mediation practice. Family therapists are frequently working with family conflicts in 
mediation roles. Hence, discourse analysis research in family therapy contexts needs 
to be taken into account because it bears upon what happens in mediation. As with 
other domains of professional practice, discourse analysis has been deployed in 
research interviews to analyse therapists' thinking or decision-making. For example, 
Guilfoyle (2002) interviews therapists about practices of power in therapy and uses 
discourse analysis to make sense of their responses. But this is not a study of these 
practices of power in action. 
Edwards (1998) provides one such example of a discourse analysis of a 
counselling session with a couple. He analyses extracts from this conversation, using 
a conversation analysis approach, in relation to the construction of identity categories 
by the couple in the course of the interview. What he is interested in is the work the 
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two people are doing to work up identity categories for themselves and for each other. 
I would refer to this as a study of their positioning of each other in the course of the 
interview. The work being done by the counsellor is paid virtually no attention, 
however, in this analysis and the interactions between the counsellor and clients are 
not emphasised. Moreover, the focus on how identity categories are 'worked up' 
tends to solidify discursive positions in the process of their analysis rather than render 
them more fluid and subject to possibilities for change. This kind of analysis does 
not show how professional practice works or even how it might work. That is my 
main purpose, however, in this study. 
The closest attempts to study what I am interested in here, that is the 
processes of change in mediation, can be found in the work done by Jerry Gale and 
Steven Kogan and their collaborators. Their work features the study of conversations 
through the application of textual analysis procedures (rather than through, say, 
ethnographic studies or interpersonal process recall). Some of these studies have 
even involved an analysis of narrative conversations in family therapy contexts. Let 
me now review what has been achieved in several studies published in recent years. 
Gale and Newfield (1992) published a study of a solution-focused therapy 
session with a couple conducted by Bill O'Hanlon. This study has also been written 
up in full by Jerry Gale (1991). The aim of this study was to 'describe how an expert 
therapist uses language in the therapy session to achieve particular therapeutic 
outcomes' (Gale & Newfield, 1992, p. 153). The explicit agenda is, therefore, to 
shed light on the process of conversation and especially on the effects of the 
therapist's contributions. Do they bear out the claims that a therapist makes for what 
he or she does in therapy? Discourse analysis of a whole therapy session is 
conducted within the tradition of Conversation Analysis and a series of nine 
'rhetorical procedures' used by the therapist are identified. The focus is on the 
relationship of these procedures to other features of the context of this conversation. 
Analysis of what is achieved through the management of tum-taking is stressed. 
They are able to demonstrate that a number of therapist responses articulated by the 
therapist in his writing about his work were in fact present in the conversation and 
also that there were some 'rhetorical procedures' identified by the researchers that 
went beyond what the therapist knew about his own work. They report his response 
that he has learned something about his work from the research exercise. Such 
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outcomes are encouraging for the textual analysis of discourse in counselling and 
mediation. It suggests that such research can serve both a validatory or confirmatory 
purpose and that it can also have additive value to an understanding of what happens 
in a conversation from the perspective of a participant. 
In a 1997 article with Steven Kogan, Jerry Gale has shifted in his approach to 
textual analysis (Kogan & Gale, 1997). Again, an analysis of a marital therapy 
session is presented. This time, the therapist is Michael White and the narrative 
therapy session is conducted before a conference audience and is commercially 
available on videotape. To my knowledge, it amounts to the first published discourse 
analysis of a narrative therapy interview. In this piece of discourse analysis, some of 
the methods drawn from Conversation Analysis are still present (for example, the 
analysis of the management of tum-taking, adjacency pairs, reversals etc) but there 
are some other influences on their methodology that are acknowledged: 'discourse 
and narrative-based inquiry' (Kogan & Gale, 1997, p. 105) and elements of 
'postmodern theorizing'. They cite Potter and Wetherell ( 1987) as methodological 
sources but make no mention of Fairclough or of Parker and Burman. However, the 
analysis is explicitly linked to a Foucauldian analysis of power relations. Therefore, 
it is reasonable to claim that the movement of this study is in the direction of Critical 
Discourse Analysis and away from a strictly Conversation Analysis approach. As a 
result, the analysis responds, not just to the work done in the text to produce self and 
relationship, but also to the background work being done by dominant discourses of 
gender in the relationship between the couple. The therapist's moves to challenge 
some of the discursive positionings produced out of such discourse are made explicit. 
It is a much more politically conscious analysis that emerges as a result. A concept of 
'reciprocal editing' as a rhetorical move is described, for example. This term refers 
to a process of mutual negotiation of meaning between the therapist and the client 
that develops in the exchange of utterances. It refers to deliberate moves by the 
therapist to construct statements in tentative terms, to use tag questions to clarify 
meanings, and to invite the client to revise the therapist's meanings (p.114). Kogan 
and Gale analyse reciprocal editing in terms of the discursive work that it does and 
the political effects that it has, rather than leaving it in the domain of technical 
therapeutic skills, separate from the socio-political context. I would argue that they 
are describing a particular example of how a therapist is positioning himself and his 
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clients in a way that invites the clients forward into the production of meaning in this 
con versa ti on. 
Kogan and Gale are explicit also in locating their research in the context of a 
postmodern research tradition. They eschew the essentialist goal of trying to 
determine what the therapist was 'really trying to do' or what the participants' 
experience of the session 'really was'. Instead, they pursue a 'decentering' agenda 
for research as well as describing this agenda in therapeutic practice. Hence they 
claim to be producing an account (and it is explicitly an account, not the account) of 
how the discourse (including the talk that took place in the conversation) 'operated to 
produce spaces for people' (Beels, Kogan & Gale, 1997). 
Kogan ( 1998) takes this agenda further in a subsequent article in which he 
analyses a solution-focused therapy interview with a couple. His analysis claims 
allegiance to a Conversation Analysis tradition, with a Foucauldian perspective 
thrown in to enable: 
a view of the construction of reality as contested and political ... Which 
meanings form in an interaction is a political issue, as the construction of 
a meaning displaces some other meaning. 
(Kogan, 1998,p.231) 
One of Kogan's main emphases is on the ways in which a therapist 'disciplines' the 
clients' narratives, grants a more central position in the conversation to the husband's 
narrative, and thereby creates 'an unequal distribution of agency' (p. 247). He ends 
up asking an ethical question about what meanings the therapy he is researching 
legitimates and what it excludes. Kogan's and Gale's examples of discourse analysis 
are, therefore, very close to the emphasis on the politics of meaning-making that I am 
interested in here. While I am not committed to the Conversation Analysis emphasis 
on sequences of tum-taking, the questions that Kogan and Gale are asking based on a 
Foucauldian notion of the politics of meaning-making serve as a useful foundation for 
this study. Adding the theoretical concept of positioning theory into the mix does not 
seem to me to interfere with this analysis. Rather, it adds an extra conceptual tool to 
the discourse analyst's repertoire. 
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Discourse Analysis Of Mediation Conversations 
There are a series of studies that have taken excerpts from mediation 
conversations and analysed them in terms of discourse dynamics. In the main, these 
studies have focussed on mediation as an interesting genre within which to study 
aspects of conversation rather than with a view to informing the practice of 
mediation. Greatbatch and Dingwall recorded a series of mediations at ten different 
agencies in England. They have written several analyses of segments of these 
conversations (Greatbatch & Dingwall, 1989, 1997, 1998). The 1998 analysis is 
typical of these studies. They describe mediation as 'a process in which a neutral 
third party helps separating couples to reach their own agreements' (p.122), a 
definition which suggests a problem-solving model of mediation. 
The segment of conversation that Greatbatch and Dingwall select out for 
intensive analysis is very small (11 lines in total) and does not allow for much 
development or change to take place. It also does not demonstrate much of the 
mediators' (there are two) work. Rather, the analysis focuses on the production of 
identity categories in minute detail. The first group of these identity categories are 
called 'discourse identities' and refer to transient interaction functions, such as: 
speaker, report producer, accuser, addressee, overhearer, questioner, nonaligned 
party. To call these identities seems to me to unduly stretch the concept of identity. 
Positioning theory offers a better alternative. It is more elegant to refer to these as 
discursive positions taken up in the course of interaction rather than fully-fledged 
'identities'. Then, Great batch and Dingwall address institutional and other social 
identities, including those of mediator and disputant, spouses/ex-spouses, parents, and 
gendered identities. Their interest lies in describing how the participants work up 
these identities, including how they 'invoke and accept or contest the relevance of 
identities on a moment-by-moment basis' (Greatbatch & Dingwall, 1998, p. 131). 
Again, positioning theory offers some conceptual grounds for better describing these 
processes. These 'identities' appear to correspond better with 'roles' than with 
discursive positions. Moreover, positioning theory enables the asking of more 




The process of mediation itself and its role in the production of identities are 
not attended to in this study. To do this requires more of an emphasis on how people 
shift identities around, rather than just how they work them up. It would also require 
an attention to the relationship between the identities the mediator calls disputants 
into and the identities they choose to take up. For this kind of purpose, I would 
suggest that discursive positions and position calls are more precise analytic tools 
than identities for this kind of discussion. This is what I shall show in Chapter Seven. 
Another example of discourse analysis in mediation is the project written up 
in several articles by Angela Garcia (1991; 1997; 2000). In these studies, she uses an 
ethnomethodological Conversation Analysis approach to analyse the conversational 
exchanges that take place during the phase of mediation where proposals for 
resolution are being generated and placed on the table. Her interest is in the process 
of mediation, particularly in the process of bargaining and negotiation through which 
dispute resolution is accomplished. Garcia focuses on the discursive practices of both 
mediators and disputants. She analyses the conversational moves by which mediators 
solicit such propositions for solving a dispute, or (less commonly) themselves make 
proposals, sometimes in the form of a question. In the texts she analysed (transcripts 
from fifteen small claims mediation hearings), she found a number of examples of 
participant reluctance to make the first move in proposing solutions in response to 
mediator 'solicits'. This reluctance was expressed in silence, passing, or making non-
position report talk (talking about anything other than expressing a position or 
making a proposal) (Garcia, 2000, p. 330). Mediators, on the other hand, were often 
restrained from making propositions themselves by a discourse of neutrality in 
mediation theory. 
This is useful research that addresses the process of conversation and is 
concerned with the work that participants are doing as they use discourse to negotiate 
conflict resolution. The study shows some aspects of the processes by which the 
professional power of mediators is both discursively constructed and resisted. The 
limitations of it from a Critical Discourse Analytic perspective are the limits imposed 
by the disciplines of Conversation Analysis. It does not pay much attention to the 
imbrication of larger orders of discourse in the specific content of the exchanges. 
In another study (Manusov, Cody, Donohue and Zappa, 1994), a particular 
discursive aspect of child custody mediation sessions was investigated. The authors 
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looked at the exchanges (called 'account sequences') between divorced or divorcing 
couples in which an accusation of wrong-doing was made by one party to the other, 
followed by the giving of an account of some kind (excuse, justification, mitigation, 
concession or refusal), followed in turn by an evaluation by the original accuser. 
Sometimes this process was interrupted by a mediator intervention. Although this 
study is not a piece of qualitative discourse analysis like CA or CDA (instances of 
these 'account sequences' are coded and quantified), it is interesting from a 
constructionist perspective as an example the structuring of responses in patterned 
discourse. The study shows how certain forms of accusation make certain forms of 
account more likely and how certain forms of account-giving make certain 
evaluations more likely. In other words, the pattern of communication developed in 
these mediation conversations proceeds on the basis of which position calls are issued 
and then taken up in a way that issues another position call in return. 
Moreover, the data collected by Manusov et al. supported mediator 
intervention early in the process after the issuing of an aggravating rebuke. 
Mediations in which the mediators intervened in this way were more likely to lead to 
agreements on the substantive custody issues. This finding i.s interesting (although 
hardly definitive) in view of the preference in transformative mediation for a more 
laissez-faire approach in which mediators are more likely to stand back and let 
participants communicate freely with each other. This research suggests that, in 
exchanges between parties, the pattern of account sequences ( of 
accusation/justification/evaluation) is likely to dominate the mediation conversation. 
In training seminars, some people trained in transformative mediation have 
commented that a narrative approach is more 'directive'. They question a mediator's 
efforts to interrupt a conflict story and ask questions that are aimed at producing a 
new story rather than allowing the parties to communicate freely. This piece of 
research, however, supports the mediator taking an active role to intervene in the 
conflict story rather than allow it free expression. 
What is encouraging about the development of these kinds of studies is the 
attention being paid to the process of what actually happens in a mediation. Over 
time, such work promises more useful information for the development of practice 
than outcome studies that measure outcomes without taking account of the processes 
by which these results have been produced. Summative evaluation studies in which 
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detailed processes are not studied (called black box evaluations my Michael Quinn 
Paton, 1994) are addressed primarily at managerial concerns rather than professional 
ones. The development of professional practice of mediation requires more of these 
kinds of studies that explore how various discursive strategies work. This 
dissertation aims to contribute to this purpose. 
The Narrative Analysis Of Mediation 
The narrative perspective has been taken up in the research literature on 
mediation to a modest, but significant, extent. The focus has been mainly on the 
application of narrative theory to the analysis of what happens in mediation. In an 
important theoretical article, Sara Cobb (1994) wrote about 'A narrative perspective 
on mediation' (my emphasis) rather than about, say, a narrative perspective in 
mediation or for mediation. Her focus was upon the implications of narrative theory 
for 'understanding and evaluating the storytelling process within mediation practice' 
(Cobb, 1994, p. 49, emphasis in original). She advocates studying the storytelling 
that happens in mediation as an example of 'a micro-level discourse practice' (p. 49) 
and is interested in the ways in which the practice of storytelling 'functions 
reflexively to construct the context in which stories are told' (Cobb, 1994, pp. 51-2). 
Cobb's analysis of storytelling in mediation focuses on three elements of the 
function of narratives. The first is the function of narratives to establish 'coherence', 
described as causal linkages between components of a story in a unified account. The 
story that someone tells in a mediation is a meaningful construction that has internal 
consistency through its integration of plot components, characterisations and thematic 
elements. As well as internal coherence, a story may be said to establish coherence 
with other narratives ('inter-narrative coherence') in the meaning system of a person 
or of a family or community. Cobb describes stories told in mediation as 'nested' in 
a context of meaning in which other stories are told and lived. The conflict story 
consolidates, and is consolidated by, other narratives in a web of meaning. The 
concept of inter-narrative coherence then extends into the comparisons and contrasts 
between the stories of the parties to a conflict. From this perspective, says Cobb, 
'conflicts are the product of inter-narrative coherence' (Cobb, 1994, p. 54, emphasis 
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in original). As a mediation proceeds, a conjoint narrative emerges that involves the 
reformulation of each party's story in the light of the other's story. 
The second function of narratives, says Cobb, is to stabilise conflicts through 
bringing 'closure' to an account in the face of other possible stories. The discursive 
work that narratives do, Cobb argues, is to close off other possible interpretations of 
events. 'Unstable sites' in a story of events will need to be closed off in order to 
protect the story that each party tells. The more complete the narrative, the more 
easily narrative closure is established. Cultural resonance with dominant cultural 
narratives also aids the narrative function of closure. Stories that resemble dominant 
cultural stories have more stability and are more likely to be given credence as a 
result (Cobb, 1993; 1994). They are likely also to be harder to argue against in the 
midst of a conflict. 
The third function of narratives that Cobb articulates relates, in effect, to the 
discursive analysis of positioning. She calls it the 'interdependence of conflict 
narratives'. This phrase refers to the way in which people in conflict 'with great 
regularity' (Cobb, 1994, p. 56) construct the other as responsible for, or to blame for, 
the negative aspects of the problem. They construct themselves as 'victims' of the 
other's 'villainy.' Cobb points out that 'victim' and 'villain' are interdependent pairs 
of discursive positions. The validity of each position rests on the presence of the 
other position in the narrative. Typically in mediation conversations, people position 
themselves in 'positive discourse positions' and the other in 'negative discourse 
positions' (p. 57). She links the idea of a negative discourse position with 
Fairclough 's (1989) 'delegitimate social locations'. In conflict narratives, these are 
often assigned to others alongside contrasting narrative constructions that work to 
legitimate the self. 
So how do these ideas about narrative production relate to the discursive 
analysis of positioning as I am seeking to elaborate it here? In the first place, Cobb is 
directing our attention to the work done in discourse, that is, in the content of what is 
being said, to shape relations between people. In this regard, she is critical of the 
validity of the common division of process and content in mediation (Fisher & Ury, 
1981: mediators should focus on the process and leave the parties to be responsible 
for the content). Her argument is that narrative content has considerable influence on 
the process of mediation. She is also alert to the intertextual cultural links between 
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what is being said in a particular instance and the background orders of discourse. 
These links are what she calls 'cultural resonance'. Without referring to the 
developments of positioning theory as Davies and Harre have developed it, she is 
speaking about incipient notions of discursive positioning, especially in her 
comments about story constructions that position the other as villain and the self as 
victim. The ideas of narrative coherence and closure connect with the determining or 
constitutive aspects of discourse theory. Cobb asserts that: 
' ... the determinacy of narrative meaning is quite obvious in everyday 
life.' 
(Cobb, 1994, p. 54) 
The ideas of coherence and closure help elucidate the work of narrative in the 
production of power relations. Cobb demonstrates how they work against the 
production of agentic positions. Coherence and closure are produced unevenly in 
mediation conversations (Cobb, 1993) and the very unevenness can legitimize one 
participant's position in relation to another. However, she also notes possible sites 
for the disruption of narrative coherence and the interruption of closure and the 
possibility of taking advantage of these through asking destabilising questions. 
The analysis is limited, however, by the focus on storytelling, which tends to 
take place early in the sequence of a mediation conversation. Positioning theory is 
capable of handling more than this. Applied to the utterance rather than to the story, 
it allows for a more nuanced description of positions in relation to specific utterances, 
rather than in relation to overarching narratives. It can therefore be extended and 
made more useful for the analysis of subtle increments of change. 
Janet Rifkin, Jonathan Millen and Sara Cobb (1991) have studied another 
piece of discourse positioning that focuses on the relations between the mediator and 
the parties. They are interested in the prevalence of concepts of mediator neutrality in 
mediation discourse and point to two different meanings of neutrality that appear in 
this discourse: impartiality, defined as 'the ability to interact in the absence of 
feelings, values, or agendas in themselves' (Rifkin et al, 1991, p. 152); and 
equidistance, defined as 'the ability of the mediator to assist the disputants in 
expressing their 'side' of the case' (p. 152). They then go on to show how these two 
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competing meanings of the concept of neutrality can end up contradicting each other. 
Mediators can find themselves in a paradoxical situation where the desire to be 
impartial works against the establishment of equidistance or vice versa. In terms of 
positioning theory, we might say that the discursive positions for mediators in 
relation to these two discourse formations are at times incompatible. The result is 
that mediators sometimes have problems negotiating their relationships with 
disputants without creating expectations that they cannot fulfill. 
This study is an interesting one for several reasons. First, it picks up a 
particular discursive element in the mediation literature (neutrality) and examines it, 
in effect, in a deconstructive light. The result is a weakening of the general 
assumption of mediator neutrality, a cornerstone of modernist mediation theory. 
Secondly, it is an example of the intertextual nature of positioning. Professional and 
academic discourse is shown to impact on the specific nuances of utterance in the 
midst of mediation conversations. Positions taken up in one discursive context have 
implications in many others. This instance is an apt example of Foucault's postulate 
of the links between knowledge and social practice. A specific piece of academic 
discourse is shown doing its work to shape relations in professional practice and 
having an effect on people's lives. Thirdly, Rifkin et al's argument shows how a 
mediator can be unconsciously embedded in competing discourse positions and yet 
unable to make sense of this, with unfortunate results for the mediation process. It 
points to the value of the analysis of discursive positioning by mediators for the 
purpose of working out ways forward in such situations, even though the authors do 
not articulate their arguments specifically in the language of positioning theory. 
Cobb and Rifkin's (1991) study of storytelling in mediation also focussed on 
'discourse positions' (Cobb, 1994). Their usage of this phrase refers to positioning in 
another specifically limited way. They focus on one main aspect of positioning: who 
speaks first in telling their story in a mediation. They showed how the first speaker in 
a mediation conversation established the terms of the conversation, laid the ground 
for the second speaker's telling of a story and strongly influenced what the second 
speaker could speak about. In an analysis of a cohort of community mediation cases, 
they found that, in 75% of cases, the first story told framed the agreement that 
eventuated (Cobb, 1993). In a strong statement of this insight, Sara Cobb says: 
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' ... the first narrative that is told colonizes subsequent narratives.' 
(Cobb, 1994, p. 49) 
It is a promising analysis with implications for practice because it calls on 
mediation practitioners to take the power relations of what happens in a mediation 
conversation into account. 
Concluding remarks 
There are some promising inroads that have been made into the 
understanding and the articulation of mediation practice through the use of 
discourse analysis methods. I have outlined some of these and my reading of 
them in relation to positioning theory. The field is still in its infancy, however, 
and the value of such research depends on further development of the 
methodology and on its application to professional practice. It has been more 
common for discourse analysis to be used to inform social analysis in general 
than it has been for it to detail the specifics of professional practice in ways that 
might be of use to practitioners. However, there does exist more recent research 
that suggests that practitioners of mediation can employ discourse analysis to 
make sense of what happens in their practice. Such research promises a practice 
that takes account of the negotiation of meaning, identity and power relations in 
the moment of conversational exchange, rather than in structures that are merely 
made manifest in conversation. Of all the concepts available in discourse theory, 
positioning theory points most clearly to these possibilities. 
It is time to move on towards the articulation of a form of mediation 
practice that takes positioning theory more explicitly into account. In the next 
chapter, I shall outline a narrative approach to the theory and practice of 




An Elaboration Of Narrative Practice In Mediation 
In Chapter Two, I outlined a series of concerns about both problem-solving 
and transformative mediation and in Chapter Three introduced some theoretical ideas 
that have the potential to address these concerns. These ideas were drawn from 
discourse theory, constructionist notions of practice and a poststructuralist analysis of 
professional power. It is necessary now to begin to articulate a mediation practice 
that embodies these ideas. I am using the name 'narrative mediation' to encompass 
these alternative approaches to practice (Winslade & Monk, 2000), even though there 
are some risks in doing so. The approach I am elaborating is not summed up nor 
even necessarily accurately described with reference to narrative theory per se. More 
importantly, however, the term makes a link to the articulation of narrative therapy in 
the family therapy field (White & Epston, 1990, and others). Using this name 
acknowledges the debt owed to narrative therapy in the development of narrative 
mediation and also signals to those who are interested in these ideas in therapy that 
there may be an application of interest in the neighbouring field of conflict resolution. 
In the course of talking about the narrative mediation approach in this chapter, 
I am going to illustrate a series of particular conversational practices with examples 
from a role-played mediation in which I am the mediator. I shall not include a 
transcript of the whole conversation in this study. I shall use only excerpts sufficient 
to enunciate and demonstrate the practice rather than to locate it in the full context of 
a conversation. But first it is necessary to explain the basic principles of an approach 
to mediation that draws on narrative and poststructuralist theory and makes use of the 
concept of discursive positioning. This will include some comments on the nature of 
conflict when viewed from a constructionist perspective and some guidelines for 
practice. 
A Constructionist View Of Conflict 
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Conflict As A Product Of Difference 
From discourse theory, we can derive a set of assumptions about the genesis 
of conflict in human relations. In the first place, if the truth that we can know is the 
product of the legitimation of discourses in particular social contexts then no one can 
have exclusive access to it. There is no singular·knowable reality. What gets to count 
as truth will always come from a cultural perspective. Therefore, the general 
diversity of discourses and the complexity of social life are bound to produce 
diversity of perspectives on any issue. From time to time, different positions are 
going to clash. Conflict therefore can be seen as the inevitable articulation of 
difference. 
An understanding of conflict as produced in the flow of discourse, which is 
mapped onto people's subjective positioning, amounts to more of an outside-in theory 
of conflict than an inside-out theory. There is no need to resort to an inside-out 
theory of unmet needs, expressed as interests, to explain how conflict arises. 
Conflict can often also be understood from a constructionist perspective as a 
by-product of the operation of power in the modern world. We have seen in Chapter 
Three how Foucault and other poststructuralist writers have theorized power relations 
produced in discourse and expressed as privilege in various forms. We have seen, 
too, that power is always being resisted. Therefore it is to be expected that in conflict 
there will be a dimension of contest between processes of domination and resistance. 
We can, therefore, expect many of the disputes that come to mediation to be sites 
where such contests are being worked out. For example, in the ongoing contests 
between men and women over gender entitlements, divorce mediations are key 
conjunctures where dominant patten:is of gender power relations are constantly being 
produced, reproduced or challenged. 
Position Calls 
Positioning theory also offers potential for understanding the particularities of 
how conflict gets produced and inflamed in interactions. If we look at the utterances 
people make as social practices that establish discursive positions for themselves and 
for others, then it is possible to analyse the discursive positions made available to the 
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other in any utterance. Often in conflict situations such position calls offer only very 
narrow options from which the other can respond. Instinctively, people refuse to 
accept such narrow positions and a conflict is thereby reproduced on a moment-by-
moment basis. An example might be when one party to a conflict constructs 
themselves in a particular utterance as a victim of another's deliberate neglect or 
cruelty. The other is thereby positioned as something of a thoughtless villain 
deserving of approbation, but may refuse this as too narrow an interpretation of 
her/his intentions or actions. Another typical example of positioning in mediation 
occurs when one party utters something like: 
Look, I am just trying to be reasonable here. 
This can be read as an attempt to establish legitimacy for the speaker's sense of 
entitlement based on perhaps a background discursive privileging of rationality and 
logic over emotional expression. But, implicitly, it calls the other party in a dispute 
into a position as unreasonable, irrational or too emotional. Rather than be subjected 
by such a description, the other person will resist this position and the conflict 
becomes inflamed. The repeated offering of such position calls and their repeated 
refusal or acceptance is sufficient to produce a conflict, particularly when such 
position calls begin to coagulate into patterns. 
The Narrative Metaphor 
Narrative theory also helps understand the mechanics of the construction of 
conflict. It proposes that we commonly assemble elements of discourse into stories 
and use these as frameworks of meaning to make sense of life. As Michael White 
(1989) put it: 
We enter into stories, we are entered into stories by others, and we live our 
lives through stories. 
(p. 6) 
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From Jerome Bruner's (1986) perspective, our utterances and practices can be 
considered 'performances of meaning' (p. 25). We enact these performances more 
with the characteristics of a well-formed story in mind than with facts, realities and 
cause-and-effect logic. Through stories, we establish coherence (Cobb, 1994), order 
events through time, develop characterisations and construct denouement out of 
narrative trajectories. Thus, we develop stories of our relationships with others, 
stories about ourselves and stories about other people. In conflict situations, 
therefore, we might expect to find competing narratives being played out and people 
occupying the subject positions available in these stories. Since no story can account 
for all possible events, there will always be a process of selection of elements for 
inclusion in a particular narrative. Each selection would be made on the basis of 
narrative plausibility or coherence. Moreover, each arrangement of plot elements 
would legitimate (or de-legitimate) different subject positions. Each account would 
also set in motion a different plot trajectory for the future, because one of the features 
of narratives is that they develop sequentially and connect events over time. 
Cobb ( 1994) warns us also to expect that stories that people tell in mediation 
will contain disparities in terms of their narrative coherence, perhaps on the basis of 
the degree of cultural resonance a story exhibits, or in relation to the degree of 
legitimation that exists for the teller's discursive positioning. 
The point for mediation is that stories take on a life of their own. Thus, when 
a conflict story takes root, it generates a momentum (or coherence, Cobb, 1994) that 
cannot be claimed to reflect simply the facts or realities of a situation because stories 
mediate our knowledge of reality. It makes sense, therefore, to ask how a story is 
shaping a relationship as the protagonists in the story take up the positions that are 
available in this narrative and perform meaning around them. 
However, there will always remain other possible elements that sit outside of 
any particular narrative and remain unstoried. These elements are a source of the 
possibilities for new narratives to be formed and the events of the conflict recast in a 
new coherence. This is the task of mediation. Thus we can account through narrative 
theory for the differences between stories that people tell about events and for the 
persistence of these differences as people hold onto the coherence that a story offers 
them even in the face of contradictory information. We can also conceive of a 
mediation practice that is not so much about separating the facts from the stories and 
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working with those, as it is about working with the parties to create an alternative 
story. Such a story needs to be plausible for both parties and to include the 
significant events of the conflict story in a way that makes sense to both of them. 
A further characteristic of stories is that they are cultural creations (Bruner, 
1986; Cobb, 1994). Indeed, a cultural world is constituted within a framework of 
stories. Therefore, the stories within which we live our lives always draw from the 
cultural stories of the world around us. Moreover, the cultural imperatives in a story 
can create a narrative in which the end of the story has been prefigured by an event in 
the beginning (Bateson, 1993). 
Therefore, in a mediation there are likely to be a series of stories at work at 
different levels. There will be the conflicting stories of the dispute that each party 
brings. Any support persons who become involved, including lawyers, will also have 
their own versions of these stories too. There will be the unfolding story of the 
mediation itself. And there will be background stories that shape the meanings from 
which people draw the elements of other stories. These background stories may 
include larger stories of relationship, familial stories, cultural stories, or fictional 
accounts drawn from books and movies. 
The task of mediation can be considered to be a teasing out of these stories in 
order to open up possibilities for alternative stories to gain an audience. Rather than 
searching for the one true story, the narrative mode of thinking welcomes the 
complexity of competing stories and numerous influential background stories. Sara 
Cobb speaks of the 'opening of (conflict) narratives to alternative interpretations' 
(Cobb, 1994, p. 60). Out of this complexity can emerge a range of possible futures 
from which parties to a mediation can choose. This is the 'subjunctive mood' 
(Bruner, 1986, p. 29) that narrative thinking promotes. It is useful for mediation 
because conflicts so often narrow the field of vision for protagonists (Cobb, 1994). 
The subjunctive spirit opens people's thinking to the possibility that things can be 
different. In this kind of climate, repositioning is possible and substantive changes to 
relationships can follow. 
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Entitlement 
Despite what I have said above about the construction of conflict in discourse, 
it is still useful to re-think elements of the problem-solving theory in relation to a 
constructionist perspective. A key element is the idea of underlying interests. 
Clearly it has been useful for mediators to use this concept in the process of helping 
people move away from polarizing positions. The problem lies in its essentialist 
links. Interests that are tied to a universal human nature can make a claim for 
attention on the basis of some authority. The conceptualizing of 'unmet needs' 
creates a condition of oughtness about their fulfillment. If they are needs, then they 
deserve to be satisfied. Needs are viewed as fundamental characteristics of being 
human and arise naturally. This is what it means to call them essentialist. 
One problem with this concept lies in the assumption that everyone's needs 
are individual and equal. But often the interests that people bring to mediation are 
discussed in terms that clearly are not equivalent. For example, in the context of 
divorce mediation, it is more common for men to present claims for entitlement not to 
have their careers adversely affected by child care arrangements than it is for women 
to 'need' this. In employment disputes, the entitlements of waged workers are not 
expected to carry the same force of legitimacy as the claims of employers. In other 
words, people feel different degrees of entitlement to their needs. By social 
convention (that is, within discourse), they are granted different degrees of 
encouragement to claim them. Their needs may even be constructed in discourse 
quite differently with regard to, say, gender, culture or social class. 
At a recent mediation in which I took part, there was a dispute between Maori 
members of a school community about the correct way to observe a 'wairua tapu' 
(pronouncement of sacredness). The dispute focused on whether the children of the 
school could be taken to swim in a pool on the land that had recently been designated 
'wairua tapu'. What was obvious to me was that the 'needs' different parties felt to 
have 'wairua tapu' observed in the way that they were claiming were not based on 
any kind of universal human nature but on a particular tribal history and a set of 
Maori discursive assumptions. Neither do I believe that this experience is restricted 
to members of 'minority' cultural groups. For all of us, what we assume to be our 
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needs and interests are never free of the authorising and legitimating worlds of 
discourse. When we sense that we are being treated unfairly, we make this judgment 
against a background of what we know to be the 'nonnal' patterns of treatment. 
These norms are in tum attached to a cultural and historical context. 
I assume, therefore, that the discursive contexts in which we live lay down for 
us the systems of validation for our interests. In order to establish this assumption 
more clearly, I prefer to use the term 'entitlements' rather than the term 'interests'. It 
has more of a flavour of social construction than of biological imperative. What we 
believe we are entitled to is granted its title within a social world. Entitlements are 
achieved, acknowledged or assumed within relational contexts, in contrast with 
interests, which are internally referenced to the individual psyche. This point has been 
made before. Trina Grillo ( 1991) explained the perception of being injured by the 
actions of the other party in a conflict as 'arising from a sense of entitlement, which 
in tum is a function of the prevailing ideology' (p. 1567). With this change in 
emphasis, we can again revisit the notion of the interests or entitlements that people 
seek to assert in a conflict. But we can also take into account how these entitlements 
are at times likely to include exaggerations built on positions of privilege (also 
established in discourse). We can potentially take into account the power relations 
expressed in differential entitlements more easily than we can if we are tied to an idea 
of interests based on individual, biological needs. 
What is more, the idea of entitlement can give us greater leverage in the 
context of a dispute and therefore open up more options for forward movement. 
There is something about the dominant idea of 'needs' that makes them appear non-
negotiable and accords them 'taken-for-granted' status. The basis for needs is 
understood as pre-existent and its legitimacy scarcely open to examination. 
Entitlements, on the other hand, lend themselves more easily to close scrutiny, debate 
and challenge. A sense of entitlement can be linked with a desire or intention that has 
been constructed. From here, a process of deconstruction can render this construction 
visible and, therefore, more open to change. 
Patterns of entitlement often form around specific groups or identities in a 
community. Discourse constructs such patterns in ways that privilege groups of 
persons in relation to other groups. Through discourse, such patterns of entitlement 
offer people identity positions, authenticate those positions, regulate their dispersal 
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and exclude others from their benefits. Thus, we come back to viewing conflict as a 
clash of entitlements that occurs between people in overt or covert ways on a day-to-
day basis. 
Emphasizing Restraints Rather Than Causality 
Another aspect of theorizing conflict derives from the innovative work of 
Gregory Bateson (1972). Bateson advanced an approach to the understanding of 
complex phenomena that departs from the dominant assumptions of positive 
explanation found most commonly in the modernist scientific method. We have seen 
in Chapter Two how the problem-solving approach to mediation builds on and 
applies the model of the scientist-practitioner looking objectively at a problem, 
seeking to ascertain its underlying causes and then addressing an intervention at the 
level of the underlying cause to resolve the problem. 
Bateson's insight was that it is possible to conceptualize the facilitation of 
desired changes without having to resort to a conventional notion of causality. He 
refers instead to a theory ofrestraint (Bateson, 1972, p. 399 ff.). The idea here is that 
it is not enough to understand the continued existence of a problem through 
considering its antecedent events as positive causes of what follows. It is also 
possible to ask how the continued existence of a problem can be explained in terms of 
the restraints on the manifestation of other possible narrative trajectories. Such 
restraints can be said to contribute as much to the continuation of a problem as the 
antecedent causes. From this principle, we can consider how to go about producing 
change through removing restraints rather than through isolating antecedent causes 
and intervening in these. This approach knits nicely with discourse theory, because it 
points to the ways in which dominant discourses function to maintain their influence 
through restraining the possibility of other ways of thinking. 
In relation to the conflicts that people bring into mediation, we can consider 
these less as problems to be solved than as stories that restrain us from noticing the 
possibilities that lie in other stories about what has happened. Conflict stories can be 
understood as restraining stories of cooperation and understanding for example. 
Viewed in this way, conflict stories do not necessarily have to be analysed for their 
causal factors in order for changes to be produced. Rather, the stories of cooperation 
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and understanding or the like can be developed so that the conflict story begins to 
wither and its significance begins to fade. This different way of thinking can itself be 
experienced as fresh and invigorating, because it constructs the conflict story not so 
much as an obstacle to be overcome but as a dragging weight to be cut away in 
pursuit of some more satisfying story. The focus of conversation is on the 
development of the new story rather than on methodically dealing with the causes of 
the conflict story. 
Goals Of Narrative Mediation 
What then are the goals of a mediation process from a narrative perspective? 
In a problem-solving approach the goal is the formulation of an agreement that solves 
the problem. This is the fabled win/win solution that satisfies the interests of the 
disputing parties. Advocates of the transformati ve approach have questioned the 
instrumentalism involved in a reliance on reaching agreements as the primary goal of 
mediation. They urge the inclusion of more intangible goals such as improved 
understanding or communication, making people better human beings, and social 
transformation through improved relationships. 
Approaching mediation through a narrative lens alters the perspective on what 
might count as a valued goal. Goals are formulated in terms of narrative trajectory, a 
relational psychology and discursive shifts, reflecting the philosophical basis of this 
approach. We are not so focussed on the construction of events within the particular 
narratives of problem-solution, or of disempowerment-empowerment, or of blocked 
communication-clear communication, although in particular circumstances these 
constructions may pertain. Even within the problem-solving tradition, where 
settlement is usually the goal of mediation, there exists a recognition that mediators 
might be involved in the story of a conflict past the development of an agreement. 
Howard Raiffa (1985) speaks of 'post-settlement embellishments' to the negotiated 
agreement. A narrative perspective promotes a goal that moves through time, that is 
a story, rather than a singular settlement. I would advance three goals for a narrative 
mediator to bear in mind: a) creating the relational conditions for the growth of an 
alternative story; b) building a story of relationship that is incompatible with the 
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continuing dominance of the conflict; and c) opening space for people to make shifts 
in discursive positioning. I shall expand on each of these in tum. 
Creating The Relational Conditions For The Growth Of An 
Alternative Story 
Most mediators would agree that it is not the mediator's job to decide on a 
desired outcome and then to persuade the parties to agree to it. It is a commonplace 
to assert that the parties are responsible for deciding on the desired outcome of a 
mediation. And yet we must accept that the mediator's discursive practices will 
influence outcomes through the very positions offered in every question asked or 
response offered. Therefore, it is necessary to focus attention on the kind of influence 
that a mediator can be intentional and transparent about having. 
If we think in narrative terms, the goal of mediation has to be constructed in 
terms of the development of a narrative towards some kind of denouement. A written 
agreement may well be a pertinent aspect of such a narrative, or it may not. We can 
avoid the trap of becoming too attached to the goal of 'resolution' if we focus not on 
one component of the solution-bound narrative but on the narrative trajectory itself. 
If mediators concern themselves with developing the relational conditions that make 
possible the forward movement of a solution-bound narrative then they have done 
their job. In Wittgenstein's (1958) words, a mediation may be considered successful 
if people 'know how to go on'. Or in Bakhtin' s ( 1984; 1986) terms, ongoing 
dialogue, rather than a fixed agreement that ends the conversation, should be the goal 
of mediation. Agreements may thus at times be considered dangerous interventions if 
they take no account of ongoing relational shifts and developments. 
Sara Cobb ( 1994) has some things to say about the relational conditions 
necessary for a mediation outcome that is not simply reproductive of existing power 
relations. She would involve the mediator in regulating the process of story 
construction so as to address any disparities that may exist between the parties in the 
narrative coherence of their accounts of the conflict. The mediator must 'manage the 
construction of content' (p. 60) in the stories that people tell in mediation. This is an 
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argument against the more laissez-faire non-directiveness of the transformative 
approach to mediation. 
Moreover, a narrative attention to the ways in which both personal identity 
and power relations are constructed in relational and discursive contexts invites us to 
construct the goals of mediation in relational and discursive terms. Thus, we are less 
concerned with the satisfying of individual interests as with the construction of a 
respectful and equitable relational context that can serve as the basis of an ongoing 
relationship. 
There are times of course when a mediation takes place between parties who 
have no ongoing relationship. In such circumstances, a notional ongoing relationship 
can be invoked. We can ask parties to think about how the resolution of this 
particular dispute fits with their general preferences for their relations with, say, their 
customers. In this sense, any dispute is always part of a larger relational context. 
Ironically, what I find is that prior attention to the creation of a relational narrative 
often makes the process of negotiating particular agreements far more straightforward 
than it is in a problem-solving approach. But the narrative mediator perceives these 
agreements as part of the larger process of developing a cooperative, peaceful 
relational narrative, rather than as the pre-condition for such a narrative. 
Building A Story Of Relationship Incompatible With The 
Continuing Dominance Of The Conflict 
The second goal I would propose for narrative mediation is principally 
thematic in nature. If we begin from the assumption that the relationship between the 
parties will contain thematic elements that are being restrained in their expression by 
the continued dominance of the conflict, then the goal of mediation can be conceived 
as the removal of such restraints and the renewed expression of such thematic 
elements. 
There may be many names for such themes. Often they are called things like: 
cooperation, understanding, listening, mutual respect, teamwork, agreement, positive 
focus, fairness, joint action, partnership, collaboration, justice, humour, courtesy, 
equity, kindness, generosity, harmony and so on. There is nothing essential about the 
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name for such a theme. What matters is that it represents something in both parties' 
minds that is being restrained in the relationship by the continued existence of the 
conflict. Another way of saying this is that, under such restraints, relational events 
that feature such themes are remaining unstoried in the production of a working story 
of relationship for each party. 
The goal of the mediation becomes the rescuing from oblivion of such 
unstoried relational elements (either events that fit with these themes or direct 
expressions of these themes) and their incorporation into a new story of relationship. 
An agreement or resolution may well be incorporated into such a new story or the 
conflict story may simply become redundant in the face of the emergent new story, so 
that little actual resolution is necessary. 
Opening Space For Shifts In Discursive Positioning 
The practice of deconstructive conversation in narrative mediation (see below) 
leads to the formulation of a third goal. Transformative mediators construct a larger 
goal of personal and social transformation for the process of mediation. I support 
their vision of the work of mediation as having a bigger purpose than simply fixing 
problematic eruptions so that the social status quo can continue unchallenged. Like 
them, I envisage a role for mediation in the production of a better and more peaceful 
world. Therefore, I believe it is useful for mediators to develop a conceptualisation 
of this purpose that can be a useful guide in moment-by-moment practice. However, 
I would choose to formulate the kind of transformation I am seeking to embody in 
practice in different terms than those of 'recognition' and 'empowerment'. 
The basis for a narrative conceptualisation of social change needs to be 
discursive in origin. We are building on a social theory in which we understand 
discourse to be active in the production of social relations, and we, therefore, need to 
formulate the goals of mediation in terms of building more equitable social relations. 
Positioning theory offers the most useful leverage for the articulation of such a 
practice. The goal of mediation from a narrative perspective can be described as 
achieving some degree of deconstruction of the discourses at work in the production 
of the dispute, and of the relational positions offered to the participants within such 
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discourses. Cobb ( 1994) refers to the need for destabilizing narrative closure in order 
to open the door for new interpretations. 
It follows too that such deconstructive effort leads to the possibility of parties 
making discursive shifts within the discourses that have been dominant. That is, 
mediation conversations can open the space for the issues to be described in different 
terms, for positions offered within dominant discourse to be refused, and for parties 
to reposition themselves within dominating discourses that they are experiencing as 
problematic. They might move from a way of speaking that positions the other in a 
'negative discourse position' (Cobb, 1994, p. 61) to a more positive positioning. It is 
important too that the shifts that take place are not just in any direction. It would not 
be acceptable, for example, for mediation to be employed to create discursive shifts in 
directions that promote greater social injustice. The goals of mediation therefore 
need to have an ethical dimension to which a mediator needs to be accountable. 
Narrative mediation is not just about the development of any story. It should stand 
for the advancement of equity, justice and democratic partnership and oppose 
practices of exclusion, systematic silencing and subjugation. It is not therefore about 
the construction of possibilities for agency for their own sake. The purposes towards 
which agentic action is aimed need also to be examined. 
In straightforward terms, the goal of narrative mediation can be described as 
the production of discursive shifts. When such shifts take place, we can expect the 
ongoing relational narrative to take a different course from the path that was being 
followed under the influence of the conflict story. Consequently, we can expect 
people to act differently in relation to each other and the conflict story to become less 
compelling. 
The Politics Of Mediation 
In the light of the critiques of mediator neutrality mentioned in Chapter Two, 
it is no longer sustainable for mediators to pose as dispassionate process specialists 
who are neutral with regard to the content of disputes. They are forever making overt 
and covert judgments on how issues are to be addressed, which settlement prospects 
are preferred and how diverse interests are to be attended to. The moves that 
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mediators make influence the disputing parties' actions and reactions, ultimately 
shaping the course of a conversation. Advocates of problem-solving have often 
downplayed the effects of mediators' own biases, values and viewpoints and instead 
have emphasized the degree of impartiality that can be achieved. 
Christopher Moore (1996) makes a distinction between neutrality and 
impartiality. He assigns the term neutrality to the absence of any prior relationship 
between the mediator and either of the disputing parties and to the mediator not 
receiving any benefit or payment from either party. He reserves the term impartiality 
for describing the process objective of refraining from favouring either party's 
interests, wishes or proposals over another's in the course of a conversation. 
Impartiality amounts to evenhanded conduct of the mediation. The test of 
impartiality is considered to lie, ultimately, with the judgment of the conflicted 
parties. At the end of the mediation, if they can testify to the evenhandedness and 
fairness of the mediator, only then can the mediator be deemed impartial. 
While it is not desirable to undermine mediators' efforts towards ethical 
practice along these lines, there is a difference between making these efforts and 
assuming the achievement of a neutral discursive position as a result of making such 
efforts. There are a multitude of ways in which mediator biases, prejudices and 
preconceptions will necessarily enter into the subtleties of their selections of content 
to respond to and their choices of words. A discursive analysis, particularly one that 
is alert to the subtleties of position calls, can help make this evident. Rather than 
taking up a position of empty neutrality, the mediator can be seen to adopt a stance 
and take a position in every utterance and to issue position calls to the parties as she 
does so. To use discourse at all means to work with culturally bound tools and, 
therefore, from a cultural position. 
Folger and Bush (1994) have shown some examples of the ways that 
mediators can exert influence on the trajectory of a mediation through influencing the 
frames of reference within which matters will be discussed. They argue: 
When conflicts are mediated, social justice issues can be suppressed, 
power imbalances can be ignored and outcomes can be determined by 
covertly imposed third-party values. 
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(Folger & Bush, 1994, p. 5) 
One of their critiques of the problem-solving approach to mediation concerns the 
instrumental focus on producing an outcome in the form of an agreement. This focus 
in itself leads to the selection of content for emphasis to fit with what can be written 
into an agreement. It privileges the tangible aspects of a dispute such as differences in 
money and property ahead of more intangible emotional elements. 
If we accept that mediator neutrality and impartiality are attractive ideas rather 
than straightforward expectations, we must grapple with the fact that mediator 
influence is an integral part of the mediation process. The ethical dimensions of 
practice change from a desire to work within the scientist-practitioner tradition of 
objective neutrality towards an ethical management of the particular nature of the 
mediator's influence. Does it work in the direction of the promotion of greater justice 
in social relations or does it work intentionally or unintentionally towards the 
reproduction of injustice? Does it open up more possibilities for action for people or 
does it close these down? 
Some mediators suggest that their influence should be used to offset the 
advantages that a more powerful party may have in the mediation (for example, 
Haynes, 1988). Indeed, if the mediator fails to bolster the influence of the weaker 
party and to curb the dominating effects of the stronger party, some critics would 
suggest that mediation becomes an abusive activity. Take, for example, the 
differential levels of influence that an employer and an employee bring to a 
mediation, or a landlord and a tenant. These positions offer different degrees of 
entitlement in relation to one party's ability to make decisions that affect the other 
party. Consider too the disparity of power and influence between a party who is 
educated, rich and eloquent and one who is uneducated, poor and inarticulate. When 
these degrees of variance over relational influence are present, mediators could be 
called unethical if they did not find some way of attending to power discrepancies. 
There are problems, however, with mediators managing the difference in 
status, authority, and relational position between parties by sboring up the weaker 
party and checking the behaviour of the party perceived to be dominant. This kind of 
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analysis of the workings of conflict and how conflict can be resolved is based on 
assumptions of power as a commodity that can be possessed in finite quantities that 
are distributed (unevenly) between people. In other words, a modernist, structural 
analysis of social hierarchies is being employed. Structural positioning at the top of 
the social hierarchy is assumed to mean that a person amasses a certain quantity of 
power that will translate into conversational influence in the mediation. 
But this kind of analysis builds in a certain rigidity of expectation. Those in 
the position of structural advantage cannot be dislodged from their power in one 
conversation. And those in the position of disadvantage cannot remove the 
disadvantage through talking about it. From this perspective, protest that stops short 
of structural change is not valued. This kind of analysis itself always runs the risk of 
obscuring or trivialising the efforts people make to resist their own subjection. Such 
efforts have to be conceptualised as futile in terms of a structural analysis. As a result 
mediators are not encouraged to expect much opportunity for potency in their work. 
From a poststructuralist perspective, power does not so much adhere 
automatically to structural positions in hierarchical arrangements as it operates in and 
through discourse. Discourses offer people positions of greater or lesser entitlement. 
Within particular discourses, some positions are rendered more legitimate or more 
visible and others are subjugated. Some voices get a full hearing and others are 
silenced. But, of course, discourses are products of the shifting, changing, unstable 
conversations that take place in communities and relationships. As discourses shift 
and change, so the discursive positions of legitimacy and marginalization ebb and 
flow. In other words, it matters what happens in a conversation. All is not 
predetermined by social structure. Structural positions of privilege only manifest 
power in the context of conversations in which such privilege is practised, or in 
which entitlements are laid claim to and not made subject to challenge. Thus, power 
is produced on a moment-by-moment basis, rather than determined by social structure 
in advance of a conversation. For power relations, this means that it matters what 
happens in the course of a mediation conversation. I would expect that, as a result of 
the expression of resistance, subtle shifts and changes in discursive positioning will 
take place in the moment of producing utterances in conversation. 
171 
From this perspective, I conceive of the role of the mediator as having certain 
responsibilities and certain possibilities. The responsibilities lie in the need for 
vigilance about the shape of the power relations being advanced in the conversation, 
including a reflexive awareness of how professional power can be practised by a 
mediator in colonising ways. The possibilities lie in the opportunities for constant 
renegotiation of power relations that can be realised in the course of a mediation. 
Position calls and claims of entitlement can be deconstructed, refused or resisted at 
any moment. Voices that have been subject to systematic silencing can be heard and 
made legitimate. Viewpoints that have previously been rendered invisible can be 
paraded and discussed. In these ways, power relations can be destabilised and agency 
realised. Even in the most apparently powerless of circumstances, people can find 
small ways to act that make a difference to their relational position. 
However, if power is not a commodity, then it makes little sense to talk of 
people being equal or unequal in their possession of it. It also makes little sense to 
speak of empowerment in the sense of an action by the mediator to balance the 
'amount' of power being held by the respective parties. Moving away from a 
globalised notion of power sensitises mediators to people's abilities to act in their 
own behalf, even in small ways that do not radically alter structural arrangements. 
Reflexivity 
The work of Michel Foucault, as discussed in Chapter Three, has 
problematised the politics of relations between professionals and their clients, 
particularly in the fields of medicine and psychology. He draws attention to the ways 
that knowledge in any domain of professional practice is produced within dominant 
discourse. This is no less true in mediation than in other domains. From a narrative 
perspective, the relationship between knowledge and power is important for the 
politics of relations between mediators and their clients. To take this relationship 
into account requires mediators to commit to a reflexive stance in their practice. 
Therefore, let me articulate a reflexive practice of mediation. 
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A reflexive practice seeks to handle power and privilege in ways that 
demonstrate the principle of accountability. Reflexive practice includes, but is more 
than, 'reflective' practice (Schon, 1983). Reflection suggests an individual process of 
thinking back over experience and learning from it. 'Reflexivity' refers to a more 
dialogical or conversational process, one that involves people being answerable to 
each other for their actions. This form of accountability involves taking account of 
and reflecting on the impacts one has on the other. It requires professionals to be 
accountable to their clients and contrasts with the more common form of 
accountability which is focused 'upwards' toward employers or funders rather than 
being concerned with the views of clients. 
The concept of reflexivity has been developed in relation to research methods 
(Banister et al., 1994; Lather, 1991) where it has been used to distinguish research 
that objectifies and exploits its subjects from research that respects its subjects as co-
participants in the research process. In such research, the researcher includes himself 
or herself as a participant whose research questions are not neutral or objective but 
situated and interpretive. The researcher's interpretations are always open to 
alternative readings as well, especially in the light of the co-participants' 
contributions to the research task. 
Similarly, in fields of professional practice such as mediation, a reflexive 
approach opens to view the positions from which professionals and their clients relate 
to each other. This process of opening to view is not a strictly neutral activity. 
Reflexive moves make relational positions evident and begin to shift or transform 
these positions. Reflexive practices help to make what mediators and clients are 
often barely aware of more obvious, and therefore more available to conscious efforts 
to change. 
Reflexive practice makes privilege and entitlement subjects for discussion and 
deconstruction. It alerts us to the ways in which professional and academic discourse 
grants authority to the words uttered by the mediator. It requires mediators to avoid 
the assumptions involved in 'practising down', just as researchers have 'researched 
down' (Hoffman, 1992). Practising down would be achieved by professional 
mediators laying their theoretical knowledge over their clients' experience. A 
reflexive approach by contrast involves deliberately making professional privilege 
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transparent and demonstrating willingness to be repositioned by the clients' 
preferences. This might involve some of the following relational moves: 
• inviting parties to comment, theorize or editorialize on the mediation process and 
content 
• being prepared to be surprised by and to learn from what the parties have to teach 
rather than seeking to assimilate parties' comments into the mediator's existing 
knowledge 
• asking permission to make process moves rather than assuming this as a 
professional right 
• speaking or writing reports about parties only in ways that one would be happy 
for the parties to overhear or read 
• treating all documents or recordings that come from the mediation process as 
being co-authored with the parties rather than as belonging exclusively to the 
professional, including notes and files which should be open to client inspection. 
The outcome of this kind of reflexive practice should be a more dialogical process 
than simply a personally reflective practice. It can only be achieved in the kind of 
conversation from which each participant emerges a little changed. In order to 
practise this way, mediators have to shrug off the cloak of objectivity and accord 
parties a position of shared authority in the conversation. They have to be prepared at 
times not to take themselves too seriously, even to be able to laugh at their own 
predilections. And they have to be willing to learn from those to whom they are 
seeking to offer a learning experience, to be served by those they are serving. 
Respect 
One way to describe the political stance described above is to use the word 
'respect'. To adopt the reflexive stance advocated above amounts to a systematic 
effort to communicate a palpable respect. Few would take issue with 'respect' as an 
abstraction, but not everyone would embody respect in the performances of meaning 
that I am advocating here. In order to understand this stance let me articulate a 
conception of just what it is in another person that we might respect. 
The concept of positioning (see Chapter Three) enables a discursive 
understanding of respect. If discourse authorises and legitimates the positions of 
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entitlement offered to people in conversations and at other times limits or excludes 
them from such positions, then mediators can make conscious use of discourse to 
offer disputants opportunities to take up positions of moral agency. When mediators 
do this, they can be said to offer people respect. Such respect invites people to take 
up subjective positions in the grammar of mediation relationships rather than inviting 
them into subjected positions. Such subjective positions are frequently the subject of 
contest and are not to be taken for granted. I conceive of them as achieved moments 
of practice rather than as states of being. Nor once achieved in a given context can 
such a subjective position be guaranteed to continue. It is not like a state of 
enlightenment that, once reached, is never lost again. Rather, discursive positioning 
is always being reproduced in everchanging contexts and there are always challenges 
and contests, not all of which can be taken on in a given moment. 
Listening discursively, or listening to how discourse positions people and also 
to their preferences to take up or to refuse such positions calls, enhances the 
possibility of offering people respect. Treating people with respect entails calling 
them into speaking positions, especially in situations where the dispute arises out of 
systematic exclusion of a person's voice. For example, heartfelt concerns about the 
particular effects of racism or sexism can be effectively sidelined by being described 
merely as 'political correctness'. If a mediator solicits the giving voice to these 
concerns this is no insignificant act in the micropolitics of conversation. 
Michael White (1989) has proposed an aphorism that embodies the principle 
of respect I am seeking to describe here. 
It is not the person that is the problem. Rather, it is the problem that is 
the problem. 
(White, 1989, p. 6) 
This statement sounds so straightforward that it may seem obvious. However, it 
needs to be understood in the context of many habits of speech that describe people 
by summing up their essential being, or totalising them on the basis of a narrow range 
of experience. This happens whenever someone is described in a conflict situation as 
though they are a particular characteristic, for example, aggressive, weak, a liar, 
difficult to deal with, stubborn, bad-tempered, unreasonable, arrogant, or the like. In 
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professional psychological discourse, deficit labels of psychological diagnosis can be 
applied in the same totalising way. A person can be described as overreacting, acting 
out, emotionally disturbed, passive-aggressive, and so on. When such descriptions 
are used by someone with the authority of a professional training behind them, the 
totalising effect is magnified. Communicating respect entails avoiding falling into 
ways of speaking that employ objectifying descriptions like these, or in other ways 
totalise people. 
It is very common in conflict situations for one party's description of the other 
to narrow considerably. Whereas the two parties may have previously experienced 
each other in a range of ways, under the influence of a dispute, the experiences that 
are selected for remembering become restricted to those that describe a person's 
participation in the dispute. The complexity of experience is reduced to a small range 
of words applied to the exclusion of other possibilities. People are totalised and 
places where they could be thought of as otherwise are obscured. Communicating 
respect entails continuing to maintain curiosity about the possibilities that lie outside 
of any simple summary of a person. 
Relationships too can be described in totalising ways. A common description 
of conflicts is to call them 'personality clashes'. Such a description privileges the 
essential individual qualities that we call personality. The assumption of 
'personality' is that individuals carry around with them some kind of stable 
personhood that is context-free. The assumption is also that these personalities will 
not change and so when two people clash, the conflict is to some degree inevitable 
and determined by the pre-existence of personality features. However, people are far 
more complex than any descriptions. Nor can relationships be reduced to simple 
summaries without distortion. There are always exceptions to any description. 
Communicating respect means holding the door open to such exceptions, rather than 
simply accepting an analysis of the conflict that is based on an essentialist description 
of either persons or relationships. 
To communicate the kind of respect I am outlining here requires that 
mediators make a conscious effort not to see people as essentially anything, to refuse 
to sum people up. It implies a willingness to look for contradictions and to celebrate 
them as indicative of the range of possibilities that anyone has at their disposal. This 
stance encourages mediators to see people as more than their actions in the current 
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dispute. My belief is that people usually appreciate being spoken to from this 
enlarged viewpoint. It also involves being on the lookout for opportunities to 
celebrate, appreciate and build on every little step into positions of moral agency, to 
have a voice in matters that affect them and to act from subjective positions in 
discourse. Another way to say this is that a mediator needs to be on the lookout for 
possibilities that lie beyond the realistic and the known, always seeing the potential 
for people to step into neglected knowledges or understandings, and seeking to 
capitalise on such potentials. 
Elements Of A Narrative Practice 
In this section, I intend to describe some ways to articulate the principles 
argued above in the practice of conversation. To illustrate this articulation, I shall 
draw from a transcribed mediation conversation that can serve as an example. This 
conversation was a role-played mediation which was recorded and transcribed. I 
shall not present the whole of the conversation but rather select pieces of it that serve 
the purpose of illustrating the method I am proposing. 
Deconstructive conversation 
The first concept that I want to emphasise is that of deconstructive 
conversation. This concept refers to the mediator's focus in the early part of a 
mediation as the issues that have fueled the conflict are laid on the table. To work 
narratively, the mediator is not just listening to the parties telling their stories and 
joining with them through communication of empathy. In addition to doing this, the 
mediator listens for the discursive positioning being negotiated, the entitlement 
claims being made, the power relations at work, and the discourses being referenced 
in the construction of the stories. She or he seeks to enjoin the parties in a 
conversation that opens up these discursive influences to view, rather than allowing 
them to continue to do their work behind the scenes. Deconstruction is not an 
analytical operation carried out by the mediator on the parties. Rather, it is achieved 
as the mediator asks questions that invite the parties to step outside of the conflict 
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story and to think about how they have been caught in a web of discourse in the 
development of the dispute. It is best done in a spirit of wondering and curiosity, 
rather than critique. 
The effect of this kind of conversation is first of all to 'render strange' (White, 
1991) what has become familiar in the conflict saturated story. Taken-for-granted 
aspeets of 'how things are' can be viewed from a new perspective and take on a 
different hue. I do not mean here an objective perspective. Objectivity would be too 
narrow a range of perspectives. I would argue that any shift in perspective creates a 
new discursive vantage point, which will still be embedded in discourse, but which 
always entails a loss of certainty in relation to the original story of the conflict. 
Deconstructive conversation loosens the authority of a dominant way of thinking and 
opens the door for different ways of thinking. 
I shall now introduce the conversation that will serve to illustrate a 
deconstructive inquiry. The scenario for this conversation was given to the role-
players only a few minutes before the recording. It runs as follows: 
Dennis and Mario are in a permanent and loving relationship. They are 
committed to each other and each has a satisfying and rewarding job. The only thing 
they want is a family of their own. Dennis'sformer partner Marlene agrees to 
conceive a baby with Dennis and to hand the baby over to Dennis and Mario when it 
is born. Although Dennis and Marlene had split up some years ago they had 
maintained a supportive relationship and were good friends. 
Baby Samuel is born and he is much loved by both his father and his mother. 
Marlene is so attached to Samuel after carrying him for nine months and giving birth 
to him that she is reluctant to give Samuel up. At first she stalls for time and then 
later admits that she has no intention of giving Samuel up to Dennis and Mario. 
There were no contracts drawn up prior to the conception of Samuel. The 
whole arrangement was based on trust. Neither wants to destroy the friendship but 
they both want Samuel. Dennis suggested mediation to Marlene in the hope that they 
would be able to establish at least a shared parenting arrangement. Marlene agreed 
and Mario supported the process. 
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What follows is a segment of conversation based on this scenario. It comes 
about ten minutes into the conversation as Dennis and Marlene are talking about the 
discursive positions offered to each other in the versions of future they each want to 
advance. My concern as mediator here is to inquire about the taken-for-granted 
aspects of the envisaged stories, and about the discursive positions they can identify 
for themselves in these versions of future. 
MARLENE: Do you want me to pop into his life maybe fifteen years from now and 
say hey yeah by the way this is your mom. 
DENNIS: No not fifteen years from now .. 
MARLENE: (interrupting) .. but this whole time she's Auntie Marlene or something 
. . . I don't understand .. 
DENNIS: Well ... you helped me out .. and you brought this child into our lives ... 
you 're .. you 're gonna be part of it .. somehow .. we've just got to figure that out. 
JOHN: Can I .. can I just check out .. because I mean you just spoke about a picture 
of what might happen .. you know like if .. I mean I'm not suggesting this is how it 
will go but I'm just saying if things were to go as you 're imagining that Dennis would 
want them to go .. right .. it would be .. and you (Dennis) described a picture ... and 
you (Marlene) sort of responded to that picture .. which was along the lines of you'd 
be distant .. you'd sort of somewhere .. whether it's fifteen years or six years later 
you'd come in and be Auntie Marlene .. something like that .. so it sounded like a 
picture in which your role in Samuel's life would be what ... 
MARLENE: A close family friend that's always there. 
JOHN: A close family friend. 
MARLENE: ..... I'm still Marlene and his best friend but to Samuel I'm just a family 
friend that he maybe calls Auntie Marlene and I cannot see myself that way (JOHN: 
Right.) .. maybe in the beginning I didn't have a problem with that but now .. I'm not 
his aunt .. I'm his mother. 
JOHN: So can I just check .. (to Dennis) was that .. is that anything like the picture 




In this conversation the discursive position for Marlene produced in the 
original agreement with Dennis is spelled out in a way that it has not been before. In 
response to questions about its sources, it is linked to the role of a 'close family 
friend' in the dominant discourse of family. Perhaps it contains echoes of the 
handling of family shame around 'illegitimate' births in which the dominant story of 
family is maintained through the ruse of turning the mother into a sibling or an aunt, 
while other family members (usually grandparents) raise the child as its parents. The 
deconstructive inquiry into what such a picture contains is done without requiring 
anyone to commit themselves to this picture. Along the way, the ground is prepared 
for departure from the positions inherent in this story. It is after all just a story and its 
authority is loosened simply by naming it. 
In the next segment, a deconstructive question gets behind the meaning of the 
picture to its relation with background discourse. Dennis' s answer is indirect. It 
appears to change the subject but in the end it comes around to filling in the details of 
Marlene's position more fully. This is followed by a recognition of the differences in 
positioning between the tug of dominant discourse of family and the prospect of a 
family with two male parents. 
JOHN: Can I just ask .. cause I'm interested in this picture that .. you had that you 
know you both actually had which was of Marlene's role being like a distant family 
friend ... like where does a picture like that come from .. where do you get it from .. I 
mean is it out of your own lives or .. out of what you've heard other people talk about 
or .. like where do these pictures come from? 
DENNIS: ....... I just .. personally .. I just felt that when Samuel was at an age when 
he can understand (JOHN: Mhmm.) .. or even begin to comprehend what was going 
on ... obviously there would be .. differences there would be two men in his life taking 
him to school taking him to soccer (JOHN: Yeah.) .. doing those types of things ... 
with regards to the other .. families it would look different and I guess when he was 
able to recognise those differences ... I didn't envision some big old summit that we'd 
all sit down but something like that an informal .. type of .. meeting where he gets to 
meet ... not meet Marlene for the first time but where we really discuss .. you know 
where he came from .. and I thought we could do it in an informal way ... where it 
was comfortable for all the parties. 
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JOHN: See .. I mean .... like what I heard you describing .. tell me if any of this is 
wrong because I want to make sure that I'm hearing you correctly but you had 
various pictures of being a parent .. right ? (DENNIS: Yes.) .. and you described 
some of those like taking him to soccer and what were the other things you mentioned 
.. you know .. 
DENNIS: School. 
JOHN: Soccer, school those kind of things .. and ... and you had a picture of like 
what is ... a primary parent's role in those things .. right? 
DENNIS: Mhmm. 
JOHN: And .. but you also had a picture of .. the difference .. you know like .. this 
would be different from some other kids and .. because he would have two male 
parents .. right? (DENNIS: Mhmm.) .. so you .. you kind of had a .. is this right that 
you had a picture of kind of what is generally expected that parents do and also 
pictures of .. things that as two gay men you would do differently ... and that you 
would have to deal with those differences .. right .. 
It is clear that Dennis cannot rely on dominant discourse for a legitimate 
model of parenthood. This conversation is deconstructive to the extent that it opens 
up a view of the limited positions available in dominant discourse and identifies the 
need for a different discursive position from which to be a parent. The same issue is 
pursued with Marlene in the following segment of conversation. Her answer takes 
her in different direction but it is still about the shaping of discursive positioning in 
relation to notions of family. 
JOHN: I'm interested in where your picture came from too of the .. what Dennis was 
wanting was Marlene as the family friend .. like where does that come from? 
MARLENE: I just .. I didn't .. I would see myself as a friend still (JOHN: Yes.) .. a 
really close friend but maybe not this child knowing that I was Mom ( J: Yes .. 
because?) maybe because in my own head I wasn't ready to be a Mom at the time 
that he approached me ( JOHN: Right.) .. so I didn't see myself as Mom. 
JOHN: OK .. so you didn't have a picture of yourself in that place in that role ... 
MARLENE: Being that full on ( JOHN: Right, yeah.) .. at the time it was more of 
realistic role that I thought I could fulfil ( JOHN: OK.) .. for this child ... but now .. 
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JOHN: Just the giving birth role .. the carrying of the child (MARLENE: Right.) .. 
that's as far as your envisaging of yourself in that role went .. at that time right? .. 
and over the last months that that envisaging has grown. 
MARLENE: I am Mom (JOHN: Yeah.) .. and he needs his mommy (JOHN: Right.) .. 
and so something that I didn't feel that I could do before .. is so real right now .. it is 
so much of my reality .. my fature. 
JOHN: So as that ... you know like that .. it's sort of like over those months that 
picture and that envisaging of your own ... role in Samuel's life has grown .. it's kind 
of developed and grown as time's gone by ... 
Here we see in Marlene positioning herself in relation to a discourse of 
motherhood that has grown more salient during her pregnancy. The salience of this 
discourse has grown more significant for her through her pregnancy and she has 
rejected the more marginal position in relation to this discourse that she earlier was 
happy to occupy. The implication is that further development can also take place and 
that identity as a parent is not fixed, an important consideration for a mediation about 
the care of a child. 
Deconstructive conversation builds on a mediator stance of curiosity about 
meanings, rather than an acceptance of standard meanings. Careful inquiry into the 
meanings of expressions or story elements seeks to avoid taking any particular 
meaning for granted. It conveys the idea that meanings are not fixed but are shaped 
by context and are negotiable in conversation. Such inquiry can be deconstructive, 
because it loosens the grip of established meanings and unpacks the background 
assumptions against which things make sense. As these assumptions are cast into the 
spotlight of curiosity, they begin to look more like options or preferences, rather than 
unassailable truths. 
The particular spirit in which such curiosity might be expressed requires a 
little further explanation. It needs to be distinguished from the kind of curiosity that 
can be experienced as interrogation or examination. Nor is it the same as data 
co11ecting. In these questioning processes, the person being questioned is subjected 
to the questioner's intent, supplying information to fit into a schema existing already 
in the mind of the questioner (for example a list of diagnostic criteria). In the spirit of 
the modernist scientist-practitioner, the questioner solicits details from the client that 
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become 'facts' once they are interpreted within the framework of the professional's 
expert knowledge. 
This spirit of asking questions to collect data is not the kind of curiosity I am 
advocating here. I advocate a stance of curiosity that is not so much confirmatory as 
exploratory, not so much aimed at confirming hypotheses as at generating them. In 
this spirit, the person being questioned need not be subjected but is invited into the 
subjective position of the knower. A mediator seeks to learn from the knowledge of 
the client, rather than subsume the latter's knowledge within expert knowledge. 
Some family therapists have described this stance as adopting a 'not knowing 
position' (Anderson and Goolishian, 1992), or 'deliberate ignorance' (Hoffman, 
1992). These descriptions describe this spirit in terms of its binary opposite. The flip 
side of 'not knowing' would be a spirit of respectful wonder or nai"ve inquiry that 
welcomes ambiguity and indeterminacy, because of the increased range of 
possibilities that they open up. 
Let us look at some examples of what happens in practice when curious 
questions are used in this spirit. 
JOHN: Dennis used the word catalyst before .. like he described the original 
understanding as being that you would be like a catalyst for them .. for Dennis and 
Mario to have a child ... how did that.fit with your understanding of what the 
agreement was to start with .. how does that word.fit? 
MARLENE: Now I just think it's horrible but at the time but I guess at the beginning 
I was wrapped up in my own career and I didn't even see a child in my future .. so I 
didn't mind .. I wasn't in a relationship and I saw how committed him and Mario 
were so I .. I didn't think there would be any harm in allowing you know two great 
men to raise a child so I don't want to describe myself as a catalyst but as ... the 
means to the end .. if I was able to provide them what they needed that they couldn't 
provide for themselves then at that time I didn't think it was a problem .. however .. 
it's all changed .. I didn't think it was going to change. 
The question focuses on one word that has been used and asks Marlene to articulate 
how it positions her. She responds by telling a story of a shifting meaning. The word 
'catalyst' would have 'fitted' for her at one time but its meaning has shifted in 
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relation to developments in her life and it now has a strongly negative meaning. By 
negating it, she eludes being subjected by it and enters a subjective position in the 
story. A curious question has thus opened up a deconstructive inquiry into the 
evolution of her positioning in relation to a particular piece of discourse. She 
articulates a more agentic position for herself than would be possible if she remained 
in the position circumscribed by the word 'catalyst'. 
A parallel exchange then takes place with Dennis in response to Marlene's 
comments. Again, I ask a curious question that seeks to expand further the range of 
possible positions. The word 'catalyst' is now, in Bakhtin's terms, double-voiced. It 
carries forward both Dennis's original assertion and Marlene's negation. 
DENNIS: I used the term catalyst and it may sound cold but .. I came to the 
realisation that .. this relationship was not working (JOHN: Yes.) .. I trusted her .. 
we spent a lot of time together .. I .. I moved on .. I'm very happy in my relationship 
now .. I .. she is right when she says that we did have a strong friendship ... yes and I 
still value that friendship that's why I went to her instead of a person I didn't know I 
went to a person I did know and did trust and did believe in .. and she would assist 
me .. she would be a vehicle .. to bring in a child to .. our lives .. which is .. utterly 
impossible .. you know ... we didn't want to adopt .. that was the other option we 
explored but .... we wanted something more personal. 
JOHN: Can you help me understand how come you had such trust in .. this 
friendship .. this relationship that you were prepared to contemplate .. you know such 
a significant thing .. 
DENNIS: (overlapping) Well ... I cared about her ... trusted her loved her ... it's 
just the .. the intimacy wasn't working and .. that was my personal recognition .. of .. 
what was going on in my life .. she's intelligent, she's career-oriented ... she was a 
good .. a good candidate I guess. 
As a result of the use of deconstructive curiosity, this time the word 'catalyst' has 
developed a richer meaning in the context of a story of relationship. Dennis's story 
also breaks out of the narrow range of position calls that the word 'catalyst' at first 
suggested. He repositions himself in relation to his own earlier utterance and in 
response to Marlene's negation of her subjection by it. He offers her a different 
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position of greater subjectivity in a trusted friendship. However, the tug of the old 
discursive meaning reasserts itself, perhaps, in his final choice of an objectifying 
word like 'candidate'. 
One further example of the use of curiosity will suffice. This time the curious 
question occurs as part of the development of a new dimension of appreciation that 
stands in stark contrast with the original conflict story. 
DENNIS: I do understand that she's developed a bond .. an attachment .. that's 
wonderful. 
JOHN: That means something to you? 
DENNIS: Yes that means something to me. 
JOHN: Tell us tell us what it means. 
DENNIS: It means that she's developed an attachment, she .. encompassing love and 
uh ... 
JOHN: ls that something you see as goodfor Samuel? 
DENNIS: Yes I do .. that's wonderful .. I think that's great ... um .. (some 
conversation omitted) I want her to understand that I feel .. I feel that she has made 
an attachment and a bond with Samuel (JOHN: Yeah.) .. and .. I guess we're in a 
point .. we' re at a point where .. something' s gonna have to happen for us to move on 
.. because the original agreement no longer .. means anything. 
JOHN: Yeah .. you .. you've reached a .. an acceptance of that. 
DENNIS: Just within myself I don't .. I'm sure she's very aware of that as well. 
JOHN: Yes .. well she's been saying that to you hasn't she (DENNIS: Yes.) .. thatfor 
her that happened some time ago. 
DENNIS: Long time ago. 
JOHN: Yeah .. so you've reached that point .. of accepting that the original 
agreement isn't going to work any more. 
DENNIS: With reservation because I have .. in order to move forward .. in order to 
see my son .. I will have to compromise .. my .. my thoughts or my .. original idea or 
perception and so .. in order to see my son .. which I want to see my son I want to be 
with my son and in order for this to take place ... 
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Here, the statement that Dennis makes is explored by enquiring further into its 
meaning. As mediator, I am not offering an interpretation of his statement so much 
as issuing an invitation to him to step into the subjective position of interpreter of his 
own words. The interpretation he offers in response amounts to a significant 
relational shift in the context of the conflict. It is as if he cannot make meaning 
without shifting position in line with the meaning. In the process, the story of the 
original agreement is dismantled further as a new set of meanings begins to emerge. 
Externalising Conversation 
A particular rhetorical move in narrative conversation that assists the process 
of deconstruction is the development of an externalising conversation (White & 
Epston, 1992; Winslade & Monk, 2000). Externalising conversations reverse the 
common logic, in both popular and academic psychology, that focuses explanations 
for events inside the person. Externalising makes a grammatical and syntactical shift 
that emphasises the relational domain and the world of discourse as an origin for 
experience. As mediators externalise a conflict, they speak about it as if it were an 
external object, or a person, exerting an influence on the parties but not identified 
solely with either party. In the process, they introduce a way of speaking about the 
conflict that interrupts stories of blame and guilt, or accusation and defence, and 
opens the way for the disputing parties to begin to disidentify with the conflict itself. 
This way of talking promotes a clear separation between persons and problems and 
then invites persons into a re-evaluation of their positioning in a problematic story. 
For example, in the story being used as an illustration, I might have asked questions 
about how the dispute was the cause of difficulties between Dennis and Marlene, 
rather than about how Marlene and Dennis were the cause of the dispute. The dispute 
might then be spoken about as if it had designs on their lives, had desires to 
undermine their friendship, and had played tricks upon them both to convince them to 
speak its lines. In terms of positioning theory, the problem is constructed as issuing 
position calls upon which the parties are asked to decide where they stand. If they 
choose to resist the notional position call issued by the externalised problem, they are 
implicitly taking up positions in a different storyline. 
186 
When a mediator introduces an externalising conversation, parties often 
experience a sense of relief and a lightening of the heaviness of the problem. Blame 
and its counterparts, guilt and shame, are burdens that can best be thought of as 
hindrances to the task of finding a constructive way forward in conflict situations. 
The humanistic assumption that a way forward can be found by encouraging people 
to take responsibility for their part in producing the conflict fails, in my experience, to 
obviate this heaviness. By contrast, the lightening embodied in an externalising way 
of speaking can rapidly give the parties a different experience of the conflict they 
have been living with. The different way of speaking brings about a subtle shift in 
grammatical position in relation to a problem. From this position, things look 
different. And when things look different, the power and authority of habitual ways 
of thinking about a dispute are deconstructed. 
Let me now illustrate this process with reference to some examples of 
externalising drawn from the mediation conversation with Dennis and Marlene. A 
simple example from early in the conversation lies in my summary of what the parties 
have been telling me. 
JOHN: So is this right that at one point you both had .. or you both thought you had 
a similar understanding and that things have changed .. is that right .. that the 
understanding has disappeared between you at the moment. 
The origins of the changes that have happened are not ascribed to either party 
but to 'things' and 'the understanding' that has disappeared is spoken of as if it took 
itself off into the distance, rather than that either party stopped being willing to 
understand the other. Another example comes from an exchange with Marlene in 
which her change of mind about keeping the baby is spoken about in this way. 
JOHN: So that whole experience of going through carrying Samuel for those months 
kind of altered the whole situation for you? 
The origins of the change are spoken of in an impersonal way as produced by 
the experience of carrying the baby, rather than as a deliberate (malicious?) intent on 
Marlene's part. The temptation for Dennis to enter into an accusing description of the 
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change as originating in Marlene's lack of consistency or integrity is thereby pre-
empted. She is therefore not called into disputing this negative discursive position 
and can consider other options for the positions she wants to take up. 
DENNIS: ... but we really haven't really talked to it .. talked about it much .. you 
know we 're just kind of involved in Samuel's life and his wellbeing right now. 
JOHN: Does that .. I mean not talking about it .. does that fit with the history of your 
friendship? 
In this example, 'not-talking-about-it' becomes the externalised subject of the 
sentence and the question is framed to bring about a maximum contrast with the 
qualities of friendship for which they have previously expressed much value. It is 
also worth noting that the theory of restraint referred to above is deployed here. In 
the way this relation between competing stories is constructed, the friendship .story is 
granted priority and the problem story is discussed in terms of its fit. Thus the 
problem story is constructed as restraining the more important story of the valued 
relationship. But the story of valued relationship becomes the one in relation to 
which the parties are asked to position themselves. This is the opposite of what 
usually happens in problem-solving rhetoric, where the problem to be solved is 
placed in centre stage and the story of change emerges slowly in response to the 
process of brainstorming options and negotiating an agreement. 
A further example shows the development of an externalising conversation 
over a series of exchanges. In this instance 'resentment' is used for a brief period as 
the externalised problem. Externalising allows me as a mediator both to acknowledge 
the emotional experience and, at the same time, to speak in a way that assists with a 
process of disidentification with the story in which the feeling of resentment features. 
DENNIS: ... I want the child with me ... that was what we discussed .. and I guess 
also I'm building resentment .. there is a sense of resentment because I just feel like 
I've been thrown .. and now she's telling me that you know we've .. she's turning it 
upside down like I feel like I've been thrown .. now she wants .. you know the baby's 
been with her for four months .. all the time .. she's also taken a little time off her 
work is allowing her to be home so she's with the child a lot now and I'm only 
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allowed to come and visit him and that is not what I assumed this was going to be 
that's not what we discussed and that's not what I want I don't wanta just go visit 
him .. 
JOHN: OK so resentment has entered into the picture .. right? 
DENNIS: Yes. 
JOHN: And tell me about the effect of that like what effect has resentment had for 
you for the relationship 
DENNIS: It's just ... I want .. I want action (JOHN:Yeah.) I want the child .. I really 
don't want to hear what she has to say ( MARLENE: exactly) .. I really don't want to 
talk to her now .. I want to take the child and start our lives and .. and move on. 
JOHN: So it's like resentment has really got in the way of you wanting to hear what 
she's got to say. 
DENNIS: Yes .. in essence. 
JOHN: And you were saying Marlene that you've tried to speak to him .. 
MARLENE: I've been telling him this for a while now but he doesn't want to hear it 
JOHN: OK .. It's like .. because .. what you're saying is resentment has even stopped 
you hearing these things .. whatever she's got to say. 
DENNIS: Yes .. now it is .. (JOHN: Right.) and I'm just .. 
JOHN: (interrupting) and it's taken .. I mean has it also had an effect on your 
relationship? I mean the friendship that you described .. it sounds like a remarkable 
friendship .. a wonderful friendship .. over many many years and through some 
transitions and stuff like that .. is resentment somehow (DENNIS: Yes) undermining 
that? 
DENNIS: Yes I think it is. 
JOHN: (to Marlene) Would you .. how would you say it? .. would it be the same? 
MARLENE: I don't even see a friendship right now. 
JOHN: You don't even see one .. so resentment even blocks the .. even the vision of 
that ..... and yet .. I mean .. I've heard you say that ... if .. in some way resentment 
was not to be there and maybe some other things that are in the way I don't know .. 
you would want to keep the friendship .. that you still value it. 
This is also an example of asking some 'relative influence' questions (White, 
1989; Winslade & Monk, 2000). Once resentment has been externalised, the 
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separation of the problem from the person is maintained by asking some questions 
about its influence on both parties. Thus, resentment is constructed as a character in 
the scenario, rather than as an essential aspect of Dennis. It has played a role but it is 
a position in a storyline and is not fixed to some inner truth about Dennis. If it is not 
essential, then it follows that a different response and a different basis for interaction 
can be constructed. 
In this next example, the emotion of sadness, another internalised 
representation of the conflict story, becomes the externalised problematic element. It 
is nominalised and objectified and thereby removed from being essential. 
JOHN: (to Marlene) What .. do you see .. how do you see the relationship 
developing between Dennis and Samuel .. what do you notice that's happening? 
MARLENE: I don't know .. he looks sad whenever he's with Samuel because he 
can't have him .. (JOHN: I see.) so I really don't know .. I mean Samuel's a happy 
baby so .. I think .. I know Samuel is happy to have two people .. two additional 
people .. who love him but he looks sad .. so I haven't been really able to see that 
bond .. I mean he's happy holding the child but .. 
JOHN: So sadness is almost interfering with the development of that relationship in 
the way that you would hope that it would develop .. is that right? 
MARLENE: Mhmm .. (inaudible) 
JOHN: If sadness wasn't there so much what would you be hoping to see developing 
in the relationship between Dennis and Samuel? 
MARLENE: That he's there .. that he helps Samuel develop and grow. 
This use of externalising comes late in the development of a counter story and 
the 'sadness' by this time refers back to a previous state of affairs when the problem 
story held more sway. It is clearly a restraint on what by this time is a fledgling story 
of alternative to the conflict story. In order for this story to fly, it needs to be free of 
such restraints. My concern therefore was not to encourage either party to dwell in 
the existence of this sadness, but rather to acknowledge it as a restraint and to focus 
the conversation more on a continued development of what it was restraining. The 
subjective positioning offered to Dennis and Marlene is the agentic one of actively 
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developing a relationship with Samuel in contrast to the subjected positioning of them 
that 'sadness' is offering. 
Restorying Practices 
Let us tum now to the practices associated with the construction of a counter-
story to the conflict-saturated story. As argued above, the process of deconstruction 
contributes to the opening of space for such a story but there is a more deliberate 
effort needed to foster the development of a coherent and viable story that can be 
embodied in a performance of meaning. The next section addresses this task by 
specifying, describing and illustrating a series of methods for finding the openings to 
a counter-story and of developing something out of these openings. 
Articulating Hope 
It is common in a problem-solving approach for the first task of mediation to 
be about defining the problem that needs to be solved. In my own practice, I have 
found that this sometimes lends more weight to the problem than is necessary. It is 
established in the place of importance from the outset. My aim in mediation is to 
create the relational conditions in which an alternative story to the conflict story can 
flourish. Therefore, I often seek to open this story from the very start. I make the 
assumption that people have agreed to a mediation process with some hope of 
something better than the conflict story. Even when they harbour serious doubts 
about the intentions of the other, they still have hope that the mediation process will 
bring about some relief from the discomfort of conflict. This hope can be the opening 
to a story of cooperation and respect. Therefore I often solicit its expression at the 
start of a mediation conversation. 
The basic question that can be asked is about what each party hopes will come 
from the mediation. Note that it is not about each party's individual wants or needs. 
I am not just asking what each party hopes they will get for themselves. The question 
invites forward a hope for the relationship in the context of the mediation. Let me 
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illustrate this approach with an extract from the beginning of the mediation 
conversation that we are using in this chapter. 
JOHN: I guess .. I'd be interested in .. in starting by asking each of you what your 
hope would be for what would come from this meeting? ..... . 
MARLENE: My hope is ... that my son Samuel ... have ... it's important to me that 
my son Samuel have a mother and stay with his mother ... a constant ... mother in his 
life .. and .. I'm not trying to take Samuel away from his father .. however .. 
JOHN: So your hope (writing) is that Samuel .. have a constant .. mother in his life. 
MARLENE: Mhmm ... By constant I mean ... primary role in his life. 
JOHN: Primary role .. that's what constant would mean to you? (MARLENE: 
Mhmm.) Okay ... anything else that would be your hope for this meeting? 
MARLENE: ...... I think Dennis is a wonderful person and will be a wonderful fa .. . 
and is .. and is going to make a wonderful father and I'm not trying to take that away 
from him .. however I do want Dennis to understand that Samuel is .. half mine. 
JOHN: So you 're wanting something for Dennis here as well .. (MARLENE: Yes) 
right? 
MARLENE: Yes. 
JOHN: You're wanting some understandings here about .. Dennis's role in Samuel's 
life? 
MARLENE: Mhmm. 
JOHN: Is that right? Have I (MARLENE: Yes.) caught that? 
MARLENE: Clarity as to what his role will be in Samuel's life. 
JOHN: OK .. so clarity would be an important hope that you would get from this 
conversation .. that clarity would increase? (MARLENE:Mhmm.) ... anything else? 
... is that enough for the moment or .. ? 
MARLENE: Yeah, my thoughts are real ... (grimaces). 
JOHN: OK. .. (turns to Dennis) What about you Dennis? What .. what would you 
hope would come from this meeting? 
DENNIS: Well .. in the beginning we had a .. a verbal agreement that she was going 
to be the catalyst to bringing Samuel into our lives .. me and Mario's lives .. and ... 
shortly after .. giving birth to Samuel .. the agreement .. there was no longer an 
agreement .. size wanted to keep the child .. and I had hoped that it would be my child 
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and me and Mario would be the primary caregivers of Samuel. (JOHN: OK.) so 
today ... 
JOHN: What's your hope for today? 
DENNIS: I hope to .... kind of find my role. 
JOHN: Find my role. 
DENNIS: Find a role that works for myself .. Mario .. Marlene 
JOHN: And Mario is your partner? 
DENNIS: Yeah .. he's my partner. 
JOHN: ..... Sorry .. continue .. I interrupted you just to clarify that there. 
DENNIS: Oh yeah .. just .. like a role for myself, Mario and as well as Marlene .. that 
best ... that will provide the best for Samuel's life. 
JOHN: OK .. So it's like a conversation you're hoping will be one that has this kind 
of discovery in it that you would find this .. this role and that you would work out what 
these roles are for each of you? 
Since we are talking about hopes here, rather than about embodied realities, 
no commitment is being asked as yet of either party. However, each is invited from 
the start into a subjective position in the mediation conversation. Each also gets to 
hear the other express their best intentions from the start. In these best intentions is 
likely to be expressed the spirit of the relational goals for the mediation. The tone of 
the conversation is set and any problems that later get defined can be understood as 
restraints on the materialisation of these hopes. Materialising these hopes becomes 
the prime focus of the conversation, rather than resolving the problem. My aim as a 
mediator is to help them define their relationship more in relation to these hopes than 
in relation to the problem. The problem becomes more of an annoying obstacle to the 
development of these hopes, rather than something to be resolved before hope can be 
expressed. This framing move pre-figures the process of objectifying the problem in 
an externalising construction. It also amounts to a position call from the mediator. I 
am calling them into positions in a particular story of this conversation. It is not a 
neutral position, since it clearly privileges story elements and discursive positioning 
that accords with their hopeful intentions, rather than with their positions in a 
problem story. 
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Both Marlene and Dennis, however, do make reference to their positions in 
the conflict story. Marlene refers to her own desire for Samuel to stay with her and 
Dennis speaks of his desire for the original agreement to hold and for Marlene to 
hand Samuel over to him. However, my questions invite them to envision hope for 
the relationship as well as for themselves and they each respond to that too. Marlene 
has hopes that include clarification of Dennis's role and Dennis hopes for a discovery 
in conversation with Marlene of sustainable roles for himself, Marlene and Mario. 
As I review this exchange, I can see a piece of Marlene's expressed hope that 
I did not pick up on at the time and could have done so. She says that she wants 
some understanding from Dennis about her feelings about Samuel. Increased 
understanding could have been emphasised more as a legitimate goal for the 
conversation. This piece of conversation has nevertheless done enough to establish a 
position from which the conflict story will eventually be viewed. In the process, the 
conflict story takes on a different perspective. Its authority is deconstructed a little. 
What is needed next is for the story of hope to be kept alive through linking it to other 
story elements. 
Recovering Unstoried Experience 
We can expect the story of a conflict to be constructed within a narrow range 
of discourse and with enough coherence about it to have fueled and sustained the 
relational conflagration. However, narrative theory suggests that no story has a 
mortgage on possible truths and no story will ever be large enough to include all 
possible story elements. Any account of events has to be selective and therefore has 
to leave some things out. It is likely that a conflict story will omit elements that are 
illustrative of themes of cooperation, mutual understanding or respect, in favour of 
the relational events that spotlight the conflict. It is likely too that it will position 
parties as combatants rather than as partners in a shared enterprise. 
The advantage of this perspective for a narrative mediator is that the narrative 
logic can be reversed. If we are alert to the possibilities of story elements that 
contradict the conflict story or are left out of it, we can seek to make of these 'unique 
outcomes' (White & Epston 1990; Winslade & Monk, 2000), or exceptions, an entry 
point into a new story. Once we start to look for these exceptions to the dominance 
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of a conflict story, we can notice always an abundance of them within a relational 
context. They exist in even the most feeble attempts to fight back against the 
dominance of a conflict story. They exist as we have seen in the hopes that 
participants bring with them into a mediation. They exist in parties' side comments 
that are often quickly glossed over in favour of a return to the dominant story. They 
exist in relational moments that are not predictable from the perspective of the 
conflict story or not consistent with its trajectory. They exist in shared 
understandings, or small agreements about what has happened, or moments of 
cooperation, the potential significance of which lies neglected in the shadow of the 
things about which disagreements exist. They exist in sometimes unspoken desires to 
address the issues raised by the other in a fair way or in a willingness to offer 
compromises in return for peace. They exist in small acts of resistance to the 
dominance of a dominating discourse. 
The mediator's task in relation to these unique outcomes is to highlight them 
and to invite parties to take up positions in relation to them. In the process, the 
mediator can help the parties weave them into a viable story through connecting them 
with each other. The purpose of this deliberate positioning to develop a counter-story 
of dialogue, cooperation and agreement. This counter-story can be assembled through 
finding unique outcomes, marshalling a series of plot elements, naming it as a project, 
inviting parties to step into its characterisations, and enhancing its significance 
through identifying its themes. Inquiry into its history can enhance its validity, 
inquiry into its current existence can reveal its important components and an inquiry 
into its future trajectory can generate hope in its viability. In other words, the 
mediator's task is to help the parties to develop in this counter-story the narrative 
coherence that Cobb (1994) described. A narrative method seeks to achieve all this 
through the asking of questions that are generative of such a counter-story. Let us 
return to our illustrative mediation conversation for some examples of this work in 
practice. 
The conversation has made reference to the transition Dennis and Marlene 
made from being married to being separated, to being good friends, and later to 
agreeing to have a baby. Under the influence of the conflict story that threatens their 
friendship, this history is being put to one side. In that sense, it is losing its place in 
the history of their relationship, which is being steadily taken over by the story of 
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disagreement. In every utterance, Dennis and Marlene are positioning themselves in 
a story of relationship that is increasingly relegating concepts like friendship to the 
background. My assumption is, however, that this story of friendship, if recovered, 
might provide some basis for working through this new challenge in a spirit of 
cooperation. It might open up possibilities for re-positioning. I therefore expressed 
curiosity about this history. 
JOHN: Can I ask does it say something about your .. relationship as it has developed 
since you have been living separately and Dennis has been involved with Mario ... 
I'm talking about that you were willing to make this agreement to start with 
MARLENE: I guess it remained strong ... 
JOHN: It remained strong. 
MARLENE: We were able to keep that friendship that we had going into our 
marriage (JOHN: Right.) and ... even though the marriage didn't work out he .. 
found .. someone else in his life .. that friendship was still there. 
JOHN: Is that friendship .. important to you? (MARLENE: Yeah.) Sounds like it is. 
MARLENE: Yeah .. yes and I mean ... I want to keep that friendship .. I do want to 
keep that friendship however .. I do want to keep Samuel as well. 
Marlene's last comment in this exchange is indicative of the existence of 
competing stories. They are hinged in this sentence on the word 'however'. The 
major part of this exchange, though, stories the relationship between Dennis and 
Marlene as remarkably strong. This description does not fit with the story that they 
are not able to talk to each other about a sensitive issue, because it speaks of 
occasions when they have done this in the past. 
In the next example, the unique outcome happens in the immediacy of the 
present rather than in the history of their relationship. It arises when I hear Marlene 
accusing Dennis of not hearing or listening to her, something that he agrees that he 
has been reluctant to do. However, her story of him not listening to her is referenced 
to past occasions and was linked to the conflict story. I suspected it may well be 
different in the immediate moment and wanted to give Dennis a specific invitation to 
demonstrate that he could listen to what was important to her. Such a demonstration 
would not be predicted by the conflict story. Hence, if he took up the invitation we 
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might have a relational experience for both parties that could take its place in the 
counter story that was being assembled. 
MARLENE: .. I don't want to be ignored any more .. and I want you to start hearing 
me .. and you' re not hearing me .. you 're not hearing the fact that I didn't know that 
these nine months were going to change my life so much .. and I didn't know that the 
past four months were going to change my life even more so .. and I don't think you 
want to hear that you don't want to hear the fact that there was an attachment made. 
JOHN: Can I just interrupt you for a second because you 're you 're saying he 
doesn't want to hear that .. and he's sitting here listening to you say that and I'm 
wondering whether we can.find out perhaps what he is hearing .. I mean because 
you 're stating that he's not hearing and I'm wondering whether we can ask him .. is 
that OK? 
MARLENE: Mm. 
JOHN: (to Dennis) Do you want to respond to that because .. Marlene's saying that 
the last few months have made a difference and .. you know I'm wondering as you 
spoke about before that you wanted to be .. you valued this friendship .. whether, you 
know, in the .. in the spirit of that friendship how do you hear what she's saying? 
DENNIS: ..... I do understand that she's developed a bond .. an attachment .. that's 
wonderful. 
JOHN: That means something to you? 
DENNIS: Yes that means something to me. 
JOHN: Tell us tell us what it means. 
DENNIS: It means that she's developed an attachment, she .. encompassing love and 
uh ... 
JOHN: Is that something you see as good for Samuel? 
DENNIS: Yes I do .. that's wonderful .. I think that's great ... um .. 
JOHN: Can you just pause therefor a second .. (DENNIS: Yeah.) you might want to 
think about what else you want to say. 
DENNIS: Yes I'm .. need to think about what .. 
JOHN: (to Marlene) You were saying you don't think he's hearing that .. I mean you 
know he's saying something now .. what are you hearing him say right this minute? 
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MARLENE: I hear him saying at this minute that he understands that I have a bond I 
have developed a bond with the child. 
JOHN: OK .. is that good for you to hear? 
MARLENE: ..... Part of me doesn't believe how .. part of me doesn't think he realises 
how deep that bond is. 
JOHN: So .. you've got some reservations about whether .. (MARLENE: Mmm.) .. 
yeah .. those reservations taken into account is it still a good thing to hear? 
MARLENE: Mhmm. 
JOHN: Right .. what difference do you think it might make .. to hear that. 
MARLENE: In my decisions? 
JOHN: Well not in any decisions just in terms of your .. ' cause I mean before you 
were .. you expressed some strong concerns which I thought were really important 
about .. that he wasn't hearing what's important to you .. hasn't been hearing .. 
right? .. do you hear him starting to hear? 
MARLENE: Mhmm. 
JOHN: You've still got reservations I know but you hear him starting to hear .. is that 
important for you that he does? 
MARLENE: Mhmm. 
JOHN: So I'm wondering what does that open up .. in terms of possibilities .. or .. 
conversation between you about these things .. if you can hear each other on these 
issues? 
MARLENE: For me it's important that he .. continues to hear my thoughts and 
understand my thoughts .. and understands my feelings .. and not so much take into 
account the original agreement ( JOHN: OK.) cause since then things have changed. 
JOHN: OK and if he can do that .. what does that open up that you can offer back to 
him? 
MARLENE: Begin to work on something that will be beneficial for both he and I and 
Samuel. 
There are several aspects of this pivotal exchange in this conversation that I 
want to draw attention to. First, I was careful in asking Dennis to speak about how he 
was hearing Marlene to reference the 'spirit of friendship' that he had already spoken 
about as something that he valued. This was an effort to create the maximum 
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possible opportunity for his response to be positioned in relation to the counter-story, 
rather than in relation to the conflict story. 
Secondly, the influence of the conflict story can still be heard as this unique 
outcome is being constructed. Dennis struggles to say things that indicate that he is 
hearing Marlene (and at the same time granting credence to her position). No doubt 
he is feeling the internal tug of the conflict story as he speaks. Marlene also struggles 
to hear his words and give them credence. She has reservations about whether she 
can trust his words. She is tempted to listen to the conflict story and dismiss his 
efforts as insignificant. 
Thirdly, my own efforts at this delicate moment are purposefully directed. 
Some who have viewed this tape would even say I was being 'directive'. But my 
purpose is to take an active role here in the construction of a different set of 
discursive positions for both of them. By this time, I did believe that it was 
necessary, in order for them to be able to work together as parents, for Dennis to 
accept that things had changed for Marlene, not out of any manipulative intent, but as 
an outgrowth of the commitment she had made in the original agreement. I did also 
believe that it was necessary for them to reach an understanding that did not position 
Marlene as a wrongdoer, having to eat humble pie and in Dennis's debt. Such a 
relation, I assumed, would not produce power between them in ways that would be in 
theirs or Samuel's best interests. Nor did I believe that it would be in the best 
interests of the relationship preferences that they had stated if Dennis was to continue 
to be storied as not listening by Marlene. Therefore, I was deliberate in asking a 
series of small questions, some of them closed questions, each of which was designed 
to invite them a small step further into the construction of a story of listening, 
understanding and appreciation of each other and into wondering about the possible 
futures that such a story might have in store. I was active in the process of co-
authoring this relational shift because without my involvement I believe it would be 
likely that the possibilities in this moment may well have been swamped by the 
conflict story. I would defend my active involvement by saying that I was careful 
throughout to check that each move was in accord with what the parties wanted and I 
believed that I was acting on behalf of the original statements of hope that they had 
made. 
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Fourthly, the exchange illustrates the mileage that can be gained in story 
development through the use of the concepts of 'landscape of action' and 'landscape 
of meaning' (Bruner, 1986; White 1992; Winslade & Monk, 2000). The landscape 
of action is the plane on which plot events take place. It is the plane of actions, 
behaviours and practices. The landscape of meaning is the plane of interpretation 
where human beings dwell on, think about, reach conclusions about and react against, 
plot events. I am not claiming a essential structural boundary for this distinction. 
Thoughts and interpretations can be plot events and actions are embodiments of 
meaning and both are shaped by the dominant discourses of the social worlds in 
which they live. It is simply a useful construct that allows for the shaping of 
questions that grow a story. Several times in a row in this exchange, I identified a 
moment of plot development (that is, an event on the landscape of action) for the 
counter-story and sought to increase the significance of this moment by asking 
questions about the meaning of it (that is, issued an invitation to interpretation on the 
landscape of meaning). I asked Dennis to make meaning of and take a position on his 
statement that he has understood Marlene's development of an attachment with 
Samuel. Then I asked Marlene a series of questions about how she has heard 
Dennis' s response and about the significance of that for her. Building a relational 
story in mediation involves doing a lot of this kind of weaving back and forth 
between the landscapes of action and meaning and also between the two parties. 
Everything that one person says positions the other. It can also be a plot event that 
the other person can be invited to position herself or himself in relation to. 
Continuing to ask questions in this vein begins a conversation in a deliberate 
direction, that is, in the direction of the counter-plot. 
Building Momentum For The New Story 
As unique outcomes such as those in the examples given above are found or 
constructed in the moment, they need to be built into a story that has a compelling 
enough storyline, and is plausible enough, to have a chance of surviving after the 
mediation session has ended. Some commitment to it needs to be demonstrated by 
the participants in the mediation. The identification of unique outcomes can be said 
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to open space for the development of a new story but in order for a clearing to 
become a pathway out of a dispute the story needs to be well-enough formed to carry 
the weight of each of the parties' hopes for something different. It needs to develop 
the qualities of a good story. So what are these qualities? 
A good story needs a storyline that is coherent and is more than a chance 
collocation of events. Events that are separated by time need to be not just strung 
together but stuck fast with the glue of human intentions and emotions and with 
thematic consistency. A narrative trajectory needs to be established and current 
developments need to be linked both to the antecedents that foreshadowed their 
evolution and to the possible futures that they predict. The protagonists in this story 
need to have a sense of character development in a direction that is pleasing and not 
diminishing for them. In mediation, this means that both parties need to have a sense 
of meeting a heroic challenge for which they are respected by the mediator. In the 
process, the relationship between the parties should involve the performance of 
meaning (Bruner, 1986) around some key themes that serve as adequate 
counterpoints to the themes of the conflict story. For example, in the conversational 
exchange above, the conflict story featured the theme of not listening or 
understanding. The counter-story therefore needed to build on moments of listening 
and understanding by way of contrast and to develop these concepts as thematic 
elements around which future practices could be organised. 
Focussing on the qualities of a good story in the process of generating 
momentum for the counter-plot distinguishes narrative mediation from other 
approaches to mediation. Rather than an instrumental focus on solving problems and 
reaching settlements, narrative mediation proposes a focus on constructing a new 
storyline. This is achieved by progressively storying the relational context in ways 
that are incompatible with the continuation of the dispute and are favourable to the 
development of agreements, mutual understanding and cooperation. The emphasis is 
on creating the relational context out of which agreements might be formed rather 
than on reaching agreements which can serve as the basis of ongoing relationship. 
Often in this process, there is not just one final agreement but many small agreements 
along the way, sometimes but not always leading up to the signing of a formal 
agreement. Often, a dispute starts to dissolve rather than be resolved as the discursive 
conditions that have supported the conflict are weakened. If, however, a formal 
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agreement is signed, this signing is not thought of as the culmination of the story. It 
is, rather, a significant plot event that embodies a relational theme that will hopefully 
continue to be expressed in ongoing plot developments after the mediation has 
concluded. If a review meeting is held some time after the mediation, it can focus not 
just on how the signed agreement has been implemented but also on weaving into the 
developing story any new plot events that can be discovered. 
It is time to look at this story-building work in practice. The first example 
follows a little after the exchange immediately above where Dennis made some 
moves to demonstrate his understanding of what Marlene has gone through. Here the 
current relationship developments are storied against the background of the friendship 
that the parties have maintained after their separation. 
JOHN: ... I'm still .. affected by both of you and what you said about describing your 
friendship and this .. you know .. would you forgive me if I said it was a remarkable 
friendship an original one that you've had over a number of years through different 
things (MARLENE: Mhmm.) (DENNIS: Yeah.) ... and I'm imagining that in order to 
keep that through those things .. you've had to be creative about how you've created 
the terms of your friendship .... Is that right? I mean you haven't done things just 
how everybody else does them ... (MARLENE: Mhmm.) is that right? (MARLENE: 
Yeah.) .. is that something you're proud of? 
MARLENE: I'm proud that we were srill able to remain friends even after (JOHN: 
Yeah.) .. our separation. 
JOHN: Yeah that's something of really great significance .. is that right? 
( MARLENE: Mhmm.) .. is that something you' re proud of too .. that you were able to 
do that? 
DENNIS: Yeah ... I mean .. I don't know about proud .. I don't know about proud. 
JOHN: Is that .. would you choose a different word? 
DENNIS: It's like we made it (JOHN: Yeah.) .. accomplished something that doesn't 
usually happen .. with the circumstances it was trying .. it was a difficult time for both 
of us and ... we made it through. 
JOHN: See .. I guess what I'm getting at by asking about that is .. I'm wondering 
whether you 're at another point where you 're having to do that again .. where you 're 
having to somehow find your own way through and not .. you know the normal 
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patterns of how everybody does this or how .. conventional ways of doing this in 
society .. they' re not going to work for you you' re actually gonna have to work your 
own way through. 
MARLENE: We 're definitely not conventional. 
JOHN: Right and ... and you 're going to have to find a pattern of parenthood that 
isn't just conventional because of the situation you 're in and the relationship you 're 
in and because of Samuel's needs for his parents. 
MARLENE: And I'm willing to do that with Dennis .. all I ever wanted was for 
Dennis to hear .. and to understand the way I was feeling and .. he was so stuck on 
the original agreement that (JOHN: OK) .. he wasn't willing to know and knowing 
now that he can hear it (JOHN: Yeah.) or .. with reservation I think were his words 
(JOHN: Yeah .. yeah.) .. but it may .. it is going to move forward as long as him and 
Mario and Mario's not here so we can't speak for him as well and he was part of this 
(JOHN: Yes.) .. but .. for them both to understand that I am a part of this child's life 
and I don't want not to be a part of this child's life as another role .. I want to be 
recognised for the role that I am .. his mother .. from the beginning. 
JOHN: (to Dennis) How does that sound to you to hear that? 
DENNIS: ...... It sounds like ... it will allow us to move forward .. and that's what 
I'm thinking about now .. I .. put the .. original agreement ... somewhere .. and I'm 
thinking of Samuel's wellbeing (JOHN: Yes.) .. and I believe it is important ... yes I 
might know .. I might not be able to experience that bond I didn't carry the child for 
nine months but .. I .. I'm listening now .. before I wasn't listening. 
This exchange builds on the deconstructive work done earlier in which the 
authority of the dominant discourses at work in the production of conventional 
patterns of parenting after divorce was loosened. In this discursive domain, despite 
the development of many alternative discourses, conventional legal discourse still 
promotes the story of one parent 'winning' custody off the other one (while children 
are positioned as chattels). In order to establish a parenting arrangement that departs 
from the conventional it is often necessary to articulate this departure and this is what 
I believe is taking place here. The precise details of the parenting arrangement that 
Dennis and Marlene will reach are not yet clear. However, the relational conditions 
necessary for negotiating such an arrangement in a respectful and mutually satisfying 
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way are being cemented in place. They are also being located in a narrative history in 
the relationship between these two, a history about which they both get to hear each 
other make statements of positive evaluation. At the end of this exchange, both 
parties are looking forward and making distinctions between how they were 
positioned in the conflict story and how they are positioning themselves now. When 
such repositioning statements are being made in a mediation, I am confident that the 
way is clear to invite the parties to join in a process of brainstorming and negotiation 
similar to what might be expected in a problem-solving mediation. This will go 
much more quickly and smoothly once a favourable relational context for it to do so 
has been established. 
At this point, I asked a question that began a new exchange that focussed on 
the development of the story of Dennis's bond with Samuel. It seemed to me that a 
recognition by both parties of the importance of Marlene's attachment with her son 
was in place. What the parenting arrangement they were considering needed now 
was for the story of Dennis's relationship with his son to grow. My assumption was 
that this would benefit the story of cooperation between them. 
JOHN: Can you experience a bond with Samuel when you see him now when you're 
with him? .. is that growing? 
DENNIS: Yeah. 
MARLENE: It looks it .. I do. 
JOHN: Does he? 
DENNIS: That's good. 
JOHN: (to Marlene) What .. do you see .. how do you see the relationship 
developing between Dennis and Samuel .. what do you notice that's happening? 
MARLENE: I don't know .. he looks sad whenever he's with Samuel because he 
can't have him .. (JOHN: I see.) so I really don't know .. I mean Samuel's a happy 
baby so .. I think .. I know Samuel is happy to have two people .. two additional 
people .. who love him but he looks sad .. so I haven't been really able to see that 
bond .. I mean he's happy holding the child but .. 
JOHN: So sadness is almost interfering with the development of that relationship in 
the way that you would hope that it would develop .. is that right? 
MARLENE: Mhmm .. (inaudible) 
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JOHN: If sadness wasn't there so much what would you be hoping to see developing 
in the relationship between Dennis and Samuel? 
MARLENE: That he's there .. that he helps Samuel develop and grow. 
JOHN: That he's there . that he helps .. helps with what do you mean? 
MARLENE: With his development .. and his upbringing. 
JOHN: So you want him to have a big role .. right? .. not just a distant .. 
( MARLENE: No.) family friend role. 
MARLENE: No .. he is Dad .. that's all I want. 
JOHN: (to Dennis.) ls that .. is what Marlene's saying .. sounding like .. something 
closer to the role that you'd like to play? 
DENNIS: Yes .. I want to be there .. I want to be his father .. I want to do those things 
with him .. but I don't want to have to .. beg or .. get her approval .. you know it's my 
son and .. I want to be there. 
JOHN: So you want to .. sorry .. let me get this clear .. you want . you don't want to 
beg .. you don't want to be asking Marlene's permission to be his father ( DENNIS: 
Yeah .. exactly.) .. to be Samuel's father .. is that right? (DENNIS: Mhmm.) ... So 
what would that be like .. can you .. can you help flesh that out a little bit? 
DENNIS: I would like to pick him up and take him and have him stay with me and do 
those types of things I don't want just to swing by and visit him for two hours and oh 
he has to eat and oh he has to do something so now you guys have to leave and .. 
JOHN: You want to not be a visitor .. is that right? 
DENNIS: Yeah .. not a visitor .. I want to be in his life. 
JOHN: You want to be .. (DENNIS: daily life .. ) responsible for him in some ways. 
DENNIS: Yes .. provide for him 
JOHN: Provide for him. 
DENNIS: Do all the things Dad's do .. or loving parents do I should say 
JOHN: OK .. How's that description of the kind of role that .. Dennis would want to 
play as a father .. how's that sounding to you? 
MARLENE: That sounds fine and I never .. erased the role of him being a father .. I 
never erased the role of him having a major part of Samuel's life and raising Samuel 
with Mario .. I just .. I guess I have been trying to define my role now. 
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It is interesting that Marlene is prepared to take the lead in storying Dennis's 
relationship with Samuel. It conveys a message that she supports and welcomes his 
active involvement as a parent and also Mario's. With this support articulated, 
Dennis is able to build on this platform and begin to articulate small details of his 
envisaged role as a parent. He is enthusiastic in his rejection of the discursive 
position of 'visitor' but there is still much that needs to be 'fleshed out'. As he starts 
to flesh it out, he struggles to describe what he envisages. In the process, he is pulled 
by dominant discourse into speaking of his role as a 'provider' but then a few seconds 
later departs from gender-specific parenting discourse by choosing the word 'loving 
parent' to describe himself rather than 'Dad'. Each of these pieces of conversation 
builds the growing story of cooperation between them. This story is developing into 
something that is by now reasonably robust even though nothing has been settled yet. 
One further example of an exchange that builds the momentum of this story will 
suffice. This example features the offer of an apology that is aimed at repairing 
damage done by the conflict story. 
MARLENE: I am .. I am sorry that I hurt you .. because I've seen the sadness in your 
eyes ( JOHN: Yes.) .. and I don't want this to interfere in our friendship .. but I've 
been hurting also because you haven't seen my side .. and you haven't been able to 
recognise a mother and a child bonding because you were so stuck on well .. he's 
going to have me and Mario and that's it 
DENNIS: Well along those lines it's not only difficult for me and I can't speak for 
Mario but it's going to be difficult for him as well .. I mean this was like something 
we were doing .. you know and .. yes to make it more accommodating we 're going to 
have to modify some stuff .. it's not the conventional family or what have you .. 
JOHN: When Marlene says that she feels sorry that she hurt you .. how does that 
affect you? 
DENNIS: I think she is .. I think that .. (JOHN: You believe that?) after the eleven 
months she really is sorry because I think she really knows .. that she did something 
differently that wasn't supposed to happen and this is such an important .. it's a life 
it's not .. 
JOHN: Does it help you that she says that? 
DENNIS: Yes it does. 
206 
JOHN: Is it helpful in the kind of partnership that you need to have to share 
parenting Samuel? 
DENNIS: Yes. 
JOHN: And does it help you that Dennis has heard what was important for you that 
you felt like he wasn't hearing for so long? 
MARLENE: Mhmm .. in a way . . I'm not trying to say .. the roles have reversed in 
the sense of I've changed my mind now .. whereas he changed his mind in the past on 
our relationship .. now I'm changing my mind as far as .. I didn't realise what I was 
doing what I was going through .. and it is very important that he now .. somewhat 
hears that .. or he now .. I don't know .. I still don't know as to what level he 
understands it .. really hears it .. but he has made .. he has acknowledged that he has 
heard it .. so that makes me feel .. back in the picture. 
This apology from Marlene, which she volunteered unsolicited, is another 
unique outcome. Apologies do not fit with the development of a conflict story but 
with an emerging counter-story. The rest of this exchange amounts to an elaboration 
of the significance of the apology. My working assumption is that an apology is not 
the end of a story but the opening to a new chapter. In some discursive contexts, 
apologies are expected to be the last word in a conflict. In others, they are viewed 
suspiciously as empty words not to be trusted. I prefer to think of apologies as 
windows opening to a story development. The new development may not always 
advance itself however. Questions need to be asked to elaborate its significance. 
What matters is not the words of the apology so much as the performance of meaning 
that follows those words. This again is what the mediator has to focus on in building 
the momentum of the new story. 
Concluding Remarks 
There is more that can be said to articulate a narrative practice in mediation 
but this is not the place for an exhaustive survey of practices that can be included in 
this rubric. Along with Gerald Monk I have surveyed this field more fully elsewhere 
(Winslade & Monk, 2000). What I have included here is sufficient to represent that 
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practice within the context of a study that has a slightly different scope. My purpose 
in this chapter has been to articulate a practice in enough detail so that it can be 
recognised and replicated. This is a relatively new practice that, apart from our 
writings, has not been extensively written or practised in the field of mediation 
(although it has gathered to itself a robust history and literature in the field of family 
therapy). Therefore a reasonably thorough expounding of this practice has been 
necessary before the asking of what might be considered some research questions 
about this practice. I shall move next to ask these questions about the effectiveness of 
an example of narrative mediation. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Discourse Analysis of a Narrative Mediation Conversation 
This chapter will engage with the transcribed text of a particular narrative 
mediation conversation and present an analysis of this conversation based on the 
questions outlined in Chapter Four in the critical discourse analysis tradition. The 
conversation to be used is a role-played mediation scenario. It does not represent a 
whole mediation process but rather a segment of a joint meeting between a mediator 
and the two parties to this family mediation. I shall present the scenario that the role-
players were given to work with and outline briefly the instructions they were given 
and the process by which the role-play was set up. Then I shall present a slightly 
edited transcript of the mediation conversation interlaced with some commentary that 
begins the analytical account of what happens. I want readers to have the chance to 
get a feel for the whole conversation in this way as well as to see the process of 
analysis being developed. Then, in Chapter Eight, I shall return to develop some 
analytical categories drawn from the theoretical decisions made above and further 
advance the analysis of the text, focusing particularly on certain sections of it for 
detailed analysis. 
The Scenario 
Genna and Alan had been married for six years when their relationship fell 
apart after Genna discovered that Alan had been having an affair for more than two 
years. Genna and Alan have one child: Rebecca aged three at the time of separation. 
Genna took the initiative to end the relationship and went to live with her mother. 
Their divorce was finalised after two years. Alan's relationship with the other woman 
had ended soon after his separation from Genna and he had not had a permanent or 
meaningful relationship since. 
A short time after she began living with her mother, Genna got a job in the 
area. Genna's mother, Theresa, looked after Rebecca while Genna was at work. 
209 
Genna's father had died a few years before. This situation continued for four years, 
during which time Theresa spent more time with Rebecca than Genna did as Genna 
enjoyed an active social life as well as a challenging career. The situation suited both 
women as Genna enjoyed the relative freedom her singleness and work life afforded 
her and Theresa had become extremely attached to Rebecca. 
When Rebecca was just seven years old, Genna was killed in a car accident. It 
was a tragic and trying situation for both Rebecca and Theresa and they supported 
each other through the difficult times. On hearing of Genna's death, Rebecca's father 
Alan, who had had virtually no contact with his daughter since his separation from 
Genna, (Rebecca had only received birthday cards from Alan) decided that he should 
now have custody of Rebecca and stated his intentions to Theresa. Theresa was 
distraught to hear this and urged Alan to reconsider for everyone's sake. Alan was 
quite determined to file for custody of Rebecca but agreed with Theresa that they 
would seek mediation before lawyers became involved. 
Instructions given to role-players 
The role-players were given the scenario (as printed above) the day before the 
mediation recording. They did not know each other and had no communication about 
the process until shortly before the recording of this conversation. In order to warm 
them both up to the role they would play in the mediation, I sat with them for about 
fifteen minutes before the recording and asked a series of questions. These questions 
were designed to help them take on the roles and sort out necessary story elements so 
that there would no huge surprises for each other in the conversation. Questions 
included things like: 
What job do you do? 
How old are you? 
What has the relationship been like between you two over the years? 
Who initiated this mediation and why? 
How often has Alan seen Rebecca during the last few years? 
How did Genna die? 
How long has it been since her death? 
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What sort of girl is Rebecca? What does she like to do? 
Tell me the story of how the divorce happened? 
It could have been possible to speak with them separately to develop their personal 
accounts of the scenario. However, the need to develop a coherent story as the basis 
for role play necessitated that they both hear each other's comments as a basic 
narrative skeleton to develop a conversation from. To do otherwise would have 
risked throwing the role play off if one role player introduced story elements that 
were hugely inconsistent with the other's narrative. 
The mediator in this conversation was Gerald Monk. He was given the same 
written scenario that the role players were given at the same time that they were given 
it. During my conversation with the two role-players who would play the disputing 
parties, Gerald was in the room but was not part of the conversation until the 
recording began. 
Before the mediation began, I also gave the role-players some advice about 
how I wanted them to play the role. This was based on experience of mediation role-
plays. I asked them to play the roles in a way that they would play such a situation 
for themselves. I did not want them to think of the most difficult person they have 
met and play that person in order to frustrate the process. Nor did I want them to be 
too easy for the mediator and move so quickly to a story of cooperation that the 
mediator did not have much to do. I did want them to play the roles in a way that 
emphasized response to the mediator's moves, rather than solid resistance for its own 
sake. I also reminded them that we had one session and, if they wanted to achieve 
some progress, they needed to do it in this session, rather than play it out over six 
sessions. While this instruction may have created a limitation for this exercise in 
terms of the transferability of practices to other contexts, it is also consistent with the 
reality that mediators often work within regulatory contexts that impose time limits 
on mediation processes, sometimes of only one session. 
Both role-players commented afterwards on how the preliminary discussion 
was helpful. Here are their comments: 
Jackie: It's a good thing you gave me a little speech about being hard, too hard 
because I was coming in there .. I was coming in with from a .. (bangs fist against 
hand) ( .. )and the setup you did in asking those questions prior was really helpfu.l .. 
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Craig: Yeah. 
Jackie: really helpful .. because otherwise we would have had to like create in our 
heads as we went along and it would have been a surprise ... 
John: You could easily trip each other up like that .. yeah .. 
Jackie: yeah .. and then we'd have conflicting stories or whatever .. so that was 
really helpful all those .. those questions .. 
Craig: I appreciated not only those questions but the manner in which you did that .. 
General contextual f ea tu res 
Some comments about the general contextual features of this conversation are 
worth making at the start. The mediation context defines the genre of text as a 
mediation conversation. This genre creates a series of expectations for the 
participants about the positions that they will occupy in the conversation. Gerald, as 
the mediator, takes up the position of speaking first and asking the questions that 
drive the conversation. Theresa and Alan are in the responding position and must 
choose along the way to take up Gerald's position calls or refuse them. As they do so, 
they will also be conscious of the other party as a second addressee influencing their 
utterances. All three will have the range and type of their utterances shaped by the 
conventions of participation in a professional interview. 
A mediator in Gerald's position will carry the professional authority of his 
profession and the institutional authority of the family court system into such a 
conversation. Although this authority may be diluted from that of a judge, for 
example, it is nevertheless present and will affect how his every utterance is 
incorporated into meaning by the parties. It is a conjunctural authority rather than an 
institutional or structural authority. There is a sense in which a mediation meeting is 
a 'preconstructed space' (Bourdieu, in a television interview cited by Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough, 2001, p. 99) or a conjuncture in which the composition of the participants 
and the positions they take up in relation to each other is constrained in advance of 
the particular individuals entering into those positions. 
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Mediation Conversation 
GERALD: Thank you both for being here .. as you know you've read the brochure 
2 and consulted with our mediation firm and I understand that the reason we're here is 
3 to discuss the .. primary caregiving arrangements for Rebecca ... and Alan I 
4 understand that you began the proceedings to ... to look at care giving arrangements 
5 ... and so we're here to do that .. what I would like to do ... to begin is to talk with 
6 one of you .. to get .. a fuller understanding of the circumstances that have led to this 
7 meeting and led to the point of wanting to discuss the .. the care of Rebecca and so 
8 I'd like each of you to take turns so we ... we start with one of you and the other, if 
9 you wouldn't mind, just being patient with me as .. as we talk and then we will change 
IO and then I'll talk to the other person .... who would like to begin? 
11 ........ (Alan gestures towards Theresa to begin, she does the same in return.) 
12 THERESA: This was his idea so I think that he should begin. 
13 GERALD: OK ... OK Alan? So can you give me a little background as to what has 
14 led to you wishing to have the ... the meeting and your thinking about that. 
The mediator opens this conversation and begins to set up some of the 
parameters of what will happen. His focus is on: process issues, such as who will 
speak and in what order; a fair and even tumtaking norm for interaction; both parties 
having a say in the process; a request for patience while the other person is talking; 
and a norm of conversation control through addressing comments to the mediator 
rather than towards each other. But this is not just a process conversation. The 
content of the conversation is already being shaped by the choice of words used. 
Gerald recognises the overall legal context in which this conversation takes place as 
part of some "proceedings" ( 4 ), a word that carries traces of legal discursive practice. 
All three participants are no doubt aware of the significance of this legal discourse, 
through which the public power of the state can be exercised to shape the private 
world of the family. The public gaze on the adequacy of Alan and Theresa for child-
rearing purposes can be expected to lie in the background of this whole mediation and 
both can be expected to be constructing their responses in full awareness of this gaze. 
They will be speaking as if under examination to some degree or other. 
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However, it is also apparent through the mediator's introduction that other 
conversations about the issue are now being recontextualised in the context of 
mediation. There is a sense of drama being established because the meanings that 
have been dominant in previous conversations and in the legal system are to some 
degree being made open to re-working in this conversation. Perhaps some 
consciousness of the indeterminate nature of what will come from this 
recontextualising contributes to the hesitancy that is evident in both parties about 
speaking first. 
Gerald carefully chooses words to describe the subject matter of this 
conversation as about 'primary caregiving arrangements' (4) and 'the care of 
Rebecca' (7). In this choice of words, he establishes a position on the content of the 
mediation that is not neutral. He avoids directing the discursive traffic towards the 
traditional legal discourse through use of a word like 'custody' (with its potential for 
objectifying Rebecca as a legal chattel) and instead indicates a preference for the 
discourse of family relationship. Gerald comments in his reflections on the 
transcript: 
I think it is critical to be attentive to the relational domain in mediating 
custody and access issues. I was acutely aware of how I wanted to attend to the two 
parties to 'encourage', 'invite' points of connection and collaboration between them. 
A discourse I am attracted to is caregivers getting on for the benefit of the children. 
This is a clear position on the substantive issues that will shape the cues that he 
attends to and selects for emphasis as a mediator and the kind of outcomes he will 
favour. Moreover, it is a stance that places him in a position of perhaps mild 
antagonism to the hegemony of the legal rights discourse. 
Theresa takes up a respondent position in the 'proceedings'. In the process, 
she gives away the power of the first speaker (Cobb & Rifkin, 1991). However, in a 
sense she retains her position through reserving her comment and grants Alan the 
rights of first speaker from a position of something like benevolence. He is not just 
speaking first therefore. He is speaking first on her say so. Therefore, her action here 
is complex and should not be too hastily seen as, say, deferring to male privilege, for 
example. It can be read more as foreshadowing her voicing of a counter-statement 
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later. She also establishes her position in relation to the whole issue through saying, 
'This was his idea ... ' The statement begins to position her as not wanting the current 
caregiving arrangements upset and calls Alan into position as the one making trouble, 
disrupting Rebecca's life. 
15 ALAN: Well I talked to my attorney and .. after I found out ... that Genna had passed 
16 ... and I told him that I really wanted to see my daughter again and he suggested that 
17 the best way to go through this with the court is to go through this mediation I guess .. 
18 and so ... that's why I thought ... that's why .. we're doing this I guess. 
19 GERALD: What are your hopes ... for this meeting? .. what .. what would you like 
20 to come out of it? 
21 ALAN: ... Well I'd like to see if there's a way that we could both agree that ... that I 
22 could play an important role in .. in my daughter's life and .. I don't wanna exclude 
23 her grandmother, I don't wanna exclude Theresa but I just wanna make sure I also 
24 can play a part. 
25 GERALD: OK. .. thank you .. Theresa .. I'd like to hear your perspective .. what's 
26 happened up until this meeting with regard to the issues around Rebecca's care? 
27 THERESA: Well I was really surprised to hear that ... Alan wanted to get custody of 
28 Rebecca simply because he hasn't really been a major figure in her life for all these 
29 years and .. this has been a really difficult time for my granddaughter and I'm 
30 concerned that ... any more changes in her life are going to have really very powerful 
31 and negative ... impact on her ... so I think that it's important that we both that 
32 Rebecca and her life and what's comfortable and familiar for her and that's living 
33 with me we've been together for years and we're very close and ... I don't want to 
34 lose that. 
In this segment, Alan begins by making a connection between this 
conversation and the wider discursive context in which it sits. It is part of a context 
of conversations with attorneys, precipitated by the circumstances following the death 
of Rebecca's mother, Genna. Traces (in Bakhtin's, 1981, sense) of Alan's 
conversation with his attorney might be expected to tum up in this conversation, as 
might traces of conversations that have taken place around Genna's death, perhaps at 
a funeral. Neither Alan nor Theresa comes into the conversation as individuals in a 
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totally originary position in relation to their own voices. They come subject to 
discursive influences from the significant contexts in which they live. A mediator 
might be wise to be alert to such influences and be ready to deconstruct them along 
the way. Theresa may well bring traces of conversations with her daughter, Genna, 
that have taken on particular salience since Genna's death. Here, it is worth noting 
that both Jackie and Craig, who play the roles of Theresa and Alan, are well-educated 
university faculty members. Their use of discourse can be expected to reflect their 
knowledge of the habitus (in Bourdieu's 1991 terms) necessary for agentive action in 
this context. 
Gerald begins by asking them to speak about their hopes for the meeting ( 19). 
He shows an evenhanded approach to the parties by asking them each to answer this 
question, offering them both the same discursive position of having a voice in this 
conversation. However, he also appears to lose sight of this intention when he turns to 
Theresa after Alan has responded. At this point he asks her a different question. He 
also acts to shape the content of the mediation by directing their attention to positive 
intentions from the start. This contrasts with the discursive assumption that would be 
established by asking an opening question seeking the definition of a problem, such 
as might occur in a problem-solving model. 
Alan and Theresa answer his questions in sharply contrasting ways but both 
indicate their awareness of the pull exercised by the discourse of exclusive legal 
ownership of children that lies in the background of their exchange. Alan seeks to 
counter this discourse and to establish a position from which to negotiate with 
Theresa that places his action in starting these proceedings in a generous and 
favourable light. He picks up on Gerald's invitation to speak about care of Rebecca, 
rather than custody, and speaks about 'wanting to play an important role in his 
daughter's life' (22). He invites Theresa into a relational place of agreement rather 
than contest and he specifically rejects the idea of exclusion of Theresa (22). Theresa 
announces directly her own opposition to the discourse of legal custody and the 
position of exclusion that could potentially be offered to her within this discourse. 
She positions Alan as a proponent of this discourse, ignoring his disavowal of it, and 
as a potentially disruptive force in Rebecca's life. The position she establishes for 
herself is one of greater entitlement through her knowledge of Rebecca and of her 
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lifestyle, through her closeness of relationship with Rebecca and through her 
demonstration of concern for Rebecca's wellbeing. 
35 GERALD: OK ... thanks .. Alan would it be OK with you if ... I spent a little time 
36 talking with Theresa about ... describing her relationship with Becca and ... the time 
37 they've had together so I understand that more then I want to .. come back to you to 
38 understand more the contact you've had and what your hopes are about how .. about 
39 how that might look .. would that be OK with you to do that? 
40 ALAN: Sure. (Nods.) 
41 GERALD: OK .. well Theresa would you mind telling me your .. your sort of history 
42 with Becca over .. over time and .. the nature of your relationship and how that's 
43 changed. 
44 THERESA: Well.. I'm .... since my daughter died I've .. my granddaughter and I 
45 have gotten even closer but we've always been very close because my daughter was 
46 just a very busy person .. she worked hard and she played hard and she had a really 
47 active social life .. so that .. Becca and I spent a lot of time together .. I mean I take 
48 her to dance lessons, gymnastics, we do after school activities, she's a very active 
49 child and I've been with her through all of that, we're really close ... since my 
50 daughter died ... we've become even closer .. we spend a lot of time together .. we 
51 comfort each other .. we understand each other .. so it's been a really really close 
52 relationship ... and it's helped her and me to get through this period .. and I just.. I .. I 
53 don't want to lose that and I don't want her to lose that. 
54 GERALD: Can you tell me some more ... information about the amount of time that 
55 you spend with her now and ... h .. how that has changed and what the current 
56 situation is .. in ... yeah really I'm wanting to get a sense of the day to day experience 
57 that you have with .. with Becca and where you see her and ... 
58 THERESA: OK .. well ... I work full-time .. so .. we get up in the morning and I make 
59 her a big breakfast, she likes big breakfasts .. and I take her to school, I drop her off at 
60 school and then I go to work and .. after school she's enrolled in an after school 
61 programme, it has all kinds of activities and then I pick her up when I get off work at 
62 five o'clock and I take her home and .. she does her homework at the dining room 
63 table while I'm cooking dinner so .. we have dinner together, we go over her 
64 homework and then usually we read together before she goes to bed ... so ... and 
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65 then on the weekends as I said she's very active so I take her to .. different classes 
66 and lessons and ... she's really into gymnastics now so .. she's been taking 
67 gymnastics for a couple of years now, we go to gymnastics class on Saturday 
68 morning .... When Genna was alive, we'd all spend Sundays together .. so .. 
69 GERALD: Yeah. 
70 THERESA: On family picnics ... 
This segment begins with Gerald reflexively negotiating the process move of 
giving his attention to one party and asking the other to listen for a while. Since a 
separate meeting with each of the parties was not possible, this process move can be 
understood in narrative mediation as a substitute for such a separate meeting. Gerald 
negotiates this move in the form of asking permission, thus positioning Alan and 
Theresa as permission givers, and therefore as having some authority in the direction 
the conversation will take. It is an authorising move. This might be understood in 
contrast to much professional discourse that would assume that such decisions are the 
prerogative of the mediator. It is one of the methods by which narrative mediators 
might seek to remain accountable to their clients and at the same time, in a small way, 
to disrupt the discursive assumptions through which power/knowledge (Foucault, 
1980) operates to constitute professional privilege. 
The conversation moves into a discussion of the 'history' of Theresa's 
relationship with Rebecca. This locates Theresa's entitlement claims (Winslade & 
Monk, 2000) for her role in Rebecca's life as constituted over time. The basis of this 
entitlement is established in Theresa's responses as founded on 'closeness' (45, 47, 
49), amount of time 'spent together' (47, 68), and knowledge of and participation in a 
child's daily routine (58-68). A note about ethnicity is necessary here too. The 
written scenario did not specify the ethnic background of the participants. But the 
ethnic background of the role-players themselves introduced a cultural locatedness in 
terms of ethnicity into the conversation. Jackie, who played Theresa, is African-
American and Craig, who played Alan, is Anglo-American. In the analysis, therefore, 
it is necessary to take account of the racial and ethnic influences on what is said. 
Theresa's sense of entitlement, then, can also be understood within an 
African-American cultural tradition that values 'otherrnothering' (by grandparents, 
aunts, sisters, friends or neighbours) alongside 'bloodmothering'. Sharing the task of 
218 
mothering among women is argued to have discursive support in both West African 
cultures and in African-American cultural traditions (Hill Collins, 1991). However, 
Theresa's claims of entitlement, while legitimated within the cultural discourse of 
African-American people, may well be muted in their expression because of her 
knowledge that these claims do not carry much legitimate weight for her white former 
son-in-law, and are unlikely to be recognised within the law. 
Gerald comments on his intentions here in his reflections on the transcript: 
I wanted to help the parties talk of the history of their association with Rebecca to 
contextualise the reasons for the potential disagreement on outcomes. My experience 
of mediation is that when opposing parties learn about the other and their struggles 
and challenges with the issue at hand it is more likely that they will develop points of 
empathy and understanding than if they go straight to solving the mechanics of the 
problem. Understanding context enables the parties to find points of connection 
unlike a purely problem solving approach that may produce a one dimensional series 
of descriptions compared with the multitude of descriptions produced by historicised 
'rich' descriptions of the interactions. 
71 GERALD: Now .... Rebecca's Mum died .. I understand .. and .. so you've been the 
72 primary caregiver.. and your daughter died in a car accident .. how long has that been 
73 now? 
74 THERESA: It's been a month. 
75 GERALD: It's just been a month. 
76 THERESA: Yes. 
77 GERALD: And before then .... you were engaging in this ... having this relationship 
78 you've just described .. of .. being there for her breakfast and .. has this just been 
79 going along .. and breakfast and then .. school and after school and then homework .. 
80 and gymnastics .. has that just been going for a month since ... Genna's death or is it 
81 something that you've also been involved with before .. her Mum died. 
82 THERESA: Yeah .. it's been like that for years. 
83 GERALD: Right. 
84 THERESA: That's the lifestyle she's used to. 
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Here the routines of daily life and relationship between Theresa and Rebecca 
are invited out of a somewhat timeless rendition and placed in juxtaposition with the 
major event of Genna's death. Theresa introduces the word 'lifestyle' in the final 
utterance of this exchange (83 ). It is a word that signals participation in the 'late 
modem' world (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999) where lifestyles are considered 
matters of identification with a variety of subcultural options, rather than given by 
cultural tradition. Perhaps this usage is not uppermost in Theresa's mind in relation 
to a seven-year-old child but the word still carries such traces (Bakhtin, 1986) with it. 
Perhaps it sends exclusionary messages to Alan. More salient still is her claim of 
entitlement to care for Rebecca on the basis of familiarity with this 'lifestyle'. 
It is worth noting here too the way in which Genna's death is talked about. 
There are discursive patterns evident here that constitute the practice of speaking 
about death and about the dead. When Alan signals that Genna's death was a month 
ago, Gerald underlines the significance for this conversation of the recency of the 
death by using the word 'just' (74). Gerald approaches his question about Genna's 
death speaking in a softer, serious tone and there are respectful pauses used before 
each mention of death. There will be meanings of death in general, and Genna's 
death in particular, that will be lying in the background of this conversation. While it 
may not be appropriate in this conversation for a mediator to explore all of these, the 
pauses and the tone can perhaps be read as indicative of and respectful towards some 
of these meanings. The likely construction of death of a family member within a 
discourse that features "loss" highly may well, for Theresa, open up potential for this 
conversation to be understood as one that could add to this sense of loss. She could 
easily be thinking, 'I've lost my daughter and I am now afraid that I will lose my 
granddaughter.' She could perhaps be positioned as needing to guard against this 
possibility within this discourse. 
85 GERALD: And ... so how .. how involved have you been in relation to Genna .. 
86 sorry, to Becca's .. with her education and her.. health and wellbeing. 
87 THERESA: Well .. 
88 GERALD: What role have you played in that? 
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89 THERESA: Well ... her Mom and I kind of shared that, we'd both go to parents' 
90 meetings and conferences at the school ... but Genna's life was very busy so when she 
91 wasn't available then I would attend those things myself .. but there were times when 
92 we both went ... and my daughter also enrolled her in the gymnastics classes .. 
93 sometimes she took her but generally I took her .. to those kinds of things things so 
94 I've been very much involved in all aspects of Becca's life. 
95 GERALD: OK .. OK .... what.. what are you aware of in terms of Alan's ... contact 
96 with Rebecca .. from your perspective .. how have you seen that from .. the way you 
97 look at things? 
98 THERESA: Well Alan hasn't had a lot of contact with her since he and my daughter 
99 separated. He does remember her birthday every year and ... he's .. he's called the 
100 house a couple of times and spoken to her .. not very often .. but as far as actual 
IOI physical contact, there hasn't really been a lot that ... 
Now the daily picture of Rebecca's life with Theresa is widened with 
reference to other contexts of her life. The conversation focuses mainly on her 
schooling. Parental practices that could be said to be criteria) for public judgments 
of adequate parenting (attending parent teacher conferences in educational discourse 
means being a 'good parent', as does enrolling a child in extra-curricular activities 
like gymnastics) are referenced and used to extend the basis for Theresa's entitlement 
claims. The basis for her entitlement claim is summarised as her 'involvement in all 
aspects of Rebecca's life' (94). The word 'involvement' will become a pivotal word 
in this conversation. Theresa's discursive strategy is built around her contrasting of 
her involvement with Alan's lack of involvement. The more she positions herself as 
involved the more she positions Alan as uninvolved. Here she begins to set that up. 
Gerald anticipates her move to some extent by asking her perspective on Alan's 
'contact' (95) (his synonym for involvement) with Rebecca. 
The phrase 'from your perspective' (96) establishes the possibility of 
difference in perspective. It implies the limited truth value of any single perspective 
and it sets up the opportunity for comparison of perspectives as the conversation 
continues. The question could be read as an attempt to open up the chance for 
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Theresa, after having made her own claims of entitlement very explicit, to cede a 
little legitimacy to Alan for his sense of entitlement for participation in Rebecca's 
life. But Theresa is not yet in a place where she can do that with comfort. She does 
not have enough information to counter the story of Alan's Jack of involvement that 
makes more sense in her position. Therefore she contrasts Alan's lack of 
involvement (and therefore his lack of legitimate claims of entitlement) with her own 
intimate involvement. This Jack of involvement is tempered with some references to 
some exceptions to it (birthday cards and phone calls) but after referring to these 
exceptions she returns to stressing the story of Alan's uninvolvement. 
In how she speaks of Genna she uses a nominalisation, 'Genna's life was very 
busy,' (90) in a construction that downplays a sense of Genna's agency in how she 
lived her life. Perhaps this is a move to protect her dead daughter from any 
suggestion that there was anything wrong with her parenting. Possibly, the desire not 
to speak ill of the dead comes into play here. Also possible is a discursive strategy on 
Theresa's part to base the legitimacy of her own claim to care for Rebecca on 
Genna's assignment of that role. For this purpose, Genna's parental judgment needs 
not to be in doubt. 
Gerald describes his posture in this stage of the mediation as one of 'a highly 
curious, inquisitive interviewer/researcher'. He is positioning Theresa and later Alan 
as key informants with stories to tell that are of intrinsic interest to him. So he asks 
many questions to enrich these stories, and Alan and Theresa are called to be tellers 
of stories or authors, each with their own interpretive slant. 
102 GERALD: OK .. so now I'd like to catch up with Alan a little and understand his 
103 perspective (turns to Alan) ... the nature of your relationship with .. your daughter .. 
104 with .. do you address her as Becca? .. or .. 
105 ALAN: Rebecca. 
106 GERALD: Rebecca ...... Can you tell me a little about your ... involvement with 
107 your daughter over .. since her birth ... just want to understand how that's developed. 
108 ALAN: Yeah, we were very close ... since the beginning ... we had a real good 
109 physical bond and ... we would go out, I remember merry-go-rounds a lot when she 
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110 was really small .. and she used to like to cuddle with me a lot .. and I ... taught her 
111 how to .. read . . . and .. I used to read to her a lot .. and we had a lot of good times .. 
112 unfortunately it was complicated by my .. relationship with my ex ... 
113 GERALD: With Genna? 
114 ALAN: Yeah with Genna .. and ... Genna actually .. she was .. she had a different 
115 lifestyle, she had a different way of wanting to .. to spend her time so she .. after a 
116 busy day she would want to go out in the evening, y'know maybe two three four 
117 times a week .. to a movie or to a play, she thought .. y'know .. it's boring just to stay 
118 at home ... I was happy just to .. to have a family .. to stay home with our daughter, 
119 but ... I tried ... y'know because of .. because of her I tried to .. to go out and so forth 
120 .. more than I would have wanted to but actually with my daughter, the two of us had 
121 a lot of good .. we used to do a lot of father-daughter sorts of things, rough and 
122 tumble .. and I really felt .. a good strong connection. 
123 GERALD: So .. very early on you had a strong presence .. this was .. this was when 
124 you and Genna were together ... you taught her to read and you were involved in .. 
125 playing with her and you .. would you care for .. Rebecca when Genna wanted to go 
126 out in the evening in that .. in that stage? 
127 ALAN: Actually that was .. I really enjoyed it when we did that ... sometimes it was 
128 hard because Genna would .. get ticked off with me because .. y'know .. what's wrong 
129 with going out .. why don't you wanna do that .. and .... but I .. I often .. I would say 
130 to her look I'm fine with you just going out by yourself because I actually enjoyed 
131 spending time just directly with Rebecca. 
132 GERALD: So at that point when you were together you had a lot of involvement .. 
133 with Rebecca .. and that changed, I understand, is that right, given ... what Theresa 
134 has described .. happening. 
135 ALAN: Well yeah it's a complicated thing because ..... (exhales) Genna and I didn't 
136 .. you know .. we didn't really get along and .. she wasn't really .. that available .. and 
137 ... I guess like I said before .. she was always wanting to do things, do, do, do and ... 
138 so .. she .. she really wasn't very nice to be around and she was angry with me a lot 
139 and .. I wound up meeting somebody else and we kind of .. connected .. and then 
140 everything sort of went downhill as far as my relationship with Rebecca from that 
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141 point on .. and that was .. my heart was broken because I .. it's like giving up your 
142 left arm to keep your right and .. but every time I tried to ... to talk to Genna 
143 reasonably about me seeing Rebecca she would just give me so much grief ... oh so 
144 you think you have time for her when you have your .. your lover .. (mocking tone) 
145 you know and this and that .. she would just give me such grief that .... it just became 
146 impossible. 
147 GERALD: So what did that .. how did that affect your relationship with Rebecca, 
148 what .. happened in terms of your contact with her .. after that had happened? 
149 ALAN: Well we were living apart obviously at that point and .. 
150 GERALD: Mhmm. 
151 ALAN: Uh ..... (exhales strongly) You know, I asked her to .. I wanted to see 
152 Rebecca .. and I .. started to come by and ..... Genna just made all kinds of threats 
153 and she would yell and become hysterical and scream at me and ... it just became too 
154 difficult ... my attorney advised that I didn't really have .. much legal recourse as 
155 much as I thought .. I should fight for this but he said there's not .. you're not going 
156 to be .. there's nothing much you're gonna gain with this ... 
In this piece of conversation between Gerald and Alan (although it should 
always be remembered that Theresa will be exerting considerable influence over what 
is said through her position as audience), the basis for Alan's claims of entitlement to 
expand his role in Rebecca's life are explored. Gerald uses the same word that 
Theresa used, 'involvement' ( 106) as he invites Alan to develop his own claim to care 
for Rebecca. Picking up from Gerald's cue and perhaps also from Theresa's claim, 
Alan makes his own pitch on the basis of emotional and physical closeness, 
referencing a different time period than Theresa did. He goes back to Rebecca's early 
years and his relationship with his daughter before the separation between Alan and 
Genna. The word 'bond' is used ( 109) which carries a variety of possible traces with 
it: a) a commitment and set of duties that remain unquestioned through long periods 
of time (cf Cordelia in King Lear); b) a legal set of rights and responsibilities (as in 
the expression, 'My word is my bond'); c) a natural biological tie; or d) an essential 
psychological link between family members as described in Bowlby' s (1969/1980) 
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widely popularised attachment theory. His physical contact with his daughter is cited 
as an expression of this bond in 'cuddles' (110), in 'rough and tumble' (121) (an 
acceptable description for affectionate play that does not carry overtones of being too 
effeminate within the norms of male culture). 
Gerald's ackno~ledgment of Alan's 'involvement' and his 'bond' with his 
daughter is marked by his choice of the expression, ' ... you had a strong presence' 
( 123). It is an interesting choice. The word presence (which contrasts with absence) 
is a softer nominalisation than bond or involvement and needs the intensifier 'strong' 
to match Alan's statement. It is a word that might be expected more in a masculine 
than a feminine discourse about relationship. 
Next Alan goes on to account for his subsequent lack of expression of the 
'bond' that he has just argued for. He uses the rhetorical strategy of positioning his 
recently deceased ex-wife Genna as an obstacle to the ongoing development of his 
bond with his daughter. This is a risky strategy, though, in front of Theresa, who can 
be expected to be still tender in her grief for her dead daughter. Alan risks angering 
Theresa through 'speaking ill of the dead'. Note also in passing the use of the 
objectifying, depersonalising shorthand, 'my ex' ( 112) and Gerald's refusal of this in 
his immediate referral to her by name ( 113 ). But Alan is aware of the possibility of 
alienating Theresa and adopts a number of discursive tactics to deflect this danger. 
He refers to Genna a little euphemistically as having a 'different lifestyle' ( 114). This 
nominalisation matches Theresa's earlier one in its softening of a sense of Genna's 
agency. 'Having' a lifestyle is weaker than 'choosing' one, for example, and 
suggests that any ill effects on Rebecca from this lifestyle are scarcely Genna's 
responsibility. He goes on to say that Genna was not 'nice to be around' ( 138). He 
positions her as a something of a 'bad mother' who wants to go out all the time rather 
than adopt a norm of domesticity and personal sacrifice and himself as the 'good 
father' who, by contrast, is willing to do so and even 'enjoys' ( 127) spending time 
with his young daughter. However, he does this without appearing to express a direct 
judgment of her. Then, he slowly builds a picture of Genna as often unreasonably 
angry. At first she is described mildly as 'ticked off' with him ( 128). This intensifies 
into a slightly euphemistic, 'We didn't really get along,' (136), followed by a more 
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direct, 'She was angry with me a lot' ( 138). She is portrayed as using bitter sarcasm 
( 144 ), and finally becomes, 'Genna just made all kinds of threats and she would yell 
and become hysterical and scream at me'(] 52). The ground for these eventual strong 
statements is carefully prepared with the more neutral descriptions. But, in the end, 
he does deploy the common gendered strategy of r~ndering a woman's concerns 
illegitimate through referring to them as 'hysterical' (153). 
In the process, he drops into the conversation the information about his own 
affair with another woman. This is constructed as the most natural thing in the world 
in the context of he and Genna not getting along and her not being 'available' (136). 
In this context, he 'wound up meeting someone else,' ( 139) as in a natural sequence 
of events over which he has little control, and they 'kind of .. connected' ( 139), which 
also sounds positive, natural and innocent of any hurtful intent, or indeed deliberate 
planning. After that, 'everything .. went downhill'( 140), he describes a little 
vaguely. There is nothing in this description that recognises his own actions as 
disqualifying his entitlements as a father, a discursive stance that Genna obviously 
took. He reverses the usual use of the discursive position of the cuckolded wife as 
brokenhearted by claiming for himself that his 'heart was broken' ( 141 ). His use of 
the expression 'she would give me such grief' ( 143) is interesting too. He is referring 
to Genna's anger with him and his own response to this. The image produced is of 
him as sad in response to anger. It perhaps amounts to claiming the morally superior 
position of being sad and longsuffering in the face of 'unreasonable' anger. 
Then he speaks about his desire to see his daughter after his separation from 
Genna. He says, 'I started to come by,' ( 152) and mentions that Genna responded 
with 'threats' ( 152) and 'hysteria' ( 153 ). It might be noteworthy here that Alan is 
positioning himself as in the agentic position here of 'coming by' and Genna in the 
position of responding. There is no mention of an agreement for him to see his 
daughter. Did he just 'come by' unannounced and take Genna by surprise, giving her 
little dialogical space? Or was she unwilling to negotiate and therefore leaving him 
without dialogical options? It is not completely clear. 
There follows a segment of conversation that I shall omit. It continues to 
develop Alan's claims of entitlement to contact with Rebecca through further details 
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of his attempts to continue to make contact with his daughter in the face of his ex-
wife's opposition to this. Gerald tries to clarify the details of this contact, which 
turns out to be very minor. Let us pick up the conversation again when Gerald 
summarises this interaction, attempting as he does so to acknowledge (and lend some 
authorising weight to) Alan's story of his desire for relationship with his daug~ter. 
157 GERALD: Yes .. yeah .. so what I understand is that you've made lots and lots of 
158 efforts to want to see her, you've described driving past her ... her home on a number 
159 of occasions .. 
160 ALAN: .. phone calls 
161 GERALD: Phone calls, you've sent birthday cards and Theresa has noted that that's 
162 happened .. but what has ended up happening as a result of the distress that occurred 
163 between you and Genna that you felt that it was too difficult to make contact with 
164 Rebecca at that point and so .. rather than get involved in that confrontation .. you 
165 took a step back .. but kept in your heart your relationship alive with her and kept 
166 connection with the school and monit. .. observing and watching her a little bit from a 
167 distance .. with her schooling. 
168 ALAN: Right. 
169 GERALD: And you described having her portrait on your dresser it's a statement 
170 about your ongoing desire and of course you're the person who called this meeting .. 
171 so .. I want you to know that I'm understanding about your interest in her and I .. I 
172 was really wanting to get more clarity about what it specifically looked like in terms 
173 of that contact, so it's been very very small. 
Gerald here seems concerned to play down the conflict between Alan and 
Genna, perhaps because little can be gained from reviving it now that Genna is dead 
and perhaps also because he doesn't want to take the risk of alienating Theresa. He 
uses the nominalisation 'distress' (162) to bundle up the elements of the story of 
conflict Alan has told. It is a softer word than some that Alan has used and focuses 
on the emotional effects rather than on any assignment of responsibility. He also 
uses the key word 'involvement' in a different fashion ( 164). In relation to 
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'confrontation', lack of involvement is given a positive valence. The point is not 
developed far but it is a subtle unsettling of the sense of certainty in the conversation 
that involvement is always a good thing. 
It is also worth noting in passing Gerald's switch in mid-utterance from the 
use of the word 'monitoring' to the word 'observing' ( 166). This is clearly an 
expression of discursive preference. No doubt the revision relates to the traces of 
unwanted meaning that the word 'monitoring' carries with it. In particular, the idea 
of monitoring brings to mind Foucault's notions of surveillance and the exercise of 
disciplinary power (Foucault, 1978). Gerald does not want to suggest, or to some 
degree legitimise, the exercise of male surveillance over a female's life, even though 
he is referring to a child in this instance. So he quickly withdraws that word before it 
is completely out of his mouth. 
174 ALAN: Well listen ..... it would really have been not in Rebecca's interest for me to 
175 try and force issues because ... 
176 GERALD: Mhmm. 
177 ALAN: because of .... (several words omitted) she .. she ... she could really just fly 
178 off the handle and ... (brief exchange omitted) Genna was really crazy and I .. I didn't 
179 want my daughter to be subjected to all that .. I've heard .. I've read books .. you 
180 know and I've seen talk shows where they talk about how you shouldn't argue in 
181 front of your daughter and .... and Genna didn't mind but, y'know, if I was trying to 
182 force the issue to see her it really would have .. it would have screwed up Rebecca .. 
183 big time .. 
Here, some popular psychological discourse enters into the conversation. In 
a way that would not have been possible prior to the development and popularisation 
of psychodynamic psychological knowledge, Alan is responding, in both his actions 
and in his account of his actions, to many conversations he has heard about how a 
good parent should take responsibility for the psychological health of children. He 
wants to avoid creating a traumatic childhood experience for Rebecca and so shapes 
his own decisions in response to injunctions such as, 'You shouldn't argue in front of 
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children,' ( 180) or else you will 'screw them up' ( 182). He references television 
'talk shows' ( 180) as a recent development in the technologies of disciplinary power 
(Foucault, 1978) that serve the purpose of constituting parental behaviour and family 
relations. Such shows subject some volunteers to a public gaze as a public spectacle 
to inform general public and often use psychological experts to pronounce on the 
norms of how people should behave. Such pronouncements are clearly in the 
background of Alan's comments here. He even uses the term 'subjected' ( 179) to 
describe the power effect on his daughter, were she to see her parents arguing. 
Alan's use of the word 'listen' ( 174) is interesting too. It signals a concern 
that something has not been heard and it underlines his position call, to Gerald 
especially, to hear and validate his own position. It can be read therefore as a claim 
for mediator support. 
184 GERALD: Right.. right ..... now things have changed a lot ... when did you become 
185 aware that Genna had .. had died? 
186 ALAN: Just about .. a little over a month ago. (looks down) 
187 GERALD: ...... What .. was your experience of discovering that? 
188 ALAN: Oh .. it was shock .... as much as we didn't get along I... you know .. she 
189 was a good person in her own way and ... I was shocked to hear that (quiet voice) .... . 
190 and ... after a while, after that initially subsided I .. thought to myself wow this is .. . 
191 finally the .. unfair warden .. the unfair prison guard is no longer there to keep me 
192 from my daughter, from a father-daughter relationship so I sort of .. you know .. 
193 honestly felt relieved .... nothing against Genna but ... um .. and again I don't have 
194 anything against Theresa being a part of Rebecca's life .. I understand how important 
195 grandmothers can be and .. I don't want to take anything away from that I just want 
196 what's .. what .. what rightfully is a father's right to be part of his daughter's life. 
This little exchange demonstrates the discursive positioning Alan wants to 
establish for himself in sharp relief against a background of some competing 
discursive demands. Again, we see the discursive influences on the ways in which 
death and the dead are spoken about. A somewhat ritualised reference to shock 
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( 188) is followed by the paying of respects to Genna, now that she is dead, as a 'good 
person in her own way' ( 189). This is scarcely a compliment although it takes that 
form. It might be said to be 'damning with faint praise'. It also removes her gender, 
and therefore any reference to gender relations, through the choice of the word 
'person' over an alternative like 'woman.' 
Then, Alan moves quickly back to his own agenda of portraying Genna as an 
serious obstacle to his relationship with his daughter. This time she has become an 
'unfair warden' or 'prison guard' (191) keeping him in the prison of separation from 
Rebecca. This is a strong metaphor and perhaps he gets concerned after using it that 
he will have alienated Theresa further, so he seeks to restrict any relational damage 
caused by re-stating his openness to Theresa's continued involvement in Rebecca's 
life. This move is backed up by a statement of folk psychological knowledge about 
the importance of grandmothers in children's lives ( 194-5). He also takes care to 
justify his sense of 'relief' after Genna's death by modifying his reference to it with 
the word 'honestly' ( 193 ). This usage can be read as an effort to insulate his 
disclosure of feeling from possible criticism. How can you criticise someone for 
expressing honest emotion? Moreover, he asserts 'nothing against Genna' (193) 
almost in contradiction to his suggestion that he actually does have something against 
her. It is an attempt again to soften the effect of the words he has uttered. 
At this point, Alan's use of the nominalisation 'father-daughter-
relationship' ( 192) is interesting. He revises his initial formulation in which he 
describes Genna's actions to 'keep me from my daughter' to 'from a father-daughter 
relationship'. He positions himself here as the reasonable parent, concerned to avoid 
conflict, while Genna, the 'unfair warden', is constructed grammatically as the active 
agent who is interfering and blocking. He constructs himself as the victim of her 
actions and implicitly calls for back-referenced sympathy, and now justice. 
Next, Theresa is offered a position of inclusion, again to counter any possible 
alienated position she may have felt tempted to take up in response to the comments 
about Genna. Finally in this segment, Alan calls up an additional legal discourse to 
support his claim for entitlement by speaking about a 'father's right' (196) to be part 
of his daughter's life. A rights discourse in which entitlement claims are based on 
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social role bears little relation to the stronger focus, throughout this conversation so 
far, on a discourse of emotional closeness as the basis of entitlement. Nevertheless, 
in a conflict story it can become available as a resource to be deployed as it is here. 
Gerald's intentions at this point are worthy of note as well. In his reflections 
on the transcript, Gerald says that his invitation to Alan to speak about Genna's death 
was aimed at building connection between Alan and Theresa: 
I am seeing if I can build points of connection through inviting Alan to acknowledge 
Genna's death and his feeling about this. To not do this might have appeared a bit 
callous for Theresa. It could have 'backfired' if he said that he was very happy that 
she was dead but my hunch was that it would make sense to Alan to express some 
sadness or regret for her parting in front of Theresa. 
Gerald's concern is therefore not just to take care with how he positions himself in 
relation to the two parties, and with the positions he calls them into, but also, to some 
extent, to manage the positioning by the parties of each other that his questions might 
be producing. In the end, it is debatable whether his strategy backfired or not. Alan 
did make brief comments acknowledging Genna's passing but then went on to utter 
thoughts that counteracted any positive effect for Theresa. Theresa's response 
appeared kept pretty well in check. She makes no nonverbal response and says 
nothing immediately. However, in the next section of conversation, she does give rein 
to her criticisms of Alan. 
197 GERALD: OK ... Theresa, I'd like .. I'd like to come back to you and ... from your 
198 perspective what's your relationship and connection been with Alan .. from the 
199 beginning and how that's unfolded and changed and how it is today for you? 
200 THERESA: . . . . I feel like Alan just tends to take the easy way out .. I think that .. I 
201 don't know maybe he just doesn't want to have .. to engage in conflict he's saying he 
202 didn't want to have conflict in front of Becca but I think that if he loved his daughter 
203 then he would have fought to see her .. (Alan shakes his head) and I think that .. I 
204 know that he knows that when he called the house .. whenever 1 answered the phone I 
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205 would let him talk to her .. and I think if he had asked me to make arrangements to 
206 bring her to a park or something so he could have seen her I would have done that .. 
207 my .. I'm just angry because he didn't do that, because he didn't try and see her. .. 
208 and because he hasn't been a part of her life .. now all of a sudden he wants to take 
209 her .. and. I just don't think it's fair. 
Although Alan and Theresa have been shaping their comments in relation to 
each other for some time, here, for the first time, Gerald invites direct comment from 
one party about the entitlement claims of the other. Theresa is invited to respond to 
what Alan has been saying. She does so by reacting strongly and directly to his 
words. She dismisses his reasons for not pursuing contact with Rebecca over 
Genna's objections as taking 'the easy way out' (200). She almost implies that he is 
a 'wimp', a gendered term for a man who lacks courage in a fight and is therefore 
worthy of some degree of contempt. Her logic for this criticism is interesting. She 
says that, 'If he loved his daughter he would have fought to see her' (202). What are 
the discursive origins of this logic? Perhaps, she is drawing from a Romantic 
discourse of the male hero walking over hot coals for his beloved (even if the beloved 
is a child.) Perhaps, she is thinking more in terms of a female image of the lioness 
fighting for her cubs, an image often called up approvingly to account for a woman's 
fierceness in defence of her children. It is one of the situations where women are not 
only allowed, but expected, to show aggression. To do so marks a person as a 'true' 
woman. Such discourse sets a standard by which a woman's behaviour might be 
assessed. But here she would be using it to assess a man's behaviour. Is this usual in 
conventional patriarchal discourse of gender? Men are usually expected to show 
courage and aggression in different arenas and to be willing to sacrifice their devotion 
to their children for some wider public cause. However, Alan has made his claim to 
be entitled to be part of Rebecca's life on the basis of emotional intimacy and on the 
basis of being more 'maternal' in his instincts than her mother was. Perhaps this 
crossover leads to his being judged on criteria normally reserved for women. Or 
perhaps the winds of a feminist argument along gender equity lines can be felt in this 
assessment of Alan as a parent ('the same criteria should be used for any parent, 
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whether male or female'). My point here, in speculating along these lines, is that 
Theresa's utterance carries traces of other usages and that these traces, even when 
they are not clearly specified, are relevant to the positioning she offers Alan in this 
conversation. 
In the end, after expressing a~ger on this basis, she re-iterates her argument 
that Alan's entitlement claims are not legitimate, because he has not been part of her 
life. His desire to now be part of it is characterised as 'all of a sudden' (208), 
suggesting that he is not consistent and trustworthy. Finally she claims, despite his 
assurances to the contrary, that now he wants to 'take her' (208), raising again the 
discourse of legal ownership of children as chattels. Her 'I don't think it's fair' (209) 
amounts to an appeal to a notion of folk justice. 
However, despite the strength and anger of these statements there is another 
voice in the midst of Theresa's utterance. It is a less polarising voice and one that 
opens up a possibility that her anger is not necessarily finalizing and that options 
other than an adversarial battle are still possible. She refers to her willingness to 
allow Alan to speak on the phone with Rebecca (204-5) and to arrange a meeting 
between them both in a park. If her anger at him for not being involved pushes her 
towards determinacy in how she sees him, this voice opens up a small gap of 
indeterminacy (Linehan & McCarthy, 2000). A narrative mediator needs to be on the 
alert for these kind of gaps in a conflict story and ready to examine their possible 
significance. Gerald begins to do this in the next exchange. 
210 GERALD: Have .. can you think of a time where ... the connection with Alan was .. 
211 under easier circumstances .. at an earlier point? 
212 THERESA: Oh sure, he could .. when he and Genna were together ... I babysat for 
213 them when they went out and I think things were fine .. and he was close to his 
214 daughter when she was young .. but ... I think that I've got more distant from him 
215 because he's distanced himself from his daughter ... and that angers me .... (she looks 
216 directly at Alan) 
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A point of difference in the relationship between Alan and Theresa is 
acknowledged here. Gerald is seeking the inclusion of some different discursive 
positions that may exist for the two parties in their relationship history. Such 
positions have the potential, if they are salient enough, to become the basis for a way 
forward in this conflict. However, the conflict story is still pow~rful enough and the 
alternative positions not strong enough, or perhaps not relevant enough, for a new 
story to get off the ground at this point. Theresa acknowledges the story of difference 
and then quickly reasserts the story of conflict. 
217 (9 lines of transcript omitted) 
218 GERALD: And your perspective on conflict was that you saw it was important for 
219 Alan to fight and challenge and engage in the conflict with Genna .. to declare his 
220 ongoing love for .. for Becca. (Alan shakes his head) 
221 THERESA: Exactly. 
222 GERALD: And .. so your idea of conflict is .. one of meeting it and working through 
223 it to declare your passion. 
224 THERESA: I think so .. because .. y'know because I think the message he gave to 
225 his daughter was that she wasn't worth fighting for. (Alan is shaking his head 
226 throughout Theresa's utterance) 
227 GERALD: Uh huh ... and yet for you .. Alan .. it's very clear that fighting and .. I 
228 sense a very painful set of entanglements and conflict that you experienced with 
229 Genna had felt far too distressing to put you and Rebecca in .. and that when you 
230 weighed everything up .. you made a decision to step back .. is that accurate? 
231 ALAN: Yeah I mean it's like .. it's like .. at the end it was like a war zone .. and 
232 there's, there's no point when two people are just .. you know .. right in each other's 
233 faces .. there's nothing you can do .. believe me I tried many times .. many times .. 
234 GERALD: Right .. right ... so this is one .. one important piece in this conversation I 
235 think is about your different views around conflict and what can be done .. with that .. 
236 with with conflict in relationship with .. with Becca .. 
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Gerald is not happy on reflection with his use of the word 'accurate' in this 
exchange. It suggests an epistemological stance that he does not want to convey, one 
that is perhaps more suited to a courtroom pursuit of the 'facts'. He commented on 
reading the transcript: 
I don't like my use of the word 'accurate'. It is a word that implies that my 
understandings will be exact. 
Gerald's preference here is for a language that offers Alan and Theresa a different 
kind of position than that of witnesses in a courtroom. They are not there to provide 
an accurate account that the court will then interpret in order to establish a judgment. 
He wants them to be positioned in a more powerful place of making the judgments as 
well as providing the information on which they will be based. 
It has become apparent to Gerald that the two parties are positioned 
differently within a discourse about conflict itself. In this exchange with both parties, 
he engages in a brief deconstructive inquiry into the meanings of conflict that each is 
operating from. In the background, one can imagine a field of military metaphors 
that they are drawing on, or perhaps the metaphors of streetfights. Alan even 
compares conflict with Genna to a 'war zone' (227). There are codes of behaviour 
that go with any context of conflict. What is the honourable way to behave in a 
conflict? Is it to make a stand on principle and fight with 'passion' (223), Theresa's 
word for it? Or is it to avoid the collateral damage of battle and to withdraw (Alan's 
preferred strategy)? With different discursive norms in place, their construction of 
their own and of each other's positions results in very different interpretations, 
especially of Alan's actions. This piece of deconstructive inquiry might be said to 
contribute to the overall purpose of mediation by loosening the grip of these 
discursive positions. Once they have been acknowledged to be 'different views 
around conflict' (235) they can no longer do their divisive work behind the scenes. 
They may still be influential but their influence is at least more open to scrutiny than 
it was. Gerald is careful to construct both viewpoints as conscious and agentic 
choices rather than as reactions to others' actions. Theresa is described actively as 
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'meeting' conflict, 'working it through' and 'declaring' her passion (222-3). Alan is 
described as 'weighing everything up' and 'making a decision to step back' (230). 
In his reflections on the transcript, Gerald speaks about his intentions here and 
of his ambivalence in pursuing this conversation further. First, he references this 
inquiry into ideas about conflict to the narrative therapy and narrative mediation 
practice of building externalizing conversations. 
I am Looking at joining the parties around the notion that conflict has a significant 
presence in this mediation and that both have a different relationship with it. By 
externalizing conflict I am inviting the parties to explore their different relationships 
with conflict rather than focussing on how each other may be the source of conflict 
in some way. 
However, he also acknowledges that this deconstructive enquiry is not as complete as 
it might be. He indicates that he had thoughts about pursuing it further and was also 
constrained by some competing thoughts about doing so. 
It may have been helpfu.L at this juncture to deconstruct conflict further and enquire 
from each of the parties about their experience and understanding of conflict in their 
Lives ... knowing the context from which their respective ideas around conflict were 
formed may have built further understanding and connection between Alan and 
Theresa. However there is a risk in doing this as the parties may experience my 
questioning as being too intrusive. It invites them into a subject area that they may 
think is not directly related to the immediate issues at hand. Deconstructing 
questions have the potential to be intrusive. 
Once again, his concern is with discursive positioning. He does want to open up the 
possibility of the parties re-positioning themselves in relation to the meaning of 
conflict (both their own and the other party's). But he does not want to do this in a 
way that risks them exposing material that is too personal in front of someone else 
with whom they are in conflict. 
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237 GERALD: ... what I'm wanting to know is .. where you're at right at this moment in 
238 terms of how much room each of you see .. you should have as caregivers in 
239 Rebecca's life ... I hear you (looks at Theresa) saying earlier that you would .. if 
240 Alan was talking to you directly on the telephone you would definitely not hang up, 
241 in fact on the contrary you would make efforts for Becca to be able to meet with Alan 
242 in the park and have time with him and .. you sound that there have been periods of 
243 time when you have been very supportive of that contact ... and I hear you say 
244 (turning to Alan) that grandmothers are very important in children's lives .. (Alan 
245 nods) there's a sense that this could be an important relationship to foster and 
246 continue for Rebecca .. is that, is that accurate .. have I understood that right? 
247 ALAN: That's right. 
248 GERALD: I just want to know right now .. acknowledging that things can change ... 
249 what ideas you have about .. one another having involvement with Rebecca .. how do 
250 you see it right now? 
251 THERESA: Well I'm totally against him having custody .. of Rebecca .. I think that 
252 it's .. it's just too drastic a change for, for a child to go through .. and I don't think 
253 that he's equipped to deal with a child .. I don't think he has a clue what it's like to 
254 raise a little girl .. what's he going to do with her hair.. I mean this is a child with 
255 bushy African hair, this is a white man .. what's he going to do with that .. who's 
256 going to comb her hair .. do you know what colour .. what her favourite colour is .. 
257 or what toys she takes to bed with her at night .. these are things that are part of our 
258 everyday life and he has no clue about .. so I don't mind him having contact with her 
259 .. but I think it should be just you know a few hours maybe once every couple of 
260 weeks or something like that .. (Alan shakes his head) because I don't think that .. I 
261 don't think Rebecca deserves to have her whole world turned upside down 'cause 
262 suddenly he's decided to be a father. 
In this segment Gerald continues his pursuit of some relational basis for 
cooperation and agreement between Theresa and Alan. Having not found a strong 
enough story of this in their relational history, he moves to the future. He attempts to 
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move past the mouthing of polarising slogans by addressing his question to the 
complexities of daily life. Interestingly, in terms of the entitlement claims based on 
'closeness' of relationship that both Alan and Theresa have made, he addresses this 
question by also using a metaphor that constructs relationship in terms of spatial 
relations when he asks about how much 'room' (238) they each see for the other 
person in Rebecca's life. In support of this strategy, he cites two examples from what 
they each have said that suggest more inclusive positioning of the other. These are 
unique outcomes (White & Epston, 1990) in relation to the conflict story. 
However, while Alan offers brief agreement with the idea that Gerald is 
developing, Theresa has not yet finished arguing her claim to be entitled to have the 
major role in Rebecca's life. So she refuses the conciliatory position Gerald offers 
her and instead goes back on the offensive by throwing up the word 'custody' (250) 
again and establishing her position in reaction to it. Then she goes on to elaborate 
some of the kinds of details that Gerald was asking for, not in support of a shared 
story but in support of her own entitlement claim. Moreover, she introduces some 
new elements to this claim. For the first time, she raises an argument based on racial 
and cultural grounds (she is African-American and her granddaughter is a bi-racial 
child). She also extends her earlier statements of entitlement based on intimate 
knowledge of the details of Rebecca's life. In the end she does offer a glimpse of the 
kind of vision that Gerald was asking for. She speaks about a role for Alan in 
Rebecca's life, but uses the term 'contact' (258) which positions him more in a role 
of occasional visitor rather than responsible caregiver. Alan's moves to seek greater 
involvement in his daughter's life are described as 'turning her whole world upside 
down' (261) and characterised as a sudden whimsical decision. The positions offered 
to Alan in these descriptions are those of a parent who cannot be relied upon and who 
casually and insensitively disrupts his daughter's life. The phrase 'suddenly decides 
to be a father' has a familiar ring to it from many other conversations from the genre 
of custody disputes. It is no doubt borrowed from other people Theresa has heard use 
it. 
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263 GERALD: .... Alan what's your perspective .. on the kind of involvement that each 
264 of you would have in Rebecca's life right now? 
265 ALAN: Oh I'd like to see something more .. half and half .. really ... what she said 
266 about you know .. her African American roots is true and .. and the hair and those 
267 kinds of things but there's also things that I can offer her as a father that no 
268 grandmother can offer her and ... I know how much she cares about me .. the things 
269 that she told me when she was a little girl .. she used to say that I was her one and 
270 only Dadda and .. I know how much she loves me and that's really important for a 
271 little girl to have a father .. and no one else can take the place of that ... and ... and 
272 sure it will take a while for us to .. get back to where we were but I'm confident that 
273 we can the love is there .. the bond is there .. the physical connection is there and it 
274 will happen. 
275 ... (] 3 lines omitted) 
276 GERALD: So what ideas did you have around what that would look like in terms of 
277 having more involvement? 
278 ALAN: Well I think it would be nice to have the three of us do things together .. go 
279 to the beach or go and do .. do different things and .. and .. and then I could learn 
280 from some of the things that we do together about how she .. how .. how Theresa is 
281 with her granddaughter and things I can learn about some of her up to date, up to the 
282 minute, up to the minute interests that she has .. I'm pretty good at picking up on 
283 things like that .. so I think to ease into it I think that it would be good for us to do 
284 some things together and uh ... 
285 GERALD: Do you have any thoughts .. I know I often end up talking very 
286 specifically about this and just want to have a sense of what it looks like .. how .. what 
287 would you imagine in terms of the hours .. that would be involved in terms of this 
288 development? 
289 ALAN: ... Well ... maybe to start with I could .. could ... could meet with her for a 
290 few hours three or four times a week and ... (Theresa shakes her head) sort of slowly 
291 expand beyond there and .. Grandma would always be welcome to come by. 
292 GERALD: You're saying that you would be open to doing things with Theresa and 
293 Rebecca to learn .. more about where she's up to now .. 
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294 ALAN: Sure. 
295 GERALD: .. and to ease into it .. do you see that you would do that first before 
296 meeting more regularly with her on your own? 
297 ALAN: Yeah .. yeah right it makes logical sense. 
In this section of the conversation, Gerald pursues with Alan the same kind of 
question that he asked Theresa earlier. Just as Theresa had deployed an expression 
common amongst women to describe men in custody disputes, so Alan uses the stock 
expression 'half in half' (265) which is standard to the requests many fathers make 
for custody. But he does not stay with answering Gerald's question for long. The 
conflict story still exerts a powerful pull on him as well and he begins to respond 
more to Theresa's previous utterance than to Gerald's question. There is a 
concessionary acknowledgment of Theresa's entitlements on the basis of race, which 
is then countered with a reference to the special entitlements based on biological 
fatherhood, backed up with more assertions of emotional closeness. The discursive 
argument that male role models are essential for children is produced to support 
Alan's claims. There is some popular psychological knowledge to this effect (for 
example, Bly, 1990, Moore & Gillette, 1991, & Biddulph, 1997), often based on an 
uncritical acceptance of gendered social roles and sometimes used to render 
inadequate the work done by mothers (Silverstein & Rashbaum, 1995). 
Gerald's move as mediator at this point is to ignore the re-ignition of the 
conflict story and the inflammatory rhetoric that has gone before and to pursue the 
development of a story of inclusion. He does this by bypassing the claims of 
entitlement as a basis for a tug of war over Rebecca's life and asks about the possible 
futures Alan is constructing on the basis of these entitlements. He seeks details 
(hours, activities, purposes) about the kind of contact with Rebecca Alan would 
prefer. Such details serve the purpose of developing greater coherence (Cobb 1994) 
for the story of Alan's 'involvement' with Rebecca. In the process, he constructs with 
Alan a story of gradual development of relationship in a modest sounding way. 
Gerald comments in his reflections on the transcript that his intentions here were to: 
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... invite the parties to talk as explicitly as possible about what their plans were and 
what they were wanting from one another and what they were wanting form the child. 
Explicit discussion helps clarify what each is wanting. There is quite a lot of 
vagueness present in the discussion so I persevered with wanting more specific 
information. 
The meaning of what Alan is seeking from this conversation shifts at this point, 
possibly for him, and likely for Theresa. He gets to hear himself detail a story of 
future possibility that now starts to include some of Theresa's expressed concerns 
(such as not to introduce large sudden changes into Rebecca's life). She gets to hear 
a story of future possibility that does not resemble the ones that she feared on 
Rebecca's behalf (for example, the sudden disruptive uprooting of a child from what 
is familiar to her). As this story emerges they slowly start to take up positions in 
relation to it. 
298 GERALD: So .... you Theresa you mentioned about a few hours every couple of 
299 weeks looked like something that would work for you .. do you have any .. I'm sure 
300 y'know you're responding to .. inside to Alan's comments, what do you .. what are 
301 your thoughts and feelings about what he's proposing? 
302 THERESA: Sounds like he's moving too fast for me .. I don't think there's room in, 
303 in Rebecca's life right now for him to see her a few times a week for a few hours .. I, 
304 I just don't see how that works ... I don't think he .. he realises just how short the day 
305 is once .. once she's picked up from .. from the after school centre ... she's busy doing 
306 homework, we have a routine and then we eat dinner and then we go over her 
307 homework watch a little tv and then it's bedtime for her .. and I can't see how he 
308 really fits in that, I can see doing something on the weekend .. (Alan grimaces) you 
309 know I can see us .. the three of us doing something on the weekend maybe .. but in 
310 terms of her day to day life I don't see how that's going to work. 
311 GERALD: OK ... so ... from your perspective you're definitely open for Alan to 
312 feature more prominently in Becca's life but you're very concerned about the pacing 
313 of that .. (Theresa nods) and you're also concerned over time that large chunks of 
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314 time with Becca going backwards and forwards between your home and Alan's 
315 home would be problematic (Theresa nods) but despite that, that you are seeing Alan 
316 having a place in .. Becca's life .. that he hasn't had before. 
317 THERESA: I .. I think .. that's possible .. but I also think we have to check in with 
318 Rebecca and see how she handles that .. I'm not sure that it's a good idea to ~ush her 
319 right now .. she's just so vulnerable .. so I think we have to really .. 
320 GERALD: Well her Mum .. her Mum's .. been dead a little over a month .. this must 
321 be a huge turmoil for you and for her ... so you're thinking anything dramatically 
322 changing right now would be problematic. 
323 THERESA: Yeah. 
Now Gerald moves back to Theresa to explore the possibility of developing a 
joint story around what is now an opening to some relational re-positioning between 
Alan and Theresa. He puts to her Alan's imagined picture of how contact between 
himself and Rebecca might go. She responds apparently negatively by saying it 
would not work. In the process she uses Gerald's earlier spatial metaphor, arguing 
that there would not be enough 'room' (302) in Rebecca's life for him to do what he 
is suggesting. But she also engages in the task of imagining something that would 
work better. She mentions the possibility of a weekend outing (308) which Gerald 
interprets in a larger frame of meaning as 'openness for Alan to feature more 
prominently' (312) in Rebecca's life. Her nods suggest that she goes along with this 
expansion of meaning. Gerald also stretches her statement grammatically. She has 
spoken in the language of tentative possibility - 'I can see .. the three of us doing 
something on the weekend maybe' (309). Gerald's response moves into the 
indicative mood and states that, ' ... you are seeing Alan having a place in .. Becca's 
life .. ' ( 315-6). Again she does not refuse this move, although she does hedge slightly 
by using the word 'possible' (317). In this way, she takes up the position of 
inclusion that has been offered to her. And she also offers back to Alan a sense of 
possible inclusion. This is not yet a negotiation of options for resolution as in a 
problem-solving approach. They have not got that far yet. But it is a segment of 
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conversation in which possible and imagined trajectories of story are brought together 
and some relational re-positioning is taking place. 
At the same time, there is considerable caution about how Theresa engages 
with this new story. She is not yet ready to commit to it. Rather she is thinking about 
all the meanings of what is involved. This brings her to thinking about Rebecca's 
response to these ideas and to suggest asking Rebecca for her opinion. It is 
interesting to note the discursive position being constructed for Rebecca in this 
utterance. Even though she is only seven, Rebecca is accorded by Theresa a voice in 
decisions about her own life. Not all seven-year-olds might expect to be offered this 
position. In different cultures or historical periods, such discursive positions would 
not exist for children (who should be 'seen and not heard'). Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough ( 1999) talk about the trends for discourse in late modern society to shape 
the constitution of families in ways that emphasise a more democratic set of relations 
between family members. This can be seen as an example of that. 
324 GERALD: .... There's something occurring .. occurred to me as I'm hearing both of 
325 you talk ... I've been involved for a number of years as a mediator working with 
326 where there are disputes that exist between people about caregiving arrangements for 
327 children .. and I'm just struck .. by each of you .. despite all you've gone through .. 
328 both of you .. that there's some appreciation of the other and their role in Becca's life 
329 but more than that .. that .. you Alan were saying that you felt comfortable spending 
330 time with Theresa ... for periods of time in the weekend to .. start to slowly connect 
331 with .. with her (Alan nods) and to learn to be in .. Rebecca's life again and an 
332 openness to engaging with Theresa in a fuller way than you have in the past and I 
333 hear you (turning to Theresa) also say that despite everything that happened with 
334 your daughter ... and .. I'm sure the conflicts that you witnessed first hand that they 
335 both went through and that .. Genna's perspective (Theresa nods) on it, you know, 
336 and the affair and so on ... despite all of that you still felt .. like you could open your 
337 heart enough to Alan for him to telephone you and that you were prepared to make 
338 space and time for ... him to be with Becca and I .. I'm really struck by that 
339 recognition of the importance of each of you in Becca's life .. I'm just wondering 
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340 how come it's like that .. because oftentimes those relationships after the kind of 
341 conflicts and certainly the pain that you're experiencing now often destroys that 
342 fact .. destroys those kind of connections and I .. would you mind just expl- .. telling 
343 me a little bit each of you how that hasn't been just written off completely. 
At this point Gerald makes a little speech. In his reflections on the transcript 
he refers to it as a 'summary' made with the purpose in mind of helping 'develop a 
joint narrative about the emerging conversation.' He is wanting to capitalise on the 
unique outcome that has happened - the move that both parties have made into a story 
that positions them more as cooperative with each other. Treating this move as an 
event on the landscape of action (Bruner, 1986; White 1992; Winslade & Monk, 
2000), he seeks to develop meaning around it on the landscape of consciousness. He 
wants to develop its significance such that it will be taken more notice of. The moves 
here are worth paying close attention to. 
First Gerald uses a nominalisation to downplay a presentation of himself as an 
expert interpreter. He says somewhat vaguely there is 'something occurring to him' 
(324) as if he is slowly catching up from behind, rather than more directly, say, 'I 
think this is what you are both saying ... ' Theresa and Alan are thus positioned as 
informing him rather than the other way round. Then, a story of appreciation and 
respect is plucked out of the numerous other stories that have been spoken about 
during the conversation so far. This is constructed in Gerald's utterance as the central 
story by its placement in the foregrounded clause of the grammatical construction. 
The conflict story which has dominated both parties' communications so far is 
relegated to a backgrounded clause headed by the word 'despite' (three times: 327, 
333 and 336). In the foreground in the third instance is placed the agentive statement, 
' ... you still felt .. like you could open your heart enough ... ' ( 336-7). The 
backgrounded aspects introduced by the word 'despite' are framed as annoying and 
unfortunate restraints on the emergence of a more heroic story of courage and 
strength of purpose in the interests of cooperation. Gerald offers them both different 
positions in relation to the conflict itself (that is different from how they have 
positioned each other) and in relation to the substantive issues. They are constructed 
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as holding onto some positive things in the face of adversity, rather than as polarised 
around a problem to be solved. The problem in this utterance looms smaller rather 
than larger. 
Having developed briefly a plausible story in this regard, Gerald asks a 
question that presupposes the story that he has just told. He asks Theresa and Alan to 
theorise and explain how they have managed to do this. Thus they are positioned as 
agents in the construction of this alternative story. They are also positioned as 
editorial commentators on a selected aspect of their own experience. Gerald has been 
offering some editorial comment himself and he asks them to join him in this. In the 
process of making this invitation, he begins to ask them to 'explain' their actions and 
then revises this usage in favour of one that does not carry with it some connotations 
of 'justifying before an authority'. Gerald comments himself on this correction that 
he makes: 
I was about to say, 'Would you mind explaining?' This word feels to me too 
authoritarian, too much like me being the expert. 
Alan and Theresa are also positioned in this summary as exceptional people in 
comparison to some unnamed others whom Gerald has met who would not be able to 
do this, who would have had their best intentions swamped by the events that Theresa 
and Alan have been through. The question now becomes one of whether or not Alan 
and Theresa will take up the positions Gerald is inviting them into, or whether the 
conflict story will pull them back into its orbit. 
344 ALAN: Well I .. I've never had a problem with Theresa I mean .. she .. she was 
345 correct before when she said that like on the phone that she was pleasant with me and 
346 .. and she didn't get in the way between me and Rebecca. 
347 GERALD: Did you know .. have you discovered anything right now that you didn't 
348 know about Theresa's ideas about you having involvement with Rebecca. 
349 ALAN: Well what she said about her hair and her African-American culture and so 
350 forth I mean that .. I didn't, hadn't thought that through as clearly before so .. but 
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351 there's another thing here that I'd like to say I mean .. I think .. I think we could be 
352 potentially working well together at co-parenting but I think one thing that .. that 
353 Theresa hasn't addressed is I think because of .. I think the apron strings are a little 
354 too tight in a way .. I think that she's .. what .. what I'm concerned about her saying .. 
355 asking Rebecca what Rebecca thinks .. that Theresa's gonna be sort of nudging her 
356 you know like what the correct answer is .. which is that Grandma really wants to 
357 spend as much time as she's always spent with her and this is .. it's not .. normal for .. 
358 I mean sometimes grandparents are involved in kids' lives but usually you know it's 
359 the direct parents .. and .. and .. I'm just concerned how .. how you know how she's 
360 going to be contaminating things so to speak . 
361 GERALD: So right now your pointing out maybe a little bit of distrust .. of Theresa 
362 in impacting on Rebecca's ideas about what she's going to .. (pause - change of 
363 videotape) 
364 GERALD: From what you just said it strikes me that .. you have a little distrust .. 
365 present as you think about Theresa and ... talking with Rebecca and maybe 
366 influencing her in terms of some the things she might say regarding the pacing and 
367 connection .. I hear that .. but I also hear a willingness to work with Rebecca .. and a 
368 willingness to .. and I'm just wondering whether you're open to speaking a little bit 
369 about .. the connection with Theresa that you could consider going and spending a 
370 few hours in the weekend with the three of you .. how that could be the case .. and 
371 how come you're prepared to do that given all the things that you've gone through .. 
372 and the fact that you felt very alienated and cut off from your daughter. 
373 ALAN: Yeah well again the major thing was between me and .. and Genna .. 
374 GERALD: And Genna .. yeah. 
375 ALAN: .. and and Theresa to her credit you know .. at the beginning didn't get in the 
376 way between me and my daughter and she was always polite with me and .. and I 
377 think she even knows in her heart that Genna wasn't that available a lot of times .. so 
378 I never felt ... the same thing I felt from Genna from from Theresa so I think there's 
379 potential to .. to work together hopefully. 
380 GERALD: OK .. thank you .. 
246 
In Alan's response there is considerable ambivalence. He swings back and 
forth between the position that Gerald has offered and his more familiar position in 
the conflict story. Yes, he acknowledges Theresa's actions that suggest openness to a 
basis for relationship that could be cooperative. Yes, he is taking into consideration 
and ma~es room for things she has said (for example about Rebecca's hair and her 
links with African-American culture). Yes, he can speculate about 'working well 
together' (352) and 'co-parenting' (352). But also he still has concerns that pull him 
back towards the conflict story. His concerns can be seen to be expressions of several 
conventional discourses. The gendered story of children being too tightly tied to 
women's 'apron strings' (353) appears in his speech. As does a notion of the 'normal 
nuclear family' and the 'normal' role of grandparents (357-359) in relation to this. 
And he is concerned about Theresa's use of her privileged position of access to 
Rebecca to sway her opinions against him. Then Gerald ensures the evenhandedness 
of the conversation by inviting Theresa to respond to the same question. 
381 GERALD: .. what do you make of .. 
382 THERESA: Well .. 
383 GERALD: .. your willingness to continue to engage? 
384 THERESA: I think it's interesting that Alan's not trusting me .. in terms what I'm 
385 going to say to Becca because Becca's my priority I'm not going to say tell her 
386 anything that's going to hurt her in any way I'm not going to mislead her in all these 
387 years I've never told her anything bad about her father .. I figure .. I mean it's 
388 interesting that he doesn't trust me .. he's the one that had the affair .. I've never 
389 thrown that in his face or anything and .. and I don't intend to .. and I'm not trying to 
390 ... I'm not trying to interfere with him having a relationship with his daughter, I'm 
391 just trying to make sure that she has stability in her life and right now I think stability 
392 for her is .. is being with me and continuing the lifestyle that she's .. as closely as 
393 possible that she's used to and that's .. living with me. 
Theresa's response is not so much to Gerald's question as to Alan's distrust of 
her expressed in a previous utterance. And it is a selective and reactive response to 
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how she has been positioned by Alan. It selects out for reaction one side of Alan's 
expressions of ambivalence and ignores the other. Thus, in this moment, the conflict 
story is selected out ahead of the cooperation story. Or perhaps she is wanting to 
emphasise some aspects of her meanings that she wants in future to see included in 
any story of cooperation (the impo~tance of stability for Rebecca and her primary 
living context being with her grandmother) and therefore feels that it is important to 
reassert them. 
Gerald is persistent though in following up on the story of possible 
cooperation. He directs her attention back to his question and this time phrases it as a 
simple yes/no question asking her to confirm his own meaning statement. 
394 GERALD: ..... So despite the fact that you're really clear about what .. what 
395 Becca's needs are right now in terms of the stability and routine and the familiarity 
396 with what she's experiencing .. despite your real clearness about that .. you still have 
397 some openness to Alan being present in some way ... is that accurate? 
398 THERESA: Yeah. 
399 GERALD: What .. what's your sense of what Alan might add to Becca's life? 
400 THERESA: Well she's a bi-racial child .. and so ..... even though when people look 
401 at her they're gonna make assumptions about who she is I think it's important for her 
402 to know her heritage on both sides .. so that's something that he can provide in her 
403 life ... and I think the child needs a male role model .. and so he's, I'm sure he's able 
404 to do that or I think he is ... and I think it will give her a certain amount of balance .. 
405 to have a loving parent now that Genna's gone .. I think that's, those are important 
406 things but I .. 
407 GERALD: Do you see ... Alan as a loving parent? 
408 THERESA: .. That's my hope. I'm not sure, he's going to have to demonstrate that 
409 ... I hope that's who he is. 
The commitment invited by a yes/no question is a small one. This time 
Theresa takes up the position that Gerald offers her. Her response supplements his 
question. Gerald seeks to build on it by asking a further question that is clearly 
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directed towards expanding any thoughts she may have about Alan's inclusion in her 
relationship with Rebecca. She responds to this question by accessing a discourse 
about the psychological importance of knowing cultural heritage. Then she cites the 
same discourse that Alan has already alluded to about the necessity of positive male 
role models for healthy psychological development. And Ala~ is described as 
'providing' something in her life, an expression that is faintly evocative of the 
conventional male role in the patriarchal family - that of 'provider.' At this point she 
drops into her utterance a comment about Alan as a 'loving parent.' The moment is 
significant and Gerald does not let it pass. He asks more about the significance of 
this expression. In so doing, he invites Theresa to perform meaning around it, to step 
further into a commitment to these words and to extend the story of cooperation and 
mutual respect another pace forward. 
410 ( 15 lines of transcript omitted) 
411 GERALD: ... So you've added a real concern about conflict could drive a real 
412 wedge between Alan and Becky as she goes through her adolescent years and that's 
413 something you wonder about .. however despite that ... what has .. I'm just 
414 interested to know this because .. a lot of parents in a circumstance .. or caregivers or 
415 .. grandparents in a circumstance like you has .. could easily close her heart right off 
416 and close that connection right off and I'm wondering .. what is it that Alan's done 
417 over the years .. despite the fact that he's had very little contact with her that's kept 
418 alive in you the idea that .. he has the potential to be a loving parent .. a fa- .. a good 
419 father to Becky .. an important parent in Becky's life ... are there things that he's .. 
420 that you've seen in Alan .. or things he's done despite the little contact and your .. 
421 your views about that. 
422 THERESA: Well I think his relationship with her when she was younger .. they were 
423 very close .. and I think the potential is there for them to do that again .. um I think 
424 more than him actively doing anything to make me have hope is that .. the, the main 
425 thing that he hasn't done was to be in her life, he hasn't actively done anything to 
426 harm her .. it's kind've been he's just been not active in her life .. 
427 GERALD: Right .. right.. 
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428 THERESA: and so I kind of see this as he's trying to correct that. 
429 GERALD: Uh huh. 
430 THERESA: at this point .. 
431 GERALD: Is that a desirable move from your perspective? 
432 THERESA: It's late .. it's late .. it's just really late .. you know I .. 
433 GERALD: But not too late .. given all the other things that you've said. 
434 THERESA: I think .. that the timing of it .. limits just how close he's gonna be able 
435 to get .. I think he's missed a really important part of her life .. already and .. you 
436 know and .. and that pisses me off .. that she's missed that time with him .. but I don't 
437 think no you 're right it's not too late for him to have some kind of a relationship with 
438 her .. I just think there's .. there's limits to how much, how close it can be just 
439 because he's messed up. 
I have omitted a brief conversation about each party's distrust of the other that 
does not develop far and remains something of a sidetrack away from the main 
direction of the conversation. At the beginning of this segment, Gerald summarizes 
this conversation using the externalising language of narrative mediation. Conflict is 
externalised and personified as a separate being from both Rebecca and Alan with the 
potential to affect their relationship. Neither is positioned as at fault in this 
construction. He comments in his reflections on the transcript: 
A new area of conflict arises that was a surprise to me. I externalise distrust to avoid 
the awkwardness of locating distrust in each person and suggesting that it might be 
an internalised quality that is less movable, owned and more trait-like, rather than 
existing relationally in the present moment. 
Gerald goes on to ask a long and subtle question of Theresa that requires her 
to speculate about Alan's qualities as a parent (418-422) and to relate these to events 
that she has witnessed. It is a question that asks her to generate new meanings rather 
than simply to report on what has happened. In the process of asking this question, 
Gerald carefully positions Theresa in a place of respect. First, he speaks of her as 
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exceptional to Gerald's knowledge of other parents who would have 'closed their 
hearts'(415). The inference is that Gerald sees her as openhearted. He has offered 
her this identity construction to step into simply by answering his question and he has 
done this by use of contrast with what can be safely expected to be an unattractive 
position by way of comparison (someone who is cold hearted and quickly closes off 
connections with others.) Secondly, he corrects his reference to 'parents' to include 
both 'caregivers' and 'grandparents' (414-5) such as Theresa. This is an effort to 
ensure that his language does not inadvertently create a position of exclusion for her. 
Thirdly, he refers to a process of 'keeping alive an idea' (of Alan's potential to be a 
good parent). Keeping something alive stands in contrast to letting it die. In view of 
Theresa's recent experience of her daughter's death, this image may have particular 
personal poignancy. 
Moreover, let us look at what the step is that she is being invited to take. It is 
to 'keep alive' the 'idea' that Alan has the 'potential' to be a 'loving parent' and a 
'good father' and then to search through her memory for experiences that would 
corroborate this description. This is such a small step that it is hard to refuse. To do 
so could appear churlish and carries the risk of being called 'coldhearted'. It fits Alan 
Jenkins' ( 1990) description of questions that are 'irresistible invitations'. Theresa 
does not refuse the invitation. She steps into the position of constructing Alan as a 
potential parent, referencing his relationship with her when she was young and adding 
that he has not done her any harm. 
The dominant conflict story reasserts itself still in her reference to his lack of 
presence in his daughter's life, indicating that there is a degree of ambivalence in her 
responses. She is being tugged by two competing stories of Alan. The moment is a 
delicate one in the direction of this conversation. She swings back to the story of 
potential and assigns a motive to Alan as currently trying to correct his past failures. 
There is even a hint of a more positive interpretation of Alan's distance from 
Rebecca. It has at least prevented harm. Gerald picks up on Theresa's concession 
and invites her to evaluate it, to take a position in relation to it. Is it desirable or not? 
This is another invitation to take a step forward into a relational position that will 
include Alan in future in a positive fashion. Theresa teeters on the edge of 
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responding to this invitation. It is 'late' (432), she prevaricates. Gerald agrees and 
suggests 'not too late'(433), which keeps the ambivalence alive. In the end though, 
Theresa opts for the idea that she can envisage Alan having a positive relationship 
with his daughter (437). Her statement to this effect includes some comments that 
refer to the dominant story but also clearly and decisively opens up space for a 
negotiation of how this can happen. She has stepped into a position in a new story at 
this point. The rest of the conversation will amount to an effort to elaborate this 
story. However, as we shall see, the dominant story is not yet done with. It still has 
questions which need to be addressed. 
440 (4 lines omitted) 
441 GERALD: What do you make of Alan's efforts to .. send birthday cards and I 
442 understand you (looks at Alan) sent cards on other occasions as well .. is that .. 
443 ALAN: And all the time at school.. 
444 GERALD: .. and that .. the occasions he's seen her at school and .. consulted with 
445 the teachers about her .. her wellbeing .. are those examples of .. someone that is .. 
446 still wanting to find connection with her or how do you see that? 
447 THERESA: ... I think that's the minimal effort .. I think it's the easy way out ... I 
448 think he should have been doing a lot more than that .. and I think .. when Rebecca 
449 gets those cards it just points out the fact that she doesn't have a father that's active in 
450 her life anymore and it kind of reminds her of that .. so actually those were kind of .. 
451 painful .. it would almost have been better for her just to forget about him .. than to be 
452 reminded of that he's here he's alive he's well .. but he's not having an interaction 
453 with you .. and you know a card here and there .. 
Gerald's question seeks to extend the viability of the story of Alan's potential 
as a parent by attaching it to known events in the past. He wants to grow the story of 
potential cooperation in the relationship. Theresa is ambivalent in response. Clearly, 
she can answer in the positive, but she is again pulled by her other story of Alan as 
neglectful, a story that is fueled by her witnessing of Rebecca's pain at not seeing her 
252 
father. She references a scale of judgment against which Alan's efforts are assessed 
as 'minimal'. Gerald says about this that his intention was: 
... to assist Theresa to remember that Alan does have an ongoing relationship despite 
his physical absence from Rebecca. 
It is part of the narrative perspective that stories do not only exist in one person's 
mind. They are not just cognitive events in that way. Rather they have a life in 
discourse and can be enlivened through another person's remembering, particularly as 
it is spoken into existence in conversation with a mediator in this instance. 
454 (4 lines omitted) 
455 GERALD: Mhmm ... given your openness to this contact but caution about how 
456 that's done and the frequency of it .. what .. what would you imagine if Becky was 
457 here right now .. listening to Alan declare what he wants to do in her life .. what's 
458 your hunch about what Becky would be saying .. about Alan. 
459 THERESA: .... I'm not really clear ... on what it is that Alan wants ... I know that 
460 if Becky thought that he wanted to take her to live with him that she wouldn't want to 
461 leave me .. her home .. the friends and the school and all the different familiar 
462 surroundings that she knows, I know, I'm sure that she wouldn't want to do that ... 
463 but I think she would be open to having interactions with him. 
464 GERALD: Would it be a positive experience for Becky to hear .. how Alan would 
465 like to start off by maybe even the three of you going and doing something, going for 
466 a few hours on the weekends .. 
467 ( JO lines omitted) 
468 What about .. the ... the desire to want to be part of her life now and want to .. be very 
469 present in her life right now .. if she listened to that part of the conversation .. what 
470 effect do you think would that be a positive step? 
471 THERESA: I think .. I think we need to approach it very delicately .. because .. she 
472 could hear that as .. I'm glad your Mom's dead now I can see you .. she could 
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473 interpret it as that and we want to make sure that's not .. that's not the message we 
474 want her to get. 
This time Gerald comes at the task of thickening the story of cooperation by 
including Rebecca's voice in a hypothetical way. He comments: 
I was wanting to 'bring in Rebecca' and invite Theresa and Alan to consider what 
her perceptions might be. This is a symbolic attempt to bring in the child's voice in 
her absence as it is understood by the conflicted parties. 
He is also here privileging Theresa's knowledge of Rebecca's views by asking her to 
speak on her granddaughter's behalf. In Theresa's response, she indicates her view of 
Rebecca's openness to the story of potential contact with Alan ( 463) but also 
represents some limits to the meaning of the interaction. Again Gerald invites 
Theresa into the position of making an editorial judgment on Rebecca's behalf. 
Would this be a 'positive' experience (464)? In a sense he is positioning her here as 
the responsible parent, intimately knowledgeable about Rebecca's interests. Theresa 
supplements this by taking up a protective role on Rebecca's behalf, especially 
protecting her sensitivity around her mother's death. Her representation of Alan's 
discursive strategy as, "I'm glad your mother's dead, now I can see you" (471), 
actually bears some resemblance to Alan's own earlier statement. She may now be 
responding not just to Gerald's question but at the same time to this earlier comment. 
She positions herself as protecting Rebecca against this interpretation and goes 
further by including Gerald and Alan in her protection of Rebecca by the inclusive 
use of the word 'we' in, "That's not the-message we want her to get" (472-3). The 
usage is significant in terms of the position she is taking in relation to the cooperation 
story (we are now working together) and in terms of the invitation for Alan to join her 
in the parental role of protection. 
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475 GERALD: ( .. ) I'm wondering whether .. her hearing her Dad wants to engage in the 
476 way that he's .. and the effort he's making to do that now, right now .. today .. she 
477 would warm to that .. that would be a positive rather than a negative experience? 
478 THERESA: You know .. at this point I'm not sure .. 
479 GERALD: Uh huh. 
480 THERESA: She's pretty fragile .. given what she's recently gone through. 
481 GERALD: Uh huh. 
482 THERESA: So I'm think- .. I don't know .. I guess we could just approach her and 
483 ask her .. you know what do you think about us going to the beach this weekend with 
484 your Dad or the movie .. or whatever. 
485 GERALD: Mmm. 
486 THERESA: I think we could ask her and I mean she's pretty verbal and she'll .. 
487 she'll be honest about what she's feeling .. I can't really predict because she's been 
488 rather moody lately ... which is understandable .. so I'm not sure. 
489 GERALD: Would you be willing to encourage .. the .. you know as parents and .. and 
490 loved ones, caregivers, grandparents have a .. do have an enormous influence and 
491 sway on children at seven ... ( 3 lines omitted) would this conversation you'd be 
492 having with Becky about Alan stepping in gradually in the way that you've described 
493 .. would you .. from what you've said it sounds like you would be supporting that 
494 kind of conversation rather than undermining it .. what .. what's your take on that? 
495 THERESA: I think what I could support is asking her about one visit .. I think that 
496 she's young and I think it's difficult for her to see .. like long range processes and .. 
497 (9 lines omitted) 
498 GERALD: (overlapping) Would there be encouragement .. in your voice .. or 
499 discouragement do you think .. as you think about .. doing that with Alan. 
500 THERESA: Well there wouldn't be discouragement .. I don't know, I don't know 
501 whether it's encouragement or neutral .. I wouldn't discourage her at all .. I'm not 
502 against it. 
503 GERALD: Would you convey that your Dad would really like to see you on the 
504 weekend .. would you have some kind of part of the conversation including Alan's 
505 motives as well for Becky to hear? 
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506 THERESA: Yeah. 
This section of conversation takes place largely in the subjunctive mood. It is 
uttered in the language of future possibility and wondering (Bruner, 1986, speaks of 
stories as 'subjunctivizing reality') rather than o~ current indicative statement. It is 
the realm of 'as if' rather than the realm of facts, or of 'what is.' It is a linguistic 
space in which possibilities can be explored without being finalized. In this realm the 
story of Alan's and Theresa's joint care for Rebecca is being slowly fashioned. 
Gerald is pursuing this process of story construction by asking a series of questions 
that press for details about small developmental increments. He comments: 
I am inviting the parties to step out of one frame of reference for a moment and look 
at another. 
In each question Theresa is invited further into the position of supporting the story of 
Alan's involvement. On each occasion she takes up this position, albeit with some 
caution and careful thought about the consequences. There is still a genuine sense of 
dilemma and Theresa continues to position herself as protective of Rebecca. 
507 GERALD: .... Alan what are you making of the conversation .. we're having right 
508 now. 
509 ALAN: I really liked that you asked that because that's exactly the fear that I had 
510 was that she would be discouraging with the tight apron strings ... and so I think that 
511 that's .. you hit the nail on the head on that .. that the way she does it is .. is really 
512 important .. you know cause if she says .. you know honey I have a lot of things 
513 planned here I know we can do with each other .. but would .. your Dad .. would you 
514 like to see your Dad .. I mean she could stack the cards really easily if she chose to .. 
515 and I know what it's like you know to .. have certain routines and certain familiar .. 
516 habits and .. inclinations and .. so I think what you said before is really important, you 
517 know, if she asks that in a positive way and tells her .. how much I really love her 
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518 and want to see her .. I think that at least it's a fair chance for her to .. to know .. to 
519 answer .. you know. 
520 GERALD: What have you heard about what Theresa has said about you being in 
521 Becky's life? 
522 ALAN: I think she's scared .. yeah (very softly) .... and you know listen .. to be 
523 honest I have some of my own .. fears too .. you know I haven't been .. the kind of 
524 parent I would have .. dreamed of being .. it just hasn't worked out, I mean I can't .. 
525 you know I can take some responsibility but .. Genna also is very much involved in 
526 this and .. in making it really really hard .. but I do take my responsibility .. and I feel 
527 sad and I, and I have .. I have my own fears and doubts about .. how it'll go .. but I 
528 know my heart is pure on this I know that I love my daughter and I want to .. do 
529 whatever I can to make it work .. I'm really convinced that I will do that. 
530 GERALD: So you're talking about fear both in terms of Theresa's fear about you 
531 engaging more fully .. and you've talked about your own .. did you hear any other 
532 things that Theresa said about her perspective on you being in Becky's life, in 
533 Rebecca's life? 
534 ALAN: ... That she doesn't want to .. upset the applecart .. really quickly and .. and 
535 disrupt .. disrupt Rebecca's world and I can understand that .. that's why I suggested 
536 that we .. that you start by doing things together. 
537 GERALD: Did you hear about her seeing the validity, seeing the value of you being 
538 involved in Rebecca's life as a father and .. 
539 ALAN: I heard some of that. 
540 GERALD: .. and as a parent? 
541 ALAN: I heard some of that. 
542 GERALD: What .. what was it like to hear that from Theresa? 
543 ALAN: Well .. I would have enjoyed hearing a little bit more (smiles) but .. what I 
544 did hear was nice. 
In an effort to knit the story of cooperation in further still, Gerald asks Alan a 
series of questions that invite him to make meaning out of Theresa's preceding 
utterances. In this way, the story that was set in future possibility can be woven into 
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the present reality. It is noticeable that the mood is not subjunctive now but 
indicative. But the subject matter is the exchange that has taken place in the 
subjunctive mood. In other words, what was talked about first in the tentative 
language of possibility is now moved into the language of material reality. Talk of 
what could possibly be is realised through its very utterance as a discursive event 
which now can be talked about as having happened. This does not yet mean that the 
imagined conversation with Rebecca has taken place, but its likelihood is increased 
through the discussion of the meanings that not only would ensue if it did take place 
but which are also already ensuing through its even being envisaged. 
However, as has happened in this conversation already several times, the old 
story of conflict and distrust re-appears. Alan attributes Theresa's cautious protective 
comments on Rebecca's behalf to an underlying 'fear' in her, supporting this with 
reference to his own 'fears'. Such nominalisation (and reification?) of emotion as 
essential and originary is common within humanistic psychological discourse. One 
consequence of it here is that it blinds Alan to a possible interpretation of Theresa as 
a practising caregiver, appropriately protecting her granddaughter in a time of 
fragility. The interpretation he is persuaded by constructs her as acting more selfishly 
out of her own emotional disposition, than altruistically out of her assessment of what 
is important for Rebecca. This construction threatens the delicate new story, and 
Gerald is deliberate and persistent in steering the conversation back to a basis on 
which the new story can continue to develop. He asks in the end a very specific 
question about whether Alan has heard Theresa's statements in (cautious) support of 
his inclusion in Rebecca's life. He has. So Gerald asks about the significance of 
these to Alan. This time Alan is being positioned as editorial commentator. 
545 GERALD: OK .. OK .. right ... so where are we up to in this conversation right now 
546 in terms of your understandings about .. what .. to do next? 
547 THERESA: Well I'm .. sensing that ... sometime soon .. I guess we'd have to figure 
548 out when what day or time you'd be available .. and I'll just ... approach Becca and 
549 ask her what she feels about .. spending some time with her Dad .. doing whatever 
550 activity we figure out .... 
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551 ALAN: But see I think it's really important to do what you said .. about saying how 
552 much I .. I care about her .. cause I want her to know that .. and that may influence 
553 her decision. 
554 THERESA: I think that she'll hear that better coming from you .. directly so ... I 
555 don't think you Jet me finish what I was saying so if we could .. if, if it can be 
556 arranged so that I just introduce the idea and let her think about it I'm just kind of 
557 introducing it neutrally I'm .. not against it .. but I don't want to pressure her .. either 
558 .. at this point .. but .. and just say well you know your Dad's gonna call you .. and ... 
559 we can talk about it .. and just let her mull it over .. and I think it's important for her 
560 to hear how much you Jove her from you .. not necessarily from me I don't think it 
561 will have the same meaning .. and if you're going to start building some .. contact 
562 with her I think you need to tell her that directly. 
563 GERALD: Is this news for you that you could talk .. to .. Rebecca directly and 
564 calling Theresa's number? 
565 ALAN: ..... Well .. yeah .. I mean .. yeah. 
At this point in the mediation a kind of negotiation begins to take place 
around the details of implementing the story of cooperation. It differs from a 
problem-solving conversation in that they are not brainstorming options in the 
abstract, so much as trying to concretise on the landscape of action a relational stance 
that has already been set up. The foundational work has been done and the 
negotiation is not around a settlement so much as around plans for further story 
development with the major themes already agreed upon. It is noticeable here that 
Theresa and Alan are now addressing each other rather than speaking through the 
mediator. They each contribute ideas about what they will do and will request the 
other to do. The positions being constructed in this exchange are different from those 
earlier in the mediation. Albeit somewhat tentatively, they are now positioning each 
other as partners in a joint enterprise. Rather than expressing competing entitlement 
claims in finalizing ways that exclude the other, they are now discussing each other's 
concerns in an inclusive, more dialogical manner. 
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566 GERALD: Uh huh .. OK .. um .. what's occurring to me is um .. that the distr- .. the 
567 distrust is still around a little in terms of these ... beginning points of reconnection .. 
568 I'm hearing you say that you'd really like Theresa to be very supportive of .. and 
569 being encouraging of .. Rebecca to have some time with you and Theresa in an outing 
570 of some kind in the first instance. 
571 ALAN: And she could .. 
572 GERALD: .. and that would be really important to you. 
573 ALAN: Yeah .. and she could even say .. if she didn't want to say it the other way 
574 she could say .. your Dad has a message that you wanted to pass from him .. a 
575 message saying that he really wants, loves you .. 
576 GERALD: Right. 
577 ALAN: .. and he really wants to see you .. she doesn't have to vouch for me if she's 
578 worried about that .. you know .. she could just deliver the message from me .. 
579 GERALD: Right. 
580 ALAN: .. it's just to let her know I .. you know that it's important to me. 
581 GERALD: OK .. and I hear you (turns to Theresa) loud and clear about your concern 
582 about .. a lot of what's going on in Becky's life and the stability issue and .. things 
583 being fragile and needing to take things very very carefully ... and I also hear at the 
584 same time an interest in you seeing Alan having a place in her life .. you've heard 
585 Alan talk about how he would like you to be supportive of this conversation .. so that 
586 he has some chance to make at least one meeting happen .. in the first .. in the first 
587 instance .. What .. what are you wondering about as you hear Alan ask you to .. be 
588 encouraging? 
589 THERESA: I'm trying to think of a way that I can be genuine with her because that 
590 is our relationship .. 
591 GERALD: Mhmm. 
592 THERESA: .. and I think that I can say .. well Becky you know I spoke to your Dad 
593 today and he wants us to go to the park on Saturday .. and I think it's a good idea .. 
594 but I want you to talk to him about it and he's gonna call you later .. so because I still 
595 .. I don't want to be the one to convey your feelings to her .. because .. if you 
596 disappoint her then I lied to her .. and so I think it's important for you to talk to her 
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597 directly about your feelings and what you want .. in terms of a relationship with her .. 
598 I would like to witness it but I don't want to be .. the go-between between the two of 
599 you in that way .. I can support it by saying I think it's a good idea .. because in 
600 saying that I think I'm not .. pressuring her .. I'm still allowing her to make choices 
601 because she's at that age where I encourage her .. to think through making decisions 
602 and .. and to be sensitive to her own feelings .. and to be genuine with me about that 
603 and if I give her whole song and dance or a spiel I'm gonna, I'll be pressuring her to 
604 do a particular thing and I want to her to be honest with me .. if she doesn't want to 
605 do it or if she doesn't feel this is the right time .. I want to leave to leave room for her 
606 to be able to say that to me. 
607 ALAN: And I .. and I understand that .. I mean I wouldn't want you to pressure her I 
608 think what you said before was fine .. just to say that you .. you .. Dad wants to get 
609 together and you think it's a good idea, just like a couple of sentences is fine .. and 
610 then I .. I would be happy to tell her how much I love her when I see her and I don't 
611 expect you to be the go-between .. I'm just talking about the initial set-up so that at 
612 least there's a fighting chance that I'll get a chance to see her .. that's all. 
613 THERESA: .... Yeah .. I don't think I've done anything to discourage you having an 
614 interaction with your daughter .. and I'm not gonna start at this point .. I just .. I just 
615 wanna see that we're doing it in a way that's respectful .. of her and that's considerate 
616 of who she is .. and what she's used to and what's comfortable for her. 
Gerald begins this exchange with an externalisation of distrust (566) that sets 
it apart from Theresa and Alan. Rather than describing it as an internal feeling state, 
it is nominalised and objectified. In the process, he positions them as committed to 
'reconnection' and posits 'distrust' as a discursive restraint upon their joint purpose. 
This contrasts with an approach that would construct the distrust as a problem to be 
overcome in some way, or as intertwined with some identity project. Putting things 
this way round constructs the 'distrust' as diminished in size in comparison with the 
parties' intentions and desires and invites them to disidentify with it and to identify 
further with the 'reconnection'. As they both respond to this position call, they take 
up such positions and speak them further into existence. 
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After setting up the discursive context in this way, Gerald offers some 
acknowledgement and understanding of concerns that each party has in relation to the 
process of reconnection. For Alan, it is the issue of how Theresa sets up his 
conversation with Rebecca. For Theresa it is about Rebecca's fragility being 
respect~d and finding a way to convey to her what needs to be said without speaking 
too much on Alan's behalf. The issues that are being discussed are things like 
'pressure' versus 'free choice'; being 'supportive' versus being 'undermining'; 
carrying a 'message' versus 'vouching for' that message; being genuine and honest 
versus being dishonest. Alan makes a plea for Theresa to speak to Rebecca in 
support of reconnection with Alan. Theresa takes up this invitation and explores in 
some detail how she can do this in ways that do not compromise her integrity and 
which do not cause distress to Rebecca. The negotiation is in considerable detail and 
is finely nuanced but it is also done in a spirit of cooperation. The position calls they 
offer each other are not being refused as frequently as they were earlier in the 
conversation. 
617 GERALD: ..... So what are the next steps? 
618 THERESA: .. .. .. .. I guess ... looking at our schedules and .. setting a time .. a 
619 tentative time .. assuming that Becky goes along with it and .. then for me to talk to 
620 her and make arrangements when you'll call .. after I've talked to her. 
621 ALAN: Sounds good .. we could go to the beach .. it's supposed to be really nice this 
622 weekend ... I can ... get some boogie boards and .. you know get there early to get a 
623 nice space and everything. 
624 THERESA: OK we'd have to do that on Sunday because she has gymnastics on 
625 Saturday. 
626 ALAN: That's fine. 
627 GERALD: I hear you both starting to .. talk with one another about planning this 
628 meeting and I'm also aware that when we began this meeting .. that .. what was on the 
629 table was more around the primary caregiving arrangements and I'm wondering .. 
630 whether .. the two of you in the spirit that you've presented today will look at .. the 
631 situation one step at a time and looking at the chance of having a week- .. a weekend 
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632 experience for a couple of hours whatever we decide .. and that .. we meet together 
633 again to .. talk through the nature of ongoing .. an ongoing caregiving relationship 
634 and how that .. how that looks .. while recognising right now that you're really clear 
635 about .. wanting to continue to be the primary caregiver .. and recognising that you 
636 came here today wanting to have a~ least a significant equal share in the parenting and 
637 I just want to honour both of your intentions as you came to the meeting but also 
638 recognising your willingness to take a step to having you connect, Alan, ... with 
639 Rebecca and you being open to .. in a very gradual and careful way .. seeing how 
640 that's going to look and how that will work ... what are your thoughts about you 
641 deciding to sort out the specific details about this first meeting and then we return to 
642 have another meeting ... to talk more about the nature of ongoing arrangements? 
643 ALAN: You know as you were saying that I was thinking it's been four years since I 
644 really had the opportunity to see her and so you know .. a few weeks or months 
645 transition is not gonna .. it's not gonna be that big a deal and so I think it's .. I'm fine 
646 with going slow .. I don't wanna cause disruption for Rebecca and I realise that you 
647 have .. a lot of history together and ... and I frankly from what you've said today I feel 
648 like I could learn from you .. learn from what you've done with her .. so maybe we 
649 could .. you know when I spend time with .. you know if that works out with Rebecca 
650 .. then we'll both feel differently about how to proceed in the future coming back to 
651 map out more specifics. 
652 THERESA: .... Yeah .. in the back of my mind though I still have the concern that 
653 eventually you're going to try and take her away from me .. I still have that. 
654 ALAN: ... I have no desire to take her away from you .. again I recognise that you 
655 guys have been very close .. and any third party is gonna be unfamiliar .. but .. you 
656 know .. I .. I guess I would hope that in the coming weeks and months you 'II see what 
657 kind of provider I can actually be and that I'm not out to push you aside .. maybe .. 
658 maybe I could show that .. prove that to you .. and you won't feel that way .. that 
659 would be my hope. 
660 THERESA: We'll see. 
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661 GERALD: We'll see .. so can we make another appointment to .. discuss the 
662 care giving arrangements, caregiving plan for Becky and ... we'll schedule that for 
663 our next meeting 
664 ALAN: Sounds good. 
665 THERESA: OK. 
666 GERALD: Thank you both. 
In the final segment of the conversation the details of time and place for the 
agreed upon reconnection meeting are begun to be sorted out. Since the relational 
context for these has been carefully established, it does not appear to be difficult to 
achieve this. Gerald comments in his reflections on the transcript: 
It feels like we have come to a point where these two might enter into a problem-
solving sorting out stage and can maybe do it without my help and with goodwill. 
Attending to the relationship in a full way throughout the mediation so far has 
brought us to the point that can begin to take ownership of the process of sorting 
things out. 
Gerald has another concern though and that is to locate the small agreement 
that has been established in the wider context again. The larger picture of caregiving 
for Rebecca is still not settled. This needs to be acknowledged. Gerald seeks to 
contextualise this particular conversation in relation to this bigger picture and invites 
Alan and Theresa to join him in this meaning. He uses words like 'one step at a 
time', 'take a step', 'very gradual and careful way', 'see how that's going to look' 
and 'talk more' to emphasize the partial nature of this conversation and to appeal for 
time for the progress made to be embedded. It amounts to an appeal not to finalise 
the conversation but to keep it open. 
I was feeling really good about the progress made ... However this was early days. It 
was a very fragile connection that may be tested over the next few weeks. I would 
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track the story of connection and cooperation in future sessions ... and would want to 
meet with Rebecca at some point. 
He avoids finalising language like 'custody' and speaks in language which suggests 
ongoing dialogue about the care of Rebecca: viz 'ongoing caregiving relationships' 
(629); 'the nature of ongoing arrangements'; 'the caregiving plan' (663). The 
number of present continuous tense verbs and noun gerunds he uses is striking in this 
utterance. The discursive message seems to amount to something like, 'Get used to 
the idea that this is going to be a continuing conversation.' In his reflections he 
comments: 
Neither Alan nor Theresa choose to refuse this position call. Alan speaks 
about moving slowly and about a period of transition to some new relational position. 
He hints at how he has learned from this conversation about the importance of this 
slow transition. Theresa agrees and refers to a concern in the 'back of her mind' that 
Alan will try to force the issue and 'take' Rebecca from her. What she is implying to 
be in the 'front' of her mind, however, is her accordance with the idea of taking 
things slowly and not rushing to any finalised position. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Discourse Analysis Of Narrative Mediation (continued) 
In the previous chapter, I have worked through a piece of text, produced 
from a role-played mediation, analysing the text as a sequence of utterances. My 
focus was in close at the detail of positioning in conversation. In this chapter, I 
want to pan back and bring the background discursive picture more into view. 
My aim is to develop the analysis to make links between the general orders of 
discourse at work and the particular subjective experience being produced; to 
specify the positions calls being offered and either taken up or refused; to tease 
out the places where there are contests over meaning taking place; and to show the 
mediator's work and its discursive effects. 
In the course of doing this, I wish to lay further claim for the usefulness of 
discourse theory in general, and positioning theory in particular, to the practice of 
mediation. My focus is on the moment-by-moment effects of utterances, described 
as the offering and taking up of position calls against a background of more 
general orders of discourse. As participants in mediation conversations issue, take 
up or refuse the discursive positions available in a particular context, they take on 
identity projects, negotiate relations, privilege some meanings over others, and 
work through the task of 'knowing how to go on' in a conflict situation. 
Background orders of discourse 
Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) recommend that discourse analysis 
should proceed by first drawing a 'charcoal sketch' of the orders of discourse as a 
'backdrop for more detailed analysis of discursive practices' (p.115). In the 
foreground of the conversation between Gerald, Theresa and Alan, a discussion is 
taking place about the care of a young girl. However, it is not taking place simply 
in terms decided upon and chosen by the participants. In the background lies a 
discursive world against which the exchanges in the foreground make sense. 
While discourse always has its local and particular aspects, we can expect the 
background orders of discourse to be evident in the expressions available for 
participants to use in the construction of th~ir utterances. People live in discursive 
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communities and draw on these communities for the 'sense of oughtness' 
(Linehan & McCarthy, 2000) that guides their expectations of what is normal. If 
life is more than just a concatenation of events, we need to make meaning of 
things that happen. To do this requires us to draw upon fields of meaning that we 
share with others. In the discursive formations that constitute the background to 
our use of discourse will also lie the hegemonic arrangements that punctuate the 
possibilities and limitations of life. In some sense, we can expect a conversation 
such as this to reproduce elements of such hegemony. But we need also to look 
for ways in which the outcome is not fixed by hegemonic patterns from the social 
world around these people. This is a significant conversation that may well be 
pivotal for future family relations. The participants are forging their relations 
within a struggle to articulate competing perspectives. They are making up these 
relations in a conjuncture that lies between public and private worlds, or between 
systems and lifeworld in Habermas's (1987) terms. My aim in this chapter is to 
articulate my reading of the struggles for positioning that are taking place in 
relation to the background orders of discourse. Mine is not the only possible 
reading of the data. It can only be a provisional reading. However, it is the one 
that, I believe, coheres best with the theoretical arguments I have been mounting 
in this dissertation. 
In this mediation conversation, there appear to me five background 
discourses that deserve to be highlighted because of their strong influence over the 
discursive positions available from which to speak here. These are: a legal 
discourse, a discourse of the family, a discourse about gender relations, an 
individual psychology discourse and a discourse about race and ethnicity. I shall 
examine the constitutive effects of each of these in tum in the construction of this 
mediation conversation. 
Legal discourse 
Through the institutions and processes of family law, the modern state 
exercises control over the private world of the family. This is achieved at times 
through the use of sovereign power (such as through the enforcement by the 
police of court orders, if necessary with physical force) but more commonly 
through the disciplinary powers of the courts. In the family courts, norms are laid 
down, against which behaviour of family members is assessed and in line with 
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which decisions are made about the care of children. These discursive norms 
extend well beyond the domain of court hearings, however. They shape the 
advice given by lawyers and can be expected to shape the practices of mediation 
as well. This mediation clearly takes place against the backdrop of family law. 
Alan speaks of having consulted his lawyer. Theresa may have as well. Many of 
the terms that crop up in this conversation have legal connotations: terms such as 
custody, proceedings, rights, caregiver. 
Traditionally under the law, children were defined as chattels owned by 
parents (originally fathers and later mothers as well). One lawyer articulates this 
discursive formation in the following way: 
The language of custody and access creates notions of 'ownership', 
'winning' and 'losing'. It gives the perception that the parent who 
gains custody has 'won' the child as a prize at the end of a battle with 
the parent who has access being able to 'borrow' the child on an 
occasional basis. 
(Dodds, 2002, p. 9) 
The spectre of a possible custody order hangs over this conversation, steering the 
participants away from certain possible utterances and towards others. However, 
the discourse of legal ownership, while it still exerts a hegemonic pull, has been 
modified considerably in the climate of liberal humanistic discourse about the 
family. The existence of family mediation at all owes its existence to such 
modifications. In mediation (reflecting late modem legal discourse), family 
members, even children, are constructed as individual democratic citizens with 
rights and with a voice in legal proceedings. This is not to say that such rights are 
always equal in weight. Equality is always constrained by the pull of many other 
discursive influences. Norms are also laid down about the care of children that 
exert influence over what can be expected here of a father and of a grandmother. 
With the death of this child's mother, there is a genuine legal dilemma between 
the claims of an estranged father who has biologically based claims of entitlement 
and a grandmother who has claims based on a history of care and daily 
involvement. The conversation, in part, amounts to an attempt to articulate a 
resolution of the opposition between the discourse of legal ownership of children 
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and more recently developed challenges to this discourse based on democratic 
notions of children's relational and emotional needs. 
Discourse of the family 
There are many assumptions built upon in this conversation that are 
drawn from conventional discourse about family. Not just in law but in many 
other cultural sites, family norms are laid down and expectations formed. 
Families should have two parents, a father and a mother. Traditionally at least, 
fathers should be the breadwinning head of the household and mothers should 
provide for the emotional and physical care of children. Although these norms 
have been hugely modified in the course of the last fifty years they persist in 
various ways and are interpellated in this conversation in a series of places. The 
word 'provider' is used to refer to Alan on two occasions (lines 402 & 658). The 
role of Theresa as mother-in-law is referred to as 'interfering' (line 390). Good 
parenting is referenced in relation to participation in schooling, attending parent-
teacher conferences, taking children to out of school activities (for example, 
gymnastics), providing physical affection, not arguing in front of children, 
continuous involvement in children's lives. This picture can all be complicated or 
disrupted by divorce and death, as in this example. 
Within the discourse of the family, a marriage partner who has a sexual 
relationship with someone outside of the marriage is spoken of as having an 
'affair'. Alan has done this in this scenario and as a result he appears to have 
forfeited a position of privilege within the family. He is no longer considered a 
'good' father, and his involvement with his daughter has been actively blocked. 
Within this family discourse, certain norms for a mother's behaviour are 
referenced. Mothers should stay committed to their primary domestic duties, be 
'available' to their husbands, fight for their offspring against any threat to remove 
them and be responsible for the stability of the family. But they should not hold 
the 'apron strings' that attach them to their children too tightly. Fathers, as well 
as being providers, are expected to be involved with their children's lives, act as 
role models for children's development, express affection within specified limits, 
be sexually faithful and, following divorce, see their children in weekend access 
visits. Against these standards, Alan is judged as falling short and Genna is 
described in terms that make her less than committed to her designated role. 
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Theresa, in this conversation, has stepped into the mother position on her 
daughter's behalf but, as grandmother, her role is somewhat ambiguous following 
her daughter's death. Nevertheless, the only critical judgment that is raised 
against her relates to 'holding apron strings too tightly.' 
Such discursive themes can be traced back in the history of the family for 
some distance. However, the existence of an African-American cultural tradition 
in the background of this conversation also needs to be taken into account. There 
are accounts of the discourse of family in African-American culture that differ 
from the dominant white assumptions that have been built into legal discourse. In 
particular, the tradition of 'othermothering' taken up by grandparents, aunts, 
sisters or friends is much more legitimate within African-American discourse of 
the family (Hill Collins, 1991). Within this cultural tradition, 'othermothers', like 
Theresa, would have legitimate claims of entitlement that do not pertain within 
dominant legal discourse. We might consider such claims to be built on a 
subjugated discursive knowledge. As Theresa positions herself as a legitimate 
caregiver within this knowledge, she also challenges Alan and Gerald to accept 
and legitimate such a claim in this conversation. This is tantamount to a position 
call into a place of resistance in relation to the dominant discourse of family, 
based on the assertion of a minority cultural tradition. 
It is also important to pay attention to recent subtle developments in 
mainstream modernist discourse of the family. Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999), 
(in part citing Giddens, 1994), refer to the trend in (what they call) 'late modem 
society' for a reflexive approach to the construction of personal identity projects 
that are constantly being revised. One feature of this, they suggest, is that 
relationships with intimates (lovers, friends, children) are: 
.. shaped less and less by traditional norms, and increasingly take on 
the character of 'pure relationships' which are to do with the rewards 
that those involved can gain from them. Such relationships depend on 
reflexive control, and democratic principles which have hitherto had 
force in different social domains come to be seen as having force within 
these relationships. In particular they come to be regulated through 
democratic dialogue, and the problem of 'dialogical democracy' comes 
to be a central political concem which transcends the traditional 
division between the public and private spheres. 
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(p.82) 
These trends can be seen in this conversation. The willingness of both parties to 
participate in the democratic process of mediation rather than to battle this issue 
out in court is itself evidence of the trend. The entitlement claims that each of 
them put forward are founded in large part on the basis of quality of relationship 
with Rebecca, rather than on other possible claims based on biology or social role. 
Alan even claims that his 'heart is pure' (528) at one point. Moreover, Theresa 
makes it clear that she will give Rebecca considerable democratic say in whether 
or not she will meet with her father. The arrangement for Rebecca to meet Alan is 
intended as the basis making further decisions about the development of their 
relationship based on interpretation of experience rather than on fixed social roles 
or biological rights. 
Once again, we have a dominant background discourse and a social world 
in which there exist many departures from and modifications of its influence. The 
struggle is again one in which the hegemonic arrangements are constantly in 
process of revision in one direction or another. This conversation is one local site 
where such hegemonic arrangements are in process of being shaped. The three 
participants are seeking to articulate the particulars of how this hegemonic contest 
will be settled (temporarily at best) for Rebecca's ongoing care. 
Gender discourse 
At times, the family discourse is hard to separate from gender discourse, 
which is not surprising since the family is a major institutional site for the playing 
out of gender discourse. But not all aspects of relations between men and women 
are inscribed in the discursive practices of the family. It can well be productive to 
look at how a wider view of gender discourse impacts on the family. The question 
is to do with which of these two lenses will be placed in front of the other. There 
is a danger in subsuming any discourse under another one because placing one 
lens in front of the other always runs the risk of making particular forms of power 
relations invisible and silencing voices on the margins. 
In the ways that the parties in this conversation speak, a number of 
gendered assumptions become implicated in the exchange of discourse between 
the participants. I am not suggesting that anyone in this conversation is 
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intentionally exploiting gendered power relations to their own advantage 
(although this can and does happen). However, the general discourse of gender 
can readily become implicated under our very noses in reproducing such power 
relations, even when we do not intend it to do so. Some of the assumptions 
embedded in this conversation (although not necessarily shared by the participants 
as personal attitudes) can be summarised in the following propositions: 
1. That men are the primary financial providers in households (402 & 658). 
2. That women are better suited to be emotional caregivers ( for example: ... '/ don't 
think that he's equipped to deal with a child', line 253). 
3. That father's have 'rights' over their children(' ... I just want what's .. what .. 
what rightfully is a father's right to be part of his daughter's life, line 196). 
4. That children are tied (loosely or tightly) to a woman's 'apron strings' (lines 353 
& 510). 
5. That women 'naturally' know better how to parent little girls (line 253 ). 
That men deal with matters 'logically' and 'reasonably' ('/ tried to ... to talk to 
Genna reasonably', line 143) and women are more 'emotional' and more likely to 
become 'hysterical' (' ... she would yell and become hysterical and scream at me 
and ... it just became too difficult,' line 153). 
6. That children need men to be 'male role models' while the role of women is taken 
for granted without being theorised in such a way (line 403). 
There are also places where some of these assumptions are contradicted in this 
conversation as well. It would be a distortion to suggest that these assumptions 
reign unchallenged or even that they are always dominant in any specific 
relational context, just because they continue to dominate in general public 
discourse. We can find examples of Alan taking up childrearing tasks that fit with 
the discursive descriptions of a woman's role in a family. We find Theresa 
prepared to look after Rebecca without Alan's presence as a role model. We find 
all three parties discussing Alan's ability to be emotionally close to his daughter. 
We find openness to a parenting relationship that is defined along different lines 
than gendered role division. 
The question in an analysis of a mediation conversation is not just about the 
presence or absence of either assumptions that reproduce dominant discourse 
(they cannot so easily be eliminated from our interpretive repertoires) or of efforts 
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to contradict such dominant discourse (contradictions cannot so easily become the 
norm). The question is about which agenda gets advanced in the course of the 
conversation. Therefore, it is necessary to trace the trajectory of both dominant 
discourse and its contradiction through the course of a conversation and to 
determine which has gained ground along the way. In this regard, it can be 
argued that, by the end of this conversation, more space has been opened for 
Theresa's voice. Her knowledge of Rebecca's developmental needs has been 
heard by Alan and her caregiving role has been validated. It can also be argued 
that more space has been opened for Alan's fathering to be based less along rigid 
gender role specifications than was the case at the start of the conversation. 
Nothing is, of course, finalised in this hour. But then again, nothing ever really is 
finalised in the contests over discourse. Hegemonic struggles go on and on. The 
ground shifts continually and dominant discourses, at times, reassert themselves 
and, at other times, people position themselves in places of resistance to dominant 
discourse. 
Liberal-humanistic psychology 
It is worth spotlighting the psychological assumptions that lie in the 
background of this conversation as well. They are drawn from the dominant 
psychological knowledge with reference to which individual subjectivity is 
constructed in the modern world. Without this psychological discourse, many of 
the statements made by the participants in this conversation would not make 
sense. One way to notice this is to imagine oneself in another time or place where 
such statements could not be heard. In this way, we can understand how 
psychological knowledge has impregnated general discourse to the extent that we 
take it for granted and seldom question its validity. Let us look at some examples 
of this. 
There is a general assumption of individual psychological needs that 
underlies much of the talk about Rebecca's life. A notion of emotional stability 
and the importance of particular kinds of emotional nurturing (for example 
expressed in 'cuddles', line 110) is stressed in ways that would not have been 
common before the development of modem psychology. 
The notion of childhood trauma having lifelong determining effects on a 
person's life underlies much of the discussion about the care needed to avoid 
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disruption for Rebecca, as it does in the assumptions of special vulnerability in the 
aftermath of grief. It would not have been likely that parents and caregivers in the 
process of settling custody issues would have considered the psychological effects 
of trauma before the twentieth century impact of modern psychology. 
Within the development of family discourse about democratic 
relationships, there is a corresponding need for the construction of a reflexive 
individual subjectivity to take part in such relations. So we have a discussion 
about Rebecca in ways that constitute her as a speaking subject, even at seven 
years old, with the ability to reflect on her own experience and to have an 
influential say in the decisions about how and when her father and grandmother 
will interact with her. Being able to verbalize one's feelings is a key skill for 
participation in this discursive world. Both Alan and Theresa are concerned to see 
that she develops and exercises this skill. 
Another feature of modern psychology has been the development of 
elaborate taxonomies of pathology for the description of psychological problems 
and, ostensibly at least, to enable their 'treatment'. In this way, psychological 
knowledge has modelled itself on medical knowledge and carved out a position of 
social influence for itself. In this conversation, there is no actual mention of the 
'deficit discourse' (Gergen, 1994) of psychological pathology, but its presence 
can be felt as a spectre in the background of some of the concerns about 
Rebecca's development. There is an expression of concern about the 'turmoil' 
(line 321) that Rebecca has been going through and a desire not to increase this 
through making further 'disruptive' psychological waves in her life. 
Race discourse 
Finally, in this section, it is necessary to mention the presence of culture 
and race and the general discursive conditions that shape experience of this in the 
mediation. Racial or cultural issues are not featured overtly in more than a couple 
of exchanges in this conversation. However, their presence should not be ignored. 
Often background discourses can have powerful effects. 
Theresa is African-American and Alan is white or Anglo. They are 
talking about the care of a child who comes from a bi-racial marriage. Rebecca is 
therefore categorised as a 'bi-racial' child. Theresa speaks in the text of the 
special knowledge needed to care for African hair and makes a part of her claim 
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of entitlement on this basis (line 254). Since hair care itself can be learned 
presumably without huge difficulty this could appear to be a small insignificant 
point. However, as a window to a whole world of understanding about the effects 
of pervasive racist discourse on personal development, this statement assumes 
greater import. 
Although Rebecca has one white and one black parent, no doubt it will be 
her black skin that will be marked in a post-colonial world as more defining of 
who she can be than her white heritage. Theresa hints at this and alludes to the 
special coaching that she can offer along the way in how to deal with the racism 
that she will likely encounter in life. It is noticeable that Alan does not dispute 
this claim and indeed Craig (who roleplayed Alan) was to say after the mediation: 
Craig: I think part of where I was at is .. I wanted a voice but I'm a little afraid 
of just how capable .. you know, how am I going to do her hair .. I didn't have an 
answer for those things. 
Jackie: I know. ( continues - inaudible) 
John ( overlapping) : That was telling when she said that?( .. ) 
Craig: Yeah .. (..) 
Craig: .. with the hair and stuff .. you know it's tricky cause I .. I .. you know in 
an adversarial process I can't give away too much and still claim .. but I did feel 
the legitimacy of that and I felt my own .. fears about how capable could I be and 
that's why I said at the end that I think I could learn from her .. 
These comments suggest that the brief, somewhat oblique, mention of the spectre 
of racism did play a significant part in the production of the ongoing relations in 
the mediation. Without the background orders of discourse that specify the 
dominant patterns of racial and cultural relations, the exchange between Theresa 
and Alan which Jackie and Craig are referring to here would not make sense. 
Theresa's raising of this subject (somewhat tactfully, it might be said) positions 
Alan as needing to declare his opposition to racism in some way. He moves to 
make more room for Theresa's ongoing involvement in Rebecca's life as a result. 
Moreover, Theresa is aware of the leverage she has in raising this issue. Jackie's 
(who played Theresa) comment, 'I know,' in the above exchange was expanded in 
the following way: 
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John: Did you .. did you know that .. that he was doing that .. that he was 
experiencing that at that point .. that fear and .. ? 
Jackie: That he didn't have an answer for me? 
John: Right .. you knew that? 
Jackie: I knew I got him there huh (..) I know that's an issue with bi-racial 
children .. 
I would therefore argue that a counter-story to the one that racism would 
author for Rebecca's life is being produced in the dialogue between Alan and 
Theresa. Theresa takes a lead in this production and Alan is willing to join with 
her. In the need for such a story to be made explicit and consciously worked at, 
however, lies the continued power of racist discourse and its attendant material 
effects on life opportunity. 
Positioning And Positions Calls 
In the course of this conversation, both parties to the mediation seek to 
establish reflexive positions for themselves in relation to the above discourses. 
They also call each other into position or interpellate (Althusser, 1971) each other 
into the discourses that wash their way across the landscape of this conversation. 
Let us focus on the discursive positions that each of the parties take up and offer 
each other early in the conversation and then look to see how these positions 
change as the conversation develops. If such movement does take place, it is 
reasonable to assume that the dialogue is having an effect and that a judgment 
about effectiveness can be made. 
Since mediation is intended to serve a conflict resolution purpose, the most 
salient positioning moves will be in relation to the subject of the conflict. As I 
have theorised above, in conflict situations people are concerned to establish for 
themselves positions of entitlement and, frequently, to discredit the entitlements 
of the other party. Often, too, they seek to finalise the conversation on the basis 
of their own sense of entitlement without taking into account the sense of 
entitlement of the other. So how does this happen in this conversation? 
Theresa begins by positioning herself as Rebecca's current and most 
appropriate caregiver. She establishes a history to this function that precedes 
Genna's death and goes back to the time of Alan and Genna's separation. It is 
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founded in her intimate knowledge of Rebecca's daily life, her consistent 
availability for her granddaughter, her link to her through her deceased daughter, 
her cultural knowledge and her relationship with Rebecca which features 
emotional closeness. She claims to be a 'major figure' in Rebecca's life. 
Standing on this ground, she makes comparisons with Alan. She offers Alan a 
position of something close to exclusion on the basis of his record of 'distance' 
from his daughter, his failure to fight harder for his daughter against Genna's 
restrictions of his access to her, and his being 'the one who had the affair'. As she 
establishes herself as the representative of stability, familiarity and continuity in 
Rebecca's life, she positions Alan as disruptive. His disruptions, moreover, are on 
the basis of sudden unpredictable and, therefore, untrustworthy moves. They are 
overdue and 'late' and therefore not legitimate. In relation to the race discourse, 
she claims the position of having privileged knowledge and positions Alan as not 
knowing and, therefore, less entitled to be Rebecca's caregiver. 
In response to his beginning of 'these proceedings,' she is a willing 
participant. She indicates a readiness to contest strongly any suggestion of Alan 
making a legal custody move. But she is also careful to participate in dialogue. 
In the context of the workings of the modern family court, it is important to 
present as reasonable and not hostile and, no doubt, she is aware of this. So she 
positions Alan as someone to be responded to and dialogued with. She recognises 
him as a father wanting a relationship with his daughter. 
Alan begins by adopting a position of reasonableness in this conversation. 
Craig makes this explicit in talking about how he played the role after the 
mediation: 
Craig: .. you know .. I was into reasonableness. 
The position from which he seeks to claim entitlement is that of concerned, 
reasonable parent. The flipside of this reflexive positioning is the implicit 
position call for Theresa. If she objects to his claims too strongly, she will be 
positioned as unreasonable. Alan does not stand on a rights discourse very much, 
despite occasional inserted comments that indicate his awareness of the potential 
of this legal discourse. Throughout the whole conversation, he does not make a 
claim for custody of Rebecca and generally avoids speaking in a legal discourse. 
In these choices, he avoids positioning Theresa as adversary in a legal battle, 
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although the background institutional power can still be felt. Jackie commented 
on this after the roleplay. 
Jackie: I was surprised because at no point did you talk about custody .. or taking 
her .. you know I kind of thought that was where you were going to come in from .. 
that was my expectation .. 
John ( overlapping): You were ready for that. 
Jackie: Yeah .. and then I probably would have taken a hard stance. 
In relation to Rebecca, Alan stakes a claim based on emotional closeness 
in the past. He positions himself as somewhat aggrieved, because he has been 
kept away from his daughter by Genna. In his story, Genna is placed in the 
position of persecutor and he is the victim (line l 5lff.). As already indicated this 
is a risky strategy since 'speaking ill of the dead' can provoke Theresa to her dead 
daughter's defence and make her more hostile to Alan's cause, but he tries to 
manage this possibility by acknowledging Theresa in various ways as: not getting 
in the way of his relationship with Rebecca (line 346); as a good caregiver for 
Rebecca; as a possible 'co-parent' (line 352); as having important cultural 
knowledge that he does not have (line 349). He does not want to come across as 
'pressuring' (line 603). He explicitly says at the outset that he does not want to 
'exclude' Theresa (line 23), or to 'shock Rebecca and cause a stir' (line 534). 
The main critique Alan has of Theresa is that she is holding the 'apron strings' too 
tightly and he is concerned that she will use her influence with Rebecca to 
undermine the possibility of his relationship with Rebecca. 
By the end of the conversation, it is clear that some subtle shifts in 
position have opened up. Theresa has moved to a place of willingness to involve 
Alan in joint activities with Rebecca, with a clear view to ongoing relationship 
being made possible. Alan has conceded that his custody move is not really in 
Rebecca's best interests and is willing to take things slowly and work with 
Theresa to build relationship with his daughter. Both have stepped back from 
places of opposition to each other's entitlement claims. Theresa has dropped the 
positioning of Alan as not deserving contact with Rebecca because of his affair 
and his lack of regular contact with Rebecca for some time. She acknowledges 
that Alan has things to offer his daughter from a different racial and cultural 
perspective from what she can offer. She acknowledges him as a father who loves 
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his daughter and as making desirable moves to correct the distance that has 
dominated his relationship with her and states her willingness to encourage 
Rebecca to respond to this. Alan has dropped his accusation of tight apron strings 
and his concern that Theresa might undermine his relationship with Rebecca has 
eased. He expresses a willingness to learn from Theresa, positioning her as an 
experienced teacher whose knowledge he respects. 
What has opened up is a cautious mutual positioning as partners in a joint 
enterprise. At the moment, this enterprise is the limited one of setting up a 
weekend outing, but the promise is there that this will build into an ongoing 
sharing of the caring for Rebecca. They begin to speak directly to each other, 
rather than through the mediator. In this exchange, an enriched dialogue begins to 
take shape in which they negotiate details about how to organise the outing. Each 
positions the other as a dialogical partner worthy of engagement and having 
something worthwhile to say. 
In relation to the dominant discourses referred to above, how then do the 
two parties fare in terms of the possibility of agency? Clearly they have withstood 
the pressure of legal discourse to subject each other to notions of ownership of 
children. They have not even discussed 'custody' and yet have begun to form 
some important aspects of a shared arrangement for the care of Rebecca. To do 
so, they have had to consciously stand apart from the dominant story of family. 
The positions they are offering each other in the latter part of the interview do not 
seem to fit with suggestions of 'interfering grandmother' or 'unfit father'. 
With regard to gender, I would argue that, by the end of the interview, 
Alan has recognised a greater degree of legitimacy for Theresa's position than he 
was doing for Genna's at the start. He may be said to have learned something 
from her, rather than simply assimilated her wishes into a compromise 
arrangement. The arrangements discussed recognise both parties' relational 
claims for participation in Rebecca's life, but entitlement claims based on legal 
discourses of ownership have not been privileged in the choices made, either by 
the mediator or by the disputing parties, despite the existence of these in the 
available repertoires. Nor has anyone used the discourse of race to make 
exclusive claims either. Theresa has used it to claim specific knowledge that will 
be of advantage to Rebecca, but she has clearly also recognised that Alan also has 
special knowledge that will be of use to her. 
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The Mediator's Moves To Invite Re-Positioning 
It is clear from the previous section that some discursive re-positioning has 
occurred during the conversation. The mediation conversation, then, has had an 
effect. And an analysis of positioning enables the development of a precise 
account of the shifts that have been made. On this basis, this study makes a claim 
to demonstrate the value of positioning theory to the understanding of mediation 
effectiveness from a microanalytical perspective. 
What remains to be established is the mediator's contribution to this 
process. In this section, I want to examine the social practice of mediation, as it is 
articulated by Gerald, in this conversation. I have outlined above in theory the 
conceptual rationale for a narrative mediation practice. Let us now look at how 
this has been realised in this conversation. In particular, I am interested in 
illuminating the discursive strategies Gerald is employing - the lexical choices, 
grammatical shaping, content selection for emphasis and the positions he adopts 
himself in relation to the disputing parties, as well as the positions he invites them 
into in the course of the conversation. 
Before examining these discursive strategies, it is worth noting that Gerald 
himself considers this conversation to be a good representation of his work as a 
mediator. In his reflections on the transcript of this conversation, he noted: 
I felt really pleased with how I conducted the mediation ... and I would have done 
much the same if I had the time over, except for perhaps deconstructing their 
understandings of conflict more .. 
Working assumptions 
It is clear in the first utterance he makes that Gerald is taking a position in 
relation to the general legal discourse with regard to the custody of children. He 
does not echo the words of this discourse and instead frames the focus of the 
conversation as on 'caregiving arrangements' for Rebecca. This positioning is 
maintained throughout, and he makes deliberate efforts to select out for attention 
discourse that supports this purpose and to pass over expressions that would take 
the conversation into a discourse of rights and legal ownership. In this sense, he 
is not adopting a neutral stance with regard to content. He does mark out a 
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position in relation to the general orders of discourse. Within this general 
position, however, he does not favour one party over the other. With regard to 
their desires and intentions, he is neutral in the sense that he is evenhanded in his 
attention and appears to offer roughly equal encouragement to both to take up the 
positions of openness with regard to possible futures for Rebecca's sake. 
The language Gerald chooses avoids the categorising and objectifying 
language that is common in custody issues. He does not use the word 'custody' 
itself, preferring to speak of caregiving arrangements. Words like 'access', 
'visitation' and 'primary custodial parent', which are part of the hegemonic 
discourse of parenting after divorce and carry traces of legal conversation are also 
bypassed. He uses personal names in preference to descriptions such as 'your ex-
wife'. He makes efforts to use inclusive expressions like 'caregiver' rather than 
'parent' in order to avoid rendering Theresa's role in Rebecca's life invisible and 
thus privileging Alan's position as a biological parent. In all of these ways, he is 
taking the position of favouring an outcome in which both Alan and Theresa play 
a part in Rebecca's life without specifying how this might be articulated in detail. 
In effect, then, Gerald's use of language and his discursive strategies in this 
conversation amount to a participation in a larger project of 'rearticulation' 
(Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001) of the practice of 
making decisions about the care of children. 
Gerald noticed his own positions as he read the transcript of this 
conversation and commented on this: 
It occurs to me that my own biases are coming through of wanting Rebecca to 
have a chance to reacquaint herself with her father. I guess I am believing at this 
point that by the way Alan is presenting in this session he may have a positive 
presence in her life. The direction I am taking is definitely one of supporting Alan 
to make a connection with his daughter. Here I am immersed in a discourse of 
wanting children to have mothers and fathers in their lives if they are not going to 
be harmful. Of course I have no idea at this point whether Alan could be harmful 
or not and neither does Theresa. I am also positioned in a discourse of 
supporting testing out how this relationship will unfold with the father and the 
need for it to go gently. I was struck by what I would term Theresa's wisdom of 
taking things a step at a time and re-evaluating how it went later. I was 
supporting this step at this stage in both direct and indirect ways. 
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Several points are worth pausing to notice here. One is that Gerald is carefully 
maintaining openness about the outcome as well as making transparent his 
working assumptions. Despite the fact that he seems to favour Alan achieving at 
least some of what he wants from the mediation, he also hears and values 
Theresa's wisdom and supports the idea of taking things slowly. Is this 
experienced by the parties as bias? Let me include some comments that they 
made immediately after the conversation was finished. Craig, who played Alan 
made this (edited) comment: 
Craig: I think ... that there was a key .. junction .. when Gerald was underlining 
.. her having said positive things about me as a father ... that made me feel 
number one that he was really hearing me and he was a conduit between me and 
this other person I need to work with .... you see my way of thinking was that he 
was enthusiastically being my advocate at that one moment .... I felt supported. 
He also makes it clear that this was not a general feeling about the whole 
mediation: 
I didn't feel like he was my advocate throughout the whole process in tenns of 
being biased or anything like that .... but that one moment I felt like I needed a 
little .. connection .. connective tissue to get the .. to you know get the point 
across .. 
I asked Jackie about this. Gerald's work may have been problematic at this point 
if it was experienced by her as two men joining forces against her. 
John: OK .. did you feel like he was .. Alan's advocate? 
Jackie: No .. no I felt like he was asking me whether .. whether that was 
something I felt comfortable doing ..... so I mean I heard him . . I just heard him 
paraphrasing what I thought you (indicating Alan) had already said .. so I didn't 
hear it .. hear it as him advocating .. I heard it as paraphrasing ... 
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Focusing On The Relational Context From The Start 
At the start of this conversation, Gerald does not do what we might expect 
in a problem-solving mediation. He does not identify the problem. Instead, he 
seeks to establish the hopes of each party from this conversation. This is not a 
request for Alan and Theresa to express their 'side' of the story or to announce 
their g?als so that he can work towards identifying their underlying interests. The 
hopes he asks for are relational and inclusive of both parties' goals right from the 
start. Individual self-interest is not privileged ahead of relationship. It is clear at 
the outset, and all the way through, that Gerald is seeking to privilege a dialogical 
and positive story of relationship, one in which he makes the assumption that not 
all the possibilities have yet been explored. He commented in his reflections on 
the transcript: 
I was thinking that narrative approaches to mediation invite me to be consistently 
attentive to the relationship between the parties rather than being focussed on 
solving the substantive issues and seeing the relationship as peripheral. 
The emphasis on creating a relational context in which shifts in position can 
easily be made contrasts with an emphasis on negotiating a substantive resolution 
as a basis for improved relationship. It emphasises relationship as an evolving 
narrative that has a history, a present and a future and makes possible a 
consideration of how power becomes manifest in the evolution of a relation. 
Use Of Empathetic Acknowledgment And Curiosity 
Two types of utterance dominate Gerald's contributions to the 
conversation. One is repeated acknowledgement of the core content of the 
parties' utterances. He is careful to take time to give this acknowledgement in 
detail and to assure both Alan and Theresa in tum that he has heard their concerns. 
Professional acknowledgement can be considered to serve a legitimating function. 
Gerald uses professional authority to make legitimate each party's perspectives in 
front of the other party. Such acknowledgements are used as platforms on which 
to base the questions that he asks. This is active listening, but it does not use 
active listening simply for the purpose of giving the parties the experience of 
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being listened to. It serves the larger purpose of laying the foundation for a 
constructive inquiry. Along the way, he refers to each party's perspective and 
never seeks to resolve differences in perspective. Philosophically, he is 
articulating in practice a commitment to multiple perspectives in any conversation 
and the possibility of holding a variety of perspectives at the same time. He even 
draws attention to the differences in perspective that each party has within their 
subjective experience. His questions make room for the appreciation of such 
differences in the light of history, in the light of ambivalent feelings and in the 
interplay between what has been and what might be. There is no search for the 
underlying facts on which might be built a 'true' perspective. Nor are the parties 
invited to integrate their multiple perspectives into a singular viewpoint. When 
the conflict story invites them to do so, Gerald opens up the multiplicity of 
possible meanings again. 
The other type of utterance is the use of questions for selected purposes. 
At first, these questions are used in a curious exploration of what the parties are 
hoping for, how they describe the issues, the history of their respective 
relationships with Rebecca and their experience of the current situation. As the 
interview develops, Gerald's questions become more purposeful. They focus 
attention more selectively on the emerging story and he becomes less curious 
about the problem story. These questions propel the conversation forward and 
shape the moves that the parties make towards each.other and towards a 
commitment to a new story. 
As Gerald asks these questions, he calls Theresa and Alan into position as 
addressees in a particular way. They are positioned as authorities on their own 
experience, as commentators on their own and on each other's utterances, as 
agents in the construction of the future care of Rebecca. The particularities of the 
arrangements for the care of Rebecca are shaped by dominant discourses but are 
not determined by them. Throughout the conversation, these arrangements remain 
indeterminate and, even at the end of the conversation, the pattern for the future is 
not finalised. Alan and Theresa are positioned, therefore, as having a genuine say 
in what the outcome will be. Neither has exclusive say and the outcome remains 
open-ended. 
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Historicising And Contextualising Entitlements 
When Alan and Theresa express their claims to be entitled to care for 
Rebecca, Gerald's approach is not to examine these entitlements in the abstract 
against some established norm. Nor does he invite negotiation around these 
entitlements. He first seeks to locate these entitlements in their history. He asks 
Theresa to speak about her daily life with Rebecca, and the ~istory of that. He 
asks Alan details of his relationship with his daughter when he was married to 
Genna and after their separation. This approach represents a strategy that does not 
focus on entitlements as linked to essential legal or ethical positions but as 
growing out of the specifics of localised experience. 
Similarly, when Alan and Theresa speak in terms of the dominant 
discourse of custody disputes and repeat formulaic expressions common to this 
discourse, one of Gerald's strategies is to avoid a head-on challenge to this 
discourse. He works on the assumption that this discourse will exert a 
conventional influence, but that, through the detailed examination of instances of 
social practice, its influence will start to break up and contradictions to it will start 
to emerge. When Alan speaks of wanting to 'play a part' in his daughter's life 
(24 ), Gerald asks him to imagine what this would look like in day-to-day detail. 
When Theresa speaks of Rebecca being comfortable living with her, Gerald seeks 
details of the daily routine of relationship that they practice. 
Externalising Conversation 
The narrative practice of externalising conversation is not strongly evident 
in this conversation, but it is present. Gerald uses externalising nominalisations to 
speak about 'ideas of conflict' (122) and about 'distrust' (361) in an effort to 
loosen the parties' internal identification with these experiences. More subtly, 
perhaps, he refuses any temptation to join with exclusionary or objectifying 
thinking. He does not support or join with totalising discursive notions that could 
have been invited forward, such as the picture of Theresa as 'interfering' or Alan 
as a 'failure' of a father. Nor do pathologising descriptions of Rebecca feature in 
the conversation he seeks to advance. He does not seek out a story of Rebecca as 
damaged by her mother's death or by her parents' divorce. Thus, even when he is 
not utilising an externalising phraseology, his language choices are consistent 
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with an externalising conversation in their rejection of an internalising logic. 
Conflicts often feature such internalising logic strongly, particularly in the use of 
totalising accusations aimed at the other party. 
Picking Out Unique Outcomes And Assembling An Alternative 
Story 
The more prominent narrative strategy Gerald pursues in this conversation 
is that of picking up on moments of contradiction or exception and stretching such 
moments into viable storylines through the use of carefully crafted questions. In 
the process he positions Theresa and Alan as participants in these storylines and 
invites them to try on these positions for size. The storylines that each of the 
parties is intent on developing at the start of the conversation have contradictory 
trajectories and are likely to produce conflict and discord. It is easy to imagine at 
the start of the conversation that Alan and Theresa might each intensify their 
sense of entitlement in the face of the other's opposition and that they might 
position each other as opponents in a potential legal battle. There are certainly 
discursive elements present in their repertoires that would urge them into stances 
of mutual disrespect, negative attribution of the other's motives, a dismissive 
rejection of each other's desires and purposes and a falling back on entrenched 
positions of power. In this context, it is hard to imagine relational events such as 
cooperation, mutual understanding, joint enterprise, empathetic exchanges, 
appreciation of each other's historical and potential contributions to Rebecca's life 
and straightforward, problem-solving dialogue taking place. Yet these are the 
very relational events that are shaped in this conversation. 
How does Gerald seek to open enough space for a story of cooperation and 
respect to emerge? In order to make sense of this process, it is necessary to pay 
attention to the work done in discourse to 'assemble' meanings, or even 'jerry-rig' 
them on the spot, out of diverse available features. He does not simply 
unconsciously use discourse to 'defer to pre-existing patterns of meaning' (Gee, 
1999, pp. 46-7). Gerald is alert to any utterance or word that might connect with a 
discourse of shared caregiving and mutual respect. When these instances 
materialise, he seizes on them and asks Alan and Theresa to make meaning of 
them. For example, when Alan inserts parenthetically in the middle of a 
description of his envisaged time with his daughter, 'And Grandma would always 
286 
be welcome to come by' (291 ), Gerald picks up this comment and acknowledges 
it as openness to doing things with Theresa and Rebecca. His response contains 
an element of interpretation that goes beyond the meaning that Alan has made, but 
it is consistent with Alan's words. 
And when Theresa inserts a comment about how she, ' ... can see the three 
of us doing something on the weekend,' (309) in the midst of a long explanation 
of what will not work about Alan's proposals, Gerald picks up the smaller inserted 
comment rather than the larger discourse about what will not work. He is using a 
very selective empathy as he acknowledges back to her, 'So ... you're definitely 
open for Alan to feature more prominently in Becca's life .. .' (31J-2). Again, 
when Theresa slips in a comment about there being a positive value for Rebecca's 
having 'a loving parent' in her life (405), Gerald picks up this comment as a 
description of Alan and asks, 'Do you see Alan as a loving parent?' (407). What 
may have been an inadvertent use of a stock expression is invited to become a 
deliberate statement of relational appreciation. If the positioning was inadvertent, 
she is invited to step into the relation with more deliberation. The narrative force 
of such a comment grows therefore in such meaning-generating exchanges. 
There are, however, many occasions where Gerald is not waiting for such 
moments to appear. He deliberately asks questions to create their appearance. Let 
me list some examples of these questions. 
• (To Theresa, line 95) What are you aware ofin terms of Alan's contact with 
Rebecca? 
• (To Theresa, line 210) Can you think of a time where the connection with Alan 
was under easier circumstances? 
• (To Alan and Theresa, line 238) How much room do each of you see you should 
have as caregivers in Rebecca's life? 
• (To Alan, line 245) I hear you saying that this could be an important relationship 
(Rebecca's relationship with Theresa) to foster and continue for Rebecca .. have I 
understood that right? 
• (To Theresa, line 399) What's your sense of what Alan might add to Becca's life? 
• (To Theresa, line 441) What do you make of Alan's efforts to send birthday 
cards ... ? 
In these questions, Gerald is seeking out the remembering of plot elements that 
might be incorporated in a nascent story of cooperation and mutual appreciation. 
They are 'unique outcome' questions (White, 1989; White & Epston, 1990; 
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Winslade & Monk, 2000). Unique outcomes might be referred to as specific 
moments of relational positioning that do not square with the dominant discourse 
in a particular context. 
This story is also advanced by the asking of questions that invite the 
making of meaning about what the other person has said. These can be called 
unique account questions (White 1989; White & Epston, 1990; Winslade & 
Monk, 2000). Here are some examples: 
• (To Alan, line 347) Have you discovered anything right now that you didn't know 
about Theresa's ideas about you having involvement with Rebecca? 
• (To Alan, line 520) What have you heard about what Theresa has said about you 
being in Becky's life? 
• (To Alan, line 537) Did you hear about her seeing ... the value of you being 
involved in Rebecca's life .. ? 
• (To Alan, line 563) Is this news to you that you could talk to Rebecca directly ... ? 
• (To Theresa, line 445) Are those examples of someone that is still wanting to find 
connection or how do you see that? 
• (To Theresa, line 459) What's your hunch about what Becky would be saying 
about Alan? 
• (To Theresa, line 300) What are your thoughts and feelings about what he's 
proposing? 
• (To Alan, line 542) What was it like to hear that from Theresa? 
• (To Theresa, line 587) What are you wondering about as you hear Alan ask you to 
be encouraging? 
Such questions position the parties in the emerging story of cooperation and invite 
them to fold their responses into this story. They do this by contextualising a 
previous utterance as a plot event deserving of comment and positioning the 
listener to the original comment as making meaning of the other person's 
utterance. The utterances to be interpreted in this way are not just any utterances. 
They are carefully selected to be those that might contribute to the emergence of 
the story of cooperation and mutual respect. As these questions are answered, the 
person who uttered the original statement gets to hear their words being 
incorporated into an appreciative framework of meaning, one that has become 
larger than that in which their words were originally uttered. Thus the relational 
context of cooperation and respect is expanded in the space between the two 
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parties. Jackie spoke after the conversation about the effect of this process for 
her: 
Jackie: ... for me that was really skilful the way that was the way that was done 
and also the things that ... the things that Gerald chose to magnify and to extract 
from whatever we said ... the way he said well did you hear the good things she 
said about you .. about you as a father .. 
John: What was that like to hear that? To have those things asked about? 
Jackie: It was like .. it .. well it was real interesting because ... I didn't realise 
that I had even expressed that .. I didn't realise that that's what I was thinking .. 
until he reframed it even as I said it I still didn't realise the impact of what I was 
saying until he reframed it for me and then it was like .. oh .. OK I have expressed 
that .. I can see the value of .. of him being in his daughter's life ... because what 
that said to me was both of us had value in her life and I .. I had acknowledged 
that .. whereas I came in thinking well you know what she's done fine without him 
up all this time she can be fine the rest of her life without him .. 
Another class of questions are those that take the meaning process a step 
further by inviting a specific type of meaning making: the evaluation of the plot 
developments that have been proposed (White 1992; Winslade & Monk, 2000). 
An example occurs when Theresa says that she sees Alan as trying to correct the 
fact that he has not been active in Rebecca's life. Gerald asks her, 'Is that a 
desirable move from your perspective?' It is a simple yes/no question asking 
Theresa to take a stand and make a judgment of Alan. The judgment is a small 
one and therefore easy to make. Even so Theresa prevaricates a little and thinks 
carefully before assenting. But once she has assented, she has moved a step 
further into a commitment to a story of appreciation of Alan's potential as a 
caregiver for Rebecca. She has positioned herself in an emerging story. And she 
has done this in front of Alan who is himself invited to think positively of his 
move to take a more active role as he overhears what happens. He is also 
positioned by her assessment. Another subtle example of this positioning occurs 
when Gerald asks Theresa about how she would speak to Rebecca about the plan 
for Alan to see his daughter, 'Would there be encouragement in your voice?' In a 
small way this is a request for her to take a position as she speaks to Rebecca. To 
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prepare to take this position she is being asked to evaluate now the worth of doing 
so. 
Once the fledgling story of potential cooperation around the caregiving for 
Rebecca has been established, Gerald asks another type of question in which he 
invites Alan and Theresa to project the relational story they have been developing 
forward into the future. He poses hypothetical questions in the subjunctive mood 
about what might be, and how it would look if it were to be, and how people 
might make meaning of it when they saw it. These can be called unique 
possibility questions (White 1989; Winslade & Monk, 2000). Here are some 
examples of these questions: 
• If Becky were here right now listening to Alan declare what he wants to do in her 
life, what's your hunch about what Becky would be saying ... ? (line 457) 
• Would it be a positive experience for Becky to hear how Alan would like to start 
off by maybe the three of you going and doing something ... ? (line 464) 
• Would you be willing to encourage ... that kind of conversation? (line 489) 
• Would you convey that her Dad would really like to see her on the weekend ... ? 
(line 503) 
The story that is being spoken into existence in the language of 'as if' in these 
questions is later followed up with more direct questions that focus attention on 
the material plane of decisions, specific plans and actions. Examples of such 
questions are: 
• So what are the next steps? (line 617) 
• I'm wondering whether ... you will look at the situation one step at a time ... ? (line 
630) 
• What are your thoughts about you deciding to sort out the specific details about 
this first meeting and then we return to have another meeting ... ? (line 641) 
• Can we make another appointment to discuss the caregiving arrangements? (line 
642) 
There are not many of these questions asked by the mediator in this conversation, 
however. The earlier questions that have established a relational context have 
done enough work so that Theresa and Alan can begin to talk with each other to 
brainstorm a plan for the future without Gerald having to ask them to do so. 
In the process of picking up these unique outcomes and building story 
around them, Gerald directs the focus of the conversation onto the small details of 
the issue at hand. They end up not discussing the future of caregiving 
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arrangements for Rebecca at all but make an agreed plan for handling a small 
piece of the development of an ongoing plan. To be sure, Gerald, as do Alan and 
Theresa, acknowledges at the end that the process is not complete and they will 
have to return to address the future more broadly. But the emphasis has been on 
building a foundation for the future that involves both parties. This foundation is 
constructed through the invitation to each person to take up positions of mutual 
inclusion around small issues. As they do so, it becomes possible for a larger 
narrative of inclusive positioning to be envisaged. They each commented on how 
positive this experience was after the end of the roleplay. Jackie's comment was: 
Jackie: I found it really interesting how we came in with this big thing .. a mg 
thing .. you know the idea of losing your granddaughter .. is how I was 
experiencing it .. and then we got it down to one step that we could take care of in 
one day within the next week or something .. and you know it .. to me that's pretty 
amazing how he talked it to get us to agree to this one little specific thing. 
John: So what difference did that make? 
Jackie: It made it doable and it didn't .. it .. it made it easier to make concessions 
and to find the happy .. the medium between us .. because .. even though the issue 
was still in the back of my head that this may be one step towards me losing my 
granddaughter and I had to bring that back in there because it's still back there I 
can make this concession and still feel safe .. 
Craig found the focus on a small step rather than a major decision emotionally 
reassuring: 
Craig: I think that was one of the key things that you had said that .. felt 
reassuring to me .. like you used a lot of language like right now and for the time 
being and that's a small step and I felt like yeah I don't have to .. I had these fears 
like can I really deliver and you had fears of me and how vulnerable could I be .. 
but when the whole issue came down to just taking this next step right here .. 
there's so much room/or reassuring. 
This whole process of the construction of a story of mutual respect and 
cooperation can be described in Berger and Luckman's (1966) terms for the 
process of social construction. They focussed on larger social processes than this 
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microcosmic example but they suggested three stages to the construction of a 
social reality: externalisation, objectivation and internalisation. (The term 
externalisation is used here very differently from the way that it is used in Michael 
White and David Epston's work.) To illustrate, I shall briefly co-opt these terms 
and use them for this analysis. First, Gerald develops an 'externalisation' of the 
idea of a cooperative relationship. He pulls together some details and puts it out as 
a story. Then he asks some questions which treat this story as an object. This is 
the step of objectivation. As Alan and Theresa interact with Gerald around this 
story object, it achieves a kind of factual existence. It becomes an object of 
consciousness. They make plans to embody this object in further realities of time 
and place, which can make it an objective feature of the world. In the end, they 
have internalised it as a story that, at least in some small measure, has become 
their own. It will take some time for this process of internalisation to mature. 
Chances are, however, that as they perform meaning around this story, Rebecca 
will come to internalise it as just an aspect of the world. This is how things are 
for her. But it has begun for her as a position in the midst of a story that can be 
traced potentially to a particular comment in a conversation and grew, through 
being taken up by others, into a storyline. 
The particular comment that is a unique outcome with regard to the 
dominant discourse would not sustain, on its own, the relational positions in the 
new storyline. Nor could the storyline exist without the possibility of the 
relational positions implicit in such comments. The link between the relational 
positioning implicit in a momentary utterance and the ongoing production of 
forms of life lies, therefore, in how an utterance is contextualized. In the context 
of a conflict story, utterances which position conflicted parties in opposing stories, 
or in storylines that offer no sustaining place from which to act, need to be 
recontextualised (Bernstein, 1996) in a new story of cooperation. The mediator's 
primary task is not to write this story over the top of the participants, but to be 
alert to the possibilities for repositioning that emerge out of the complexity of 
conversation and the richness of discourse, and to work hard to develop the 




The Value Of This Approach 
Having provided an example of an approach to mediation that makes use 
of the concept of discursive positioning, and having examined this example in 
some detail, I now want to discuss the potential value that this whole approach has 
for the practice and the study of mediation. Specifically, I want to draw together 
the argument that has been developed so far and spell it out in order to answer the 
major question that has guided this study. That question is: how might the 
concept of discursive positioning be useful to both the practice of mediation and 
to the study of effects of mediation? I shall deal with the research issues first and 
then the practice ones. 
Developments in research method 
The analysis of discursive positioning is not strongly established as a 
research tradition. Critical discourse analysis is the closest field of research 
endeavour. In CDA analyses, there has been attention given to the ways in which 
people work up identity projects through the establishment of subject positions 
that draw upon discourse, including ways in which people resist the influence of 
dominant discourse. Less attention has been paid to processes by which people 
shift and change positions. How people make changes in identity projects is 
crucial, however, to the kind of research that might inform the practice of 
mediation or therapy. I have, therefore, needed to seek out a research method in 
this study that is sensitive to such issues. This led me to positioning theory 
because it promised sensitivity to the moment-by-moment negotiation of meaning 
in conversation in a way that did not lose sight of the larger political context of 
discursive influences. Therefore, this study has focussed on the ways in which the 
participants in a mediation conversation position each other in subtly different 
ways in each utterance. They are conscious of each other as addressees in the 
course of such positioning and they often refuse or modify the positions into 
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which they are called by the other, particularly in the midst of conflicts. Identity 
and relationship management is fluid and indeterminate in the process of such 
exchanges of positioning, despite the restraints exercised by dominant discourse. 
If mediators hold in mind a consciousness of the fluidity of positioning in 
conversation, then they need not be caught by a sense that ongoing conflict is 
inevitable. Rather, they can stay alert to the openings that will always exist for 
relational re-positioning. And they can make use of such openings for the re-
storying of relationship that opens the way for stories of peace to emerge. 
This study has demonstrated the use of positioning theory as a research 
tool. The analysis of positioning combines well with critical discourse analysis in 
its attention not just to the immediate features of conversational exchange but to 
the background functioning of dominant discourse to render meaningful the 
content of what is said. It combines the analysis of content with the analysis of 
linguistic process. But it also adds to critical discourse analysis, as it has been 
used to date, a focus on the negotiation of discursive shifts. Power relations are 
shown by the discursive analysis of positioning in the moment of their 
reproduction, re-negotiation or re-contextualisation. 
Positioning theory is a promising tool, therefore, for the analysis of 
conversation in contexts where exploring the possibility of discursive shifts is the 
goal. Mediation is one such context and therapy is another. The analysis of 
positioning can track the conversational processes that produce change. It can be 
used to analyse the negotiation of meaning, even in situations where there is 
conflict over whose meaning will dominate. The analysis of positioning holds 
much promise, then, for showing, through research, the significance of what 
happens in therapeutic conversation, that is, conversation in which changes 
happen. 
What I have articulated in this study does not, however, constitute a 
completely new approach to discourse analysis. It is better described as a variant 
on CDA, in which the principles of CDA are adapted to a particular purpose. It is 
an application of the theoretical development of positioning theory to the study of 
therapeutic change. I believe the method deserves further application in other 
contexts of therapeutic conversation. The application of such analysis need not be 
restricted to narrative mediation. It can potentially be used to analyse what 
happens in mediation or therapy conducted from a variety of perspectives. 
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Developments In The Practice Of Mediation 
With regard to the practice of mediation, let me first return to the critiques 
of mediation theories that featured in Chapter Two. These critiques were that the 
dominant problem-solving approach can be found wanting in the light of 
questions about its underlying assumptions. I argued that a problem-solving 
approach, despite embracing the concept of practitioner neutrality, was bound up 
in a cultural worldview that was far from neutral. This worldview was expressed 
in assumptions of the individual as a rational prime mover expressing his or her 
personal interests in the marketplace of life. I argued that this account of the 
individual does not take adequate account of the shaping effects of culture, or of 
power relations, in both the formation and the expression of people's interests. In 
Chapter Three, I added to this critique some theorising of how power relations 
work, through the assignment of subject positions in discourse. I also argued that 
the problem-solving approach to mediation is built on some assumptions about the 
value of bringing various aspects of life under a particular form of rational 
control. It is the application of the modernist, scientific method to problems of 
everyday life. In order to achieve this application, the scientist practitioner, in this 
case the mediator, has to be constituted as a neutral actor, disinterested in the 
outcome of the mediation. The disputants become an object of her or his study, as 
the mediator seeks to establish the underlying interests that will have caused the 
dispute. All this I argued was problematic, because its cultural and philosophical 
bias remains unacknowledged and is allowed to do its work in secret. I believe 
that the field of mediation can do better. 
Now it is time to assess how the approach to mediation that I have outlined 
fares with regard to these critiques in relation to the example analysed. Narrative 
mediation claims responsiveness to the shaping effects of discourse on conflicts 
and on what is spoken about in mediation. In the example analysed in Chapters 
Seven and Eight, these effects are seen in the mediator assisting the participants to 
negotiate their relationship within dominant discourses and to re-position 
themselves in these discourses. The influence of culture and power relations in 
the construction of persons and relationships, including relationships where 
conflict is present, is made manifest through the analysis of positioning. In the 
process, dominant discourses themselves are denaturalised, as are the positions 
that are prescribed within them. From this perspective, mediators are not so much 
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working with discrete individuals, each with their own separate interests, who are 
surrounded by cultural and social worlds. They are working with social and 
cultural influences as they are being expressed in individual struggles to establish 
positions of legitimacy for people's concerns in life. Academic disciplines in 
modernist social science have been constructed upon agreed boundaries between 
the social and the psychological. Discourse theory renders these boundaries more 
permeable. In response to these theoretical developments, new professional 
practices are starting to develop. Narrative mediation is an example of one of 
these. 
In the examples of mediation conversations provided, I have shown in 
detail some ways in which shifts in positioning take place. I have also argued that 
these shifts are not coincidental. They take place because a mediator works 
deliberately with a concept of discourse and discursive positioning in mind. Now, 
I want to spell out the specific advantages that this approach, referred to here as 
'narrative mediation', can offer. These advantages relate to the ethics of 
professional practice, to the utility of a narrative approach in producing desired 
outcomes, to the explanatory potential for making sense of what happens in 
mediation, and to the political changes that accrue from taking a discursive 
perspective. 
Ethics 
First, let me speak to the ethical argument for the approach to mediation I 
am advocating. While Chapter Two detailed some critiques of power relations in 
the modernist practice of mediation, a discursive perspective allows us to theorise 
these critiques more fully. The usual ethic of practitioner neutrality is inadequate 
as a basis for practice in the light of the analysis of discursive positioning. If all 
meanings are products of some kind of hegemonic arrangement, and conflicts are 
understood as sites where meanings are contested, then the meanings that are 
traded back and forth in mediation conversations are always going to be imbued 
with socio-political colouring of some kind. Any place from which the mediator 
speaks will also be politically coloured. We have seen how the utterances made 
by disputing parties, and by the mediator, position themselves and each other in 
loaded stances. Since no utterance can be made without establishing a set of 
positions, that is, a relation, then every utterance has a political meaning. 
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Mediator claims of neutrality with regard to meanings are a ruse. When we look 
closely at discursive positioning, the postulate of neutral positioning becomes an 
impossible ethical goal. 
A better proposition upon which to base an ethical practice in mediation is 
the idea of reflexivity. A reflexive practice (see Chapter Six) takes power 
relations and the politics of meaning-making into account and seeks to be 
transparent about and accountable for the positions that the mediator takes up. A 
narrative approach to mediation seeks to embody such an ethic. And a research 
method that concentrates on the reflexivity of the researcher has the best chance of 
also making evident the effects of reflexive practice through the elucidation of 
discursive positioning. 
The analysis of discursive positioning is also a useful tool for making 
explicit the way that professional power functions to render more legitimate the 
voice of the mediator over the voices of the participants. Mediators who are 
conscious of the subtle ways in which their own power can be expressed in the 
discursive positions they take up, and into which they call others, are in a better 
position to curb their power to control meaning. The more they do this, the more 
they make room for their clients to pierce mediators' frameworks of meaning. 
The attention given to the politics of meaning-making in a narrative 
approach increases the possibility of ethical practice in mediation. Positioning 
theory points mediators towards a noticing of the disrespectful effects of ways of 
speaking that diminish people. Totalising language, for example, can produce 
exclusionary effects. Monological utterances fail to respect the voice of the other. 
By contrast, when a mediator takes care with the positions created for others in 
any utterance, she or he is practising respectfully. Respectful practice embraces 
the possibility of agency for all parties and requires that mediators use discursive 
positioning in ways that call people into agentic positions. Moreover, the concept 
of agency, as I am using it, is itself bound up in the concept of discursive 
positioning. Agency amounts to the exercise of the opportunity to respond to the 
utterances of others by taking up, modifying, resisting, recontextualising or 
outright refusing the discursive position calls entailed in these utterances. It is an 
achievement of deliberate discursive positioning or re-positioning rather than of 
accepting the discursive positions assigned by others. 
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Utility 
Secondly, let me speak to the utility argument for the narrative approach to 
mediation. The usefulness of the current dominant mode of mediation practice 
(the problem-solving approach) relies primarily on the distinction between 
positions and interests (Fisher & Ury, 1981). Positions, understood here as the 
relatively polarised stances that disputants adopt in conflict situations, are broken 
down through a pursuit of the underlying interests that inform these positions. 
While the distinction between polarised positions and interests, as I mentioned in 
Chapter Two, has been subject to various critiques, it also prefigures the idea of 
deconstruction in mediation conversation. Enquiring about underlying interests is 
an elementary form of deconstruction, because it does not treat the espoused 
meanings in parties' statements of position as essential. It renders polarised 
stances into objects of curious enquiry. In the process, it creates new conversation 
that gives greater purchase on the possibility for change. 
However, seeking out underlying 'interests' does not go far enough in 
analysing the discursive positioning involved in the stances taken up by people in 
disputes. It leaves the interests that underlie polarised positions appearing to be 
fixed and essential rather than fluid and negotiable. It does not take cultural 
influences, discourse or power relations sufficiently into account. Privileging 
underlying interests has been successful to a degree in fostering negotiations 
between the interests of different parties. It is, however, limited as a 
deconstructive practice, and as a basis for negotiation, by the limits of the 
questions that it asks. When we go further, in narrative mediation, in 
deconstructing the assumptions that underlie the 'interests' of disputants, we get 
even more purchase on the possibility for change. In the examples presented in 
this dissertation, this work made possible smoother shifts to the eventual process 
of negotiation and the easier opening up of paths forward in relationships that 
were in conflict. 
In the analysed mediation, there is a relationship between the ethics of 
practice and the effectiveness of practice. The particular formulations of respect 
in narrative mediation position parties in places where they experience their 
relationship differently. Externalising language allows the mediator to speak to 
the parties without joining with either party's blaming of the other. As a result, 
blame is less present in the conversation and entitlements are held less tightly. In 
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the space created, stories of co-operation are given opportunity to take root and to 
flourish. When this kind of context was strongly enough established, Theresa and 
Alan were able to shift away from the positions and entitlements that they 
appeared committed to at the start of the conversation. The negotiation of these 
shifts was not grudging but was achieved with relative ease and without huge loss 
of face. 
In my experience of mediating in a problem-solving mode, the hardest part 
of the process was often the shift from the telling of stories to the brainstorming of 
options for resolution. Parties often could only make this shift with considerable 
reluctance, because the story of relationship between them was still not strongly 
supportive of resolution. A comment by Howard Raiffa ( 1985) on the problem-
solving approach emphasises why. He says, 
A shift of attitude from belligerent positional bargaining to constructive 
collaboration with an intervenor might very well take place after each 
side has gained the security of a negotiated agreement. 
(Raiffa, 1985, p. 108.) 
He is arguing for the development of a settlement as a precursor to 
some relational shifts that make a different relationship possible. The new 
story of the relationship seems to originate in the agreement. 
By constrast, the narrative practice of paying initial attention to relational 
ethics works much more smoothly. It involves positioning parties in agentic 
places and deliberately calling them into stories of cooperation before (and also 
after) addressing substantive issues that need to be resolved. We see that happen 
in both the examples I have presented. Once the disputants are positioned in a 
story of relationship that they value, and that features both parties in a respected 
agentic place, then the process of moving towards a resolution happens quickly 
and without a sense of grudging reluctance. A narrative practice avoids over-
emphasis on a settlement orientation by first developing a story of relationship 
intentions, and then rooting them in a relational history, in order to produce a 
relational context that favours resolutions and agreements, rather than continues to 
constrain them. The relationship story does not so much follow from the 
agreement as precedes it, flows through the drawing up of agreements, and 
continues on after it. In other words, the respectful practice of valuing parties' 
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best relational intentions, and avoiding joining with the discourse of blame and 
pathology, leads to greater effectiveness in facilitating negotiation. In this way, 
ethical practice makes for more effective practice. 
Explanatory Power 
Thirdly, let me speak to the theoretical value of the concept of discursive 
positioning in mediation. My argument here is about the ex·planatory power of an 
analysis that focuses on discursive positioning. Discourse analysis is a relatively 
recently established mode of research practice and is subject to constant debate 
about competing approaches (van Dyke, 1999). It does, however, have a growing 
body of literature behind it (for example, Burman & Parker, 1993; Fairclough, 
1992; Gee, 1999; Parker, 1992) as outlined in Chapter Five. That literature served 
as a base for my work, because it had the power to explain the significance of the 
smallest of utterances in the context of large-scale social forces. 
But not all discourse analysis has taken account of positioning. The 
concept of positioning adds to the explanatory power of discourse analysis in 
general, particularly in the micro-analysis of conversation. It enables a researcher 
to show, not just that there are substantial 'orders of discourse' (Chouliaraki & 
Fairclough, 1999) at work in the background of a conversation, but also how 
particular utterances in moment-by-moment interaction shape and re-shape the 
relationship of participants to these background orders of discourse. I have shown 
how participants in a mediation conversation repeatedly take up positions in 
relation to background discourses and also call each other into position in relation 
to these discourses. But the positions taken up or resisted are in constant flux in 
the course of a conversation. Relations between people are formed by negotiating 
these fluctuating positions in the context of background meanings against which 
their utterances make sense. 
Because of this sensitivity to the process of fluctuation, the discursive 
analysis of positioning is suited to the research task of analysing change 
processes. Much discourse analysis is not so sensitive to discursive shifts and 
changes. Studying the process of change is, of course, important to the study of 
what happens in mediation and in therapy. These are conversations that are 
expressly aimed at producing changes in the meanings being made in a 
relationship and, from a discursive perspective, changes in meaning cannot be 
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made except in relation to discourse. Hence, the approach I have been advancing 
here explains more clearly, and more elegantly, shifts that happen in mediation. 
Explanations that make reference to discursive positioning are especially relevant 
for understanding the practice of narrative mediation, because of the congruence 
of theoretical understandings in practice and in research. Such explanations also, 
however, have potential for explaining what happens in other mediation 
approaches. Developing this explanatory potential is important for the field of 
mediation, if it is to grow its theoretical foundations, rather than to develop only 
in loosely-theorised pragmatic directions. 
Political Value 
Fourthly, let me speak to the argument for the discursive analysis of 
positioning on the grounds of its political value. The explanatory power referred 
to above has political implications. Making the politics of meaning-making more 
explicit cannot be a politically neutral act. It can serve, in the context of particular 
relationships, to change the balance of what is possible to talk about, since the 
dominance of particular frames of meaning can be upset, simply through their 
deconstruction. Meanings that have relied on their taken-for-granted nature to 
successfully hide other meanings from view are now opened up for contest. 
Deconstruction of dominant meaning systems makes it more difficult for parties 
to a conflict to assert such meanings without challenge and therefore less likely 
that they will succeed in doing so. 
Mediation practitioners can make explicit use of this possibility to good 
effect. Theorists and researchers can also make use of the same concepts to argue 
for greater equity in practice. Moreover, in the wider scheme of things, what 
happens in the context of, say, family mediations (these are particularly sensitive 
sites in the production of family relations) might have a strong effect in a given 
society on the ongoing evolution of the social practices that constitute family 
relations. 
It is, therefore, possible to argue that a focus on discursive positioning 
both in the practice of mediation, and in research into mediation, can serve the 
political purpose of opening new opportunities for people whose social position is 
tightly circumscribed in discourse. If these are opportunities for being able to say 
things that have not been possible to give voice to in a problem-solving mediation, 
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then there is reason to claim that such an approach might make a difference to 
power relations on a local scale. 
The analysis of positioning in discourse enables us to study the micro-
level effects of conversational moves, without losing sight of the macro-level 
contextual influences on such moves. This focus has much potential for the study 
of professional practice. If we can study the effects of conversational strategies, 
then we can, by implication, also study the effectiveness of deliberate professional 
strategies. As a research tool, the analysis of discursive positioning can 
demonstrate, on a micro level, the effects of particular utterances in terms of the 
position calls exchanged. Thus, it has the potential to enhance the practice of 
mediation through informing mediators of the discursive effectiveness of their 
work. Since discourse analysis attends to the construction of power relations in 
discourse, we can also study the ethical questions of the purposes to which 
professional power is put in the practice of mediation. 
However, there is not currently a body of literature that can provide a 
straightforward model for such an analysis. It has been necessary to draw 
together ideas from several sources, in order to mount this analysis. These 
sources suggest a range of questions that can be asked of a piece of text, in order 
to bring into focus the work being done by discourse in the background of 
people's utterances. This study, therefore, contributes to the discourse analysis 
literature both an approach to critical discourse analysis that takes more account 
of positioning theory than has been accorded it to date, and an example of the 
usefulness of the analysis of discursive positioning. 
In the example of this work that I have provided, several things are clear. 
First, Gerald does not take up a neutral stance with regard to the cultural politics 
of child custody disputes. His questions have particular values embedded within 
them. And he is explicit about those values. He is interested in the inclusion of 
both parties in the care of Rebecca, rather than the exclusion of either of them 
through a discourse of custody as possession. In other words, a narrative 
approach does not confuse the ethic of neutrality with shying off from an explicit 
position with regard to power relations. Indeed, a focus on the function of 
discourse in the production of conflict enables a mediator to be explicit about a 
stand informed by ideas of social justice, and still to be even-handed in 
distributing professional respect to the parties. 
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The practice of mediation from a narrative perspective, therefore, needs to 
be admitted to be an explicitly political practice. It is about the transparent 
articulation of practices of social inclusion rather than about practices of social 
division and exclusion. It is about the promotion of dialogue, rather than 
monologue. It is about the moment-by-moment application of an ethic of respect 
in relationships. It is about resistance to practices of power that might consistently 
privilege one party in a dispute. 
It may be objected that I am arguing for an ethical or a political 
perspective, more than for a professional practice. I would answer that any 
professional practice produces or reproduces some form of political hegemony 
and has more integrity if it makes this explicit. A professional practice also needs 
to be understood as more than a technology. To be professional, it should profess 
something. Mediation, by its very existence as a professional practice, proclaims 
a preference for the peaceful and respectful resolution of conflict, rather than for 
practices of power and colonising. Such ethics should be made transparent and 
explicit, rather than hidden behind notions of neutrality, in order for members of 
the public to make informed choices about the value of mediation. In a sense, 
what I am arguing for is an approach to mediation that grapples with this 
challenge. Carrie Menkel-Meadow (2001) has recently argued that the existence 
of mediation at all 'represents a political theory about the role of conflict in 
society' (p. xiii). She refers to political ideals like equality, participation, and self-
determination as expressed in the theory and practice of mediation. The analysis 
of discursive positioning is an alternative approach to these politics, based not so 
much on striving for ideals as on analysing the material effects of discourse. 
The basis for the effectiveness of a narrative approach to mediation lies in 
the analysis of power relations in a way that can be of use to mediators. The 
move away from a singular emphasis on either structural power or individual 
personal power is, I believe, important for mediation. Structuralist critiques have 
queried the possibility of promoting social justice through mediation. A 
poststructuralist focus on discursive positioning renders mediation in general less 
vulnerable to being discredited as a practice by these critiques. Instead, a 
poststructuralist analysis of power relations, as they are constituted through 
discourse, underlines the importance of what happens in mediation conversations 
in a new way. Mediation becomes a site where discursive positioning can be seen 
to be in process of negotiation. All is not structured in advance, as we have seen in 
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the examples I have analysed. On the other hand, neither does mediation create a 
context in which anything goes, or in which all outcomes are possible. Discourse 
continues to operate as a constraint, even if sometimes a loose constraint, upon 
what might be said. 
An appreciation of discursive positioning becomes a useful tool that 
mediators can apply to their interpretation of the politics of meaning-making in 
mediation. It enables the deliberate taking of political stands by a mediator 
through the privileging of some discursive meanings over others. It enables the 
refusal by the mediator of position calls that serve an exclusionary purpose. It 
enables the mediator to enquire respectfully into the meanings of any utterance 
and, in doing so, to open up for review the power relations implicit within that 
utterance. It enables the mediator to ask questions that deliberately invite parties 
to re-position themselves in more inclusive storylines and therefore in altered 
power relations. Even when the political shifts I am referring to are miniscule in 
nature, their importance can be grown by scaffolding greater discursive 
significance for them through narrative elaboration. 
What Is Different About A Narrative Approach To Mediation? 
In the mediation example in Chapter Seven, Gerald does not follow the 
problem-solving approach of first defining the problem and then exploring the 
parties' stories with a view to establishing their separate underlying interests, 
which must then be satisfied in a win-win solution. Rather, he works to 
deconstruct the positions each of the parties take up for themselves, and offer each 
other, in the stories they tell. He is selectively curious about openings to possible 
storylines that include both parties as having something to offer Rebecca. In the 
process, rather than speaking in a way that isolates individual interests from their 
cultural context, he invites the parties to speak about the cultural influences of 
gender and ethnicity on their positioning. In the other example in Chapter Six, the 
mediation involved a deliberate focus on the parties' relationship with 
conventional discourse about the family. This focus served as the basis for the 
construction of a different story that amounted to a conscious departure from the 
dominant discourse. 
In both examples, the endpoint of the story is not a 'settlement'. In fact, in 
neither case is an agreement finalised in the space of an hour-long conversation, 
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despite the fact that some implicit understandings have been established. But a 
shift in the narrative trajectory of relationship has taken place and this shift can be 
explained in terms of shifts in discursive positioning. The parties have re-
positioned themselves in relation to the discourses that dominate the field of 
custody disputes. Their claims for entitlement have been modified in a more 
inclusionary direction rather than in an exclusionary one. The basis for ongoing 
relationship is stronger and clearer at the end of this conversation than it was at 
the beginning. The parties have developed a shared view of how caregiving 
arrangements will go forward. 
Therefore, I want to claim that this kind of conversation is trafficking in 
the politics of meaning-making in a way that makes a difference. Shifts of 
position occur in the local politics of family relations. As a story of cooperation 
and respect emerges, so the parties begin to step into relations of greater equity 
than would be predicted from the claims of entitlement with which they started. 
These are relations in which they each have an opportunity for agency and yet 
also accord respect towards the other. 
Could the same thing happen in a problem-solving or transformative 
approach to mediation? I would have to say that it might. Discursive re-
positioning may be embedded in conversations that focus on interest-based 
win/win solutions or on empowerment and recognition. Re-positioning in 
discourse is not restricted to contexts where it is named as such. I would argue, 
however, that a conscious focus on discursive positioning makes it more likely 
that such shifts would happen in a less haphazard way. Preferences for mediation 
approaches have to be based on greater or lesser degrees of likelihood, rather than 
on absolute distinctions, simply because the conversational medium of mediation 
is so complex. 
Empirically, this has not been a comparison study, and, therefore, no 
comparative claims can be established. It is not possible to say on the basis of the 
evidence presented here that a narrative approach to mediation is proven to be 
more ethical or more politically and culturally sensitive. My conclusions need to 
be more modest than that. However, I believe there are sufficient grounds for 
advancing a claim (as opposed to sheeting it home) that a narrative approach can 
produce shifts in relational positioning more effectively than a problem-solving or 
transformative approach can achieve. I would also expect that these shifts would 
be experienced by parties as more satisfying than those achieved through the 
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formation of an agreement through problem-solving. Although at this point I 
cannot prove these assertions on empirical grounds, I would reasonably expect the 
distinctions between the theoretical assumptions on which these approaches are 
built to be reflected in such a difference. At the least, I believe that I have 
demonstrated the potential for such advantages to an extent that warrants further 
study along empirical lines. 
So what has been established? I believe that this study demonstrates the 
viability and effectiveness of narrative mediation in practice, at least in the field of 
family mediation from which both examples have been drawn. Would the same 
principles apply in other fields of dispute resolution? Theoretically, I would argue 
that they should do so. All disputes between human beings must be constructed in 
discourse and involve discursive positioning. Therefore, a method of mediation 
that pays attention to discourse and positioning should be helpful whatever the 
substance of the dispute. My claim for the viability of narrative mediation is based 
on the demonstrated claim that it does promote shifts in discursive positioning, 
which, in tum, produce satisfying outcomes for disputants. 
Moreover, these discursive shifts have, I believe, been demonstrated to 
occur in response to the particular invitations issued by the mediator, rather than 
by chance. At times, negotiating parties themselves might also initiate such shifts 
on their own account. I am claiming, though, that these shifts in discursive 
positioning are, frequently enough, effects of mediator practice that can be 
tracked, as I have shown, through detailed analysis of conversation. The 
accumulation of such micro-level effects adds up to a basis for establishing 
effectiveness claims for a practice. Through the analysis of a case study, I can 
claim to have demonstrated the process by which this approach works to good 
effect and therefore that it is a practice deserving of further attention. 
As already stated, the concept of discursive positioning need not be 
restricted to the narrative practice of mediation. However, there has been a special 
fit in this study between the constructionist philosophical assumptions built into 
the narrative mediation approach and the same assumptions built into the research 
tools used to investigate it. If research is going to enhance public confidence in 
the value of a particular practice, then such philosophical congruence of research 
method and theory of practice surely gives a better chance of doing justice to the 
effectiveness of the practice. 
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In the end that is what this study has been about - analysing the 
effectiveness of a form of practice. It has been necessary to develop an 
explanation of both the research method and the practice along the way. The last 
word has been written on neither, however. What I have argued can serve only as 
the basis for further exploration and development of both narrative mediation and 
of the study of discursive positioning. That is as it should be. 
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